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Intercommunication: 
Editors’ comments
The meaning of semiotics is to provide theoretical insights and to de­
velop the means of analysis for the whole area where sign systems 
have a significance. This includes a vast region of our world, and a 
great part of scientific inquiry. Thus, the importance of this domain of 
knowledge cannot be changed by fashion, and whatever shifts may 
occur in popular words or fashionable research, this is no more than a 
further subject for research in sign systems.
The current volume of Sign Systems Studies marks several notice­
able events.
The inside-outside communication of the Tartu school of semiotics 
has been (re)established in a mode which gives us the confidence for 
multilateral communication, and a responsibility in the continuation of 
the oldest regular publication in the field of semiotics, as established 
by Juri Lotman in 1964. The signs of this are, on one hand, the publi­
cation of New Tartu Semiotics (Bernard et al. 2000), and, on the other 
hand, the regularity of publication and the authorship of Sign Systems 
Studies. In addition to the series Tartu Semiotics Library (cf. Andrews 
2000), since this spring, Dissertationes Semioticae Universitatis Tar- 
tuensis has been born. The formation of Finno-Ugric ‘semiotic league’ 
(Randviir & Voigt & Tarasti, this volume) is left as last, but this is not 
the least to mention.
The year 2000 denotes the importance of Thomas A. Sebeok’s im­
pact on the semiotics of the last half century. The biosemiotic part of 
this volume is in its entirety, although indirectly, initiated by him.
With the following comments, the editors would like to draw a few 
additional parallels in order to help the readers to find the intercon­
nections which might be useful both for better understanding of the 
subject and for further endeavours in this field.
First, we continue publishing works on theoretical and general 
problems of semiotics. The papers by J. Deely and J. Hintikka both 
emphasise the importance of mutual reacquaintance between semiotics
and philosophy, although approaching this from different sides. 
F. Stjemfelt demonstrates the use of it via his analysis of mereological 
concepts.
F. Stjernfelt’s paper on mereology will be interesting to interpret in 
the context of the distinction made by S. Meyen between taxonomy 
and meronomy and, accordingly, between taxon and meron. ‘If taxon­
omy operates with taxa, then meronomy with merons (parts). The 
concept of taxon means a set of objects, united by common traits. The 
concept of meron means a set of parts, belonging to these objects and 
having some common traits, i.e., the concepts of meron and trait are 
different’ (Meyen 1977: 29; cf. also Schreider 1983, and Kull’s paper 
in the current volume). Some of the background of the Russian bio­
logical structuralism, from where the concept of meronomy originates, 
has been described by P. Seriot (1995). The topic of holism is also 
analysed in the (‘Tartu’) paper by S. Brauckmann in this volume.
When M. Danesi in his article states that, ‘In my view, the integra­
tion of Vico and Lotman will allow semiotics to develop a truly pow­
erful investigative method for unravelling one of the greatest conun­
drums of all time: How did the mind, language, and culture come into 
existence?’; this seems to mark a strangely creative field. And when 
W. Nöth discusses with U. Eco about the placement of the semiotic 
threshold, then this is also a discussion with J. Lotman in a direction 
that would certainly have enchanted him.
Thus, second, or better to say ‘the first’, is our endless and central 
interest in the semiotics of culture, both elsewhere or here, on the spot. 
The intersemiotic space, which draws together the terms of J. Lotman 
and J. Kristeva, is structured, here, via the approaches of P. Torop and 
D. Gorlee. The semiotic theory of poetic text reaches its next chapter 
via the article by M. Lotman, and the semiotics of literature is ad­
vanced by J. Sanjines, T. Huttunen, M. Grishakova and I. Avramets. 
The oriental theme, as a traditional topic in Sign Systems Studies since 
its first years, is represented by our old author L. Mäll. T. G. Winner 
admits the intercultural aspects.
Mixing and fusion of the borders and boundaries in the contempo­
rary world goes hand in hand with the seeking of identity and with the 
need for borders. However, it is not easy to recognise the borders 
which appear in the course of the interaction of these two tendencies. 
Here, semiotics of culture has its advantage. The controversial cultural 
experience is characterised not only by its reality, but also by texts of 
culture.
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Semiotics of culture is suitable for joining different disciplines 
which are studying culture, operating as a base science for them. Since 
no integrated science of culture exists, the onus falls on cultural semi­
otic studies to develop both the empirical analysis and methodological 
research of culture. Both of these topics make up the section of ‘semi­
otics of culture’ in our journal, now, and in the future.
Ecosemiotics is also an important field of attention in regard to the 
current trends in semiotics on the pages of Sign Systems Studies, or for 
representing a developing link between the semiotics of culture and 
the semiotics of nature. It has been started in volume 26, and will cer­
tainly have a follow-up in the next volumes. Here, the contribution by 
D. Schmauks gives the first review about artificial animals in a semi­
otic context. It is interesting to refer, here, to a short paper by J. Lot- 
man (1978), in which a somewhat analogical topic has been discussed. 
R. Posner’s more general approach provides a starting point for stud­
ies in semiospheric pollution.
The collection of papers on biosemiotics, included here, represents 
the first attempt to review the important chapters of the history of bio­
semiotics proper. In this context, Cimatti’s paper about Giorgio Prodi, 
and Turovski’s one about Heini Hediger, give the first accounts of 
these two figures who laid the basis for biosemiotics. A large special 
issue of Semiotica about Jakob von Uexküll is forthcoming. Accord­
ing to T. A. Sebeok (2001), it was namely Uexküll, Hediger, and 
Prodi, who first developed biological semiotics and laid a valuable 
foundation for it. Besides these three, and Thomas A. Sebeok himself, 
of course, there are many other figures in the history of biosemiotics 
who deserve attention. Thus, the chapter also includes analyses of the 
works and views of G. Evelyn Hutchinson (by M. Anderson), Gregory 
Bateson (by S. Brauckmann), and Martin Krampen (by K. Kull) in 
respect to their impact on the development of biosemiotics.
A remark may be made about the incompatibility and (un)related- 
ness of the concepts of Umwelt and niche. Hutchinson’s concept of 
‘niche’ seems to be in a way analogical to Richard Woltereck’s con­
cept o f ‘reaction norm’. Namely, both of these, attempting to explicate 
a formerly fuzzy biological term, have given a precise definition 
which includes an extension to the «-dimensional space of the envi­
ronment, whereas n happens to be uncountable. With this, both con­
cepts have been extended beyond the limits of a methodology of natu­
ral science, and have started to drive (probably without such a con­
scious intention by their authors) towards bridging biology with semi-
otics. Thus, an additional argument for including the paper on 
Hutchinson into the current issue.
Ab actu ad posse valet illatio.
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Semiotics as a postmodern recovery 
of the cultural unconscious
John Deely
University of St. Thomas,
3800 Montrose Boulevard, Houston, Texas, U.S.A. 
e-mail: deelyj@stthom.edu
Abstract. This essay explores the terminology of semiotics with an eye to 
the historical layers of human experience and understanding that have 
gone into making the doctrine of signs possible as a contemporary intel­
lectual movement. Using an essentially Heideggerian view of language as 
a heuristic hypothesis, the name semiotics is examined in light of the re­
alization that only with Augustine’s Latin signum was the possibility of a 
general doctrine of signs introduced, and that first among the later Latins 
was the idea of sign as a general mode of being specifically verifiable 
both in nature and in culture in establishing the texture of human experi­
ence vindicated according to an explanation of how such a general mode 
of being is possible. The contemporary resumption through Charles Peirce 
of the Latin line of vindication completed especially by Poinsot is ex­
plored along these same lines in terms of considerations of why the term 
semiotics has emerged as, so to speak, the logically proper name of the 
global interest in signs.
As Galileo and Descartes experienced their situation, the new learning 
was to be a turning away from authority based on the interpretation of 
linguistic texts to establish a new authority based on experimental re­
sults expressed in mathematical reasoning. At the beginning the two 
tried, as it were, to walk arm in arm, to stand shoulder to shoulder in a 
war to delegitimize the mentality and methods bizarrely canonized 
centuries after the fiasco in the person of “saint” Robert Cardinal Bel- 
larmine, Rome’s own Torquemada.
But soon enough, in spite of themselves, the followers of these two 
found themselves parting ways, the line of Galileans leading to New­
16 John Deely
ton, Einstein, and Mission Control in Houston placing men on the 
moon and ships bound for the far stars, the line of Cartesians leading 
to Hume and Kant and a reluctant conviction that the universe of real­
ity prejacent to and independent of the human mind is a universe for­
ever unknowable. Modern philosophy, in short, came to play 
Mr. Hyde to the Dr. Jekyl of modern science, which remained con­
vinced in its practitioners that reality was just what was being revealed 
and brought more and more under the arts of human practical knowl­
edge, exactly as the medieval Aquinas had expressed it: that the 
speculative understanding of the being of nature becomes by exten­
sion practical when human beings find the means to turn that under­
standing of nature to use.
Locke, of course, had tried to intervene in the Cartesian develop­
ment to give credit and credence to the role our senses play in feeding 
the growth of human understanding, but his intervention was without 
avail for deflecting the main trajectory of the mainstream modern de­
velopment in philosophy as a kind of semiotic lapse. For, by accepting 
Descartes’ reduction of objects to representations made by the mind, 
he foreclosed the only avenue by which the understanding moves back 
and forth in its grasp of objects between the realms of nature and cul­
ture, considering the last, as Vico said, as our own construction, even 
as the former comes somehow from the hand of God, as the modems 
mainly assumed.
To be sure the Latins had only themselves to blame for being con­
signed in turn to the flames of modernity. A decent interval had to 
pass before the outrages of the Latin authorities could fade into the 
oblivion of consciousness of the living generations, and it was proba­
bly inevitable that, along with the healing o f the wounds of that mem­
ory, the speculative achievements of the Latins in illuminating the 
nature o f the workings of properly human understanding and the se­
miotic structure of the experience upon which it depends and feeds, as 
we now realize looking back, should also for a time suffer oblivion. 
But it is time to separate the chaff from the wheat, and to go back over 
the fields of Latin philosophy and civilization to see what might be 
retained or rehabilitated in the area of the philosophy of being, still, 
after all, the most ample of the interpretive horizons ever achieved 
within philosophy, and arguably the one most proper to the nature of 
understanding itself as the linguistic dimension of the human model­
ing system whereby alone a relative freedom from or transcendence
over the perceptual horizon of sensation is achieved within our experi­
ence of objects not all of which reduce to our experience of them.
The clearest beginnings of such a recovery as far as concerns 
semiotics, surely, came through the work of Umberto Eco and his 
marvelous team of students and colleagues at the University of Bolo­
gna, who were able to report that, despite our fondness in philosophy 
for tracing Greek origins of main concepts, in the case of the sign, the 
key concept of a general mode of being superior to the division be­
tween nature and culture was owing to the Greeks not at all but to one 
ignorant of Greek, Augustine of Hippo. After Augustine, there will be 
both natural and cultural signs; but before Augustine, the Greeks had 
thought of the sign mainly, almost exclusively, in natural terms. The 
or)fj.8iov of the Greeks was not at all what we would today call “sign in 
general” but rather “natural sign in particular”. The notion of sign in 
general was, precisely, signum, Augustine’s Latin term proposed just 
as the 4th century closed to express the idea that the universe of human 
experience is perfused with signs, not only through our contact with 
the natural being of our physical surroundings in the signs of health 
and weather, but also through our contact with our conspecifics in 
discourse and trade, even in our contact with the divine through sac­
rament and scripture.
There was no turning back. The Latin Age was born in the per­
spective of the sign as the pervasive instrument of understanding. It 
would take almost twelve centuries for the consequences of that fact to 
be worked through to their speculative ground in the Treatise o f  Signs 
of John Poinsot, contemporary of Galileo and Descartes, to be sure, 
but a man as decisively of the Latin past as Galileo and Descartes 
were men of the modern future. For human beings are animals first of 
all, and animals first of all experience the universe of nature not as 
things but as objects to be sought and avoided or ignored. Animals 
make use of signs without knowing that there are signs, let alone 
without realizing that signs are in the objective world of experience an 
instrument as universal as is motion in the world of physical being.1
In their absorption in the world of objects, the sign appeared to the 
Latins, even to Augustine in making his general proposal, not in its 
pure and proper being as a triadic relation (indifferent, like all rela­
tions, to the surrounding circumstances which make it physically real
Semiotics as a postmodern recovery o f the cultural unconscious 17
1 The m ost interesting formulation o f  this point by far among contemporary writers 
is to be found in Jacques Maritain 1937-1938: 1; 1938: 299; 1956: 59; 1957: 86. Com ­
prehensive discussion in D eely 1986a.
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as well as objectively so, or only objective), but rather in its sensible 
manifestation as a connection between objects experienced whereby 
the one, on being perceived, manifests also another besides itself, per­
haps even one absent from the immediate perceptual surroundings. 
That objects in order to be experienced at all presuppose signs already 
at work in the activity of understanding never occurred to the Latins, 
though that was a clear consequence (clear, that is, after the manner of 
all consequences, which is to say, once it is further realized) of the 
realization that the being proper to signs is not at all that of something 
sensible as such but that of relation as irreducible to whatever aspects 
of subjectivity the relation happens to depend upon for its existence in 
these or those concrete circumstances.
The privilege of the Latins was first to propose and then to vindi­
cate the general notion of signs. After that came modernity, a new way 
of approaching the understanding of objects as such still prior to the 
further realization that objects presuppose signs, and indeed, devel­
oped in a manner contrary to what such a realization would require.2 
Finally came the dawn of postmodernity, the recovery of signum in 
the work of the first American philosopher worthy to be named in the 
company of Aristotle and Aquinas, Charles Sanders “Santiago” 
Peirce. He was among the last of the modems, to be sure; but, more 
importantly, he was the first of the postmodems, because he was the 
first after Descartes (with the partial exception of Hegel) to show and 
to thematize the inclusion within the world of objects something also 
of the physical being of nature in its own right, just as it is in its preja- 
cency to and insouciant independence of systems of human belief and 
speculation.
The Latins had uncovered and identified the being proper to signs 
as the base of our experience of objects. But action follows upon be­
ing. The next step perforce would be to thematize the action of signs 
precisely in order to understand in detail what the being proper to sign 
entails. And this is precisely the step Peirce took after first learning 
most, though not all, of what the Latins had discovered of the sign in 
its proper being. He even gave to this action a name, semiosis, as the 
subject matter whose study results in a distinctive form of philosophi­
cal and even scientific knowledge, semiotics, just as biology is a body 
of knowledge that develops out of the study of living things, and geol­
ogy out of the study of the earth. The Latins too had demonstrated the
: See the details o f  the case as presented in D eely 1994a, along with the com m ents 
o f  Santaella-Braga 1994.
necessity of three terms involved in every sign, but their living tradi­
tion ended before any had thought to name that third term. This too 
fell to Peirce, who called it the interpretant, and who further saw 
without quite ever succeeding to explain that the interpretant need not 
involve finite consciousness.
The bare proposal for semiotics that Locke had contradicted his 
own Essay by making, of course, came near the beginning of modern 
thought; but it had no influence on the modern development. Nor did 
it embody any awareness of the Latin past in this matter, save perhaps 
in the bare echo in the English expression “doctrine of signs”, which 
Locke used to translate his nouveau Greek term (malformed) 
ог||жот1кг| of the Latin doctrina signorum actually used by Poinsot in 
explaining the content and plan of his Treatise on Signs. Had the pro­
posal been influential in its time, we would not now be speaking of 
postmodernity, for the mainstream modern development of philosophy 
(as distinct from science3) would have been aborted thereby. But the 
proposal was not influential; and Mr. Hyde had many years to live and 
to grow into the monstrosity of idealism, the doctrine that whatever 
the mind knows in whatever the mind knows of it the mind itself cre­
ates, a doctrine which the late modern philosopher Jacques Maritain, 
in exasperation, at last proposed4 should be denied the very name of 
philosophy in favor of something like “ideosophy” instead.5
As early as Locke’s proposal for semiotics, the achievement of the 
Latin Age in first proposing and finally explaining the being proper to 
sign as a general mode of being had already crossed the social line 
separating contemporary concerns from the cultural unconscious, that 
limbo for the achievements of previous generations of human animals 
which have slipped outside the focus of the consciousness of a yet 
living generation of human animals. So let me try to show how, in 
refocusing on the sign, postmodern thought has as part of its destiny to 
recover the whole of the Latin Age unified in an unexpected way by 
the theme of the sign, a theme which, we will see, reprises all the 
standard issues covered in the “standard presentation” of medieval
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doctrina  and m odem  science as scien tia  in D eely  1978, 1982a, 1986b; but the full 
justification o f  this distinction as a thesis concerning the history o f  philosophy as a 
w hole over its developm ent before, during, and after the m odem  period is to be found
in D eely  2000a.
4 Maritain 1966.
5 But, except for the astonishing writings on this point o f  Peter Redpath, Maritain’s
suggestion so far has fallen on d eaf ears.
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philosophy from Augustine to Ockham heretofore, but reprises them 
as subordinate themes to that of the sign, which is the one theme 
which unifies the age as an organic whole, and so goes beyond the 
“standard coverage” by requiring us to take account of that series of 
thinkers after Ockham which link the Treatise on Signs of Poinsot that 
culminates the semiotic line of Latin development as well to that se­
ries of thinkers before Ockham that begins with Augustine.
The language of semiotics
The Latin contribution to our European heritage of semiotics is mas­
sive С original, foundational, pervasive, yet at least temporarily, in- 
conscient in the greater part of those intrigued with signs. The situa­
tion is hardly static, but it remains true that as we enter the last months 
of the second millennium of the common era, the Latin contribution to 
semiotics exists mainly as a current or layer within the cultural uncon­
scious, yet one which little by little has begun to be brought into the 
light of conscious awareness beginning especially, as I have said, with 
the work of Umberto Eco for the world at large; but also, within the 
Hispanic world, by the publications of Mauricio Beuchot. The con­
temporary development of semiotics, we are beginning to see, owes 
far more to the Latin Age than it does either to modern or even to an­
cient times, which is not at all to deny the singular importance of the 
ancient Greek medical heritage so forcefully brought out first by Se­
beok.6 Nevertheless, the Latin Age has in our cultural heritage in the 
matter of the sign a historical weight (here, I can no more than sug­
gest) that perhaps manifests its inertia in the improbable reversal of 
fortunes of the two terms under which contemporary study of signs 
has organized itself, namely, “semiology” (first and everywhere in the 
first six or seven decades of the 20th century), then “semiotics” (here 
and there in the 60s, and now become dominant over the waning band 
of those who, more and more wistfully, label themselves “semiolo- 
gists” ). There is after all a weight of language, an inconscient capac­
ity of words subtly to shade the tint of even the most present experi­
ence with the perspective and understanding of generations past, as if
6 S e e e sp . Sebeok 1975, 1984, 1984c, and 1996.
7 See the survey o f  usage in Sebeok 1971; then further “Rectificando los term inos 
•sem iotica’ у •sem iologia’”, in Deely 1996: 3 0 0 -3 1 7 ; and “ Ferdinand de Saussure and 
S em iotics” in Tasca 1995: 7 5 -8 5 .
the ghosts of those generations were whispering memories into the 
mind’s ear as each new generation learns to speak.
Nor are my dates of demarcation, the end of the 4th and the begin­
ning of the 17th century, arbitrary. For if we look at the Latin history in 
philosophy in the light of sign as a theme, we discover something as­
tonishing: instead of a chaotic age going off in many directions, one 
only gradually achieving a center of gravity in the so-called “high me­
dieval" period and afterward dissolving into nominalism and the exu­
berance of the Renaissance recovery of Greek classics, we find a dis­
tinctive age of philosophy organically unified from beginning to end 
above all by its first speculative initiative made in philosophy without 
precedent or anticipation in the world of ancient Greek philosophy. 
The sign, it turns out, was not only the original Latin initiative in phi­
losophy, as Eco discovered, but, what seems never to have occurred to 
Eco’s circle, the sign provides the theme that shows a true unity of 
that age in moving from the simple positing of the fundamental notion 
to its complex justification as no fla tus vocis but rather the nexus of 
human experience as transcending nature in the direction of mind and 
back again from mind in the direction of nature.
In speaking thus we take up a theme from a German philosopher 
who dominated the 20th century with his cryptic pronouncement that 
“Language is the house of Being”.8 For “language” here did not sig­
nify at all what, say, the everyday American or Italian refers to by the 
vocable “language”. On the contrary, Heidegger meant something 
much more profound, what our American paterfamilias Thomas Se­
beok —  no everyday American, he, but rather, as I have explained 
elsewhere,9 and as many in this room independently and easily under­
stand, a putative Martian and (what comes to the same), like Vilmos 
Voigt, a Hungarian —  explains rather10 as the product of our Innen­
welt or “modeling system”, that species-specifically human capacity 
which results in an Umwelt, an objective world, an arrangement of 
objects classified as desirable, contemptible, or beneath notice (+,
0) insofar as that typically animal arrangement of experience is further 
permeated and transformed by the human awareness of an interpretive 
horizon for these objects as specifically consisting of more than their 
relation to the one perceiving them, and thus carrying a history which 
imports into the individual consciousness, for the most part unknow-
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ingly but nonetheless in fact, a structure of awareness and experience 
which links the individual with the understanding of the world worked 
out and adhered to by forebears long dead whose codifications of un­
derstanding are embodied in the words we speak, those linguistic ves­
sels which, all but entirely, preceded our individual births and will 
continue at play in linguistic communication long after we have died.
So the “being” which language houses is above all a historical re­
ality, the preservation in human community of the affective and cog­
nitive links which have their roots in times long past but which define 
through their presence in the psychology of living individuals the 
contours of what we call a natural language community, with all the 
vagueness and inevitable overlappings that result in that notion as a 
consequence of the fact that the human modeling system, alone among 
the animal modeling systems on this planet, is not restricted in its 
communicative elements and terms to sign-vehicles objectively acces­
sible as such to sense perception.
It is from this point d ’appui that I want to address, with an eye to 
our Latin past, the present development and immediate future of 
semiotics. For if language is, to speak in the accents properly Heideg­
ger’s own, a seinsgeschichtliches Wesen, an essence freighted with 
being, then it is surely there, indeed, in the vocable itself “semio- 
tics”(something that Heidegger himself never considered, even as he 
was typically ignorant of almost every one of the late Latin thinkers 
who were key to the semiotic denouement of their age in philosophy), 
that, our heritage lies at once concealed and manifestly present in its 
permeation of and influence over thinkers wherever the semiotic 
community has taken root in our nascent contemporary “global cul­
ture”. Even moreso is this the case with the simple vocable “sign”. So 
let us reflect on the Latin dimension of our heritage as it is carried 
within two simple English words: first “sign”, and then “semiotics”. 
What, even inconsciently, do these two simple expressions import into 
our present experience of the world from the predominantly Latin 
phase of the European development?
From Latin signum to English sign
The ontological weight of Latin history at play in the shaping of our 
contemporary use of “sign” is conveyed through a derivation directly 
and immediately Latin: signum. There is a conjecture that this Latin
term carries over a Sanskrit sense of “to cling to or adhere”, which is 
probable, but not probable enough to pursue for present purposes. For, 
so far as it is a question of the concept and destiny of sign that fur­
nishes the foundations for what we have come to call semiotics, 
namely, the body of living knowledge developed out of the thematic 
observation and analysis of the action unique and proper to signs (both 
as such and in their various kinds), we are dealing with a coinage that 
as a matter of fact does not go beyond a rather late stage of the Latin 
language itself, it being a posit, as has been discovered, put into play 
just three years before the end of the fourth century of the Christian or 
“common” (if you prefer) era.
Well, by coincidence, this was the very time when the move of the 
capital of Roman Empire from Rome to the Byzantine region had just 
been consolidated. This was the time when the peoples who would form 
Europe were adopting the original Latin tongue of the old empire, while 
the rulers themselves were abandoning Latin in favor of the Greek lan­
guage. This was the time, in short, when we witness in hindsight the 
astonishing split of a single political entity, the Roman Empire, into two 
halves soon to share virtually no common linguistic tie.
It is common wisdom that the term “semiotics” comes from the 
root of the Greek word <rr||ieu)v, standardly translated as “sign”. As is 
all too often true of common wisdom, so in this case it forms a dan­
gerous alliance with ignorance by concealing more than it reveals 
without any overt hint of what is hidden. The alliance is dangerous in 
this case because what the common wisdom conceals is of far greater 
import for any deep understanding of a European heritage in the mat­
ter of the study of signs than what it would lead the first-time comer to 
that study to believe. For the truth is, the astonishing truth, with which 
semiotic reflection needs most to begin, is that there is no general 
concept of sign to be found in Greek philosophy, and the term stan­
dardly mistranslated to conceal that fact is ormelov, a word which 
means, in Greek, not at all “sign” in any general sense but only very 
specific forms of sign, particularly ones associated with divination, 
both in the invidious sense of prophetic and religious divination and in 
the more positive scientific sense of prognostications in matters of 
medicine and meteorology.11 Егщега, in other words, are from outside 
the human realm, are from nature, either in the manifestations of the 
gods or in the manifestations of the physical surroundings. Within the 
human realm are found not signs but symbols (слЗцроАд) and, what is
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after all but a subclass of symbols, names (ovofiaxa), the elements in 
general of linguistic communication.
All this will change after Augustine (354^ 130a d ). T o o  busy in his 
youth for one set of reasons to learn the Greek language in use all 
around him, too busy in later years for another set of reasons to learn 
the Greek language visibly losing ground in the Western regions of 
Roman empire but yet dominating the realm of theological and relig­
ious discussion, and, in any event, disinclined by temperament to 
study Greek in any season, 2 Augustine it was who, in an ignorant 
bliss, began to speak of sign in general, sign in the sense of a general 
notion to which cultural as well as natural phenomena alike relate as 
instances or “species”. Not knowing Greek, he was ignorant of the 
originality of his notion. That he was proposing a speculative novelty 
never crossed his mind, and, his principal readers being similarly ig­
norant, the fact is not known to have occurred to any one in his large 
and growing audience. What was obvious to the Latins was the intui­
tive clarity of the notion and its organizing power. Look around you. 
What do you see? Nothing or almost nothing at all that does not fur­
ther suggest something besides itself, something that almost normally 
is not itself part of the physical surroundings immediately given when 
you “look around”. There is a tombstone, my childhood friend’s 
grave; there is a tree, the one planted for the occasion of the burial; 
there is a pot of flowers now dead, placed here a month ago to honor 
the memory of this friend. And so on.
Nothing at all is all that it appears. Everything is surrounded by the 
mists of significations which carry the mind in many directions, all 
according to knowledge, interest, and level of awareness brought to 
bear at any given moment when we happen to “take a look around”. 
Of course all these perceptions involve signs, the gravestone no less 
than the cloud. And the fact that the one comes from human artifice 
and the other from nature makes no difference to the fact that both 
alike signify, that both alike, in Augustine’s words, “praeter species 
quas ingerit sensibus aliquid aliud facit in cognitionem venire” (“over 
and above the sense impressions, make something besides themselves 
come into awareness”).
So little were Augustine and the Latins after him aware of the nov­
elty of their general notion of sign, indeed, that the novelty would ap­
pear never to have come to light before researchers of our own time 
turned the tools and light of scholarship to uncovering the historical
12 A ugustine 397: i, 14.
origins of semiotics. To my knowledge at least, as I have several times 
indicated, it was the team of researchers who have worked the fields 
of ancient thought from a semiotic point of view under the guidance 
and tutelage of the celebrated Italian scholar and Bologna professor, 
our friend Umberto Eco, who first brought to light1 J and subsequently 
established more fully14 Augustine’s incognizant originality in this 
particular.13 Whatever be or not be the Sanskrit overtones, the English 
word “sign” comes directly and immediately from the root of the 
Latin term signum, and this term with the familiar general sense it has 
for semiotics, of providing a subject matter that merits investigation 
into natural and cultural phenomena alike, was a novelty in the matur­
ity of Augustine.
So there is the earliest and second most definitive16 landmark in 
the Latin heritage of postmodern semiotics: the very notion of sign in 
the general sense was introduced at the dawn of the 5th century A D  to 
draw attention to and mark the fact that all our objects of sense per­
ception are experienced within a web of relations that much later 
thinkers — Thomas Sebeok in particular, developing a suggestion in 
the work of Jakob von Uexküll —  aptly designate a semiotic web. The 
very word “sign” is itself a sign self-reflexively of the not only of the 
Latin but indeed of the European heritage in this area, the very con­
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on the provenance o f  this text, ibid. p. xix.
14 Manetti 1993.
15 The discovery entered our sem iotic literature o f  today as an anomaly, a curious 
fact that, like Albert the Great’s fossils in the 1260s, puzzled the mind without sug­
gesting any grand hypotheses. Ironically, when an abduction was finally made and 
formally presented full-scale in the work o f  Manetti just cited, the guess m issed and, 
for want o f  a familiarity with the key texts o f  later Latin tim es, as w e w ill have occa­
sion to m ention, proffered the w ild  hypothesis that it w as the Latins them selves, and 
not the late m odem  structuralists and deconstructionists heir to Saussure, w ho began  
the developm ent that culminated in the sem iological thesis that there are only conven­
tional signs. See the essays referred to in note 3, p. 2, above; but especially  Chapter 16 
in the Four A ges o f  U nderstanding. N onetheless, the asymmetry o f  ancient Greek and 
m odem  national language philosophy on this point is worthy o f  note: as the ancients 
recognized only natural signs, so the m odem s came in the end to recognize only con ­
ventional signs. The Latins, by contrast, like Peircean postm odem s, are distinguished  
by the theoretical means o f  recognizing both.
16 The m ost definitive landmark, o f  course, would by rights be the theoretical dem on­
stration that the general notion o f  sign w as a w arranted  notion. But “rights” in these 
matters are, from the standpoint o f  popular culture, matters o f  som e am usem ent, when  
they are recognized at all; were it otherwise, Poinsot would have been from the start, 
and not m erely as a matter o f  future tenancy, far better known am ong sem ioticians than 
Augustine.
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crete fact that “Europe” was the gradual creation of the heirs and inter­
lopers to the original Western lands of the Roman Empire who took 
over also its original language. This melanges of peoples inherited and 
transformed the original language of that Empire through an indige­
nous philosophical development that began roughly in the 4th century 
and continued thereafter until the 17th century, the time of the decisive 
break of modernity from the Latin Age both in the establishment of 
science in the modem sense (as an intellectual enterprise distinct no 
less from philosophy than from theology and religious thought) and in 
the establishment of the developing national languages in place of 
Latin as the principal vehicle henceforward for the sustenance of 
European intellectual culture.
For since semiotics is the body of knowledge that develops through 
the study of the action of signs, as biology is the systematic knowl­
edge that is developed from the study of behavior of living things, 
etc., semiotics may be said to have actually arisen only at that moment 
when the general notion of sign as a unified object of possible investi­
gation was introduced. The mere fact that, prior to such a conception, 
there were signs at work throughout the living world (and, both be­
yond and before that, perhaps, in the wide world of physical nature 
itself, as Peirce first proposed17 and as has more recently been ana­
lyzed under the rubric of “physiosemiosis”18), does not mean that 
there was semiotics in the universe prior to the Latin Age —  except, 
of course, as a possibility in the sense of having a place “marked out 
in advance”, as Saussure so well put it.19 Semiosis, Peirce’s name for 
the action of signs taken from —  or, rather, forged on the basis of — 
remarks in the Epicurean papyrus written by Philodemus in the last 
century preceding the common era,20 precedes semiotics, just as living 
things precede biology and rocks precede geology. But biology as a 
science presupposes that the world of living things be conceived as a 
thematically unified subject of possible systematic inquiry. Similarly, 
a doctrine of signs presupposes that the action of signs be conceived 
as a thematically unified subject matter of possible investigations. And
17 His “grand v ision ”, I would call it (D eely  1989).
A term coined in D eely  1990 and developed in a series o f  essays after that, m ost 
recently 1996 and 1997.
19 Saussure 1916: 16.
Philodem us i. 54-40BC. See Fisch 1978: 40-41 for d iscussion  o f  Peirce’s deriva­
tion and coinage.
the first to give us a notion of sign which accomplishes this presup­
posed feat was Augustine.
Of course there were investigations of various kinds based on the 
action of signs long before Augustine. Indeed, we now realize that 
every investigation is based on the action of signs, every investigation 
has a semiotic component or dimension that can be brought out and 
highlighted theoretically. But that is not the point. Just as any predator 
stalking its prey relies on knowledge acquired from a study of signs, 
yet not every predator is a semiotician; so every semiotician owes his 
or her profession to the fact that someone, in fact, Augustine of Hippo, 
first introduced into intellectual culture the notion of sign in general, 
under which notion the particular investigations we call semiotics are 
brought together objectively in the conception of a unified subject 
matter of possible investigation. There are not only signs as tokens; 
there is also sign as type, the type defining and distinguishing those 
investigations properly called “semiotic” in contrast to “chemical”, 
“astronomical”, “biological”, and so forth, even though we can also 
say, from the standpoint of semiotic consciousness, that every other 
subject matter physical or cultural necessarily involves and develops 
by semiotic means.
Sign itself, the general notion or type (the “general mode of be­
ing”, Peirce liked to say) of which all particular signs are instances or 
tokens, then, is the first and foundational element of the semiotic 
heritage. For it is that presupposed notion which first makes the de­
velopment of a doctrine of signs possible in the first place. It marks, as 
we may say, the initial awakening of semiotic consciousness; and it 
occurs more or less at the very beginning of the Latin Age in the his­
tory both of the formations that lead to modem Europe and of that part 
of intellectual culture traditionally called philosophy. Semiotic con­
sciousness owes its initial awakening, if not its name, to the introduc­
tion of the general notion of sign in the work of Augustine.21
But what after Augustine? Does the Latin Age contribute nothing 
more to semiotic consciousness than its foundational and organizing 
notion of sign? As a matter of fact, Augustine’s original and constitu­
tive contribution in this regard risked in advance the disaster of nomi­
nalism, that infection of speculative thought which blinds the mind to 
the dependence in understanding of everything the senses yield upon 
general modes of being insensible as such, yet as independent or more 
independent of human whim as anything on the order of rocks or stars.
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For it is not enough to propose the general notion of sign as a mode of 
being. The proposal needs to be theoretically justified as well. How is 
it possible for there to be such a thing as a general mode of being that 
transcends the division of objective being into what exists prior to and 
independently of cognition and what exists posterior to and depen­
dency upon cognition or mind?
This question never occurs to Augustine. For him, as for the next 
seven centuries of Latin thinkers, the general idea of sign seems so 
intuitively valid that we find it employed throughout the theological 
and philosophical writings without the appearance of a second 
thought. Of course, the seven centuries in question are not exactly lu­
minous with speculative developments within philosophy. In fact, they 
are precisely what first the renaissance humanists and many modern 
historians after them refer to derisively as “the dark ages”, the centu­
ries marked more by the collapse than by the rise of centers of serious 
learning. This was a function of the condition of civilization itself in 
the early indigenous Latin centuries. But by the time in the 11th and 
12th centuries when we see the universities, that greatest of all the 
contributions to present civilization surviving from the polities of the 
Latin Age, begin to form at Paris and Bologna and then all across 
what will become Europe, spreading even to China by 1900, the “con­
stantly alive, burning and inevitable problem”22 Augustine has be­
queathed to Latin posterity makes its way to the fore. Signum: general 
mode of being or empty nominalism, flatus vocisl
The burning question bursts into flame at least as early as the 
writings of Aquinas (1225-1274) and Roger Bacon (c. 1214-1292). 
The first turn the controversy takes toward a generally theoretical de­
velopment of Augustine’s posit hanging in thin air (for what is to pre­
vent the vocable signum from being a sound signifying nothing, like 
“phlogiston” or “aether” or “immutable crystalline spheres” any of the 
countless other words posited across the centuries which turn out to be 
names for confusions in thought that, when clarified, disappear) fas­
tens not on the general notion itself but on the question of whether 
only a sensible object can function in the capacity of a sign, whether 
being a sensible material structure was rightly included in the general 
definition. For Augustine’s posit had two aspects: the general notion 
of sign as verified in whatever makes present for awareness something 
besides itself, and a proposed definition that ties this functioning to 
impressions made upon sense.
22 Beuchot 1986: 26.
28 John Deely
Semiotics as a postmodern recovery o f the cultural unconscious 29
It was over the formulation of Augustine’s definition of sign that 
the problem first broke into open flames. Beginning with Aquinas" 
and Bacon,24 then developing after them in the writings of Duns Seo­
tus (с. 1266-1308), William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349), Pierre 
d’Ailly (1350-1420), Dominic Soto (1495-1569), Pedro da Fonseca 
(1528-1599), the Conimbricenses (1606, 1607), Francisco Araujo 
(1580-1664), and culminating in the work of John Poinsot (1589— 
1644), this first aspect of the problem received an all but unanimous 
resolution among the Latins: not only sensible objects as sensible, but 
also those interpretive structures of the mind (called today “ideas and 
images” but in those times “species expressae”) on the basis of which 
sensible objects are presented in experience as this or that kind of 
thing, fulfill the function essential to being a sign. A common termi­
nology even evolved, after d’Ailly (or perhaps before, for this termi­
nological point has not quite been pinned down as yet historically), to 
mark the point linguistically. Sensible objects as such which make 
present in cognition something besides themselves the Latins agreed 
to call “instrumental signs”, while those interpretive structures of 
thought as such, those psychological states o f  the knower, as we 
would say, which serve to found the relations which make sensible 
objects present at their terminus as this or that kind of individual they 
called by contrast “formal signs”.25
But this agreement on terminology proved to be but a verbal 
agreement, which is perhaps why it has proved to have little enduring 
power beyond the time of those who forged it. In fact, the comity
23 E specially  w ith Aquinas, for even though he never focused them atically on sign as 
a question o f  system atic pursuit, his work is so  vast, and problems central to the even­
tual formation o f  such a system atically pursued theme recur tangentially to issues he 
does system atically  pursue, that he leaves a trail o f  tantalizing suggestions to be pur­
sued over the entire corpus  o f  his writings: c. 1254-1256: the C om m entary on the 
Sentences o f  P e te r  Lom bard, B ook  IV, dist. 1, q. 1, quaestiunc. 2; c. 1256-1259: the 
D ispu ted  Q uestions on Truth, q. 4. art. 1 ad 7, q. 9. art. 4 ad 4 and ad 5; c. 1269-1272: 
the Q uestions a t Random , q. 4 art. 17; c. 1266-1273/4: the Summa th eologiae  III, q. 
60, art. 4 ad 1. Indeed just this trail is what Poinsot w ill fo llow  in bringing to publica­
tion 358 years after A quinas’ death the first system atic demonstration o f  a being com ­
mon to all signs as such, and hence the first dem onstration  (in contrast to p o s it) o f  the 
existence o f  a unified subject matter for sem iotic inquiry. It w ill be exactly 353 more 
years before this effort o f  Poinsot w ill surface outside o f  the Latin language —  such is 
the s low  rhythm o f  sem iotic developm ent.
24 See esp. Bacon c. 1267.
25 The fullest historical discussion o f  this first phase o f  the later Latin developm ent is 
presented in M eier-O eser 1997: “ D ie Unterscheidung von signum  form a le  —  und s ig ­
num instrum entale" , pp. 2 3 8 -2 5 1 .
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among the differing Latin schools on this verbal point served to mask 
a much deeper disagreement that became apparent to the cognoscenti 
as soon as the question of Augustine’s defining formula was realized 
to involve the more profound problem of the very being proper to 
signs, of the type manifested in the tokens —  of the being, that is to 
say, enabling signs, any and every sign as such, to function as a sign 
in the first place.
Augustine’s original proposal of a general definition may have 
been too narrow, as all came to agree, but at least it had the merit of 
applying to particular things. Now Ockham and his followers increas­
ingly distinguished themselves by insisting that only particular things 
are real. Ideas of the mind may not be sensible characteristics of indi­
viduals, but they are subjective characteristics of individuals no less 
than is the color of one’s skin or the shape of one’s nose. My idea is as 
much a part of my subjectivity as is my shape or size or color. Hence 
the nominalists could distinguish formal and instrumental signs as 
respectively inaccessible and accessible to direct sense perception 
without admitting that there is any type or general mode of being veri­
fied equally in the differing tokens or instances of sign.26 For be it a
' 6 This second and decisive aspect o f  the late Latin developm ent o f  sem iotic con­
sc iousn ess has so far not been discussed in the literature, and M eier-O eser, in his work 
splendid as far as it goes, appallingly m isapprehends this aspect o f  the problem. I can 
refer the reader only to Chapters 8 -1 0  o f  m y forthcom ing book, Four A ges o f  U nder­
standing  (see the ‘‘prom issory note*’ in D eely  1996a), w hich traces the com plete history 
o f  philosophy from Thales to Eco in terms o f  the bearing that history has on the current 
and prospective developm ent o f  sem iotics as the positive essence o f  what can only be 
called  (in philosophy at least, where “m odernity” is defined by the epistem ological 
paradigm according to w hich the human mind is capable o f  know ing only the products 
o f  its ow n operations) a postm odern  developm ent. The opening o f  the new  historical 
epoch, in fact, m ay be dated specifically  to M ay 14, 1867, w hen Peirce presented his 
“N ew  List o f  C ategories” . For the list in question contrasts both with A ristotle’s origi­
nal list o f  C.360BC, by including specifically  the objective products o f  mind as w ell as 
the know able elem ents o f  physical nature, and also with Kant’s list o f  1781, by in­
cluding sp ecifica lly  objective, i.e., directly and im m ediately known, elem ents o f  physi­
cal nature as w ell as phenom ena ow ing their w hole being to the m ind’s own opera­
tions.
For the creation, in Peirce’s “N ew  List”, o f  an “intersection o f  nature and culture” 
(Sebeok  1975a; cf. also Sebeok 1979), set the problem atic o f  the sign squarely beyond  
the m odem  quarrels between idealism  and realism, in conform ity exactly with the 
terms originally set by John Poinsot for beginning a system atic developm ent o f  the 
doctrine o f  signs (1632: 117/24ff.): “the sign in general ... includes equally the natural 
and the social sign”, that is to say, “even the signs w hich are mental artifacts” . And i f  
there is anything which philosophy cannot account for and remain within the con ­
straints o f  the D escartes-Locke equation o f  ideas with the objects o f  direct experience,
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sound or mark, an idea or a feeling, the former as “instrumental” no 
less than the latter as “formal” remains a particular, not a general, 
mode of being. The mind in knowing may make comparisons among 
objects of which it is aware, and from these comparisons relations do 
indeed result. But the relations themselves, the relations as such, do 
not precede the knowing: they are constituted by it. Prior to the 
knowing, prior to the comparison and independent of it, there remain 
only the particulars, the subjectivities: that is all.
The Scotists and the Thomists accepted the terminology for distin­
guishing between signs whose foundation was and signs whose foun­
dation was not directly sense-perceptible (instrumental vs. formal 
signs, respectively), but they also insisted, against the nominalists, on 
a more fundamental point: when a particular object or an idea is said 
to be a “sign”, what makes the appellation true is not the particularity 
of the feature in question but the fact that it serves to ground a relation 
to something other than itself. This relation, not the individual charac­
teristic upon which the relation is based, they insisted, is what consti­
tutes the being proper to the sign as such. Thus the Latin authors es­
chewing nominalism insisted that not only was Augustine wrong to 
propose a definition tying signs to sense-perceptible objects as such, 
but that the reason why he was wrong was not merely that ideas as 
well as words and rocks serve as vehicles of signification. The reason 
is much more profound, namely, that the relations actually and prop­
erly constituting signs are always as such and in every case without 
exception knowable as such only to understanding in its distinction 
from the perception of sense —  exactly what we assert today when we 
recognize that linguistic communication arises from a species-specifi- 
cally distinct modeling system, and that it is this modeling system as 
such,27 not the linguistic communication exapted from its distinctive 
function, that constitutes “language” in the species-specifically human 
root sense — a capacity more obscurely designated (from a semiotic 
point of view) “intellect” among the Latins and “understanding” 
among the later moderns.
Here, unnoticed by any currently established historian of philoso­
phy, the theoretical divide between the nominalists and their Latin 
opponents widens to a chasm. For the nominalists relations exist only 
as mind-dependent elements of awareness through and through, as
it is the possibility o f  a know ledge o f  structures o f  the physical environment according 
to a being proper to them.
27 See esp. Sebeok 1987.
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comparisons made in thought by the mind itself. They exist wholly 
within and function as no more than a distinguishing part of subjec­
tivity itself actively cognizing —  subjectivity: that total complex of 
characteristics and functions whereby one individual in nature exists 
unto itself as distinct from the rest of the universe. For those opposing 
nominalists in the matter of resolving the “burning and inevitable 
problem” bequeathed from Augustine, relations are as much a part of 
nature as are individuals, and in fact are a part of nature apart from 
which individuals could not so much as exist as distinct individuals. 
For while indeed in the Latin notion of “substance” there is embodied 
the affirmation of natural individuals, beings existing “in themselves 
and not in another as in a subject of existence”, the nominalist inter­
pretation of that notion (the only interpretation, it would appear, fa­
miliar to the classical authors from whose works sprang the distinc­
tively modem mainstream of philosophy) is completely at loggerheads 
with the notion as we find it in Aquinas and Scotus or their followers 
among the Latins, or as we find the notion of substance before them in 
the Greek texts of Aristotle.
For the opponents of nominalism among the Latins, substance it­
self is a relative notion; for the individual, “absolute” insofar as its 
being is one, is yet only relatively distinct from the surrounding uni­
verse. The individual maintains its actual existence as relatively dis­
tinct only through and on the basis of an unremitting series of interac­
tions which provenate and sustain a network of actual relations, rela­
tions mind-independent and physical and essential to the continuance 
of subjectivity even though not themselves subjective, which link the 
individual to what it itself is not but upon which it depends even in 
being what it is. So we find distinguished subjectivity and intersub­
jectivity: substance, as a relative notion of what exists in itself depen­
dency upon other things besides itself (subjectivity), distinguished 
from intersubjectivity or rather suprasubjectivity, pure relations as 
such which actually link the individual to whatever it is that the indi­
vidual depends upon in its existence in whatever way without being 
that other thing. Intersubjectivity in this pure sense thus characterizes 
the individual but does not reduce to the subjectivity of the individual. 
Individual characteristics are thus both subjective and intersubjective, 
and the actual existence of the individual as relatively distinct from 
and within its physical surroundings depends upon both types of char­
acteristics.
The nominalists denied that these intersubjective characteristics 
had any reality outside of thought, any reality over and above subjec­
tivity itself For over and above subjectivity, the being of particulars, 
some of which happen to include cognition as part of their particular­
ity, there is nothing at all “in the nature of things”. All relations, Ock­
ham asserted, and all the nominalists after him agreed (including 
Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume; Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and 
Kant“ ), are constituted only in and by thought itself whenever and 
only insofar as the mind makes comparisons between objects and as­
pects of objects.
Comparisons the mind makes do indeed give rise to relations 
within thought, countered the later followers of Scotus and Aquinas. 
But what makes these relations unique is not the fact that thought 
forms them so much as the fact that they are suprasubjective without 
needing to be in fact intersubjective. Indeed, thought is able to form 
comparative relations only because the understanding has already rec­
ognized in actu exercito intersubjectivity as a feature of the reality of 
the physical world, the order of things in the experience of the physi­
cal aspects of our surroundings. On the basis of our experience of such 
features the mind can go on to make comparisons of its own. These 
further comparisons, like relations in nature, will be “between” objects 
as linking one to the other, but with this difference: relations between 
individuals in the physical environment cannot exist except as inter­
subjective, whereas relations fashioned by thought, always interobjec­
tive, yet may or may not be intersubjective in fact, inasmuch as one or 
the other term of such a relation either may not exist at all, or may not 
exist in the manner that thought presents it to exist. I may be mistaken 
about who my father is, even though there is no question that in fact I 
have a father. That is the whole and only difference between mind- 
dependent and mind-independent relations insofar as they are rela­
tions, but a difference that reveals a distinctive feature of pure rela­
tions as such that will prove crucial for understanding how signs are
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2K Such a spectrum o f  authors agreeing on so  basic a point is worth documenting, and 
the first one to do so  in a brief and system atic com pass, I believe, was W einberg 1965
—  although Peirce him self, as early as 1898 (CP 4.1), to cite a specific mention o f  a 
point that runs throughout his writings, had full taken note that not only is every m od­
em  philosopher from Descartes to Hegel a nominalist, but further that “as soon as you  
have once mounted the vantage-ground o f  the logic o f  relatives ... you find that you 
com mand the w hole citadel o f  nominalism, which must thereupon fall alm ost without 
another b low .”
possible:29 while every pure relation exists as such over and above 
whatever subjectivity the relation depends upon in order to actually 
exist here and now, only some relations are in fact intersubjective. 
Therefore the feature essential to and constitutive of the purely rela­
tive as such is not intersubjectivity in fact but suprasubjectivity.
If that is so, and every sign consists in a relation as such, then every 
sign as such serves to link an individual to something that is other than 
itself, whether or not this other signified actually exists in any physical 
sense as a subjectivity in its own right. The implications of this point are 
not only enormous, they are decisive for semiotics. The point enables us 
to see, in the first place, how signs can be used indifferently to lie, to 
blunder, or to express some truth: the situation depends upon factors 
wholly external to the sign relation as such, just as my being or not be­
ing an uncle is quite independent of anything I do. But perhaps the most 
interesting theoretical implication of this last point developed among the 
Latins, tentatively with the Conimbricenses and Araujo, definitively 
with Poinsot and, after him and independently, with Peirce, is the impli­
cation that the relations in which signs consist according to their proper 
being as signs differ from physical relations in nature in having of ne­
cessity (or “in principle”) three terms united rather than only two. In 
other words, it suffices for intersubjective instances of relation to be 
dyadic, whereas the suprasubjective instantiations of relations as signs 
(which realize the indifference in the nature of relation to provenance 
from physical being as such) must always be triadic. A car can hit a tree 
only if there is a tree there to be hit; but a sign can warn a bridge is out 
whether or not the bridge is out, or, for that matter, whether or not there 
is even a bridge there at all where the sign “leads us to believe” there is 
a defective one!
Semiotic consciousness, thus, first arose in the time of Augustine, 
but its principal development as a theoretical theme did not occur until 
much later, beginning with Aquinas and Roger Bacon in the 13th cen­
tury and continuing thereafter right down to the time of Galileo and 
Descartes. This main period of theoretical development occurred in 
two phases, both of which have been identified only in the most recent 
times and both of which have only begun to be explored in depth.
The first stage occurs between Aquinas and Ockham, or perhaps 
rather d’Ailly, when it comes clearly to be recognized that the being 
proper to signs need not be directly perceptible to sense, a recognition
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9 Perhaps it is not to much to say that grasping the sem iotic bearing o f  this point is 
what constitutes the uniqueness o f  Poinsot’s Tractatus o f  1632.
that culminates in the linguistic marker of the “formal/instrumental 
sign” distinction. The second stage occurs between Soto and Poinsot, 
when it comes clearly to be recognized that the being proper to signs 
not only need not but cannot be directly perceived by sense, for the 
reason that this being is constituted not by any subjective characteris­
tic as such upon which a relation happens to depend existentially 
(such as the shape of an object perceived or the contour of a sound 
heard) but by the very relation itself which, as suprasubjective — as 
over and above its sense-perceptible occasion of existing (its “founda­
tion” in the Latin sense) —  is never sense-perceptible and need not 
even be intersubjective. It follows from this that sign relations, that is 
to say, the relations in which the being proper to signs as such consists 
(or, simply, in which signs most formally and properly speaking con­
sist), must also be triadic and never merely dyadic; and this remains 
true even when the sign happens to relate actually existing physical 
subjectivities, for actuality in that sense depends upon factors wholly 
extrinsic to the sign-relation as such.
It further follows that signs are never mere individual things but 
exist only insofar as individual beings are involved with things other 
than themselves, and this with “others” both actually existing and only 
possibly existing or once having existed (as in the case of dead par­
ents) or only thought mistakenly to exist or have existed. The sign, it 
turns out, is not merely an object linking another object in thought but 
that upon which every object depends in order to be in thought at all, 
whether truly or falsely. And all of this depends on the doctrine of 
relation which the Latins inherited from Aristotle’s discussion of cate­
gories of physical being. But the Latins expanded upon Aristotle’s 
terse text enormously,30 especially under the pressure of seeking to 
come to terms with “the burning and inevitable problem” (or rather 
nest of problems) which Augustine, in his ignorance of Greek, had so 
casually handed them with his naive, innocent proposal of sign as a 
genus to which culture no less than nature contributes species.
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30 This can be seen m ost readily in their subsumption o f  A ristotle’s categorial rela­
tion, the re la tio  praed icam en ta lis seu realis, together with the thought-constituted  
relation, re la tio  rationis, under the more general rubric o f  relatio  secundum  esse, to­
gether with their setting o f  this general m ode o f  being in contrast with the order o f  
subjectivity tout court subsumed under the rubric o f  relatio  transcendentalis seu se ­
cundum  d i d , which latter expression conveyed the requirement both for discourse and 
for physical existence that substances (subjectivities or “absolute” beings) be always in 
interactions and pure relations with their surroundings either to be or to be understood. 
See esp. the “Second Preamble” o f  Poinsot’s Tractatus.
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In this way we find that, as it belongs to the cultural heritage of the 
species anthropos, semiotic consciousness is an originally and indig­
enously Latin development, first made possible thematically at the 
outset of the Latin Age by Augustine’s naive posit, but first reduced 
systematically to its theoretical ground in the being proper to relation 
by John Poinsot’s Treatise on Signs, a work brought to print as the 
Latin Age is nearing its end, and thereafter lost for more than three 
centuries in the language that almost became its tomb.
How recent is this discovery of the crucial role of the Latin past 
and how far we have to go to achieve something like a general appre­
ciation of that crucial role may be garnered obliquely from the fact 
that even as the 20th century ends distinguished figures in the nascent 
field of semiotics who name their ancestry appear routinely ignorant 
of more than half of the Latin names brought up in this discussion, 
including most glaringly that of John Poinsot, who stands easily with­
out peer in uncovering the foundations in being itself of the semiotic 
consciousness which Augustine may have introduced thematically but 
which proves on sufficient further investigation to be the conscious­
ness most distinctive of the human animal. It is not as “rational” that 
the human being finds its distinctive flourishing nearly so much as it is 
as signifying. We may even go so far as to say that semiotics as an 
essentially postmodern development carries with it the implication of 
a new definition of the human being. Even as Descartes introduced 
modernity by replacing the ancient definition of human being as ani­
mal rationale with the modem formula, res cogitans, so the advent of 
semiotics at once transcends modernity in the direction of the past and 
surpasses it in the direction of a future in which the “thinking thing” 
becomes rather once again an animal, the animal semeioticum. I turn 
to my second terminological point, my second “essence freighted with 
being”.
Where is the Latin in the English word “semiotics”?
Here I will not repeat even in substance the several times1', inspired 
by the seminal essay of Romeo,'2 that I have explored in detail 
Locke’s introduction of the vocable сггцлсотисг), an only apparently 
Greek word, misspelled at that, as it turns out, into the concluding
31 D eelv  1977. 1978. 1982, 1985, 1986, 1990a, 1993, 1994a: 109 -143 , 1994b.
12 R om eo 1977.
English paragraphs (so brief is his final chapter33) of his Essay con­
cerning Human Understanding of 1690, which propounds in its body 
an epistemological theory that is anything but hospitable to or com­
patible with this alternative development he concludes by suggest­
ing —  namely, the “way of signs”, as I think it should be called.
Let us cut to the chase, and reach our main conclusions.
We have seen that if we take the English word “sign” and ask 
where it comes from, the answer is that it comes from Augustine of 
Hippo, the first thinker of record to forge a general notion of sign as a 
genus (we might even say “genius”) to which natural and cultural 
phenomena alike are species.
But “semiotics” as an English word is more problematic. Surely its 
derivation is Greek, as at least learned common sense can divine from 
its very alphabetic formation. But here common sense, as is usual with 
even with learned common wisdom, relies on a secret covenant with 
ignorance. What investigation of the matter shows is that the linguistic 
formation in question comes about from a kind of bastard Greek coin­
age actually made by the Englishman John Locke when he proposes 
Егщгсотисг! as a one-word equivalent of the English expression, “doc­
trine of signs” —  itself an expression not merely redolent of but ex­
actly translating, almost to a point of proving an exception to Hill’s 
dictum on the non-existence of perfect synonyms, the older and well- 
established Latin formula central to the work of Poinsot and others: 
doctrina signorum. Locke’s term may have come indirectly, as Romeo 
persuasively urges, from a Greek medical dictionary. Be that as it 
may, it remains that the term as it appears in Locke is malformed. By 
the applicable requirements of Greek grammar, it should have had an 
epsilon separating the mu from the iota, which it did not. Nor can this 
malformation be dismissed as a printer’s error; for, in every subse­
quent edition of the Essay prepared by Locke prior to his being over­
taken by the boundary of time and made a definitively past author, the 
original malformation is meticulously maintained.35
Now it is curious that “sem iotics” is not a straight transliteration 
o f  Locke ’s Greek malformation. What is a straight transliteration of
Semiotics as a postmodern recovery o f the cultural unconscious 37
33 The w hole o f  L ocke’s chapter from the original edition o f  his E ssay  is photo­
graphically reproduced in D eely 1994a: 112.
34 I w ould refer the reader to the A llen  —  D eely exchange in The A m erican  Journal 
o f  Sem io tics  1 1(3/4).
35 I have actually verified this through com bined holdings o f  the Library o f  Congress 
and the libraries o f  the Smithsonian Institution, both in W ashington, DC.
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the Greek malformation Locke introduced, however, is the Latin term 
“semiotica”, which no Latin author ever used. So the term, a Greek 
malformation in Locke’s Essay, is in effect a neologism in Latin 
transliteration. But the term means in English “the doctrine of signs , 
according to the only definition Locke provided in his original intro­
duction of and comment upon the would-be Greek term.
The reason that this detour through the nonexistent Latin translit­
eration of Locke’s Greek malformation is interesting is because 
“semiotica” as Latin neologism would be a neuter plural name that 
could only be translated into English as “semiotics”. Professional lin­
guists have been careful to point out that there is in English a class of 
“-ics” words which do not conform to the usual rule that an English 
noun is made plural by adding an “s” to its ending.36 By this reckon­
ing, “semiotics” is not the plural form of “semiotic”. Nonetheless, 
“semiotics” is the direct English transliteration of the Latin “semi­
otica”, which in turn is the direct transliteration of the Greek malfor­
mation Locke introduced into the closing chapter of his Essay, and 
would be a true English plural if taken from the Latin.
So a Latin, rather than a Greek, background proves etymologically 
decisive for sign and semiotics alike as contemporary notions, despite 
Locke’s conscious choice of the Greek root (sem-) for the notion of 
“natural sign” (semeion) in his one-word summation or name (semi- 
otike) for the doctrine of signs.
O f course, the Greek philosophical contribution to what would 
eventually take form in contemporary culture as an explicit attempt to 
develop the doctrine of signs can hardly be underestimated, particu­
larly in Aristotle’s doctrine of categories —  for example, with his 
sharp development of the contrast between subjective being in the 
doctrine of substance (what Poinsot clarified long-standing Latin us­
age by terming transcendental relation?1 which is not really relation 
at all but subjective being itself viewed in terms of its existential and 
ontological dependencies upon the surroundings), and suprasubjective 
being in the doctrine of relation (which Poinsot followed Aquinas in 
terming ontological relation*). But it remains that it is first in the late
‘At least a part o f  the confusion w hich learners experience in handling the -ics  
words ... is caused by the fact that no dictionary m akes clear that the final -5  in these 
words, no matter what its origin, is not identical with the familiar plural m orpheme o f  
nouns which happens to be hom onym ous with it” (H ill 1948).
A ctually re la tio  transcenden talis seu re la tio  secundum  d i d , since in fact w e know  
of no case where Poinsot spoke or wrote a word o f  English.
Again actually: relatio secundum esse.
4th century Latin of Augustine that the general notion of sign appears, 
and that it is first in the early 17th century Latin of Poinsot that this 
general notion is decisively fully vindicated as more than a nomi­
nalism. Contemporaneously, the Latin Age itself recedes into the 
shadows of times past as modem philosophers with their nominalistic 
doctrine of ideas as the objects of direct experience take control of 
European intellectual development in philosophy.
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Comments in closing
By the time Charles Peirce passed from the status of future, that is, not 
yet living, to the status of present contributor to philosophical discus­
sion, the richness of the Latin notion of signum, its origin, develop­
ment, and vindication over the 1200 or so years of the Latin Age, had 
passed into oblivion, forgotten to all present contributors to the dis­
cussion of philosophy. Peirce in this matter, fortunately for us all, 
proved not to be a typical modern. He did not contemn the past of 
philosophy, in particular its Latin past. He undertook instead to ex­
plore it.39 And, though his explorations did not reach as far as the 
work of Poinsot, they did bring him as far as Poinsot’s principal 
teachers and immediate predecessors in the matter of the doctrine of 
signs, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and the Conimbricenses.
As a result, Peirce was able to recover the Latin notion of signum  
very nearly at the point where the Latins had left it, that is to say, at 
the point where it had been realized and definitively explained that 
signs strictly speaking are not their sensible or psychological vehicles, 
but that this vehicle, loosely called a “sign” (especially in the case 
where it is a sensible object), is but the subjective foundation or 
ground (the vehicle, we might say) for an irreducibly triadic relation 
which, in its proper being, is not subjective but suprasubjective in 
linking its subject term to a terminus or object signified as represented 
to some observer or interpretant, prospective or actual in its subjective 
being; and which, as a relation, is indifferent to passing back and forth 
between psychological and material vehicles of conveyance. Thus, 
while both the sign vehicle and the observer when actual are subjec­
tive beings, the sign itself is always and irreducibly suprasubjective.
39 The matter has been documented in Beuchot and D eely  1995. And I suggest that 
one o f  the m ost telling results o f  his Latin forays were his singular “ethics o f  terminol­
og y ” : see Peirce 1903, D eely 1998a.
And the “object signified” or significate of the sign is itself always 
and irreducibly sustained as the direct terminus of a triadic relation 
regardless of whether it has any subjective being at all as an immedi­
ate part of its objective being, its “objectivity”, or status as signified.
If the most important development for the immediate future of phi­
losophy (and perhaps for intellectual culture as a whole) is to be, as I 
believe, the realization of the centrality of the doctrine of signs to the 
understanding of being and experience for human animals, then Peirce’s 
recovery of the notion of signum from the Latins may be said to have 
marked the beginning of new age in philosophy. By overcoming the 
forgottenness of signum, the veritable Zeichensvergessenheit of moder­
nity (as including Heidegger in this particular), Peirce also destroyed the 
common foundation upon which the mainstream modem philosophers 
(from Descartes and Locke to Kant in the classical phase, continuing 
with analytic philosophers and phenomenologists in our own day) had 
constantly built. There are some today who embrace modem philoso­
phy’s culminating doctrine that only the mind’s own constructions are 
properly said to be known, ones who have yet tried to coin and appro­
priate the phrase “postmodern” to advertise their stance. But the vain 
appropriation cannot conceal the stipulation which guarantees that these 
would-be postmodems are nothing more than surviving remnants of a 
dying age, the last of the modems, in fact, the “ultramodems”. The fu­
ture, in philosophy and in intellectual culture more broadly conceived, 
belongs rather to semiotics, the clearest positive marker we have of the 
frontier which makes modernity be to the future of philosophy what 
Latinity was to philosophy’s future in the time of Galileo and Des­
cartes —  though this time we will hardly be able to repeat Descartes 
mistake of counting history as nothing, as the joint work of Williams 
and Pencak40 has perhaps best shown.
40 John Deely
References
Aquinas, Thomas i. 1252-1273. S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia ut sunt in 
indice thomistico, ed. Roberto Busa. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- 
Holzboog, 1980, in septem volumina: 1. In quattuor libros Sententiarum;
2. Summa contra Gentiles, Autographi Deleta, Summa Theologiae;
3. Quaestiones Disputatae, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Opuscula; 4. Com-
40 See W illiam s and Pencak 1991; and W illiam s 1984, 1985 1985a 1985b 1990 
1990a.
mentaria in Aristotelem et alios; 5. Commentaria in Scripturas; 6. Repor- 
tationes, Opuscula dubiae authenticitatis; 7. Aliorum Medii Aevi Aucto- 
rum Scripta 61.
— с. 1254/6a. In quattuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi, in Busa ed. 
vol. 1.
— c. 1256/9. Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, in Busa ed. vol. 3, 1-186.
— c. 1269/72. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Quodlibet 4, in Busa ed. 3, 438- 
501.
— i. 1271/3. Summa theologiae tertia pars, in Busa ed. 2, 768-926.
Allen, Barry 1994. Is Locke’s Semiotic Inconsistent? The American Journal 
of Semiotics 11(3/4): 23-31.
Augustine of Hippo 397. Aureli Augustini Confessionum Libri Tredecim, 
Latin text in O’Donnell 1992:1, 1-205; English text Confessions Books I-  
XIII, trans. F. J. Sheed, introduced by Peter Brown. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Co.
— i. 397-426. De doctrina Christiana libri quattuor (Four Books On Chris­
tian Doctrine). In: Tomus Tertius Pars Prior, 13-151; also Patrologiae 
Cursus Completus, ed. J. P. Migne, Series Latina (PL), Volume 34, cols. 
15-122.
Bacon, Roger c. 1267. De Signis. In: Fredborg, Nielsen, and Pinborg(eds.), 
Traditio. Volume XXXIV. New York: Fordham University Press, 1978, 
81-136.
Beuchot, Mauricio 1980. La doctrina tomista cläsica sobre el signo: Domingo 
de Soto, Francisco de Araujo у Juan de Santo Tomäs. Critica 12(36) 
(Mexico, diciembre), 39-60.
— 1983. Lögica у lenguaje en Juan de Sto. Tomäs. Diänoia 17.
— 1986. Signo у Lenguaje en San Agustm. Diänoia (anuario de filosofia) 
32: 13-26.
— 1987. Metafisica. La Ontologia Aristotelico-Tomista de Francisco de 
Arasjo. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autönoma de Mexico.
— 1993. La perception sensible en Santo Tomäs de Aquino. In: Bemtez, 
Laura; Robles, Jose A. (eds.), Percepciön: Colores (= La Filosofia у Sus 
Problemas; Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autönoma, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Filosöficas), 11-29.
— 1994. Intentionality in John Poinsot. ACPQ 68(3) (Summer 1994): 279- 
296.
— 1995. Algunas Teonas del Signo en la Escolastica Iberica Post-Medieval, 
selection de textos, introduction у traduction. Maracaibo у Caracas, 
Venezuela: Universidad del Zulia у Universidad Catolica Andres.
— 1998. Banez, Domingo (1528-1604), entry. Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. in 10 volumes by Edward Craig. London: Routledge, 1, 
647-649.
Beuchot, Mauricio, and Deely, John 1995. Common Sources for the Semiotic 
of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot. Review of Metaphysics 48(3) 
(March): 539-566.
Semiotics as a postmodern recovery o f the cultural unconscious 41
42 John Deely
Deely, John 1971. The Tradition via Heidegger. An essay on the meaning o f 
being in the philosophy o f Martin Heidegger. The Hague: Martinus Ni- 
jhoff.
— 1977. ‘Semiotic’ as the Doctrine of Signs. Ars Semeiotica 1(3): 41—68.
— 1978. What’s in a Name. Semiotica 22(1/2): 151-181 (essay review of 
Sebeok 1976).
— 1982. Introducing Semiotic: Its History and Doctrine. Bloomington: Indi­
ana University Press; trans. by Vivina de Campos Figueiredo as Intro- 
duqäo ä Semiotica: historia e doutrina. Lisbon, Portugal: Funda^ao Ca- 
louste Gulbenkian, 1995.
— 1982a. On the Notion “Doctrine of Signs”, Appendix I — Deely 1982: 
127-130.
— 1985.Semiotic and the Liberal Arts. The New Scholasticism 59(3) (Sum­
mer): 296-322. The “second epsilon” mentioned in this work is a blunder, 
for the “first epsilon” in the Greek “semeiotic” is not an epsilon but an 
eta, thus: Егщешткт].
— 1986.John Locke’s Place in the History of Semiotic Inquiry. In: Deely, 
John; Lanham, Jonathan Evans (eds.), Semiotics 1986. MD: University 
Press of America, 406-418.
— 1986a. Semiotic in the Thought of Jacques Maritain. Recherche Semi- 
otique/Semiotic Inquiry 6(2): 1-30.
— 1986b. Doctrine, terminological entry for the Encyclopedic Dictionary o f 
Semiotics, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok et al. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, Tome 
1,214.
— 1989. The Grand Vision, presented on September 8 at the September 5-10 
Charles Sanders Peirce Sesquicentennial International Congress at Har­
vard University, forthcoming in Colapietro and Olshewsky 1994. This es­
say was first published in the Transactions o f the Charles S. Peirce Soci­
ety 30( 2) (Spring 1994): 371^400, but, inexplicably, after the submission 
of corrected proofs, the journal repaged the whole and introduced such 
extreme errors as to make the text unreadable at some points. The correct 
version has appeared as Chapter 7 of Deely 1994a: 183-200.
— 1990. Basics o f Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
— 1990a. Logic Within Semiotics. In: Bernard, Jeff; Deely, John; Prewitt, 
Terry; Voigt, Vilmos and Withalm, Gloria (eds.), Symbolicity. MD: Uni­
versity Press of America, 1993, 77-86; Symbolicity is bound together with 
Semiotics 1990, ed. Karen Haworth, John Deely, and Terry Prewitt as a 
single volume.
— 1991. Semiotics and Biosemiotics: Are Sign-Science and Life-Science 
Coextensive? In: Sebeok, Thomas A.; Umiker-Sebeok, Jean (eds.), Bio­
semiotics. The Semiotic Web 1991. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992, 45- 
75. Since revised as Chapter 6 How Do Signs Work? — Deely 1994a: 
151-182.
— 1993. Locke’s Proposal for Semiotics and the Scholastic Doctrine of Spe­
cies. The Modern Schoolman 70(3) (March): 165-188.
— 1994. The Human Use o f Signs; or Elements of Anthroposemiosis. Lan- 
ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
— 1994a. New Beginnings. Early Modern Philosophy and Postmodern 
Thought. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
— 1994b. Why Investigate the Common Sources of Charles Peirce and John 
Poinsot? In: Spinks, C. W; Deely, John (eds.), Semiotics 1994. New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, 1995, 34-50.
— 1994c. Locke’s Philosophy vs. Locke’s Proposal for Semiotic. The 
American Journal of Semiotics 11(3/4): 33-37.
— 1995. Ferdinand de Saussure and Semiotics. In: Tasca, Norma (ed.), En- 
saios em Homagem a Thomas A. Sebeok, quadruple Special Issue of Cru­
zeiro Semiotico. Porto, Portugal: Fundagäo Eng. Antonio de Almeida, 75- 
85.
— 1996a. Los Fundamentos de la Semiotica, trans. Jose Luis Caivano. Mex­
ico City, Mexico: Universidad Iberoamericana. An expanded text of 
Deely 1990.
— 1996a. The Four Ages of Understanding between Ancient Physics and 
Postmodern Semiotics. In: Spinks, C. W; Deely, J. N (eds.), Semiotics. 
New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1997, 229-240.
— 1997. How Is the Universe Perfused with Signs? In: Spinks, C. W.; 
Deely, J. N. (eds.), Semiotics. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 
1998, 389-394.
— 1997a. Quid Sit Postmodemismus? Postmodernism and Christian Phi­
losophy (a Proceedings of the American Maritain Association; Washing­
ton, D C: Catholic University of America Press), 68-96.
— 1998. Physiosemiosis and Semiotic. In: Spinks, C. W.; Deely, J. N. (eds.), 
Semiotics. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1999.
— 1998a. The Ethics of Terminology. In: Colapetrio, Vincent (ed.), ACPQ 
Special Issue on Peirce, 72(2): 197-243.
— 2000. What Distinguishes Human Understanding? South Bend, 
St. Augustine’s Press.
— 2000a. Four Ages of Understanding. The first postmodern history of phi­
losophy from ancient times to the turn o f the 21st century. Toronto, Can­
ada: University of Toronto Press.
Deely, John N.; Williams, Brooke and Kruse, E. Felicia (eds.). 1986. Fron­
tiers in Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Preface titled 
“Pars Pro Toto”, viii-xvii; Description of Contributions, xviii-xxii.
Doyle, John P. 1984. The Conimbricenses on the Relations Involved in Signs. 
In: Deely, John (ed.), Semiotics. Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting 
of the Semiotic Society of America; Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1985, 567-576.
— 1994. Poinsot on the Knowability of Beings of Reason. American Catho­
lic Philosophical Quarterly 58(3) (Summer 1994): 337-362.
Semiotics as a postmodern recovery o f the cultural unconscious 43
44 John Deely
Eco, Umberto; Lambertini, Roberto; Marmo, Costantino and Tabarroni An­
drea 1986. Latratus Canis or: The Dog’s Barking — Deely, Williams, and 
Kruse 1986: 63-73.
Fisch, Max H. 1978. Philodemus and Semiosis (1879-1883), Section 5 of the 
essay Peirce’s General Theory of Signs. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), 
Sight, Sound, and Sense. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 31-70.
Heidegger, Martin 1947. Brief über den Humanismus. Platons Lehre von der 
Wahrheit. Bern: Francke Verlag. A separate and independent edition of 
the so-called Letter on Humanism was published in 1949 by Klosterman 
of Frankfurt.
Hill, Archibald A. 1948. The Use of Dictionaries in Language Teaching. 
Language Learning 1: 9-13.
— 1958. Introduction to Linguistic Structures. From sound to sentence in 
English. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Manetti, Giovanni 1993. Theories o f the Sign in Classical Antiquity. Bloom­
ington: Indiana University Press, trans. by Christine Richardson of Le te- 
orie del segno nell’antichita classica, Milan: Bompiani, 1987.
Maritain, Jacques Note: the writings of Maritain are so diverse and have ap­
peared in so many translations with so many modifications that it needs to 
be noted that in the thirteen years spanning 1983 and 1995 the Cercle 
d’Etudes Jacques et Rai'ssa Maritain (in the persons of Jean-Marie Allion, 
Maurice Hany, Dominique and Rene Mougel, Michel Nurdin, and Heinz 
R. Schmitz) established the definitive text of all the writings and brought 
them to publication in 15 volumes entitled Jacques et Rai'ssa Maritain. 
Oeuvres Completes. Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse et Editions 
Saint-Paul Paris, 1983-1995. In citing Maritain from this set, I will ab­
breviated it to ОС (for Oeuvres Completes) followed by volume number 
in Roman numerals and pages in Arabic numbers.
— 1937-1938. Sign and Symbol, trans. Mary Morris for the Journal of the 
Warburg Institute I: 1-11.
— 1938. Signe et Symbole. Revue Thomiste 44 (April): 299-330.
— 1943. Sign and Symbol, English trans. by H. L. Binsse of 1938 entry 
above q.v., but with footnotes separated from the text proper at the end of 
the volume. Redeeming the Time. London: Geoffrey Bles, text 191-224, 
Latin notes 268-276.
— 1956. Le Langage et la Theorie du Signe, Annexe au Chapitre П of 
Quatre Essais sur I’Esprit dans sa Condition Chamelle (nouvelle edition 
revue et augmentee; Paris: Alsatia), 113-124. This Chapitre II is the text 
of the entry for 1938 above.
— 1957. Language and the Theory of Sign. In: Ansehen Ruth Anda (ed.), 
Language: An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function. New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 86-101. Text of 1956 entry preceding, but with several 
paragraphs added near the beginning to make the essay self-contained 
when published apart from the 1938 main essay text. These added para­
graphs summarize the section The Theory of the Sign in 1943: 191-195,
to which the extensive Latin notes drawn from Poinsot’s 1632 treatise on 
signs are appended. The 1957 English text is being reprinted with the full 
Poinsot references to 1632a restored, and with some glosses added from 
the 1943 English trans. of the 1938 main entry, in Deely, Kruse, and Wil­
liams, eds., 1986: 49-60.
— 1966. Le Paysan de la Garonne, in ОС 12: 663-1035.
Meier-Oeser, Stephan 1995. Entry Semiotik, Semiologie. In: Ritter, Joachim 
and Gründer, Karlfried (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. 
Basel: Schwabe, Band 9, cols. 601-608.
— 1997. Die Spur des Zeichens. Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der 
Philosohie des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit. Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter.
Peirce, Charles Sanders. Note: all eight volumes of The Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, Vols. I-VI ed. Charles Hartshome and Paul 
Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), Vols. 
VII-VIII ed. Arthur W. Burks (same publisher, 1958), are now available 
in electronic form in an edition prepared by Charlottesville, VA: Intelex 
Corporation, 1994.
— 1898 Lecture series, Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics (the pas­
sage in CP 4.1 is from Lecture 2).
— 1903. The Ethics of Terminology from A Syllabus of Certain Topics of 
Logic. Boston: Alfred Mudge & Son, 10-14; reprinted in CP 2.219-2.226 
continuing 1.202 (Burks p. 295).
Philodemus 1978. Пер! GT]|i8icbas(bv (De Signis), trans. as On the Methods of 
Inference in the ed. of Phillip Howard De Lacy and Estelle Allen De 
Lacy, rev. with the collaboration of Marcello Gigante, Francesco Longo 
Auricchio, and Adele Tepedino Guerra. Naples: Bibliopolis, Greek text 
27-87, English 91-131.
Poinsot, John 1632. Tractatus de Signis. The Semiotic o f John Poinsot, criti­
cal edition presented and translated by John Deely with the assistance of 
Ralph Austin Powell (first independent edition; Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1985). Available also in electronic form (Charlottes­
ville, VA: Intelex Corp., 1992).
Romeo, Luigi 1976. Heraclitus and the Foundations of Semiotics. Versus 
15(5) (dicembre): 73-90. Reprinted without the brief section on philologi­
cal sources (75-79) in Deely, Williams, & Kruse 1986: 224-234.
— 1977. The Derivation of ‘Semiotics’ through the History of the Discipline. 
Semiosis 6(2): 37-49.
— 1979. Pedro da Fonseca in Renaissance Semiotics: A Segmental History 
of Footnotes. Ars Semeiotica 2(2): 190ff.
Saussure, Ferdinand de 1916. Cours de linguistique general (Paris: Payot). 
Lectures delivered at the University of Geneva i. 1906-1911 and posthu­
mously published from auditors’ notes by Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye with the collaboration of Albert Riedlinger.
Semiotics as a postmodern recovery o f the cultural unconscious 45
46 John Deely
Sebeok, Thomas A. 1971. ‘Semiotic’ and Its Congeners. In: Jazayery, Mo­
hammed Ali; Polome, Edgar C.; Winter Werner (eds.), Linguistic and Lit­
erary Studies in Honor of Archibald Hill, I: General and Theoretical Lin­
guistics. Lisse, Netherlands: Peter de Ridder Press, 283-295; reprinted in 
Sebeok 1985: 47-58, and in Deely, Williams and Kruse 1986: 255-263.
— 1975. The Semiotic Web: A Chronicle of Prejudices. Bulletin of Literary 
Semiotics 2: 1-63; reprinted “with essential corrections and additions” — 
Sebeok 1976: 149-188, to which reprint page numbers in the present 
monograph are keyed.
— 1975a. Zoosemiotics: At the Intersection of Nature and Culture. In: Se­
beok, T.A. (ed.), The Tell-Tale Sign. Lisse, the Netherlands: Peter de Rid­
der Press, 85-95.
— 1976. Contributions to the Doctrine o f Signs (= Sources in Semiotics IV; 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985 reprint with a new Pref­
ace by Brooke Williams of the original book as published by Indiana Uni­
versity, Bloomington, and The Peter De Ridder Press, Lisse).
— 1979. Semiosis in Nature and Cultur, as reprinted. The Sign & Its Masters 
(= Sources in Semiotics VTH; Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1989), 3-26.
— 1984. Vital Signs, Presidential Address delivered October 12 to the ninth 
Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, Bloomington, Indi­
ana, October 11-14; subsequently printed in The American Journal of 
Semiotics 3(3): 1-27, and reprinted in Sebeok 1986: 59-79.
— 1984b, June 3. The Evolution o f Communication and the Origin of Lan­
guage — lecture in the June 1-3 ISISSS ‘84 Colloquium on Phylogeny 
and Ontogeny of Communication Systems. Published under the title 
Communication, Language, and Speech. Evolutionary Considerations — 
Sebeok 1986: 10-16.
— 1984c. Symptom, Chapter 10 of New Directions in Linguistics and Semi­
otics, ed. James E. Copeland. Houston: Rice University Studies, 212-230.
— 1985. Contributions to the Doctrine o f Signs (= Sources in Semiotics IV; 
reprint of 1976 original with an extended Preface by Brooke Williams, 
Challenging Signs at the Crossroads [Williams 1985], evaluating the book 
in light of major reviews; Lanham, MD: University Press of America).
— 1987. Language: How Primary a Modeling System. In: Deely, John (ed.), 
Semiotics. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988, 15-27.
— 1989. The Sign & Its Masters (= Sources in Semiotics VIII; Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America). Corrected reprint with a new author’s Pref­
ace and editor’s Introduction of the University of Texas Press 1979 origi­
nal imprint.
— 1996. Galen in Medical Semiotics. Interdisciplinary Journal for Germanic 
Linguistics and Semiotic Analysis 1(1) (Spring): 89-111.
Santaella-Braga, Lucia. 1991. John Poinsot’s Doctrine of Signs: The Recov­
ery of a Missing Link. The Journal o f Speculative Philosophy, New Se­
ries, 5(2): 151-159.
— 1992. A Assinatura das Coisas. Rio de Janeiro: Imago Editora.
— 1994. The Way to Postmodemity, preface — Deely 1994a: xv-xvi 
Tasca, Norma (ed.) 1995. Ensaios em Homagem a Thomas A. Sebeok, qua­
druple Special Issue of Cruzeiro Semiötico. Porto, Portugal: Fundagao 
Eng. Antonio de Almeida.
Weinberg, Julius Rudolph 1965. Abstraction, Relation, and Induction: three 
essays in the history of thought. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin 
Press.
Williams, Brooke 1984. Preface to Logic, Philosophy, and History 
(A. F. Russell 1984).
— 1985. Challenging Signs at the Crossroads — prefatory essay to Sebeok 
1985: xv-xlii.
— 1985a. History and Semiotic. Toronto Semiotic Circle Monograph, No. 4; 
Victoria University of the University of Toronto.
— 1985b. What Has History To Do with Semiotics. Semiotica 54.3/4: 267- 
333.
— 1990. Uma decada de debates: Histöria e Semiotica nos annos 80”, Face 
3(1) (janeiro/junho): 11-28.
— 1990a. Re-posing the Objectivity Question. In: Haworth, Karen; Deely, 
John; Prewitt Terry (eds.), Semiotics. Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1991, 87-95
— 1991. History and Semiotics in the 1990s. Semiotica 83 (3/4): 385-417. 
Williams, Brooke, and Pencak, William (eds.) 1991. Special Issue: History
and Semiotics, Semiotica 83 (3/4).
Semiotics as a postmodern recovery o f the cultural unconscious 47
Семиотика как переоткрытие бессознательного 
культуры в постмодернистскую эпоху
В данной статье мы исследуем терминологию семиотики с целью 
выявить исторические слои человеческого опыта и1 понимания, 
способствовавшие превращению учения о знаках в одно из течений 
современной мысли. Исходя в основном из хайдеггеровской кон­
цепции языка как эвристической гипотезы, мы анализируем термин 
“семиотика” и выявляем, что Бл. Августин впервые придал латин­
скому слову “signum” тот смысл, который сделал возможным появ­
ление общего учения о знаках, а понятие знака как общего модуса 
бытия, конкретно верифицируемого и в природе, и в культуре в 
процессе структурирования человеческого опыта, было обосновано 
лишь в позднейшей латинской традиции в соответствии с объясне­
нием возможности такого модуса бытия. Далее мы рассматриваем 
причины того, почему уже в современную эпоху Чарлз Пирс вер­
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нулся к латинской традиции обоснования понятия знака, в основном 
завершенной в работах Пуансо. Оставаясь в рамках той же самой 
традиции, мы пытаемся понять, почему термин “семиотика’' возник в 
качестве, так сказать, логического наименования глобального 
интереса к знакам.
Semiootika kui kultuuri mitteteadvuse uuestiavastamine 
postmodernistlikul ajajärgul
Artiklis vaadeldakse semiootilist terminoloogiat eesmärgiga tuua välja 
inimkogemuse ja arusaamise ajaloolised kihid, mis tegid võimalikuks 
märgidoktriini tekkimise tänapäevases mõistes. Lähtudes peamiselt Hei- 
deggeri arusaamast keelest kui heuristilisest hüpoteesist, uuritakse nime­
tust semiootika ja jõutakse järeldusele, et vaid tänu Augustinuse poolt 
kasutatavale ladinakeelsele terminile signum sai võimalikuks üldise 
märgidoktriini tekkimine. Just ladina kultuuri hilisperioodil kerkib 
esmakordselt esile märgi kui looduses ja kultuuris olemise üldmooduse 
inimkonna kogemuse struktureerimisprotsessi käigus verifitseeritav 
mõiste. Ladinakeelne tõestusliin oli lõpuni viidud Poinsot’ töödes ja selle 
tänapäevane taastagasitulek sai teoks läbi Peirce’i. Jäädes selle tradit­
siooni raamesse, vaadeldakse termini semiootika esilekerkimist loogilise 
nimetusena globaalsele märgihuvile.
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Abstract. The “semiotic threshold” is U. Eco’s metaphor of the border­
line between the world of semiosis and the nonsemiotic world and hence 
also between semiotics and its neighboring disciplines. The paper exam­
ines Eco’s threshold in comparison to the views of semiosis and semiotics 
of C. S. Peirce. While Eco follows the structuralist tradition, postulating 
the conventionality of signs as the main criterion of semiosis, Peirce has a 
much broader concept of semiosis, which is not restricted to phenomena 
of culture but includes many processes in nature. Whereas Eco arrives at 
the conclusion that biological processes, such as the ones within the im­
mune system, cannot be included in the program of semiotic research, 
Peirce’s broader definition of semiosis has meanwhile become the foun­
dation of semiotic studies in biology and medicine and hence in biosemi­
otics and medical semiotics.
1. The boundaries of Eco’s semiotic field
Umberto Eco’s semiotic threshold raises the question of the dividing 
line between the semiotic and the nonsemiotic world. In his Theory o f 
Semiotics, Eco (1976: 9, 5) describes the area of contemporary re­
search in semiotics as the “semiotic field” and defines the dividing 
lines between this field and the nonsemiotic world as “boundaries or 
thresholds”. He distinguishes between transitory and immutable 
boundaries. There are two kinds of transitory boundaries, the political 
and the epistemological ones. The political boundaries are determined 
by the present limitations of the state of the art in current semiotic re­
search and should therefore be crossed with the advance in semiotic
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theory. The epistemological boundaries represent the dividing line 
between semiotics as a theory and its object of study, and thus be­
tween theory and practice. The semiotician’s crossing of this boundary 
should be one of critical intervention. Semiotic theory should affect 
semiotic practice. The result of such intervention should be a perma­
nent remodeling of the semiotic landscape.
The boundaries to be investigated in the following are only the 
immutable ones. Eco (1976: 6) calls them the natural boundaries and 
defines them as “those beyond which a semiotic approach cannot go; 
for there is a nonsemiotic territory [...of] phenomena that cannot be 
taken as sign functions”. Eco’s semiotic field is separated from the 
nonsemiotic world by two kinds of natural boundaries, which he dis­
cusses as the lower and the upper threshold of semiotics.
The lower threshold represents the dividing line between the semi­
otic and the presemiotic world. To Eco (1976: 19-21), this threshold 
is the one that separates nature from culture. Since his theory is pro­
grammatically a semiotics of culture and of signs which presuppose 
social convention, processes in the domain of biological or physical 
nature are by definition excluded from semiotics. Thus, Eco comes to 
the conclusion that only signs based on codes and convention consti­
tute the semiotic field, whereas stimuli, signals or physical informa­
tion are below the semiotic threshold where “semiotic phenomena 
arise from something nonsemiotic” (Eco 1976: 21). The purpose of 
my paper will be to show that, from the perspective of general semi­
otics, Eco’s lower semiotic threshold is too high and can be lowered to 
account for processes of semiosis in culture and in nature.
Eco’s upper semiotic threshold is the dividing line between the 
semiotic and various other nonsemiotic perspectives of the world. 
Even within the domain of culture, which belongs most certainly to 
the semiotic field, we are not always exclusively confronted with sign 
phenomena, according to Eco (1976: 27). Objects of culture, for ex­
ample, are not only signs. They are also physical objects constructed 
according to mechanical laws; they have an economic value and may 
have a social function. Possible nonsemiotic perspectives from which 
our cultural objects can then be considered are thus the physical, the 
mechanical, the economic, and the social perspectives, and these, ac­
cording to Eco, are the perspectives from beyond the upper semiotic 
threshold.
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2. Semiotics and the other sciences
The semiotic perspectivism which Eco adopts in this context belongs 
to one of the most fruitful approaches to the question of the dividing 
line between semiotics and other sciences. It provides the appropriate 
argument against the reproach of semiotic imperialism (Eco 1976: 6 - 
7), according to which semioticians dare to deal with too many phe­
nomena, whose study should better be left to the specialists of other 
disciplines. Against this reproach, the perspectivist argues that semi­
otics does not aim at substituting its neighboring sciences, but rather at 
contributing a different perspective to the study phenomena that can 
be investigated from several points of view. The authority to which 
Eco (1976: 16) refers in this context is Morris (1938: 4), who argued 
that “semiotics, then, is not concerned with the study of a particular 
kind of object, but with ordinary objects in so far (and only in so far) 
as they participate in semiosis”. A somewhat different perspectivism 
is also inherent in Hjelmslev’s (1943: 108) view of semiotics as “a 
common point of view for a large number of disciplines from [...] lit­
erature [...] to mathematics”. To Hjelmslev (1943: 77-78; 1954: 50), 
this world beyond semiotics is the amorphous and nebulous domain of 
content and expression purport. Language gives one kind of structure 
to this domain, namely a semiotic one, but Hjelmslev also recognizes 
that there are other sciences, such as physics or anthropology, which 
impose different kinds of structure to the same domain (cf. Nöth 1990: 
68). While both Morris and Hjelmslev are thus semiotic perspectivists, 
the perspectives they take are quite opposed. Whereas Morris (1946: 
80) wanted to establish a theory of signs “on a biological basis”, 
Hjelmslev’s basis of semiotics was the structure of language.
3. Eco between biosemiotic expansionism and 
linguosemiotic reductionism
Between these two extremes of semiotic expansionism and linguo­
semiotic reductionism, we find Eco as steering a middle course, 
pleading on the one hand for an extension, and on the other hand for a 
restriction of the semiotic field. In contrast to semioticians such as 
Buyssens (1943) and Prieto (1966), Eco extends the semiotic field by 
including both natural signs, even signs from a nonhuman source, and
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unintentional signs in the domain of semiotic study (Eco 1976: 15). 
Unlike Morris and Peirce, he restricts the semiotic field by insisting on 
social and cultural convention as a criterion of signs. Signals which 
are not based on convention, mere stimuli, and even the flow of in­
formation in machine-to-machine communication are not categorically 
excluded from Eco’s semiotic scope, but they are classified as thresh­
old phenomena which are of interest to semiotics only insofar as they 
participate in sign processes (Eco 1976: 41).' In a similar way, we find 
the study of communication as a threshold phenomenon of Eco’s 
semiotics. The definition which Eco (1976: 8) gives to the semiotics 
of communication in contrast to the semiotics of signification is ex­
actly opposed to the way in which Buyssens (1943) and Prieto (1966) 
distinguish these two domains (cf. Nöth 1990: 172). Communication, 
according to Eco, is more generally the flow of signals, which may be 
signs or not, to a destination, which may be human or nonhuman, 
while signification presupposes signs and a human being as a destina­
tion. Thus, phenomena of signification always belong to the semiotic 
field, while communication may also occur below Eco’s semiotic 
threshold.
4. Sign, code, convention, and nature
Since semiotics, according to Eco (1976: 7) “is concerned with eve­
rything that can be taken as a sign”, Eco’s definition of the sign can 
give us further insights into the delimitation of his semiotic field. Two 
of his criteria of a sign seem to establish a rather high semiotic thresh­
old: conventionality or codedness, and the potential of being used to 
tell a lie. As far as the latter is concerned, Eco has recently abandoned 
his famous claim that “semiotics is in principle the discipline studying 
everything which can be used in order to lie” (Eco 1976: 7). In fact, 
the criterion was too strong. Lies are defined in opposition to truth, 
and it is well known that the true-false dichotomy is hardly relevant to 
the study of many sign phenomena, such as pictures or architecture 
(cf. Nöth 1997a). In Toronto, in 1995, Eco himself reduced this crite­
rion to a weaker formula which states that “a sign is anything you can 
use to say something that is not necessarily the case”, and with this
For a broader sem iotic v iew  o f  sem iosis in m achine-to-m achine interaction see  
also Nöth 1997b.
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formulation, we are close to the structuralist view of the sign as being 
based on the principle of opposition (cf. Nöth 1994c).
The second criterion, conventionality, serves to differentiate be­
tween signs and nonsigns, such as mere stimuli. Eco (1976: 19) argues 
"since everything can be understood as a sign if and only if there ex­
ists a convention which allows it to stand for something else, and 
since some behavioral responses are not elicited by convention, stim­
uli cannot be regarded as signs”. For the same reason, lack of conven­
tionality, there are signals which are not signs because they are mere 
“units of transmission which can be computed quantitatively irrespec­
tive of their possible meaning” (Eco 1976: 20).
The criterion of conventionality is also the key to Eco’s perspec­
tive of culture as a semiotic phenomenon (Eco 1976: 26-27): mean­
ings are cultural units organized in oppositions and structures accord­
ing to a code. Now, culture has traditionally been opposed to nature. 
How does Eco then account for natural signs in the framework of his 
cultural semiotics? How can the idea of conventionality be reconciled 
with the idea of natural signs, for example, symptoms or natural indi­
ces such as smoke indicating a fire or a wet spot indicating the fall of a 
raindrop? The semiotic bridge which Eco’s approach offers between 
nature and culture consists in what I would like to call a radical cul­
tural ization of nature.
5. Eco’s culturalization of nature
According to Eco’s theory of semiotics, nature can be seen from a 
nonsemiotic and from a semiotic perspective. The nonsemiotic per­
spective is, for example, characteristic of everyday inferences (Eco 
1976: 17). When we infer from smoke the presence of fire or from a 
wet spot the fall of a raindrop, or more generally, from a natural effect 
its natural cause, such inferences are not yet signs, according to Eco, 
but they can become signs if the association between cause and effect 
is the result of cultural learning and coding. The same phenomena can 
thus appear as inferential nonsigns and as cultural signs, depending on 
the absence or presence of conventionality and coding in the associa­
tion between cause and effect. Eco exemplifies this transformation 
between the nonsemiotic and the semiotic from various domains of 
nature. At the level of physical nature, he argues that smoke, as long 
as it is perceived along with the fire which it causes is not a sign of it,
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“but smoke can be a sign-vehicle standing for a nonvisible fire, pro­
vided that a social rule has necessarily and usually associated smoke 
with fire” (Eco 1976: 17). The somewhat surprising distinction be­
tween these two cases, smoke seen in the presence or in the absence of 
the fire, has probably also to do with Eco’s definition of the sign as 
something “which can be taken as significantly substituting for 
something else” (Eco 1976: 7). Eco probably believes that smoke seen 
in the presence of fire does not imply such a process of substitution. 
This view of a semiotic threshold existing between perceived and un­
perceived referent is related to Eco’s argument that mirror images are 
no signs. Here, too, we have the simultaneity in the perception of the 
image in the mirror and its referent, the person in front of the mirror 
(Eco 1984: 202).
At the biological level, Eco argues that medical symptoms are only 
signs when they are recognized by the tradition of a medical doctrine:
The first doctor who discovered a sort of constant relationship between an 
array of red spots on the patient’s face and a given disease (measles) made 
an inference: but insofar as this relationship has been made conventional 
and has been registered as such in medical treatises, a semiotic convention 
has been established. There is a sign every time a human group decides to 
use and to recognize something as the vehicle of something else (Eco 
1976: 17).
At the level of human nonverbal communication, Eco (1973: 39) gives 
the example of spontaneous, noncodified expressions of emotions 
produced without any communicative intention to illustrate nonverbal 
phenomena below the semiotic threshold and argues that the same 
phenomena become codified and thus semiotic as soon as they exhibit 
cultural variation or are simulated or imitated in a histrionic context.
At the level of human artifacts, Eco’s (1973: 43) example is 
Roland Barthes’s raincoat, which is nonsemiotic insofar as it merely 
protects against rain, but semiotic insofar as it is a product of cultural 
fashion or as an indicator of the particular meteorological situation in 
which it is used. In sum, as soon as systems of convention intervene in 
the interpretation of natural phenomena and cultural artifacts, the se­
miotic threshold is crossed.
However, where does convention begin, and where does nature 
end? Eco gives no clear answer. Cognitive science, for example, has 
been emphasizing the dependence of cognition on the structure of the 
human mind and the impossibility of any direct access to the “real” 
nature of the phenomena. Many of our cognitions are universal and
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not culturally variable since they have developed according to univer­
sal laws of biological evolution (cf. Nöth 1994a). In the light of cog­
nitive science, the dogma of cultural arbitrariness has more and more 
been questioned. Not even the favorite topic of cultural relativity, the 
semiotics of color names, has escaped from the universalist perspec­
tive of cognitive psychology, as Berlin and Kay (1969) have shown. 
Can the dogma of arbitrariness and conventionality thus still be ac­
cepted as the sole criterion of semioticity? In my view, Eco’s semiot­
ics suffers from overemphasizing this criterion. Conventionality is the 
basis of one mode of semiosis, but not the decisive criterion to distin­
guish between the nonsemiotic and the semiotic world. I would like to 
defend this argument with reference to Peirce’s more general semiotic 
theory.
6. Eco’s vs. Peirce’s semiotic threshold
Peirce is one of Eco’s crown witnesses for a desirable broadening of 
the semiotic field from its Saussurean logocentric restrictions (Eco 
1976: 15-17). As far as the semiotic threshold is concerned, however, 
Eco’s reading of Peirce is either incomplete or it results in a rejection 
of an approach to semiosis that Eco considers too broad. As we have 
seen above, Eco rejects Peirce’s interpretation of inference as semiosis 
as being too broad from the premises of his own cultural semiotics 
(cf. Eco 1976: 17). Eco’s interpretation of Peirce is incomplete, when 
he argues that Peirce’s triad of sign, object, and interpretant “can also 
be applied to phenomena that do not have a human emitter, provided 
that they do have a human receiver, such being the case with mete­
orological symptoms or any other sort of index” (Eco 1976: 16).
In fact, the occurrence of signs and semiosis, according to Peirce, 
is not restricted to human receivers, but presupposes a much more 
general category which he calls mind. Mind, however, in Peirce’s 
semiotics, does not only mean the human mind (cf. Santaella 1994). It 
includes the triadic interaction of any organism with its environment 
(cf. Nöth 1994b: 2-4). Peirce even goes so far as to extend the cate­
gory of mind to nonbiological phenomena (CP 7.374). The action of 
mind in physical nature, according to Peirce’s evolutionary philoso­
phy, is the action of final causation, but let us focus only on the bio- 
semiotic threshold in the following.
The semiotic threshold which Peirce postulates is thus not the one 
between human and nonhuman minds, but between dyadic and triadic 
interactions. Semiosis begins when we cross the threshold from mere 
dyadic interactions between mechanical, chance, or “brute” (efficient) 
causes and their effects to triadic interactions mediated by a mind in 
the broadest sense. A semiotic triad is one in which a mind interprets 
(i.e., forms an interpretant of) a signifying stimulus in its environ­
ment, called representamen, relative to a goal (the object) which is 
distinct from this environmental stimulus, but not necessarily absent in 
the given situation. This interaction requires neither consciousness nor 
intentionality, but must be goal-directed. Metabolic “reactions” of an 
organism to environmental stimuli are goal-directed actions. Organ­
isms select and hence evaluate, environmental energy or matter for the 
purpose of their own biological survival, while at the same time re­
jecting other environmental stimuli as unsuitable. In a similar way, the 
immune system exhibits goal-directed triadic interactions of a semi­
otic nature. The senders of immunological messages in the blood se­
rum of an animal are the antigens, i.e., molecules of foreign sub­
stances such as bacteria or viruses. The receivers of these messages 
are the antibody molecules produced by the B-lymphocytes and the 
leukocytes, which are equipped with a multitude of receptors for the 
purpose of detecting the antigens (cf. Nöth 1994c: 49). Such processes 
exemplify semiotic thirdness above the lowest biosemiotic threshold 
(Nöth 1994b: 4).
On the premises of his cultural semiotics, Eco explicitly rejected 
the legitimacy of a place of such phenomena within his semiotic field. 
In his paper “On semiotics and immunology”, which he contributed to 
the 1987 international conference on The Semiotics of Cellular Com­
munication in the Immune System, Eco (1988) declared, to the disap­
pointment of the assembled biosemioticians, that interpretations of 
immunological processes in terms of categories such as “communica­
tion”, “sign perception”, or “semiosis” are mere models or metaphors 
used in a domain other than the semiotic field. In this paper, he ex­
presses the anthropocentric and cultural bias of his semiotics more 
clearly than in his Theory of Semiotics, when he states:
I can certainly say that if a dog wags its tail this means that it is happy or 
that if I see red spots on the face of a person this means the person has 
measles: but neither the dog nor the person follow the rules of a sign- 
system. It there is a sign system, it belongs to my competence and repre­
sents a semiotic rule I use to interpret events as if they were communi-
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eating something to me. I guess that if an immunologist sees (if possible) 
a given lymphocyte doing so and so, he will be able to predict that some­
thing so and so will happen or had happened. But such a principle is 
common to all scientific research as well as to normal experience in our 
everyday life. [...] Nucleotides do not know that A ‘means’ U. They sim­
ply react by substituting A with U. We cannot say that nucleotides behave 
semiotically because we are unable to prove that they can refrain from 
interpreting or that they can choose alternative interpretations. (Eco 1988: 
7-8).
In addition to anthropocentric and cultural bias, Eco’s last argument 
testifies to another bias, which I would like to call his synchronic bias. 
Of course, the nucleotides are not equipped with the capacity for al­
ternatives in the interpretations of their environment, but this is true 
only in a synchronic perspective. From the point of view of biological 
evolution, we certainly have had alternatives which began with muta­
tions and the ensuing evolutionary preferences for the survival of the 
fittest.
Nevertheless, Eco’s proposal for a semiotic threshold between 
mere stimuli and cultural signs seems to be related to Peirce’s dividing 
line between dyadic and triadic process insofar as stimulus-response 
chains seem to be dyadically connected in an automatic sequence, 
whereas signs are culturally mediated. In fact, this is Eco’s own argu­
ment. “A stimulus-response process”, thus Eco (1988: 8) “is a dyadic 
one: A provokes В and must be present in order to elicit В (equally 
present). I understand that the requisite of the co-presence is a very 
ambiguous one. A stimulus-response is certainly a causal sequence.” 
Such a categorically asemiotic interpretation of stimulus-response 
sequences is not in accordance with Peirce’s broad concept of semio­
sis. The response of an organism to a stimulus is determined by the 
disposition of the nervous system, which has evolved according to 
evolutionary laws. If it is “automatic”, there is predictability, neces­
sity, or generality, and these characteristics transform the seemingly 
dyadic interaction into a semiotic triad. At the same time, the stimu­
lus-response example illustrates the essential difference between Eco’s 
and Peirce’s semiotic thresholds. In contrast to Eco, whose semiotics 
begins above the threshold of culture, convention, and codedness, 
Peirce’s threshold begins much lower with phenomena determined by 
law, generality, habit, and final causation, excluding only phenomena 
determined by chance, mere efficient causation, and phenomena of 
unreflected firstness (cf. Santaella Braga 1994).
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7. The symbolicity of Eco’s signs
A final essential respect in which Eco’s semiotic field turns out to be 
much more restricted in comparison with the Peircean one brings us 
back to Eco’s above discussed culturalization of nature and to the 
topic of the typology of signs. Eco’s reluctant inclusion of natural in­
dices in the semiotic field, only on the condition that such signs be 
sanctioned by a cultural code, actually means that he interprets such 
indices as symbols. At least, such conclusion suggests itself from a 
Peircean perspective. Signs established by culture and convention are 
primarily symbols, according to Peirce, but these are distinguished 
from icons and indices, which do not primarily depend on coding. The 
index is interpreted as a sign on the basis of a causality or spatio- 
temporal connection between the sign and its object, while the icon is 
interpreted as a sign because of qualities or features which it has in 
common with its object. This famous Peircean classification of the 
sign with respect to its object has to do with Peirce’s three categories 
of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. While signs, by definition be­
long to the category of thirdness, they may exhibit in their object rela­
tion to various degrees features of firstness, secondness, and thirdness 
(cf. Nöth, Santaella 2000): in the icon, we are confronted with a fore­
grounding of the feature of firstness, in the index with secondness and 
in the symbol with thirdness. Eco’s problems with the category of the 
iconic sign are well known, and cannot be discussed here in detail. 
Suffice it to say that it has also to do with the problem of reconciling 
the feature of firstness in the icon with the one of thirdness in the 
category of the sign. Our investigation of Eco’s semiotic threshold has 
mainly been concerned with Eco’s view of natural indices, which are 
signs because of their secondness. It may now have become apparent 
that Eco’s culturalization of the natural sign is actually a result of his 
attempt to admit signs only on criteria of thirdness and not on criteria 
focusing on secondness.
8. Conclusion
Let me emphasize, in conclusion, that my Peircean perspective on Eco 
does not imply a criticism of Eco’s semiotic theory for the limitations 
of its scope. Eco’s cultural semiotics is certainly consistent in itself.
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The boundaries of the semiotic field which he establishes are a logical 
consequence of his semiotic premises. The fact that Peirce’s field is 
broader is not an argument against Eco’s theory of semiotics, but, on 
the other hand, semioticians are free to opt for either the broader Peir- 
cean or the narrower Ecoian field to make headway in the field of se­
miotic studies.
Although Eco never leaves any doubt about his conviction of the 
necessity of restricting the semiotic field from the premises of culture, 
he nevertheless once dares to risk a glance beyond the semiotic 
threshold established within his own system. At the end of his paper 
“On semiotics and immunology”, Eco concludes with the following 
remark concerning the threshold between higher and lower biological 
processes with which we want to conclude our own paper on Eco’s 
semiotic threshold: “As you probably understand,” writes Eco (1988: 
15), “such a question concerns the dramatic problem of the boundaries 
between Spirit and Matter, Culture and Nature. —  Let me stop. I feel 
afraid.”
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“Семиотический порог” Умберто Эко
“ С емиотический порог” —  это м етаф ора У. Эко для обозначения 
границы между миром сем иозиса и миром несем иотическим  а такж е, 
следовательно, между сем иотикой и см еж ны м и дисциплинам и. В 
данной статье “ порог” У. Эко рассм атривается в сопоставлении со 
взглядам и Ч. С. П ирса на семиозис и семиотику. Тогда как Эко, 
следуя структуралистской традиции, провозглаш ает основны м кри­
терием семиозиса конвенциональность знаков, пирсовский концепт 
семиозиса гораздо шире: он не сводится к феноменам  культуры, но 
вклю чает и многие процессы  природы. Эко приходит к выводу, что 
биологические процессы , наприм ер, процессы  в иммунной системе, 
не могут быть вклю чены в програм м у семиотического исследования. 
П ирсовское ш ирокое определение семиозиса стало, между тем, 
основой семиотических ш тудий в биологии и медицине и отсю да в 
биосемиотике и м едицинской семиотике.
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Umberto Eco “semiootiline lävi”
“Semiootiline lävi” on Umberto Eco metafoor tähistamaks piiri semioo- 
sise ja mittesemiootilise maailma, järelikult ka semiootika ja temaga piir­
nevate distsipliinide vahel. Antud artiklis vaadeldakse U. Eco “läve” 
mõistet seoses Ch. S. Peirce’i vaadetega semioosisele ja semiootikale. 
Kui strukturalistlikust traditsioonist lähtuv Eco kuulutab semioosise põhi­
kriteeriumiks märkide konventsionaalsuse, siis Peirce’i semioosise mõiste 
on tunduvalt laiahaardelisem: see ei haara mitte ainult kultuurifenomene, 
vaid sisaldab ka mitmeid loodusprotsesse. Eco tuleb järeldusele, et bio­
loogilisi protsesse (nt immunsüsteemis toimivaid) ei saa lülitada semioo­
tilise uurimuse programmi. Samal ajal on Peirce’i tunduvalt laiem 
semioosisemääratlus aluseks semiootilistele käsitlustele bioloogias ja me­
ditsiinis ning sealtkaudu ka biosemiootikas ja meditsiinisemiootikas.
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Language as a “mirror of nature”
Jaakko H in tikka
Dept, of Philosophy, Boston University,
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Abstract. How does language represent (“mirror”) the world it can be 
used to talk about? Or does it? A negative answer is maintained by one of 
the main traditions in language theory that includes Frege, W ittgenstein, 
Heidegger, Quine and Rorty. A test case is offered by the question 
whether the critical “mirroring” relations, especially the notion of truth, 
are themselves expressible in language. Tarski’s negative thesis seemed to 
close the issue, but dramatic recent developments have decided the issue 
in favour of the expressibility o f truth. At the same time, the “mirroring” 
relations are not natural ones, but constituted by rule-governed human ac­
tivities ä la W ittgenstein’s language games. These relations are nev­
ertheless objective, because they depend only on the rules of these 
“games”, not on the idiosyncrasies o f the players. It also turns out that the 
“truth games” for a language are the same as the language games that give 
it its meaning in the first place. Thus truth and meaning are intrinsically 
intertwined.
In this day and age, the different main approaches to language — se­
miotic, linguistic, logical, and psychological — have unfortunately 
little to do with each other. It is therefore in order, is seems to me, to 
take this opportunity to report to you some interesting recent and on­
going developments in logical theory, philosophy of language, and 
formal semantics in the hope that they might illuminate the issues 
dealt with in the other approaches. As a focal point I have chosen the 
idea of language as “a mirror of nature” in spite of the fact — or be­
cause of it — that this slogan is ambiguous. It is easy to see what a 
theory would be like that maintained that language is a mirror of the
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world, Wittgenstein’s so-called picture theory is probably the most 
fully worked-out example of such a view. But it is far less clear what 
is meant — or even what can be meant — by the fashionable denials 
of the view that language somehow corresponds to or “mirrors” na­
ture. Without claiming exhaustiveness, one can perhaps distinguish 
the following three interrelated ingredients of tliis syndrome of ideas.
(1) The essence of language is not representation, but interpersonal 
communication, having such different forms as commanding, inquir­
ing, promising, gossiping, praying, etc. All these have played a role in 
philosophers’ and other scholars’ theories. Wittgenstein had a much 
longer list of different uses of language, and his first example of a lan­
guage-game was a sequence of commands. For L. E. J. Brouwer the 
main function of language was “Willensübertragung”. I can very well 
understand the temptation to think that questions and answers, rather 
than statements, are the basic mode of language use. Indeed, I have 
tried to epitomise my interrogative theory of knowledge-seeking in the 
slogan “inquiry as inquiry”. Some scholars have seen in gossiping the 
context of the genesis of human language, and Aristotle already men­
tioned prayers as an example of utterances that are neither true nor 
false.
(2) A closely related thesis claims that language is an essentially so­
cial phenomenon, that it is conceptually impossible to think of a lan­
guage without a language community. A widespread interpretation 
attributes such a view to Ludwig Wittgenstein. According to such an 
allegedly Wittgensteinian view language is a role-governed human 
activity whose rules can be created and enforced only by a language 
community.
(3) A much deeper philosophical view holds that it is in principle im­
possible to speak consistently of the semantic relationships between 
language and reality. As test case of such relationships is the notion of 
truth, that is to say, the relation of a true sentence to the fact that 
makes it true. This relation is presumably what is meant by the notion 
of mirroring in the title of this essay.
Admittedly, we can define the notion of truth, as Tarski showed in his 
classical monograph of 1935, for explicitly formulated logical lan­
guages, But, as Tarski is supposed also have shown, this can happen 
only by means of a richer metalanguage. Now there does not exist any 
richer metalanguage over and above our actual working language,
Tarski’s “colloquial language”. Hence the general unrestricted notion 
of truth cannot be used in an colloquial language without running into 
contradictions. As I once put it, for a serious theorist of our actual 
working language “true” is a four-letter word to be avoided in polite 
philosophical discourse. And if so, all talk about our actual language 
mirroring actual reality must in the last (non-Freudean) analysis be 
little better than nonsense. The only alternative would be to postulate 
an altogether different hermeneutical technique of approaching the 
fundamental language-world relations. It is no accident that for Hei­
degger truth is not correspondence but “Erschlossenheit”.
The news I have to report to you is that all these three ways of re­
jecting the idea of correspondence between language and the world 
are either demonstrably wrong or without the support they are gener­
ally though to have. I will first deal with the first two. Within the 
scope of a single essay, I cannot deal adequately with all the system­
atical issues involved; therefore I will approach them ad hoc, or rather 
in terms of an experimentum crucis. This experiment is offered to us 
by the philosophy of language of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who is gener­
ally thought of as the main representative of the views (1) and (2). 
I will begin with the second. Speaking historically, not all commenta­
tors have accepted the interpretation according to which for Wittgen­
stein language is an intrinsically (conceptually) social phenomenon. 
There used to be controversies as to whether an isolated human being 
not living in any language community could be said to have a lan­
guage. As if to illustrate this very problem, Daniel Defoe has con­
structed for us the scenario of Robinson Crusoe on his desert island 
before the arrival of Friday. The defenders of the orthodox interpreta­
tion of Wittgenstein must maintain that in a strict philosophical sense 
Robinson Crusoe could not have a language.
Now this interpretational question has been answered by no lesser 
of a commentator than Ludwig Wittgenstein himself. In his unpub­
lished writings he repeatedly discusses the question whether an iso­
lated individual outside all language communities could have a lan­
guage. Wittgenstein even uses the very same example of Robinson 
Crusoe. And his point is completely unequivocal. Yes, according to 
him Robinson Crusoe could have a language, provided that he be­
haves vis-ä-vis his own utterances in a certain rule-governed way, so 
that a hidden observer could, for instance, use his monological state­
ments to predict his behaviour. No language community is needed to
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enforce those rules. In this sense, for Wittgenstein language is not an 
intrinsically social phenomenon.
This is an interesting result. The sociolinguistic speculations of 
people like David Bloor and Peter Winch may or may be argued for, 
as far as this essay goes, but they have nothing to do with Wittgen­
stein’s ideas. Their defenders’ attempts to hang on Wittgenstein’s 
coat-tails are therefore little short of ridiculous.
But if this was Wittgenstein’s view, why did he not say so in his 
main work, the Philosophical Investigations? Well, he does say so, 
but without using the example of Robinson Crusoe. This is because he 
had meanwhile become interested in the processes of a language ac­
quisition as providing especially important clues to its semantics. And 
from this point of view, Defoe’s story is no longer an apt illustration, 
for Crusoe had learned his language before landing on his island. Un­
fortunately, Wittgenstein did not come up with a better parable to il­
lustrate his updated view. But this does not mean that Wittgenstein 
changed his views on the social —  or, rather, public —  character of 
language in the least.
But didn’t Wittgenstein argue in so many words against the possi­
bility of a private language? Yes, but what did he mean by “private”? 
This word has two uses, and figures in two different contrasts. The 
private-public contrast can be roughly equivalent to the internal- 
external contrast, that is, to the contrast between what is accessible 
only to oneself and what is accessible to others. This is the sense in 
which Wittgenstein denied the possibility of a private language. 
Robinson Crusoe’s language behaviour must in principle be observ­
able by others.
But “private language” can also mean a monological language, that 
is, a language that is not shared be a community of speakers. In this 
sense, Wittgenstein saw no conceptual impossibility in a private lan­
guage. One of Wittgenstein’s main reasons for the public character of 
language in the first sense was the need of language-games to mediate 
language-world connections. But there are games that one can play 
alone, as Wittgenstein himself sometimes reminds us.
But doesn’t Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language-games — and 
the variety of different language-games —  betray a belief in the social 
character of language or at least betray his rejection of his own earlier 
view of language as a mirror of the world? An acute answer was pro­
vided long ago by the acute Finnish philosopher Erik Stenius who cor­
rectly pointed out that there is no conflict between the idea of lan-
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guage as a picture and the idea of a variety of uses of language. We 
can play games with pictures. I can give you a picture as a move in 
several different language-games of the kind Wittgenstein envisaged.
I can give it to you to tell what the world is like, but alternatively I can 
give it to you as a command to make sure that the world is as it is de­
picted by the pictures, or as a question whether the world is like it is in 
the picture, and so on. The real novelty of Wittgenstein’s later posi­
tion — to speak now in my own voice — is that according to him the 
very pictorial relationships are now created and maintained by those 
human activities that Wittgenstein called language-games. It is not just 
that we can play different games with the sentences of our language; 
the very descriptive meaning that enables us to do so is already con­
stituted by certain language-games.
I believe that this idea of Wittgenstein’s is not only a correct one 
but enormously fertile, and I have for a long time put my pen where 
my mouth is. For the idea of language as a mirror of nature, it implies 
so to speak both good news and bad news. It implies that we can 
speak of a correspondence between language and reality. But it also 
implies that possibility is not grounded on a structure shared by our 
sentences with the corresponding facts. There is no correspondence 
between language and the world grounded on the respective internal 
character of language and reality in their own right. As Wittgenstein 
once put it, the correspondence between language and reality, as eve­
rything metaphysical, lies in the use by language, that is, as I read 
Wittgenstein, in the language-games that constitute the semantical 
links between language and reality.
But this leads us straight to the third problem listed in the beginning 
of this essay. Can we really speak of the correspondence between our 
own language and reality in this same language —  in the only language 
I understand, as Wittgenstein put it in the Tractatus? Is the semantics of 
our language expressible in that language? A crucial experiment is of­
fered to us by the notion of truth. Is this concept ineffable after all? The 
list of philosophers who have maintained the ineffability of truth in our 
actual working language looks like the beginning of a veritable who’s 
who in the philosophy of language: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Tarski, 
and Quine, plus a large number of minor prophets. It is therefore —  but 
not only for this contingent reason — of great interest to report to you 
that the outlook has dramatically changed in the last few years. The idea 
of truth, especially the idea of truth as correspondence, and even the 
idea of logic, has been put to a new light.
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There seems to be a fairly general agreement among philosophers 
that the basic part of contemporary logic known variously as quantifi­
cation theory, predicate calculus or first-order logic is paradigm case 
of logic. For many philosophers and linguists, it is the logic. Once 
I expressed to a senior philosopher of language some doubts of the 
adequacy of first-order logic as the true Sprachlogik, that is, as the 
logic of our actual language. He stared at me with an expression of 
horror —  mock horror, I hope — and said, “Nothing is sacred in phi­
losophy any longer!” Yet there is a simple but profound reason why 
the received logic of quantification is, not wrong, but incomplete in 
the sense that it accomplishes only a part of its job description. To put 
it in personal terms, there is no point for you to buy (or to publish) any 
textbooks of logic until this fact is realised and corrected. The old 
ones do not tell you what our real basic logic is like.
In order to see this, imagine that your name is Dr. Zamenhoff and 
that you have been assigned by UNESCO the task of constructing a 
universal logical language for science and everyday life. What does 
such a language have to accomplish? Whatever else there is to be de­
manded of it, one thing is clear. In such a language, we must be able 
to express any possible pattern of dependence and independence be­
tween different variables. For of course we cannot a priori know that 
any such pattern is not exemplified in nature, society, mathematics or 
human thought. Without being able to represent all possible patterns 
of dependence and independence between variables we cannot claim 
that our logical language is a universal mirror of nature.
But how are dependence and independence between variables ex­
pressed between in a usual logical language? By the dependence or 
independence of the quantifiers on each other to which they are 
bound. And we are all told in introductory logic courses how these 
dependencies are indicated. They are indicated by the most important 
logical symbols, the brackets or parentheses (,). Such pairs of paren­
theses following a quantifier are said to indicate its scope. A quantifier 
depends on another one if and only if the former lies in the scope of 
the latter. But in the received Frege-Russell logic scopes are always 
nested. As a consequence, pairs of brackets can only express transitive 
and asymmetrical relations. For instance, branching or symmetrical 
quantifier structures cannot all be represented by their means. Hence 
many possible patterns of dependence and independence among 
quantifiers are impossible to express in a received logical language.
For this reason the traditional Frege-Russell logic is inadequate as our 
general unrestricted basic logic.
This flaw is easy to correct. In principle, we could do so merely by 
liberalising the use of parentheses. A more convenient notation is ob­
tained by introducing a new notation which as it were ad hoc exempts 
a quantifier from its dependence on another in whose (syntactical) 
scope it occurs. The result is a richer first-order logic which I have 
called independence-friendly (IF) first-order logic. This name has 
turned out to be a mistake, however. For one thing, I should not have 
been given it any particular epithet. For IF first-order logic is our un­
restricted basic logic. It simply is the first-order logic. Instead, the 
traditional first-order logic ought to be renamed as dependence- 
handicapped first-order logic or, to be politically correct, independ­
ence-challenged logic. For another thing, it is not only possible to ex­
press more independencies between quantifiers in the new language 
than can be expressed in traditional first-order languages: it is also 
possible to express kinds of dependence that could not be expressed 
before. Hence the new logic might be called dependence-friendly 
logic as appropriately (or inappropriately) as independence-friendly 
one.
Under any name, the new logic is already promising new insights 
into several important subjects, including foundations of set theory, 
compositionality, parallel processing, and quantum logic. It represents 
an important breakthrough not only in logic, but in language theory 
and the logic of science. For the purposes of this essay, it is important 
for a reason which comes up when you try to define a truth predicate 
for a language in the very same language. For the purpose of doing so, 
one must be able to discuss the syntax (i.e. the purely formal aspects) 
of the language in question in the same language. Here an arithmetical 
language can serve as a clear-cut example. In such a language, this 
syntactical self-reference takes the form of Gödel numbering: One 
codes the expressions of this numerical language into suitable num­
bers. The result is a situation that can be compared with an amateur 
play. One can speak of the actors —  and they can speak of each 
other—  in two different roles, either as their everyday selves with 
their everyday names, families, careers and nationalities, or else as 
characters in a play with certain relationships to the other characters in 
the play and to the rest of the imaginary world of the play. In the same 
way, in a self-applied first-order arithmetical language one can speak 
of numbers as numbers, so to speak in their civilian role, but one can
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speak of them also as codifications of formulas. Neither in the case of 
actors nor in the case of numbers is there anything paradoxical in such 
double-entendre situation. Moreover, characters in a play can speak of 
denizens of the real world, including their own selves outside the play. 
(I once saw a movie about an imaginary tennis champion in which 
John McEnroe and Pancho Gonzales played themselves and discussed 
events in their actual life outside the movie.) Likewise — I almost 
said by the same token —  a number which plays the role of an arith­
metical sentence can say something about itself, for instance that it is 
unprovable.
However, one thing is clear: When you quantify over numbers in 
their two different roles, the quantifiers must be independent of each 
other. For otherwise we would make the same mistake as a small child 
might commit in thinking that there are dependencies between what 
happens in a play and what happens in real life.
But it turns out that these independencies are among those that 
cannot be expressed in the received first-order logic. Hence Tarski’s 
undefinability result holds only because he has chosen as his basic 
language one which is based on the old received first-order logic. Or 
perhaps I can say that Tarski’s impossibility theorem holds only be­
cause of certain subtle but important flaws in the logic of Frege and 
Russell that he was using. Accordingly, the general philosophical in­
terest of Tarski’s theorem is very small.
Indeed, when the received first-order logic is replaced by IF one, a 
truth-predicate automatically becomes definable. Contrary to a wide­
spread opinion, the undefinability of truth in received first-order lan­
guages is not due to their being too strong, but to their being too weak 
in their expression power in that all possible patterns of dependence 
and independence between quantifiers cannot be expressed in them.
Even though these explicit results can be proved in the first place 
only for formal (but interpreted) first-order languages, there does not 
seem to be any doubt that they can be extended to suitable fragments 
of ordinary (“colloquial”) language. As I once put it, in this way we 
can finally exorcise “Tarski’s Curse” from our semantics.
What all this means for the theme of my paper should be clear. The 
gist of the mirroring relation mentioned there is the relation of a sen­
tence to the fact that makes it true. And their relation is normally ex­
pressible in sufficiently strong languages without any hidden contra­
diction or paradox. Truth is not ineffable; “true” is no longer a four- 
letter word in language theory. Language can mirror the world. One
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can even argue that this mirroring possibly comes as it were free of 
charge. What I mean is this: The language-games which give a certain 
language its meaning is all we need for the purpose of defining a truth 
predicate for that language. Hence there is no folly in defining truth, 
as Davidson has claimed. The real folly is not to define it because the 
truth predicate comes to us gratis. This constitutes in fact a similarity 
between the IF truth predicates and the minimalist approaches to truth, 
even though the letter approaches have never been developed for 
enough to yield an explicit truth conditions.
At the same time, in speaking of a correspondence between lan­
guage and the world we must heed the same warning as were regis­
tered earlier in this essay in connection with Wittgenstein’s ideas. The 
kind of correspondence my truth predicate establishes between a sen­
tence and a fact does not amount to any easily characterisable paral­
lelism between the ingredients of a true sentence and the ingredients 
of the world that it is about. The definition of truth that IF logic natu­
rally yields is truth of a sentence with the existence of a winning strat­
egy for one of the players, the verifier, in certain games of verification 
and falsification. Even though in such games, called semantical 
games, each move is correlated with a logical constant in the sentence
S under examination, there is no simple correlation between the logi­
cal constants of S and features (or its ingredients in general) of reality. 
The same constituent expression, e.g., a quantifier, can prompt several 
applications of a rule, and some of the expressions that must be used 
in a play of the game may not be subformulas of the initial sentences 
of the play. In this sense, the structure of language does not in any 
simple way mirror the structure of the world. And even to the extent 
that it does, the correlation between the two is not constituted by the 
intrinsic properties of either party, but by the human activities that I 
would call language-games if my first name were Ludwig. It is thus a 
matter of intellectual taste whether my treatment of truth should be 
labelled a correspondence theory of truth or not.
These results apply in the first place to language whose logical 
structure is made explicit. However, the same approach can be used in 
the study of the semantics of natural languages. Indeed, in my earlier 
work, I showed that in this way one can among other things obtain a 
much better theory of anaphora in natural languages than the better 
known competing ones. Moreover, the ideas and results I have re­
ported have a great deal of relevance to semiotics. For instance, the 
semioticians who trace the ancestry of their ideas to Peirce might be
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intrigued to know that the game-theoretical interpretation of quantifi­
ers that can be considered as a microcosm of the ideas expounded here 
was put forward explicitly and vigorously by Charles Sanders Peirce. 
Thus the interest of the issues and insights reviewed here extends way 
beyond any one approach to language and hopefully can serve as a 
means of integrating them.
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Язык как “зеркало природы”
Как язы к, которы й м ож ет использоваться для говорения о мире, ре­
презентирует (“отраж ает”) этот м ир? И отраж ает ли? Одна из основ­
ных традиций в теории языка, вклю чаю щ ая Ф реге, Витгенш тейна, 
Х айдеггера, К уайна и Рорти, отвечает на этот вопрос отрицательно.
1 The interpretation o f  W ittgenstein relied on here is expounded and documented in 
Hintikka & Hintikka 1986, Hintikka 1996a. The new  logic and som e o f  its applications 
are explained in Hintikka 1996b, 1998, Hintikka & Sandu 1997. Applications o f  re­
lated ideas to linguistics are found in Hintikka & Kulas 1985, Hintikka & Sandu 1993. 
C. S. Peirce’s anticipation o f  gam e-theoretical sem antics is explained in Hilpinen 1983.
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Пробным является вопрос о возможности выражения в языке кри­
тических “отражающих” отношений, особенно понятия истины. 
Казалось, что негативный тезис Тарского закрыл проблему, но не­
давние примечательные исследования разрешили ее в пользу 
выражаемости истины. В то же время “отражающие” отношения не 
являются естественными, но формируются управляемой правилами 
человеческой деятельностью наподобие языковых игр Витгенштей­
на. Эти отношения, тем не менее, объективны, так как они зависят 
только от правил этих “игр”, но не от идиосинкразии игроков. 
Оказывается, что для языка “истинностные игры” то же самое, что 
языковые игры, которые придают ему значение. Таким образом, 
значение и истина внутренне сплетены.
Keel kui “looduse peegel”
Kuidas keel, mida võib kasutada rääkimiseks maailmast, representeerib 
(“peegeldab”) seda maailma? Ja kas üldse peegeldab? Üks peamisi keele- 
tooria traditsioone (mille esindajateks on Frege, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
Quine ja Rorty), vastab sellele eitavalt. Proovikiviks on siin küsimus 
võimalusest väljendada keeles kriitilisi “peegeldavaid” suhteid, eriti tõe 
mõistet. Tundus, et Tarski negatiivne tees sulges probleemi, kuid hilju­
tised tähelepanuväärsed uurimused lahendasid selle tõe väljendumislik- 
kuse kasuks. Samal ajal need “peegelduvad” suhted ei ole loomulikud, 
vaid kujunevad inimtegevuse reeglite läbi, sarnaselt Wittgensteini keele­
mängudele. Sellest hoolimata on need seosed objektiivsed, kuna nad 
sõltuvad ainult nende “mängude” reeglitest, aga mitte mängijate idio- 
sünkraasiast. Selgub, et keele jaoks on “tõemängud” sama, mis tähendust 
omistavad keelemängud. Seega on tähendus ja tõde omavahel seesmiselt 
põimunud.
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Abstract. This paper gives a first overview over the role of mereology —  
the theory of parts and wholes —  in semiotics. The mereology of four 
major semioticians —  Husserl, Jakobson, Hjelmslev, and Peirce is pre­
sented briefly and its role in the overall architecture of each of their theo­
ries is outlined —  with Brentano tradition as reference. Finally, an 
evaluation of the strength and weaknesses of the four is undertaken, and 
some guidelines for further research is proposed.
Strange as it may seem, mereology — the theory of parts and 
wholes1 — has only rarely caught the explicit attention of semiotics.
“M ereology”, from Greek meros, part. A s a matter o f  fact, it might have been  
called “m erology”, but after the Polish logician Lesniew ski the form quoted has be­
com e ubiquitous. Lesniew ski, in his works from the 20s and 30s, considered m ereol­
ogy to be one out o f  three basic branches o f  philosophy, “protothetic” , “ontology”, and 
“m ereology”, respectively. Protothetic is a doctrine o f  propositions and their interrela­
tions and it forms the logical basis o f  his theory; ontology is based on a distributive 
rendering o f  class membership, so that distributive class expressions are identical with 
general nouns applicable to individuals. M ereology, then, considers co llective class 
expressions understood as being com posed o f  parts. B y the distinguishing o f  the two 
latter branches o f  philosophy, R ussell’s paradox is avoided: there is no such thing as a 
class containing itself. M ereology is w eaker than set theory in so far as it only admits 
one relation o f  inclusion (part of), opposed to the tw o in set theory (membership rela­
tion and subset relation, which in L esniew ski’s thought is separated as belonging to 
ontology and m ereology, respectively). M ereology in this sense o f  the word thus has 
the advantage o f  being “bottom less”, the com positional foundation o f  a class upon the 
existence o f  ultimate members being avoided. This im plies that m ereology is “phe­
nom enological” in so far as it may describe a given level o f  phenomenal existence 
without recourse to a bottom level o f  atom istic ontology, a crucial aspect o f  the sem i-
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Semiotics as a study taking significant phenomena in general as its 
object, is faced with the problem of the signification of wholes in re­
lation to the signification of its parts as a completely everyday phe­
nomenon, and the recognition of distinct levels or layers of sig­
nification is also a well-known idea in most parts of semiotics. Taking 
the prototypical case of a text as an example, semiotics is faced not 
only with the traditional linguistic question of the organization of 
phonemes and morphemes into words, and in turn, words into sen­
tences by means of syntax, but also, in turn, the successive integration 
of sentences into more extensive wholes of transphrastic discourse, 
periods, scenes, scripts, narrations, genres, systems of ideas, etc. As is 
the case in the sciences more generally, this mereological problem 
gives rise to two typical approaches; the one, reductionist, takes a 
compositional attitude to the signification of wholes which is conse­
quently seen as some kind of sum of its elements, so that an algo­
rithmic syntax of some sort is supposed to make it possible to derive 
the whole’s signification from the knowledge of the signification of its 
parts. The second, holist, stance takes the signification of the higher 
levels as irreducible, relying on their own phenomenological motiva­
tion, and, correlatively, the parts as being an analytical result of a par­
titioning of the whole, expanding the possibilities of the whole and 
making its signification in the single case more precise.2
otic perspectives in m ereology. This im plies the possib le affinity o f  m ereology to 
strongly nom inalist positions claim ing m ereology to be without any ontological pre­
suppositions whatsoever (as in L esn iew sk i’s case, and after him, Goodm an) —  even if  
this is no necessity, and m ereology m ay as w ell be connected to realist positions, for an 
actual example: Barry Smith. L esniew ski w as influenced by the part-whole reflections 
o f  the Brentanian tradition: H usserl’s 3rd and 4th Logical Investigations, in turn influ­
enced by Brentano’s Deskriptive Psychologie (1890), and Carl S tu m p fs  Über den 
psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (1873). For further accounts for these  
developm ents, see Smith (1982 , 1994). In this essay, w e shall stick to m ereological 
aspects o f  decidedly sem iotic currents o f  thought.
Even i f  none o f  the four authors discussed here use the word, I have chosen it as a 
shorthand for "doctrine o f  w hole and parts” and sim ilar m ore com plicated expressions.
O f course, each o f  these tw o alternatives displays a host o f  subvariants o f  more and 
less sophisticated types, ranging from a com pletely com positional logicist theory in the 
one end and to alm ost m ystical insistances on the w h o les’ autonom y in the other. 
M oreover, there is not necessarily a contradiction betw een the two; it is perfectly p os­
sible to imagine com prom ises, so as, e.g ., an em phasis on the primacy o f  the holist 
level giving rise to motivated, iconic syntaxes governing its parts —  com bined with a 
recognition of the possibility for these syntaxes o f  assum ing, once established, an 
autonomous status involving local com positionality.
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In this paper I shall briefly discuss the mereological implications in 
four major trends of semiotics with different degrees of connection to 
the Brentanian tradition in philosophy from which modem mereology 
originate, namely Husserl, Jakobson, Hjelmslev, and Peirce. Husserl, 
of course, is a Brentanian, and in his famous 3rd Logical Investiga­
tion, he outlines a theory of parts and wholes as a part of formal on­
tology. The second, Jakobson, has direct connections to this tradition, 
primarily via Husserl; the third, Hjelmslev, displays striking similari­
ties with the tradition without any direct influence admitted; the 
fourth, Peirce, working simultaneously with Brentano, has no relation 
at all to the tradition but still structural similarities abound.
Husserl
It is strange how little Husserl’s work is recognized or even known in 
the semiotic world. In fact, most of his work either explicitly deals 
with or at least touches upon issues central to semiotics. In his early 
work, around the period of the Philosophie der Aritmetik, he even uses 
the word himself , and later, in his chef-d’oeuvre Logische Unter­
suchungen (1900-1901), he investigates a whole series of central se­
miotic questions. Logische Untersuchungen ought to count as a classic 
of semiotics. Its long Prolegomena contains a detailed attack on psy­
chologism in logic and semiotics — in so far it constitutes a major 
contribution to the fundamental anti-psychologism of general semiot­
ics alongside Peirce’s strongly related position. The first investigation 
draws a distinction between two sign types, Ausdrücke and Anzeichen, 
respectively: signs conferring meaning to an object vs. signs merely 
indicating an object. The second investigation is a critique of empiris- 
tic abstraction theories attempting to make induction the source of 
abstract knowledge — and it points instead to a phenomenological 
change in conception modus as responsible for abstraction’s grasp of 
ideal objects. The third investigation, to which we shall return below, 
constructs the foundations for a formal ontology of wholes and parts 
which form a basis for all phenomenological and semiotic investiga­
tions in so far as it makes possible to distinguish proper parts from 
non-proper parts, the last including what is usually called properties. 
The fourth investigation takes the mereology of the third as the foun-
’ Cf. Husserliana XII which contains am ong other writings “Zur Logik der Zeichen  
(Sem iotik)” .
dation of a pure, that is, a priori grammar, mapping dependence rela­
tions between linguistic entities; nouns and sentences are taken as in­
dependent primitives which other linguistic entities are dependent 
upon. The fifth investigation is the first sketch of Husserl’s intention 
theory, distinguishing between the quality, the matter, the representa­
tive content, and the object of an act, respectively. The quality is in 
our days’ terms a speech act category; it refers to the act’s character of 
being propositional, imperative, wishing, etc. The matter of the act is 
the way its object is presented in the act, and the representative con­
tent, finally, is the degree of fulfilment with which the object is pre­
sented (perception representing the highest degree of fulfilment, and 
linguistic representations (“signitive acts”) and imaginations (“imagi­
native acts”) like fantasies, pictures, dreams, memories, etc. being act 
types with lower degree of fulfilment). All these aspects of the act are 
presented as moments, that is, “unechte Teile”, in the terminology of 
the third investigation4. Finally, the sixth investigation takes up epis- 
temology on the basis outlined in the former investigations; here, the 
central problem of categorial intuition (how categories, among them 
linguistic categories, possess their own type of intuitive fulfilment3) is 
discussed.
As is evident, most of the issues discussed in the Logische Unter­
suchungen lie at the heart of semiotics, and the mereology of the third 
investigation forms a crucial piece of formal ontology for the descrip­
tion of all these subjects. The main idea is that all objects may be de­
scribed in terms of parts and wholes, and that two types of parts may 
be distinguished. Proper parts and non-proper parts, or, parts versus 
moments, respectively. Parts — “echte Teile”, or “Stücke”, or con­
crete parts — are parts which may be separated from the whole they 
constitute, while moments — “unechte Teile”, or aspects, or abstract 
parts — are parts which may not be so separated. This sparse defini­
tion may be extended to relative autonomy and dependence, respec­
tively, so that one object is relatively dependent on another if that 
content may only exist in connection to the other or parts of it. This 
idea makes possible the crucial structure of three possible dependence 
relations between parts:
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A s a matter o f  fact, the question o f  whether the object is a genuine part or a m o­
ment ot the act is crucial to the division betw een realist from transcendental ontology.
I discuss the categorial intuition concept and its extension in Stjem felt (forthcom ­
ing a).
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Fassen wir irgendein Paar von Teilen eines Ganzen ins Auge, so beste­
hen folgenden Möglichkeiten:
1. Zwischen beiden Teilen besteht ein Verhältnis der Fundierung.
2. es besteht diese Verhältnis nicht. Im ersteren Falle kann die Fund­
ierung
a) eine gegenseitige,
b) eine einseitige sein ...” (Husserl 1984: 264-265).
Husserl’s mereological investigations includes further points of inter­
est — so as for instance the difference between wholes requiring a 
moment of unity and wholes not requiring it. Smith (1994: 236) sum­
marizes Husserl’s ideas in a small taxonomy. Between wholes, 
Husserl distinguishes those which do not require additional objects to 
exist (such as nut and bolt), opposed to those that require additional 
unifying objects (such as nails or glue). The last category yields two 
subtypes, depending on whether the unifying object is a concrete part 
or an abstract moment. In the latter case, he moment of unity will cor­
respond to von Ehrenfels’s Gestaltqualitäten.
This distinction is related to different versions of gestalt theory, 
cf. Barry Smith’s recapitulation of the Austrian gestalt school’s “pro­
duction theory” requiring such a moment of unity in addition to the 
parts, as opposed to the Berlin gestalt school’s claim that no parts of a 
gestalt are genuine and all parts are moments only accessible by ab­
straction. (Smith 1994: ch. 8). Both schools’ theories have their ad­
vantages and flip sides. The Graz school has the advantage of distin­
guishing between a part and the role played by that part in the gestalt 
in question, while the Berlin school tends to blur this distinction and 
construct a holism. The Graz school, on the other hand, tends to come 
close to Helmholtz’s old idea of gestalt-like phenomena being the re­
sult of “unbewusste Schlüsse” so as to make them an additional fea­
ture added to sense data by the intellect — while on the other hand the 
Berlin school does not follow this subjectivist idea: its holism has the 
merit of integrating both subjective and objective determinants as re­
sponsible for the gestalt, and so the Berlin school will find gestalts not 
only in the physiology of the gestalting subject, but also in the purely 
objective, even physical surroundings. Smith’s conclusion is not 
unanimous, but it seems as if the two schools correspond to different 
gestalt possibilities on a continuous scale rather than being mutually 
exclusive, so that both very subjective and very objective gestalts as 
well as a large range of intermediate types are possible. We can not go 
further into this huge discussion here, but a further clarification of
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types and subtypes of gestalts and their relation to their parts will no 
doubt enrich the semiotic discussion of mereology.
Finally, Husserl’s fourth Investigation should be added. Here, he 
outlines a pure, a priori grammar using the mereological tools of the 
third Investigation — an idea, as a matter of fact, closely related to 
Hjelmslev’s idea (cf. below). In contradistinction to Hjelmslev’s em­
pirical idea of using mereology as a descriptive metalanguage for lin­
guistics, Husserl’s idea is to base the mereological description of lan­
guage on certain ontological presuppositions, namely the privileging 
of the noun and sentence, respectively, as independent entities (after 
the Scholastic distinction between kategorematica and synkategore- 
matica, respectively, the former possess an autonomous signification). 
Furthermore, Husserl defines the important distinction between Wid­
ersinn and Unsinn, respectively — logical and grammatical nonsense, 
respectively, where the latter depends on irreconcilable syncategore- 
matica being combined, while the former is grammatical correct while 
contradictory. Husserl’s sketches of a pure grammar received more 
interest in logic than in linguistics: they became very important for 
Ajdukiewicz, Lesniewski, and the development of categorial gram­
mar. But even so, a volume like the brillant Rational Grammar by 
Jean-Louis Gardies not only outlines the Wirkungsgeschichte of the 
fourth Investigation, it also gives a detailed account of its possible 
implementation in linguistics.
Jakobson
The fact that Jakobson’s version of structural linguistics involves 
strong influences from Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen is clearly 
stated at several occasions in Jakobson’s oeuvre, but it has only re­
ceived general recognition after the work of Elmar Holenstein who, in 
a period of relative phenomenological oblivion during the sixties- 
seventies, never ceased to underline the crucial lines of connection 
between structuralism and phenomenology (Holenstein 1975, 1976). 
He even traced three or four variants of phenomenology taking each 
their characteristical departure in the Logische Untersuchungen, as 
follows (after Holenstein 1976: 586):
The schem a is, o f  course, schem atic, and lots o f  influences cross the main lines 
indicated. Ihus, it is w ell known that H eidegger w as hugely influenced by the 3rd in-
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In this respect, the first, third, and fourth Investigations, on the sign, 
mereology, and pure grammar, respectively, become founding texts for 
structural semiotics with their emphasis on the possibility of unfolding a 
set of a priori foundations for the study of semiotic phenomena.
As early as a very young member of the Moscow Linguistic Circle, 
Jakobson was acquainted with the Logische Untersuchungen through 
the Russian Husserl disciple Gustav Spet (Jakobson 1985: 281); the 
Prague Circle which he joined in the twenties was influenced by 
Husserl through its founder Vilem Mathesius (Jakobson 1971b: 713), 
and to the end of his life, Jakobson did not cease to emphasize the 
central role of Husserl in the development of semiotics (Jakobson 
1985: 203) and structural linguistics7. As a main figure in the Prague 
Structuralism, Jakobson placed a great emphasis on the 3rd and 4th 
Logische Untersuchungen especially, and several times he underlined 
his view of linguistics as a science investigating a hierarchy of wholes
vestigation, just like the 6th investigation’s d iscussion o f  categorial intuition is impor­
tant for both eidetic and structural phenom enology.
7 Jakobson (1985: 189). Here, he claim s that the 3rd Logical Investigation is “ ... one 
o f  the m ilestones for the initial advance o f  structural linguistics ...” .
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and parts8, and he envisioned language as a whole as a “pattern ot re­
lations”. In one of his major accomplishments as a linguist, the defini­
tion of the phoneme, he used Husserlian concepts not only to under­
line the anti-psychological character of the phoneme (Jakobson 1971a: 
314), but also to describe the phoneme as composed of inseparable 
aspects (‘feature bundle’). Jakobson never made one over-all theory of 
language, convinced as he was that linguistics must be made up of 
pieces taken from widely differing sources, ranging from anthropol­
ogy to mathematics, but the mereological issue is also to be found in 
his most well-known contribution to the formal research of language, 
his notion of the “marked” versus “unmarked” units of language. His 
main idea here is that language at many levels makes use of a para­
digmatic opposition between parts which are defined by asymmetric 
dependence . Markedness is defined as follows: “Eine der wesentli­
chen Eigenschaften der phonologischen Korrelation besteht darin, 
dass die beiden Glieder eines Korrelationspaares nicht gleich­
berechtigt sind: das eine Glied besitzt das betreffende Merkmal, das 
andere besitzt es nicht; das erste wird als merkmalhaltig bezeichnet, 
das zweite — als merkmallos ...”10 The opposition between these two 
is contradictory, in so far the unmarked term does not imply the ab­
sence of the feature implied by the marked term, it only implies the 
absence of any reference to that feature, be it positive or negative. 
Later, a correlated idea is presented in the theory of zero-signs, refer­
ring to the “opposition de quelque chose avec rien”, with a Saussure 
quote (Jakobson 1971b: 213). The marked term is dependent on the 
unmarked, not vice versa. This asymmetry implies, furthermore, that 
the unmarked term by Vertauschung may play the role as the more 
general term of which the marked term forms a part. A semantic ex­
ample will serve:
Like in "Parts and W holes in Language” where he begins: “ In the second part o f  
Edmund H usserl’s Logische Untersuchungen —  still one o f  the m ost inspiring contri­
butions to the phenom enology o f  language —  tw o studies devoted to “W holes and 
Parts'’ introduce the philosopher’s m editations on “the Idea o f  Pure Grammar”. In spite 
oi manifold aspects o f  interdependence betw een w holes and parts in language, lin­
guists have been prone to disregard this mutual relationship” (Jakobson 1971b: 280), 
and further, “The structure o f  the verbal code is perhaps the m ost striking and intricate 
exam ple o f  whole-part relations that are built hierarchically” (Jakobson 1971b- 2 8 2 -  
283).
It is a strange fact that Jakobson not explicitly  refers to the Logische Untersuchun­
gen in his definitions o f  the zero-sign or the m arkedness/unm arkedness distinction. 
Holenstein (1975, 1976) does not m ention any such direct influence either.
Jakobson (1971b: 3), with reference to Prince N. Troubetzkoy.
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The two extremes, horses and elephant, symmetry prevails; there is a 
mutual dependence between “mare” and “stallion” and a one-sided 
dependence of both on “horse”, so here markedness is used to erect 
co-ordinate subclasses of a class. In the elephant case, English does 
not admit special terms for the sexes (except for a duplication of the 
cow-bull distinction).
With respect to cows, however, “bull” is the marked term, while 
“cow” is unmarked. This implies two different meanings of “cow”, 
general and specific, respectively. This is to say that in neutral con­
texts, the unmarked term is used; when you for instance see a field 
with cows and bulls on it, you can indicate them all by pointing to 
them and stating: “See the cows”, while if one of your children points 
to a bull and adds: “See the big cow”, you will answer: “That’s no 
cow, it is a bull”. So the term “bull” is unilaterally dependent on the 
term “cow”. The unmarked term, so Jakobson, has a zero-meaning (in 
this case, with respect to gender) in contrast to the marked term, but it 
is characteristical that the semantics of the unmarked term now oscil­
lates between referring to the marked feature being absent on the one 
hand or referring to the absence of any marked feature on the other. 
(Cf. the specific and the general use of the word). “Cow” consequently 
oscillates between entertaining a one-sided and a mutual dependence 
with “bull”. This feature is, of course, not only found at many levels in 
language structure, but also for pragmatic reasons in use, when you 
want to single out some (small) marked subset of a set:
“A ll linguists are stupid, except fo r  cognitive linguists” :
In short, this distinction may be invoked when you want to express 
that something is part of a larger whole, but yet an atypical part.
Thus, the linguistic distinction between marked and unmarked 
seems to correspond to a cognitive and phenomenological relation 
pertaining to prototypicality. If you take as a basis a prototypical case, 
then the appearance of a non-typical case will possess an ambiguity: it 
is, on the one hand, part of the category, but, on the other hand, it dif-
linguists
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fers from the prototypical case at the centre of the category. Hence, it 
is motivated to distinguish this case from the prototypical case, so that 
a seemingly symmetrical opposition is constructed. Yet, the prototypi­
cal case’s categorizing power still extends to the marginal case, so that 
will still be subsumed under its main category. Thus, the marked cate­
gory is at one and the same time in opposition to the unmarked cate­
gory and constitutes a subtype of it — the core characteristic of the 
marked/unmarked relationship. This corresponds to the fact that in 
semantics, the tendency is that the case considered most normal, wide­
spread, prototypical, stereotypical (or any other typicality measure) 
case is referred to by the unmarked term, while the less typical case is 
referred to by the marked term, the marked term’s expression typically 
being longer and more complicated than the unmarked term . Thus, 
the marked/unmarked distinction finds its foundation in a phenome­
nological mereology.
Hjelmslev
A much more ambitious and reflective theory is Louis Hjelmslev’s 
glossematics (partly conceived in cooperation with Hans-J0rgen 
Uldall). It is probably not very well known that this theory is founded 
almost unanimously on a mereology. In opposition to Jakobson, how­
ever, this theory’s relation to the central European mereology is much 
less clear. Glossematics takes as its point of departure the necessity of 
basing the cultural sciences taken as a whole on a relation as unani­
mous as the concept of quantity in natural sciences. This relation is 
taken to be quality, measured in dependences. The dependence of one 
phenomenon on another is taken to be the very basis of the theory in 
Uldall’s Outline o f Glossematics. In his magistral and beautiful intro­
duction to the glossematic project, Prolegomena to a Theory o f Lan­
guage (Danish Omkring sprogteoriens grundlceggelse, 1943), Hjelm­
slev takes the central object of the theory of language to be the sign, 
which he analyses as follows:
Even politically correct language politics, eager to deconstruct the asymmetry 
inherent in the markedness-unmarkedness distinction, can not avoid this, cf. long 
marked forms like ‘"African-American” vs. short unmarked forms like ‘‘Am erican” .
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The idea, now, is that the central object of the study of language as a 
system are the two boxes of form. Form of expression and form of 
content, respectively, are the two areas which may be grasped by 
glossematics, and even the sign, correlating units from those two do­
mains, does not belong to the linguistic system, but to the use only. 
This implies that not only the matter of expression and content, re­
spectively, that is, phonetic matter and the phenomenological world 
referred to is left out of scope, but also expression and content in so 
far as they are substances formed by linguistic form. As the central 
object left, the respective systems of form of expression and form of 
content are now made the objects of linguistic analysis. This is pur­
sued by beginning with the discourse as an undivided whole, and 
analysis now is supposed to partition this object into invariant parts, 
named functives, registering the internal function relationship between 
them. Having exhausted this description at a given level, analysis goes 
on to repeat the procedure as to the internal structure of the elements, 
and the procedure is supposed to go on until a bottom of figurae (sim­
ple expression and content units) is reached on each of the two do­
mains. Thus, Hjelmslev adheres to what Langacker calls the building 
block metaphor. The first partitioning is supposed to give the two 
functives expression and content, thereafter follows (e.g.) periods, 
sentences, morphemes, etc.
Here, the idea of a glossematic algebra of dependences finds its 
place. Between two functives on a given level, three so-called func­
tions may be discerned, defined by types of dependence. Three possi­
ble dependences may hold between two functives: dependence, inter­
dependence, and correlation (which is the absence of dependence). 
Dependence occurs when one part requires another for its presence 
(but not vice versa), interdependence occurs when two parts mutually 
require each other and consequently only appears together, while con-
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stellation occurs when the occurrence of two parts is free, and both, 
one, or none of them is equally possible. Hjelmslev now distinguishes 
between dependences in the domains of linguistic linearisation and 
system, defined by both-and relations and either-or relations, respec­
tively, which in his vast terminological system are christened selec­
tion, solidarity, combination, and specification, complementarity, 
autonomy, respectively (Hjelmslev 1943: 37). We can illustrate 
Hjelmslev’s idea with an example from the syntactic field. Selection, 
one-sided dependence, is at stake, for instance, in the relation between 
main clause and relative clause (a relative clause may not occur with­
out a main clause, while the opposite is not the case). Solidarity, two- 
sided dependence, occurs for instance at the sentence level between 
noun phrase and verb phrase, and combination, zero dependence, is 
found e.g. between the two functives of a compound noun.
It is striking that Hjelmslev here as the basis for his theory of lan­
guage takes three mereological types of dependences very well known 
in the Brentanist tradition. We find them in Brentano, for instance, and 
at a prominent place in the 3rd Logische Untersuchungen we find the 
identical distinction between “gegenseitige”, “einseitige”, and no rela­
tion, respectively (Husserl 1984: 264-265, cf. above).
There is not, however, any mention in Hjelmslev as to where he is 
inspired to his triad of dependencies which he merely “predicts” for 
purely formal reasons. While his co-founder of the Copenhagen circle 
and enemy Viggo Br0ndal refers to Husserl, just like their common 
disciple Diderichsen does decades later, there is no mention of any 
phenomenological inspiration in the Prolegomena n At several occa­
sions, Diderichsen remarks upon the complete similarity between the 
dependence calculi of the Prolegomena and Logical Investigations, 
but no further explanation is given.13 The reasons for this is hard to 
guess, but three possibilities (at least) are at hand. One is, of course, 
that Hjelmslev simply came upon the idea of a mereological grammar
The only reference to Husserl found in H jelm slev is in the early Principes, but 
even if  it refers to the 4th investigation, it is pejorative: “ ... la theorie etrange du phi- 
losophe H USSERL” (H jelm slev 1928: 40).
None o f  tw o recent com prehensive treatises on H jelm slev m entions any possible  
relation to Husserl (Gregersen 1992, Rasmussen 1992).
Diderichsen returns over and over again to the fact that linguistics in general tends 
to focus upon "three main types o f  grammatical connexion”, and at several occasions  
he mentions in that context H usserl’s m ereological analyses from Logische Unter­
suchungen as strikingly similar to structural linguistics (D iderichsen 1966: 107 [1947], 
137 [19481, 207 [1952]) but he yields no indication as to the possib le relationship be­
tween Husserl and Hjelmslev.
independently; another is that the absence of references is due to the 
very radical and autonomy-claiming linguistics he is about to found. 
Unlike his companion Br0ndal, much more Jakobsonian in spirit in his 
reference to the philosophical tradition and to a multiplicity of sources 
for his version of structuralism, Hjelmslev wants to free himself from 
any metaphysics, inspired by logical positivism as he is. Maybe he 
saw too much metaphysical heritage in references to the phenomenol­
ogical tradition? A third possibility is influence via an intermediate (so 
as for instance Anton Marty14; both Jakobson and Br0ndal seem un­
likely in that role) or from a common source of inspiration (Brentano).
If we go into the history of glossematics in more detail, an even 
more complicated relation to mereological considerations shows up. 
In addition to the dependence calculus of the Prolegomena, Hjelmslev 
has a further concern with mereological issues in his calculus of so- 
called “concept zones” (in the content side, approximately corre­
sponding to “semantic domains”) and their parts. This idea appears as 
early as 1933, in the context of the semantic motivation of grammatic 
categories and in direct discussion with Jakobson’s markedness con­
cept (Hjelmslev 1985: 35ff). Jakobson’s binarism of course implies 
that paradigms with three terms must be analyzed as degenerate ver­
sions of four-term systems obtained by the combination of two two- 
term systems. Arguing against binarism, Hjelmslev proposes — 
probably with inspiration from Br0ndal — a tripartition instead of a 
bipartition of the zone of a given conceptual substance, yielding two 
opposed parts with a neutral domain between them. (To see which use 
Hjelmslev makes of these ideas, let us mention his analysis of gram­
matical numerus which is seen as founded on the concept zone of dis­
crete versus compact, including a neutral zone between them. Hjelm­
slev 1972: 94f). Interestingly, Hjelmslev calls this calculus “sublogi- 
cal”; it is inspired by Levy-Bruhl’s idea of “participation” in “primi­
tive” thought where opposed terms may share content. Thus formal 
logic is supposed to be one possible derivate from this sublogical ba­
sis, an idea not unrelated to Husserl’s idea of a phenomenological 
foundation of logic (Husserl 1985).
Such a three-part zone now may be occupied by different terms, 
defined by placing each their emphasis on differing combinations of
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14 Marly, w hose 1908 Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik 
und Sprachphilosophie refers to the Logische Untersuchungen. H jelm slev refers to 
Marty at several occasions, but not directly in connection to the dependence algebra.
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the three parts of the zone, this emphasis indicated by a slash in the 
relevant part(s) of the concept zone:
So a term of a paradigm is now seen as a specific combination of the 
three parts of the paradigm’s concept zone. Thus, Jakobson’s marked- 
ness-unmarkedness distinction corresponds to only two of these possi­
bilities, namely the term occupying only one of the opposed terms 
(markedness), together with the term indistinctly occupying the whole 
concept zone (unmarkedness). Thus, unmarkedness is no longer the 
mere absence of the marked term, unmarkedness is reconstructed as 
the vague presence of the whole of the concept zone. But the distribu­
tion of the emphasis/non-emphasis over the three-part concept zone 
yields seven possibilities (with the exclusion of the zero case without 
any emphasis at all) instead of two. Later in the development of 
glossematics, this calculus is further complicated by the introduction 
of two emphasis degrees (already in 1934, cf. Hjelmslev 1972), and in 
the elaborated technical presentation of glossematics in the “Resume” 
of the early forties (Hjelmslev 1975), a new set of seven possible em­
phasis patterns over three-part concept zones is established. These 
different emphasis terms now combine pairwise to give no less than 
twelve possible different polar opposites within one and the same con­
cept zone (Hjelmslev 1975: 42), just like systems with from two up to 
six internally opposed terms appear as a possibility of different em­
phases of a concept zone (ibid. 31-32). It must be said, though, that 
the implicit constraints preventing free combination to give an even 
larger set of possibilities are never made explicit, and neither of the 
two recent and very thorough reconstructions of Hjelmslev (Gregersen 
1992, Rasmussen 1992) are able to make clear the nature and role of 
these constraints. In our context, it must be added, though, that the 
concept zone calculus in its “bound” variant is argued to give exactly 
the three dependence types as a corollary (Hjelmslev 1975: 60). Thus, 
it might be said that just like in Husserl, an explicitly mereological
calculus (the partitioning of the concept zone it into three parts and 
their possible combinations) results in a dependence calculus — even 
if the route of derivation is much more labyrinthine in Hjelmslev’s 
case and necessitates further research surpassing the scope of this pa­
per. As to the influence question, there seems to be a thin thread lead­
ing from the 3rd investigation via Jakobson’s markedness concept to 
Hjelmslev’s complicated three-value markedness calculi and further 
on to his three dependence types — but without any explanation as to 
how exactly the same dependence calculus appears at each end of that 
thread.
Anyway, the radical purism in Hjelmslev’s dependence calculus as 
well as in his concept zone calculus also has other conseuences which 
is my main reason to bring him into the discussion in this context of 
actual mereological thought. Hjelmslev’s purism namely displays 
some dangers in a too consequent mereological approach. To see this, 
take Hjelmslev’s mereological treatment of linguistic tradition. The 
whole inventory of morphology and syntax, of distinctions between 
syllables, words, flections, sentences, hypotaxis, parataxis, etc. must 
be given up completely in favour of a purely mereological description. 
We are not supposed to distinguish preposition and government, e.g., 
in any other way than by knowing that one selects the other, the whole 
complex of the two again being independent of the clause as a whole 
on sentence level. The same goes for semantics where the shortcom­
ings of the theory were most easily felt; the consequent mereological 
approach prohibited any phenomenological semantics in so far as the 
elements of meaning were allowed to receive purely arbitrary denomi­
nations only15. Being functives, they were to be referred to by alge­
braical letters, and their semantic content was supposed to be read off 
their mereological dependencies only16. In lexical semantics, the the­
ory restricted itself to banalities such as that the meaning of “bull” was 
dependent on the meanings of “ox” and “male”, respectively.
Mereology and semiotics 87
13 Here, Diderichsen is admirably clear in his early insistence that formal glossem atic
description is im possible without a prior phenom enological sensibility for identities
and differences (Diderichsen 1966: 123 [1948]).
16 This consequence is still v isib le in Greimasian sem iotics, having inherited the 
whole o f  its metatheoretical apparatus from the Prolegomena. In the sem iotics o f  the 
Paris school, the orthodoxy teaches that denom inations o f  theoretical as w ell as meta­
theoretical terms are com pletely arbitrary; still they are invariably chosen so they are 
relatively easily  understandable with reference to ordinary language or linguistic tradi­
tion.
What is to be learned from the partial failure of Hjelmslev’s grand 
mereological project? The set of restrictions which the theory admits 
deliberately cuts it off from possible insights, first in the letting out of 
sight language’s reference to any context (“matter”), and second in its 
dogmatic decision that any relation between expression is content is 
merely arbitrary. Both these ideas have been excellently attacked by 
the cognitive semantics tradition17. The main implication in this con­
text, however, to be drawn concerns the consequences of the idea of a 
purely mereological dependence calculus used as a descriptive meta­
language. Such a calculus so to speak conceives its object from out­
side, sees it constructed by discrete building-blocks holding a highly 
restricted set of dependencies between them. To describe language 
and other semiotic phenomena (which is, implicitly, the ambition of 
glossematics, the matter of expression being of secondary importance) 
it is necessary not to delimit oneself beforehand to one selected cal­
culus (even if it is a fertile one) of description. Moreover, Hjelmslev’s 
use of it repeats some of the Berlin School’s less lucky consequences 
without gaining its advantages: Hjelmslev ceases to use traditional 
linguistic terminology, so that for instance morphology versus syntax 
should be mereologically reinterpreted. But doing so, the Graz School 
advantage of being able to distinguish a part (a word’s morphology) 
from the role played (in sentence syntax) in a gestalt, is lost.
Another drawback is extremely discontinuous character of the cal­
culus, given by the definition of the dependence calculus to hold be­
tween well-defined units of a lower level (which is not a necessary 
implication by dependence calculi). All continuous phenomena in sig­
nification is a priori bracketed by the choice of so restricted a meta­
language (on the linguistic expression side intonation, prosodic fea­
tures, gestures; on the content side the whole question of continuous 
schemata and their (continuous) eidetic variation in semantic descrip­
tion.)
Finally, a drawback is a fact which Barry Smith has often referred 
to: mereology’s explicit and admitted weakness. In Lesniewski’s ver­
sion, this was even picked as a special privilege of the theory, making 
it independent of ontological assumptions. The flip side of this is that 
mereology’s weakness makes it unfit to describe most empirical 
wholes without further formal equipment. In linguistics, this further 
equipment is most often tacitly presupposed — in for instance the idea
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For instance Ronald Langacker at the “W holes and their Parts” conference in B ol­
zano 1998, where this paper was presentedgiven.
of co-existence of terms in a sentence. But dependence relations does 
not in any way imply the existence of parts in the same place. A whole 
consisting of the tone A, my left shoe and the contour of England is 
perfectly admissible. Contiguous wholes thus require at least addi­
tional topologies for their description, making it possible to distin­
guish connected and non-connected wholes — and they may require 
metrics, spatio-temporal embedding and much more in order to map 
further properties of interest; this goes for objects in general as well as 
for objects of semiotics specifically. Mereology and its dependence 
calculi do remain a very important formal part of semiotics, but we 
have no reason to assume that they exhaust the formalisms necessary, 
just like a considerable work in formal ontology will be required to 
yield a more refined taxonomy of gestalt types.
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Peirce
Consequently, a much more liberal stance must be taken with respect 
to which forms may count as significant. A reflection of this kind, also 
with mereological implications, is found in Charles Peirce, albeit in 
two of the less well-known corners of his theory, namely in his theo­
ries of diagrams and of abstraction, respectively18. As is probably
Peirce’s explicit interest in the whole-part issue is delimited to the article on that 
subject in B aldw in’s dictionary. Here, he finds that a w hole is always a collection  
which is no easily  defined concept; moreover, it is, just like in large parts o f  the Bren­
tano tradition, an ens rationis, an abstraction on the basis o f  more concrete parts. Just 
like the more sensitive parts o f  this tradition, Peirce w ill admit both subjective and 
objective w holes. He concludes this sm all article with a alphabetical botanies o f  whole 
types w hich he does not pursue further, but which may be interesting to quote here 
(Peirce 1998, 1: 383):
“Many adjectives are used to distinguish different kinds o f  w holes. Certain o f  the 
phrases may be defined.
Actual whole: any w hole w hich cannot exist without the existence o f  its parts. 
U sually identified with the Constitute w hole. M onboddo’s definition (A ncient M et., i. 
479) is not quite accurate.
C ollective w hole, or aggregate whole: defined by Chauvin as “that which has ma­
terial parts separate and accidentally thrown together into one, as an army”, etc. But the 
exam ple show s that organization does not d isqualify a w hole from being called co llec­
tive, although the term totum per aggregationem w ill no longer be applied to it, in that 
case. In so far as a w hole is collective, any other relation between its parts is put out o f  
view .
Com posite whole: a term o f  Burgersdicius, w ho (Inst. M et., I. xxii. §7) defines it 
as quod ex duabus partibus constat quarum una est in potentia ad alterum et altera
90 Frederik Stjernfelt
vice versa actus est alterius. It includes the whole by information and the w hole by 
inherence.
Com prehensive whole: a w hole o f  logical com prehension.
Constituent whole: a w hole which is essential to its parts.
Constitute whole: a w hole w hose parts are essential to it. See Actual w hole  
(above).
Continuous whole: a continuum regarded as a w hole. In order to define it, it w ould  
first be necessary to define continuity. N ow  w e have, perhaps, not yet succeeded in 
analyzing the conception o f  continuity; for what the m athem aticians call by that name, 
such as the relations o f  all real quantities capable o f  being designated to an indefinite 
degree o f  approximation by means o f  a w hole number and a decim al, does not answer 
the requisites o f  the problem.
Copulative whole: a w hole consisting o f  a sign w hich is essentially applicable to 
whatever certain signs, called its parts, are all applicable, but is essentially  inapplicable 
to anything to which any one o f  these signs is inapplicable.
Definite whole: a w hole constituted by genus and difference.
D efinitive whole: see D efinite w hole (above).
D iscrete whole: the sam e as a C ollective w hole (above).
D isjunctive whole: a w hole consisting o f  a sign w hich is essentially  applicable to 
whatever any one o f  certain signs, called its parts, is applicable, but is essentially inap­
plicable to anything to which none o f  these parts is applicable.
Dissimilar whole: same as Heterogeneous w hole (below ).
Essential whole: great confusion exists in the use o f  this very com m on expression. 
Aquinas (Summa Theol., Pt. I. lxxvi. 8) uses it in a broad sense w hich w ould make it 
about equivalent to Burgersdicius’ com posite w hole, or perhaps broader. On the other 
hand, it is som etim es restricted to the w hole per informationem, and this is perhaps the 
best settled use. But others make it include the physical and the m etaphysical w hole as 
its two species.
Extensive whole: a w hole o f  logical extension, usually called a subjective or logi­
cal whole.
Formal whole: a com prehensive w hole, especially  o f  essential com prehension. See 
Actual whole (above).
Heterogeneous whole: a term o f  Aquinas; a w hole w hose parts are dissim ilar from 
the whole.
H om ogeneous whole: a term o f  Aquinas; a w hole w hose parts are sim ilar to the 
whole, as the parts o f  a w hole o f  water are.
Integral w hole (a term in com m on use since Abölard’s time): Blundevile (1599) 
says, “W hole integral is that which consisteth o f  integral parts, w hich though they 
cleave together, yet they are distinct and severall in number, as m an’s body, consisting  
o f  head, brest, belly, legs, etc.” The usual definition is quod habet partem extra par­
tem, which restricts it to space. Burgersdicius, how ever, says that parts which differ in 
their ordinal places are partes extra partes.
Integrate whole: a pedantic variant o f  Integral w hole (above).
Logical whole: same as Universal w hole (below ).
Mathematical whole: same as Integral w hole (above).
M etaphysical whole: a w hole in that respect in w hich a species is the w hole o f  its 
genus and difference. See Formal whole (above).
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well known, one of the main projects of Peirce’s philosophy is the 
classification of signs — signs in general, including the signs used in 
the sciences, so that his theory by the same token becomes an episte- 
mology. A crucial part of this epistemology connects the two issues of 
diagrams and abstraction (which, if taken separately, form rather re­
mote and seemingly insignificant branches in Peirce’s vast tree of 
triparting distinctions19).
Natural whole: a term proposed by Hamilton to replace Com prehensive or M eta­
physical whole; as if  that were not sufficiently provided with aliases under which to 
hide itself.
N egative whole: a unit regarded as a w hole, as in the phrases dens totus est ubique, 
and anima est tota in toto corpore.
Physical whole: a w hole com pounded o f  substance and accident; but som e say o f  
matter and form; and som e that both com e to the same thing. In the peripatetic view , 
however, substance is form, not matter.
Positive whole: a w hole consisting o f  parts. See N egative w hole (above).
Potential whole: sam e as Universal w hole (below ); so called because the genus 
does not actually, but only potentially, contain the species, etc.
Potestative whole: a term o f  Aquinas; equivalent to Potential w hole (above).
Predicative whole: a w hole o f  logical depth.
Quantitative whole: sam e as Integral w hole (above).
Similar whole: see H om ogeneous w hole (above).
Subject whole: sam e as Subjective w hole (below ).
Subjective whole: a very venerable name for Universal w hole (below ).
Substantial whole: a w hole o f  logical breadth.
Universal whole: see Universal.
W hole by accident: such a w hole as neither essentially belongs to the parts nor the 
parts to it.
W hole by aggregation or aggregative whole: sam e as C ollective w hole (above) in 
an exclusive sense.
W hole by information: a compound o f  act and power in the sam e kind, such as 
man, according to the Aristotelian theory o f  the soul.
W hole by inherence: sam e as Physical w hole (above).
W hole by itse lf  or per se: a w hole which essentially  belongs to its parts or its parts 
to it.”
14 Thus, as to diagrams, they are a subspecies o f  icons. One o f  Peirce’s m ost famous 
classifications is the tripartition o f  signs as to their reference to their object which may 
take place due to sim ilarity, cause, or convention, g iv ing icons, indices, and sym bols, 
respectively. N ow  these three are not species o f  a genera, they are rather to be con­
ceived o f  as Russian dolls, so  that indices typically involve icons, and sym bols involve  
both the simpler types o f  signs. N ow , the category o f  icons is in turn subdivided again, 
into im ages, diagrams, and metaphors. The first icons are like their object with respect 
to a sim ple quality, the second due to interrelations between its parts, and the third 
locates a sim ilarity in a third object.
A s to hypostatic abstractions, they form a triad together with concrete signs and 
collective signs (referring to individuals and collections, respectively), all o f  them
The crucial thing in this respect is that to Peirce, abstract diagrams 
are the machines for all necessary reasoning. It is important here to 
notice, that the definition of icons as signs by similarity is not trivial; 
it is expanded into the definition that an icon is a sign by the contem­
plation of which it is possible to discover new truths not stated in the 
construction of the icon. When this is applied to the subtype of icon 
called diagram, this implies that by the contemplation of the interrela­
tion of parts in a whole you may discover new properties not stated in 
the construction recipe for it. When we want to reason about anything, 
be it empirical or apriorical, we imagine a diagram of it, and then we 
observe the diagram while we perform manipulations of it. Diagrams 
thus forms a very general concept in Peirce, including for instance 
geographical maps, machine instructions, geometrical figures, graphs, 
mental maps, schemata etc. This broad generality is one of the great
points in the concept, being at the same time a basically mereological
.20concept .
The diagram is a stylized picture of its object — and this styliza­
tion involves two kinds of abstractions. One is the so-called “prescis­
sion”, the second of Peirce’s three distinction types, dissociation, pre­
scission, and discrimination, respectively. These separation types, in 
fact, form the equivalent in Peirce to the dependence calculi we iso­
lated in the other three semioticians. Dissociation separates independ­
ent objects; prescission separates objects which may be supposed to 
exist separately; discrimination separates objects which may only be 
represented separately. The precise relation between these distinction 
types and the dependence calculi of Husserl and Hjelmslev has not 
been established yet, but the following is a first attempt: dissociation 
is the distinguishing ability corresponding to constellation in Hjelm­
slev and independence in Husserl, while prescission separates a 
founding part from a founded part and discrimination vice versa (so 
that interdependent parts may only be discriminated, while unilaterally 
dependent parts may be prescinded (the independent part) or discrimi­
nated (the dependent part).
When making a diagram, we must prescind it from the particular 
token drawn on a piece of paper so as to grasp it as an ideal object. 
Furthermore, the activity we may picture with a diagram by manipu-
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subtypes o f  singular objects which, in turn, form a triad o f  signs for immediate objects, 
including vague signs, singular signs and general signs.
On the crucial role played by diagrams in the mature P eirce’s thought, see Stjem - 
felt (2000).
lating it, may itself be made the object of a higher-order diagram. This 
is “hypostatic abstraction” in Peirce’s system, to be sharply distin­
guished from the distinction types: it makes a noun out of a predicate 
and thus makes it possible further to investigate the properties of this 
predicate. Prescission thus is a focussing mechanism, leading to the 
predicative isolation of still more general properties of an object — 
while abstraction is an objectifying mechanism, making an object of 
thought out of a predicate, or, as Peirce puts it sloganlike, it makes a 
thing out of a thought.
Now, in addition to arise by means of prescission, the diagram — 
be it empirical or pure — forms a whole consisting of interrelated 
parts. The character of the interrelations make certain experiments 
possible, and these experiments are now interpreted as holding also 
for the object depicted:
Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things 
asserted in the premisses, forms a diagram of that state of things, per­
ceives in the parts of that diagram relations not explicitly mentioned in the 
premises, satisfies itself by mental experiments upon the diagram that 
these relations would always subsist, or at least would do so in a certain 
proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, or probable, truth. For 
example, let the premiss be that there are four marked points upon a line 
which has neither extremity nor furcation. Then, by means of a diagram,
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we may conclude that there are two pairs of points such that in passing 
along the line in any way from one to the other point of either pair, one 
point of the second pair will be passed an odd number of times and the 
other point an even (or zero) number of times. This is deduction. (Peirce 
1998, 1: 66)21
21 The shortest presentation is probably: “For mathematical reasoning consists in 
constructing a diagram according to a general precept, in observing certain relations 
between parts o f  that diagram not explicitly  required by the precept, show ing that these 
relations w ill hold for all such diagrams, and in formulating this conclusion in general 
terms. All valid necessary reasoning is in fact thus diagrammatic” (Peirce 1.54). The 
object o f  mathematics w ill be pure diagrams o f  any kind, w hile ordinary reasoning as
Take for instance a geographical map — a continuous diagram — 
constructed by triangulation from selected points in the landscape. 
I can now perform the experiment on the diagram, measuring with a 
yardstick and dividing with the scale — showing that there is 40 miles 
from Bolzano to Trento — even if this information did not have any 
place at all in the construction of the map. To Peirce, this definition of 
diagram includes even algebra — in so far as it is possible to manipu­
late algebraic formulae in order to obtain new information (solving 
equations, e.g.), algebra must be counted among the central subtypes 
of diagrams.
It is an important feature of diagrams that they are at the same time 
general and observable (in this way they are Peirce’s version of the 
Schemata of Kant’s 1st Critique, uniting concepts and intuition). They 
permits us to see, in a token drawing, a diagram type, and hence that 
the manipulation we undertake is generally valid for a whole class of 
related manipulations, not only the single one undertaken on the dia­
gram drawing. An important diagrammatical operation is the working 
together of prescission with abstraction, that is, a diagram property is 
selected as an object which may itself be subject to rule-governed ma­
nipulation. Abstraction permits the diagram to be recursive and embed 
one diagram with its whole set of procedures as an object in a more 
abstract diagram making it possible to investigate the first one. To stay 
in the map example, we can for instance generalize from the single 
map and abstract the subject of “mapness”, leading to the question of 
possible projections giving rise to maps with various properties. In 
Husserlian slang, this makes possible to investigate still more abstract 
moments as if they were Stücke.
The strength of the diagram category is that it — in contrast to the 
dependence calculi of the early Husserl and of glossematics — dis­
plays the wide variety of (not only) mereological devices used in the 
construction of meaning. In any case, namely, a diagram analyses its 
object into a collection of interrelated parts, the relations of which 
may be specified in many terms in addition to dependence: connect­
edness, boundedness, quantity, locality, form, metric relations ... But 
in all cases the relations between the parts must be “ rational” , that is, 
they must be defined clearly in order to facilitate unambiguous dia­
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well as the empirical sciences w ill use the sam e diagrams w hile being constrained by 
the appearance o f  the world as w ell.
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gram manipulation. Thus, they include all relations giving possibly 
rise to necessary reasoning22.
To conclude
The four semioticians discussed here all include mereological investi­
gations at central points of their thought — but they do not ascribe it 
the same role. In Husserl, it forms a crucial part of formal ontology, 
relevant for any ontological domain whatsoever (but not necessarily 
with any claim for being exhaustive for formal ontology), and it sub­
sequently plays a central role in his pure grammar. In Hjelmslev, ex­
actly the same calculus is supposed to be the formalism relevant to 
describe all possible formal properties in semiotic systems as a pre- 
suppositionless metalanguage deprived of any of the ontological am­
bitions of phenomenology. Yet, Husserl’s refusal that “vague mor­
phologies” may be formalized, may approach him to Hjelmslev, and 
their strong reliance on dependence calculi may probably have its rea­
son in their reliance on the former’s weak, methodological reliance 
upon logic, and the latter’s strong methodological reliance upon lan­
guage, respectively, both being discontinuous systems. Jakobson, on 
the other hand, makes a less theoretical use of mereology, but his the­
ory points towards a pragmatical grounding of mereology in prelin- 
guistic, phenomenological perception of wholes with atypical parts — 
generalizing the experience of discovery: the sudden appearance of a 
new, strange phenomenon within the bounds of the supposedly well- 
known. Peirce, finally, from a classificatory point of view, yields the 
least explicit, but most comprehensive mereology, including continu­
ous mappings of all sorts, delimited by the efficacity constraint of the 
pragmatic maxim only.
Thus, all four of them may contribute to the ongoing investigation 
of mereology’s role in semiotics. Hjelmslev’s and Husserl’s precise
22 M aybe this very general notion o f  diagram —  parts with unspecified interrelations 
being open to abstraction to classes o f  interrelations —  makes Peirce’s schema an early 
forerunner o f  category theory. Finally, I im agine P eirce’s very w ide concept o f  dia­
gram can not only generalize Kant’s idea o f  a schem a, but also serve as a unifying  
concept for the various schem a-like ideas that prevail in present-day cognitive sem an­
tics (im age schem as, force dynamics, landmark-trajectory, etc.). If  so, then the sem an­
tic processes mapped in this tradition —  metaphorical mapping, blending, conceptual 
extension etc. —  w ould be understandable as specific  variants o f  manipulation on a 
diagram.
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dependence calculi from one side — freed from the former’s ex- 
haustibility claims and fear for ontology —  Jakobson’s empirical and 
pragmatic fertilization of these ideas — and as a general framework, 
Peirce’s sketch of a diagrammatic semiotics including dependence 
calculi in its prescission theory and whole-part mappings in its dia­
gram theory. The integration of these insights should make the rela­
tion between semiotics and mereology a serious challenge.
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Мереология и семиотика
Статья дает обзор роли мереологии — теории частей и целых — в 
семиотике. Коротко представлена мереология четырех крупнейших 
семиотиков — Гуссерля, Якобсона, Ельмслева и Пирса, описывается 
роль мереологии в общем строении их теорий со ссылкой на тра­
дицию Брентано. Наконец, предпринята оценка сильных и слабых 
сторон этих ученых и предлагаются некоторые перспективы даль­
нейших исследований.
Mereoloogia ja semiootika
Artiklis antakse ülevaade mereoloogia (teooria osadest ja tervikust) rollist 
semiootikas. Lühidalt esitletakse nelja suure semiootiku — Husserli, 
Jakobsoni, Hjelmslevi ja Peirce’i — mereoloogiat ja kirjeldatakse mereo­
loogia osa nende teooriate ülesehituses juhindudes Brentano traditsioo­
nist. Püütakse anda hinnangut nimetatud teadlaste tugevatele ja nõrkadele 
külgedele ja pakutakse välja mõningad uued uurimissuunad.
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Abstract. The Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico foreshadowed many 
of the ideas currently being entertained by the modem cognitive and hu­
man sciences. By emphasizing the role of the imagination in the produc­
tion of meaning, Vico showed how truly ingenious the first forms of rep­
resentation were. His view that these forms were “poetic” is only now 
being given serious attention, as more and more linguists and psycholo­
gists come to realize the role of metaphor in the generation of abstract 
systems of representation. The Estonian semiotician Yuri Lotman es­
poused a basically similar view, highlighting the role of the poetic imagi­
nation in the generation of the textuality that holds cultures together in 
meaningful ways. A comparison of these two exceptional thinkers has 
never been entertained. This note aims to do exactly that. Specifically, it 
takes a first glimpse at the parallels of thought and method that inhere in 
the main works of these two ground-breaking thinkers. Such a comparison 
will establish a theoretical framework to make semiotics a true “science of 
the imagination”. It will show that semiosis and representation are not tied 
to any innate neural mechanisms, but rather to a creative tendency in the 
human species to literally “invent itse lf’.
Introduction
Since the 1970s there has been a noticeable increase of interest and 
writing on two previously-neglected figures in the history of ideas — 
the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) and the Esto­
nian semiotician Yuri Lotman (1922-1993). The reason for this is,
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arguably, that the modem human and cognitive sciences are finally 
“catching up” to their ideas. Both were interested, fundamentally, in 
unraveling the raison d^tre  and origins of meaning structures in the 
human species and in how these constituted the source of cultural 
systems. Both saw the imagination as the primary faculty of mind un­
derlying the invention of these very structures. Vico called it fantasia; 
Lotman characterized it as a kind of energy. Simply put, for Vico and 
Lotman Homo sapiens was “sapient” because it was, in essence, an 
imaginative creative species. Both went against the Western tradition 
of studying the human mind “objectively” or “scientifically”, arguing 
that only an orientation based on a study of the imagination would 
provide truly meaningful insights into the nature of human knowledge 
and of how it is literally created by the mind.
To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever entertained a com­
parison of these two ground-breaking thinkers. That is the purpose of 
the present brief note. It is unlikely that the great Estonian semiotician 
ever read Vico. So, the comparison to be carried out here is not the 
typical one of showing the purported influence of one thinker upon 
another. Rather, the perspective to be adopted in this essay inheres 
simply in highlighting the remarkable “isomorphisms” that can be 
detected in the work of Vico and Lotman. Specifically, the compari­
son will be carried out within the framework of three fundamental 
notions, named by Vico as fantasia, ingegno, and memoria (see Ver­
ene 1981, Mooney 1985, Bedani 1989, Danesi 1993 for detailed dis­
cussions of these notions). All citations from Vico’s New Science — 
his main work — are taken from T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch’s 1984 
revised translation of the third edition published in 1744. Allusions to 
Lotman’s ideas are based on the following works: Lotman (1977, 
1980, 1984, 1990, 1994), Lotman and Uspenskij (1973, 1978), and 
Ivanov, Lotman, Pjatigorski, Toporov, and Uspenskij (1998).
Fantasia
In Vico’s times, Cartesianism dominated the academic scene of the day, 
causing the older tradition, centered on the study of language and lit­
erature, to lose ground to an emphasis on mathematics, critical philoso­
phy, and the sciences. Vico warned that an emphasis on logic was ulti­
mately counterproductive. Natural learning, he emphasized, followed a 
developmental route that started from concrete modes of thinking, pro­
A note on Vico and Lotman 101
gressing only gradually, and with significant effort, to rational modes. 
In this developmental scenario, Vico viewed the imagination, which he 
called the fantasia, as the central force in knowledge-acquisition. His 
magnum opus of 1725, La scienza nuova (The New Science, Vico 1984 
[1725]) is, in fact, characterizable as a “science of the imagination”, as 
Verene (1981) aptly calls it. This work should have guaranteed him a 
wide readership and a broad range of responses. But it went virtually 
unnoticed until the latter part of the twentieth century as a truly remark­
able treatise on the mind, when the human and cognitive sciences fi­
nally started to take serious notice of the kinds of things Vico was 
thinking and writing about over two and a half centuries ago. His ideas 
on the nature of human rationality, and on how it must have originated 
in the imagination, are not only highly compatible with current thinking 
in some of the modem sciences, but they are also highly suggestive of 
future directions for these sciences to pursue. The idea that cognition is 
an extension of bodily experience, a kind of abstracted sensoriality, 
which is starting to receive serious and widespread attention by some 
psychologists and linguists, is, as a matter of fact, the unifying principle 
that Vico utilized to tie together all the thematic strands that he weaved 
throughout The New Science.
Vico argued that this extension is accomplished through the 
workings of the imagination. He saw it as the mental faculty that gen­
erated rational thought, language, and ultimately, culture. He sought 
access to its workings, not by means of a Cartesian-type method of 
observation and analysis, but through a study of the symbolic arti­
facts — especially humanity’s first words and myths — to which the 
primordial imagination gave birth. For Vico, Descartes’ “spectator 
theory” of knowledge was of little value, for he did not believe in a 
world as an object to be studied independently of the individual’s in­
volvement in it. The purported “facts” that scientists discovered were, 
for Vico, no more than “artifacts” of the mind. The reason why we are 
so convinced by such artifacts is that we ourselves have invented 
them. As an alternative to Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum perspective, 
Vico proposed one by which humans first feel, then vaguely perceive 
what they have felt, and, finally, attempt to develop distinct ideas from 
their perceptions. So, in counterposition to Descartes’ Latin maxim, 
Vico’s perspective could perhaps be phrased as Sentio ergo sum.
The cornerstone notion of The New Science, ‘poetic wisdom’, can 
be found in Book Two. There, Vico’s objective was to discuss the first 
form of mentality — the innate universal capacity to think “poeti-
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cally”, i.e. iconically and sensorially. The most important feature of 
the poetic mind is that it is highly metaphorical and mythological. It 
is, in other words, totally dependent on the images generated by bod­
ily experiences as they are encoded and shaped by the imagination. 
From this “poetic” state of mind the first human cultures took shape, 
developing the first institutions, especially religious, burial, and mar­
riage rites. The organization of early cultures is, thus, universally “po­
etic;” i.e. it is based upon, and guided by, conscious bodily experi­
ences that have been transformed into generalized ideas by the human 
fantasia.
The distinguishing feature of the primordial form of human con­
sciousness is that it allows us literally to “imagine” stimuli that are no 
longer present for the sensory system to react to in its biologically- 
programmed way. The thought units that result from these images are 
iconic signs —  units of thought that stand for their referents in direct 
ways. These signs also allow humans to think about their referents 
away from their contexts of occurrence. The fantasia can thus “create” 
new realities totally within the confines of mental space — hence the 
meaning of imagination as a creative faculty. By not being con­
strained to a stimulus-response environment, the imagination has be­
stowed upon humans the capacity to “imagine” fictional (context-free) 
beings, objects, and events. The fantasia thus liberates human beings 
from the constraints imposed on all other organisms by biology. As 
Verene (1981: 101) puts it, the imagination allows humans “to know 
from the inside” by extending “what is made to appear from sensation 
beyond the unit of its appearance and to have it enter into connection 
with all else that is made by the mind from sensation”.
The debate on the imagery goes back to Plato, who separated the 
image (eikon) from the idea (eidos). This set in motion the tendency to 
view rational thought as separate from mental imagery and as a more 
powerful shaper of cognition. Descartes (1637) reinforced this notion 
by claiming that mental images proceed without logic, and so cannot 
be studied scientifically. The Cartesian view ignores, of course, the 
Renaissance tradition of ingenium and the fact that even Plato used 
myths or likely narratives as the primary means for gaining access to 
an understanding of “reality”. Paradoxically, as Verene (1981) has 
pointed out, Descartes’ own style of presentation unfolds in the form 
of highly suggestive and creative imagery. What Plato, Descartes, and 
all philosophers fixated on the idea forgot, according to Vico, was that 
mental imagery is essential to thought. In fact, he makes the ability to
form and extend images a universal feature of cognition. The fanta­
sia ’s image-making capacity is a primordial power of the human mind 
that makes cognition itself possible.
Remarkably, in the work of Lotman it is fairly easy to detect the 
same Vichian notion that the basic form of mentality is poetic — a 
form which he characterizes as energeia, a kind of “creative potency” 
that undergirds every act of meaning-making, from the simple inven­
tion of words to the creation of elaborate artistic texts. As Torop 
(1999: 11) aptly puts it, Lotman’s notion of creative potency is at the 
basis of his corollary notion of modeling —  a view that has started to 
influence semiotic methodology in systematic ways (e.g. Cäceres 
Sanchez 1997, Kull 1999, 2000, Torop 1998, Sebeok 1998, Sonesson 
1998, Danesi and Perron 1999, Sebeok and Danesi 2000). Essentially, 
as I read Lotman with “Vichian eyes”, I see his notion of creative 
modeling as fantasia. For both Vico and Lotman this creative faculty 
is the force that links the biosphere with the semiosphere in all acts of 
representation (see also Cornwell 1992, Kristeva 1994, Mandelker 
1994, Kull 1998, and Portis-Winner 1999 on the Lotmanian notion of 
semiosphere).
The semiosphere is “the smallest functioning mechanism” (Lotman 
1990: 125) of human cognition that allows the mind to conceptualize 
basic experiences of sensation. Like the great biologist Jakob von 
Uexküll (1909), Lotman finds a constant point of contact between bi­
ology and human mental activity. Uexküll argued that every species 
had different inward and outward lives. The key to understanding this 
duality could be found in the anatomical structure of the species itself 
and in the kind of innate modeling systems it possessed. Animals with 
widely divergent anatomies and modeling systems do not have access 
to the same kinds of experiences and perceptions (Sebeok 1990, 
1994). For Lotman, the ability to convert biospheric reality into 
semiospheric reality is the reason why, over time, the human species 
has come to be regulated not by force of natural selection, but by the 
“force of history”. As opposed to Nature, culture is everywhere 
meaningful, everywhere the result of modeling structures that seek to 
give meaning, order, and continuity to experience. The aim of semi­
otics is, therefore, to examine, first and foremost, the origin and evo­
lution of the signifying properties of these structures. And if there is 
any one finding of semiotic research that stands out from all others it 
is that, despite great diversity in the world’s sign systems, the differ­
ence is more one of detail than of substance. These systems serve the
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original functions for which they were designed, revealing strikingly 
similar patterns throughout the world.
The semiosphere emerges as a response to a specific human need to 
model and interpret the dynamic flux of the world in the form of signs. 
Of all the modeling systems that characterize human semiosis, no other 
is so powerful and so unique as is language. Language is the ultimate 
achievement of semiosis. But, as Lotman reminds us cogently in virtu­
ally all his writings, it is highly interconnected to nonverbal modes of 
modeling and communication. Indeed the essence of language is poetry. 
It is the same type of modeling —  creative simulation —  that charac­
terizes drawings, music, artifacts and other nonverbal models of the 
world that people make and use routinely. Together with verbal models, 
they constitute one huge Text (Lotman 1990: 377).
Thus it is that Vico and Lotman have an identical point-of- 
departure in the study of human meaning-making —  the imagination. 
In both, this is seen as a quality of mind that produces poetic forms 
that unite the verbal and nonverbal domains into a holistic Gestalt of 
interconnected meanings. This “dialogue” between Nature and the 
human mind, as Lotman so often called it, is the fundamental form of 
human cognition. It constitutes, as Vico termed it, a poetic wisdom 
that is found throughout time and across cultures.
Ingegno
Given the role of fantasia or energeia in spurring the human mind to 
create its own world of thought, the question becomes: How does one 
go from imagining to actually producing signifying structure? For 
Vico, as I read him, the answer is to be found in a second unique abil­
ity of human mentation — the ingegno “ ingenuity”, “invention”, the 
faculty of the conscious mind that organizes the poetic forms pro­
duced by the fantasia into meaningful structures. Whereas the fantasia 
is an epiphenomenal product of brain activity, linking body and mind, 
the ingegno is a derivative of the fantasia —  a kind of “epi- 
epiphenomenal” activity, stimulating the mind to carry out its creative 
handiwork. It is thus not connected directly to neural processes, oper­
ating totally within mental space as it configures and creates models 
of world events. “Making sense” is a product of the ingegno as it im­
poses pattern onto the images that the fantasia creates in mind-space. 
The brains of all animals have the capacity to form memorable im-
ages. This is a survival function. But animals lack the ability to trans­
form their images into invented structures. This inheres in the agree­
ments or resemblances that the human mind alone is capable of mak­
ing between the images produced by the brain and their corresponding 
sensory units as registered by the body. As Vico phrases it: “The hu­
man mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself externally in 
the body” (Vico 1984 [1725]: 236).
The ingegno is, therefore, the source of syntax in language and of 
narrative structure in verbal discourse. It was at the creative nucleus of 
the earliest myths that humanity literally invented. Laws, scientific 
theories, fictional narrations, etc. are all traceable to the ability of the 
ingegno “to beget” —  the word ingegno derives from Latin in “in” + 
gignere “to beget”. Whereas fantasia corresponds to what Charles 
Peirce (1839-1914) called firstness, then ingegno corresponds instead 
to what he called secondness. The same view is found in Lotman. For 
the Estonian semiotician, the ability to make purely invented models 
of the world is a derivative of the fundamental creative energy of the 
human mind. This is accomplished by an innate ability to shift from 
primary poetic modeling to secondary more abstract modeling. This 
produces textuality in human affairs, an interconnected form of repre­
sentation that bestows a sense of wholeness and unity upon significa­
tion. Lotman (1990: 138) puts it as follows: “The entire space of the 
semiosphere is transected by boundaries of different levels”, which in 
turn create “a multileveled system”.
It is within such a multileveled system that symbolic activity 
thrives, transforming human consciousness into one that is no longer 
only attentive to sensible properties and to spatiotemporal and rela­
tional patterns, but also to all kinds of referents (actual and potential) 
in and of themselves within the confines or boundaries of the semio­
sphere, as Lotman calls them. Symbolicity is what creates cultural 
textuality. Drawings, narratives, theories, conversations, etc. are thus 
all interconnected symbolically, displaying similarities in structure, 
signification, and referentiality. Texts incorporate the structural prop­
erties of the symbols with which they are constructed, and deliver 
conceptually equivalent meanings. This allows people to envision dis­
tinct bits of information and real-world phenomena as integrated 
wholes, rather than as disparate elements of consciousness.
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Memoria
The final question that Vico asks is: How do we remember the mean­
ingful signifying structures that the fantasia brought into existence in 
the first place? Vico answers this question with the notion of memo­
ria— the faculty of mind that can detect the latent and original 
meaning structures of forms by simple exposure to them. This innate 
“sense of and for meaning” is not conscious, but embedded in the 
fantasia itself. Memory is thus a form of imagination itself. The crea­
tive imagination, or fantasia, is the faculty that allows us to convert 
our sense impressions into images; the memoria is the faculty that 
makes these images part of the very structure of the human brain. 
Thomas Sebeok (1987) aptly characterizes the operation of this level 
of mind as an “affective modeling of knowledge”. Susanne Langer 
(1948) has convincingly argued that, at this level of cognition, we re­
call the world through “feeling”, i.e. we “feel” that the world has a 
structure. It is at this mnemonic level that one can talk of “imaginative 
universals”, as Vico calls them (Verene 1981: 65-95, Mooney 1985: 
227-230). These are connected to each other through the medium of 
metaphor, which is itself the handiwork of the ingegno. The particular 
characteristics of this metaphorically-fabricated mental universe con­
stitute the source of differences among persons and among cultures. 
Although it evolved out of the fantasia, it has come to be the dominant 
form of mentality.
For Vico metaphor is a mental capacity that results from the inter­
action of the fantasia and the ingegno. As these two deep-level facul­
ties perform their functions in tandem, they generate metaphor, which 
can be defined as a kind of epiphenomenal amalgam of fantasia and 
ingegno. For Vico metaphor is, therefore, a feature of the mind, not of 
language. It does, of course, surface constantly in discourse in the 
form of verbal metaphors and other verbal tropes (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999, Gibbs 1994, Goatley 1997); but it can also manifest itself 
in other ways, such as in visual representational media (e.g. Winner 
1982, Hausman 1989).
Vico referred to the operations of the metaphorical mind as poetic 
logic. He called the first speakers “poets”, which etymologically 
means “makers”. He defined metaphor as a “fable-making” capacity 
emerging from poetic logic that creates likenesses among percepts and 
perceptual models to create new, and therefore, context-free, associa­
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tions. In this new world of the mind even “inanimate bodies” can be 
brought to life:
All the first tropes are corollaries of this poetic logic. The most luminous 
and therefore the most necessary and frequent is metaphor. It is most 
praised when it gives sense and passion to insensate things, in accordance 
with the metaphysics above discussed, by which the first poets attributed 
to bodies the being of animate substances, with capacities measured by 
their own, namely sense and passion, and in this way made fables of them. 
Thus every metaphor so formed is a fable in brief (Vico 1984: 404).
Phylogenetically, the metaphorical capacity emerged to convert im­
ages of the fantasia into memorable concepts. The primordial function 
of metaphor inhered in what Verene (1981) calls an “isness” relation. 
Traditionally, metaphor is understood as being tied to analogy, i.e. as 
finding something to be “like” something else. For Vico, on the other 
hand, the primordial operation of the metaphorical capacity creates an 
“isness” among things. Vico claimed that Jove was the first name cre­
ated by humans as they became conscious of the first thundering sky 
(Vico 1984 [1725]: 374-384). Once this sky was called Jove, all other 
experiences of the same phenomenon can be “found again” in this 
name. Jove is, as Verene (1981) points out, our first imaginative uni­
versal, and thus a part of memoria. Something had come into exis­
tence, and this led to a conscious separation of the sky from the earth, 
of the divine from the world. From their common perception of Jove 
the first conscious humans learned to make sense together. Without 
the power of the fantasia, all could have quickly lapsed back into 
nothingness.
As metaphorized concepts become more and more removed from 
their deep-level origins, settling into their new memory system, they 
generate highly abstract structures on their own. Free from sensory 
control, these structures gradually come to dominate purposeful 
thinking. The mind’s cognitive system is a truly powerful one. It can 
be projected onto the external world of reality to partition it, organize 
it, classify it, and explain it. These projections of the mind have pro­
duced our symbolic and cultural systems —  our institutions, scientific 
theories, laws, etc. The structure of these systems, therefore, can be 
used to investigate the structure of our memoria. This is Vico’s verum- 
factum principle, which posits that we can know only what we our­
selves have made (e.g. Mondolfo 1969, Garin 1972, Verene 1981: 36- 
64). Vico’s motivation for this notion comes from his observation 
that: “the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and
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that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of 
our own human mind” (Vico 1984 [1725]: 331). Vico warns us 
throughout the NS that we must never forget how our dominant ab­
stract mode of conceptual thinking originated, and that we should not 
ignore the fact that we continue to rely on our imagination when our 
abstract mind fails us: “For when we wish to give utterance to our un­
derstanding of spiritual things, we must seek aid from our imagination 
to explain them and, like painters, form human images of them” (Vico 
1984 [1725]: 404).
If there is any notion in Lotman that, to my mind, is totally iso­
morphic with the Vichian memoria it is his very definition of culture 
as a text, which is, in effect, one huge collective memory system, dis­
playing all the properties of neurological memory. Memoria, which 
corresponds to Peircean thirdness, is “dialogical” in the sense that it 
unfolds as an inner dialectic between individual and history. As an 
example, consider the use of the rose as a symbol for love in Western 
culture. It originated in the imagination as a way of understanding the 
feeling of love because its physical features [sweet smell], [red color], 
[plant], are perfect forms for coming to grips with this emotion. As 
this form passed into memoria it now stimulates a constant dialogue as 
to what it entails in signifying terms. In effect, this symbol “generates 
an image of the historical past, which culture transfers into the past 
and which, like an equal partner in a dialogue, affects the present” 
(Lotman 1990: 272).
The cultural cycle
It is in Book Four of The New Science where Vico develops his theory 
of the corso of history in terms of the three ages —  the “divine”, the 
“heroic”, and the “human”. He portrayed each age as manifesting its 
own particular kind of customs, laws, language, and even human na­
ture. He did not, however, see this historical sequence as necessarily 
irreversible. So, in Book Five, he elaborated the idea of the ricorso, 
the return of an earlier age in the life of a culture. The course of hu­
manity, according to Vico, goes from a poetical nature, through a he­
roic one, to a rationalistic one. Each age has its own kind of mentality 
and language. The poetic mentality, for instance, generates myths; the 
heroic one, legends; and the rational one, narrative history. Rational­
ity, according to Vico is humanity’s greatest achievement. But, unlike
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Cartesian philosophers, he did not see it as an innate “given”. He con­
sidered to be a point-of-arrival, that was achievable only in a social 
ambiance. Human beings do not inherit rationality from their biologi­
cal legacy. Stripped of culture, which is a collective memoria, human 
beings would be forced resort to their poetic, or corporeal, imagina­
tions to make sense of the world all over again.
Vico thus proposed a cyclical theory of human cultural evolution, 
according to which human societies progress through a series of stages 
from barbarism to civilization and then back to barbarism. The term 
“barbarism” in Vico refers simply to a primitive stage of civilization. 
In the first stage — which he called the “age of the gods” — religion, 
burial rites, the family, and other basic institutions emerge to lay the 
foundations of human culture. He called this primordial phase of hu­
manity the age of the “gods”, because he saw the first reflective hu­
mans as being filled with fear of natural phenomena such as thunder 
and lightening. Not possessing the knowledge to understand or “ex­
plain” such environmental events, the first humans ascribed them to 
awesome and frightful “gods” or “divine” creatures —  hence the des­
ignation “age of the gods”. In the succeeding “age of heroes”, a domi­
nant class of humans — the “heroes” of the evolving culture — 
emerges typically to subjugate the common people. These are beings 
with great physical prowess who inspire fear and admiration in the 
common people. The latter typically ascribe divine powers to these 
“nobles”. After a period of domination, a third stage —  the “age of 
humans” — invariably takes shape in which the common people rise 
up and win equality; but in the process society begins to disintegrate 
as it returns to a more vile and violent form of barbarism (rational or 
reflective barbarism). This, according to Vico, is the natural “course” 
of human civilized cultures —  a course that is not linear and endlessly 
progressive, but cyclical and finite. Cultures are bom and cultures die. 
They do not go on forever.
The key to understanding cultural evolution is language, because it 
constitutes the primary mental means by which humans encode their 
thoughts and, therefore, can come together in order to help us think 
collectively. By studying the language of the people living during a 
specific age, Vico claimed, the scientist should be able to reconstruct 
the forma mentis of that people. This was, of course, Lotman’s pivotal 
view as well. Indeed, he compared culture to a linguistic system, a 
kind of “outer reflection” of the structural properties of linguistic sys­
tems. Like Vico, Lotman also saw the first form of language as highly
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poetic (iconic). It is only in cultural contexts that humans speak a ver­
nacular, literal language.
Vico argued for this three-stage historical progression primarily on 
the basis of the etymology of our common word-concepts. He persua­
sively demonstrated that words start out as concrete, iconic Gestalten 
based on our perceptions of the referents. Then metaphor —  the innate 
universal ability to make connections among referents—transforms 
this sensorially-based meaning-universe into a conceptual one: i.e. one 
in which the referents of iconically-formed words are connected into 
generalized ideas. Finally, as cognition becomes increasingly more 
conceptual through the workings of the metaphorical capacity, the 
referents of the word-concepts also become increasingly more abstract 
and removed from their perceptual origins. Lotman, too, showed that 
the study of history is essentially a study of the meaning structures 
that result from a semiosis between body, mind, and culture across 
time.
Semiotics as a science of the imagination
In my view, the integration of Vico and Lotman will allow semiotics 
to develop a truly powerful investigative method for unraveling one of 
the greatest conundrums of all time: How did the mind, language, and 
culture come into existence? Their search for an answer to this riddle 
led each one, in his own way, to what is arguably the most important 
discovery of all time —  the “poetic mind”. And, as with many of their 
ground-breaking ideas, it is only in recent times that this notion — 
called the “savage mind” by Levi-Strauss (1962) —  has started to re­
ceive widespread attention.
Lotman has already led the way in transforming semiotics into a 
“science of the imagination”. But his view of scientific inquiry still 
creates problems among Western scientists for the simple reason that, 
in Western culture, the term science has always been synonymous 
with the “objective” knowledge of “facts” of the natural world, gained 
and verified by exact observation, experiment, and ordered thinking. 
The starting point for scientific objectivism is Ancient Greece, when, 
ever since Aristotle, Western science has come to embrace the idea 
that the physical universe is a great machine operating according to 
natural laws. Aristotle laid the foundations for the experimental inves­
tigation of matter by claiming that these laws were determinable ob-
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jectively by human reason. The term science in a Vichian-Lotmanian 
framework would have nothing to do with this traditional notion. For 
both scholars, we can know only what we ourselves have made, in­
cluding science. The “laws” of Euclidean geometry, for instance, are 
not present in the universe in the way that we have specified them. 
Rather, they constitute humanity’s cognitive strategy for organizing 
and rationalizing our visual perceptions of space.
Anything that humans have themselves made, and institutionalized 
culturally, can be designated as “artifactual”. The object of a semiot­
ics, as Lotman has showed, is to study the artifactual world, for it is 
through an investigation of all kinds of human “artifacts”, from myths 
to languages, that the nature of human thought will reveal itself. When 
we strip the mind of its rationalized symbols and codes, then we are 
left with a form of perception and memory generated by a primordial 
fantasia. This produces a language that is grounded on concrete 
modes of thought and perception that reverberate constantly in the 
corners of the mind. As Verene (1981: 123) has observed, Vico 
claimed that thunder, for instance, must have had a traumatic effect on 
the emerging consciousness of our hominid ancestors. That effect is 
being “sounded” over and over in the deepest layers of our modern 
minds in our symbols and other artifacts.
This radically new way of thinking about science has substantial 
implications and ramifications for semiotics and the other human sci­
ences, and can constitute a common grounding and unifying founda­
tion for them in the future. The Vichian-Lotmanian model of mind 
offers concrete suggestions for drafting a research agenda that con­
tains the following essential components:
• The essence of mind is the fantasia. Access to this feature can be gained 
by studying the products of the mind’s poetic structure.
• The ingegno is the faculty that allows humans to express their fantasia. It 
is the source of metaphor, myth, and all the other products of human
sense-making.
• The memoria is the textuality that emerges from this interplay between 
imagining and making of meaning.
• The signifying structures that we use in daily life (signs, texts, etc.) are 
end results of imaginative thinking.
Such agendas are actively being pursued by some contemporary sci­
entists of the mind. The research on metaphor mentioned above 
(e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) is a case-in-point. This goes
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contrary to the traditional view of mind as an information-processing 
device —  a view that has led the human and cognitive sciences astray, 
away from a deeper understanding of the mind as a creator of mean­
ings. Literature and myth, not artificial experimental studies, put on 
display our conceptions of ourselves and of the mental world which 
we have created for ourselves. These products reveal a form of think­
ing that gives pattern and continuity to human experience.
As Peirce (1931-1958, 1: 538) cogently argued, “Every thought is 
a sign”. But, as he also wrote, “Not only is thought in the organic 
world, but it develops there” (Peirce 1931-1958, 5: 551). The rela­
tively simple, nonverbal models that animals produce are natural 
forms that must fit “reality” sufficiently to secure the survival and 
“sanity” of the members of a species in their ecological niche. In hu­
man beings, however, the making of models transcends mere survival 
functions. And it is so pervasive and powerful that it often becomes 
very sophisticated indeed in the adult life of some individuals, as 
borne out by Einstein’s testimonial, or by what we know about Mo­
zart’s or Picasso’s ability to model intricate auditory or visual refer­
ents in their heads in anticipation of transcribing them onto paper or 
canvas. Language, symbols, art works, scientific theories, etc., as far 
as we know, are unique to anthroposemiosis. These make it possible 
for humans not only to represent immediate reality, but also to frame 
an indefinite number of possible worlds. The imagination-based mod­
eling capacity in humans has led to what Bonner (1980: 186) calls 
“true culture”, requiring “a system of representing all the subtleties of 
language”, in contrast to “nonhuman culture”. It is on this level, de­
fined as tertiary, that nonverbal and verbal sign assemblages blend 
together in the most creative modeling system that Nature has thus far 
produced. To study this modeling system meaningfully, it is necessary 
to start with an investigation of the imagination itself for, as Vico and 
Lotman showed, it is the creative source of all the energeia that con­
stitutes human mental and expressive activities.
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Заметки о Вико и Лотмаие: 
семиотика как “наука воображения”
Итальянский философ Джамбаттиста Вико предвосхитил многие 
идеи, которыми питаются современные когнитивные и гуманитар­
ные науки. Подчеркивая роль воображения в производстве значений, 
Вико показал всю выразительность первых форм репрезентации. Его 
оценка этих форм как “поэтических” привлекла серьезное внимание 
только сейчас, когда все большее число лингвистов и психологов 
начинают осознавать роль метафоры в порождении абстрактных 
систем репрезентации. Юрий Лотман придерживался сходных взгля­
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дов, подчеркивая важность поэтического воображения в порождении 
текстуальности, связующей воедино культуру. Сравнение этих двух 
выдающихся мыслителей никогда не проводилось. Именно оно 
является целью данной заметки. В ней предприняты первые шаги по 
выявлению параллелизма мышления и метода основных работ этих 
двух новаторов. Такое сравнение создаст теоретическую основу 
превращения семиотики в настоящую “науку воображения”. Оно 
покажет, что семиозис и репрезентация связаны не с какими-либо 
врожденными нейромеханизмами, но с творческой тенденцией 
“самоизобретения”, присущей человеческому роду.
Vico ja Lotman: 
semiootika kui “kujutlusteadus”
Itaalia filosoof Giambattista Vico oli paljude tänapäeval kognitiivsetes ja 
humanitaarteadustes käibivate ideede eelkäijaks. Rõhutades kujutlus­
võime tähtsust tähenduse tekitamises, näitas Vico esmaste represen- 
tatsioonivormide olulisust, määratledes neid kui “poeetilisi”. Alles kaas­
ajal, kui üha suurem hulk lingviste ja psühholooge teadvustavad meta­
foori osa abstraktsete representatsioonisüsteemide loomisel, on hakatud 
sellesse vaatesse tõsisemalt suhtuma. Ka Juri Lotman oli sarnasel seisu­
kohal, kriipsutades alla poeetilise kujutlusvõime olulisust kultuuri siduva 
tekstuaalsuse genereerimisel. Neid kahte väljapaistvat mõtlejat ei ole ku­
nagi võrreldud ja see ongi meie artikli eesmärgiks. Tuuakse välja paral­
lelism nende kahe novaatori mõttetegevuses ja meetodis. Selline võrdlus 
loob teoreetilise aluse semiootika muutmisel tõeliseks “kujutlusvõime 
teaduseks” ja näitab, et semioosist ja representatsiooni ei seo kaasasündi­
nud neuromehhanismid, vaid inimloomusele omased loomingulise “ene- 
seleiutamise” tendentsid.
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Abstract. The intersemiotic space: Adrianopol in F. Dostoevsky’s 
“Crime and punishment” St. Petersburg. The article focuses on the pe­
culiarities o f the intertextual space o f culture and the means o f its analy­
sis. Level analysis, compositional analysis and chronotopical analysis are 
juxtaposed in the paper. Textual and intertextual chronotopical analyses 
are considered separately. Two aspects o f textual processuality are juxta­
posed: the history o f text production and the role o f the manuscript page 
structure as a reflection o f the writer’s style and mode o f thinking (espe­
cially in the intersemiotic relationship between picture, drawing and 
word); the history o f text reception, its intersemiotic translation into dif­
ferent sign systems and its existence in culture in a scattered state. In this 
connection the notions o f the individual and mental text are juxtaposed. 
As an example a page o f F.Dostoevsky’s notebook is taken, where an in­
tricate combination o f picture, calligraphy and text offers an interesting 
information on the methods o f formation o f text conception.
Отдельная страница черновой рукописи писателя, на которой 
узнаваемы фрагменты предложений, формулировки идей, схемы, 
рисунки, каллиграфически написанные слова, подчеркивания, за­
черкивания и разные условные знаки, нанесенные на эту стра­
ницу в разные времена, разными чернилами и без всякой про­
думанной последовательности —  это одновременно автономный
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текст, отражающий тип мышления писателя, и процессуальный 
текст творчества, отражающий этап на пути от замысла до 
напечатанного текста.
В современной культуре мы часто уже не имеем некомпью­
терных рукописей, но процессуальность текста остается. В случае 
традиционных рукописей мы можем их элементы сопоставлять с 
аналогичными элементами рукописей других писателей. В итоге 
получим возможность сравнения именно структурных элементов 
рукописного листа: черновой текст как возможный мир будущего 
полного текста; условные знаки (символы, подчеркивания и т.п.), 
каллиграфия и рисунки как информация о типе творческого мыш­
ления данного автора. Мы можем этот материал интерпрети­
ровать как универсальные элементы рукописей практически всех 
писателей и тогда информативно и отсутствие какого-то элемента 
(например, при сопоставлении рисующих и нерисующих писа­
телей), или же можно страницу рукописи анализировать как 
временно-пространственную структуру, где интерпретации под­
лежит вербально-визуальное целое.
Аналогом такого рукописного листа является вся культура. 
Ведь рукописный лист — это пространство одновременного 
сосуществования разных элементов или проявления одного 
замысла или возможного мира этого замысла. Приведем ряд 
примеров. В рукописях Ф. Достоевского на ранних этапах 
встречаются одновременно на одном листе рисунок (часто порт­
рет), каллиграфически написанные имена и сам черновой текст, 
причем именно в приведенном порядке лист обычно и заполнен. 
Если в данном случае вербальное и визуальное отражают со­
отношение разных аспектов мыслительных процессов, резуль­
татом которых будет все же только вербальный текст, то 
логически (в сторону эксплицитности) следующим примером 
может быть издание вербального текста с собственными 
иллюстрациями автора. Понятно, что в таком случае картина 
дополняет слово и является органическим и эксплицитным 
элементом стиля. Следующим может быть художник-иллюс­
тратор, имитирующий в иллюстрациях стиль рукописных рисун­
ков писателя. Далее будет обычная ситуация книжного искусства, 
когда иллюстрация, с одной стороны, вступает в диалог с 
вербальным текстом, но, с другой стороны, входит в дискурс 
иллюстративного искусства своего времени и вступает в диалог с 
графической или живописной традицией. Частным случаем
является ситуация соприкосновения двух совершенно разных 
стилей, например, в случае диалога реалистического писателя 
(стиля текста) и футуристского художника (стиля иллюстраций). 
Другим частным случаем является иллюстрирование разностиль­
ной или многомирной книги, где, например, разным социальным 
мирам соответстует в иллюстрациях и разный графический язык.
Все эти примеры указывают на взаимосвязь между визуаль­
ным и вербальным в рамках одной страницы или одной книги. Но 
можно пойти дальше и сопоставить книгу и ее экранизацию по 
этой книге. Книга и экранизация в виде видеокассеты могут, 
конечно, стоять вместе на полке. Но в культуре они чаще всего 
разъединены. То же касается театральной инсценировки по дан­
ной книге. Даже если мы назовем экранизацию или инсценировку 
интерсемиотическим переводом вербального художественного 
текста, мы не можем в рамках культуры говорить с полной 
уверенностью о подлиннике и переводе. Легко установить отно­
шения первичности —  вторичности романа и его иллюстраций в 
рамках одной книги. В рамках всей культуры роман же сущест­
вует вместе с разными метатекстами, внедряющими его в куль­
туру. В их число входят наряду с иллюстрациями, экранизациями 
и инсценировками и аннотации, рецензии, разного типа рек­
ламные тексты, школьные уроки и т.д. В семиотическом смысле 
все эти тексты являются переводами, но в то же время и они сами 
могут стать подлинниками или же знакомство с подлинником 
может начаться с любого вторичного текста. Эти тексты, пред­
ставляющие разные медии и дискурсы, в сумме отражают 
особенности существования данного текста в культуре. Таким 
образом, текст существует в культуре как сумма своих транс­
формаций или переводов, причем в разных процессах рецепции 
актуализируется разная часть этих текстов. Тем самым текст 
превращается из конкретного материального артефакта в абст­
рактное ментальное целое, допускающее очень разные интер­
претации и способное участвовать в разных семиозисах, то есть, 
становится интерсемиотичным.
Интерсемиозисный аспект культуры вытекает из частичного 
совпадения знаков и языков (знаковых систем) разных искусств, 
во-первых, на уровне отдельного существования этих языков и 
текстов на них (например в случае театра и кино), во-вторых, на 
уровне ментальной интерференции, существования отдельного 
текста одновременно в виде разного типа текстов (роман, фильм,
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спектакль, картина и т.д.), в-третьих, на уровне проекции текста 
на пресуппозиционный текстовый или интертекстовый фон. Для 
описания интерсемиозиса культуры важно помнить о необходи­
мости узнавания знаков и о том, что узнавание это происходит не 
только в процессе рецепции целостных текстов-сообщений, но и 
во фрагментарных процессах перцепции. В интерсемиозисе 
культуры осмысливание и иерархизация знаков зависит не только 
от текстов —  одни и те же знаки могут входить не только в 
состав разных текстов, но и знаковых систем и, таким образом, 
иметь в разных системах разные значения. На понимание меха­
низмов перцепции в культуре опирается понимание интерлинг- 
вистичности, интертекстуальности, интердискурсивности и 
интермедийности, то есть интерсемиозисности онтологии знаков 
отдельных текстов культуры.
В конкретных и даже очень сложных текстах можно узнать 
априорные знаки, то есть общеизвестные знаки культуры, вхо­
дящие в долгосрочную память культуры и понятные в процессе 
восприятия даже в случае актуализации одного значения из 
нескольких возможных. Часто это конвенциональные фоновые 
или пресуппозиционные знаки. На фоне этих общеизвестных 
знаков бросаются в глаза процессуальные знаки, участвующие в 
смыслопорождении и концептуализирующие текст. Это автор­
ские знаки ad. hoc — уникальные для данного конкретного текста, 
или для всего творчества (творческого метода) автора. Естест­
венно возможны ситуации переосмысления априорных знаков, 
превращение их в уникальные авторские знаки. Отдельно следует 
выделить еще апостериорные знаки, ролью которых является 
осмысление целого текста как жанровой или дискурсивной 
разновидности и превращение текста в автономный знак.
На эти функциональные типы знаков опираются соответст­
вующие типы восприятия, причем в рамках культуры возможно 
говорить, с одной стороны, о текстовом восприятии как возмож­
ности разных прочтений одного и того же текста и, с другой 
стороны, о мета- или интертекстовом восприятии как чтении 
разных трансформаций текста в культуре в зависимости от 
доминирующей знаковой системы. Аудитивные, аудиовизуаль­
ные, визуальные и вербальные знаки (знаковые системы) по- 
разному передают особенности текста, но находятся с точки 
зрения культурного существования текста в отношениях комп-
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лементарности, то есть, разные прочтения текста в данном случае 
оказываются “прочтениями” в разных знаковых системах.
Интерсемиозис и означает многократность восприятия. Куль­
туру можно рассматривать как систему перечитывания и запоми­
нания этих прочтений. Многие прикладные тексты культуры 
направляют воспринимающего на многократное интерсемио­
тическое восприятие. Простым примером является ежедневное 
чтение газеты. Первое прочтение газеты происходит под влия­
нием визуальной доминанты —  это просмотр газеты по 
заголовкам и фотографиям, а также по рубрикам. Второе проч­
тение связано с ознакомлением со семиотическими признаками 
или рамками наиболее интересных статей, то есть, с чтением 
зачинов, графически выделенных фрагментов, концовок и 
подписей авторов. И только третье прочтение газеты связано со 
чтением полных текстов выбранных статей. Таким образом, одна 
газетная статья перечитывается с семиотической точки зрения 
несколько раз.
Если традиционное перечитывание романа является частью 
бесконечного диалога, в ходе которого он каждый раз откры­
вается с новой стороны, то современное перечитывание этого же 
романа в культуре превращает диалог в интерсемиотический 
полилог, где роман перечитывается в форме фильма или теат­
ральной постановки. В полилоге текст открывается с новой 
стороны, общаясь с воспринимающим одновременно на несколь­
ких знаковых системах, причем первым прочтением романа 
может стать визуальное восприятие экранизации или чтение 
рецензии. Парадоксально, что само чтение первоначального 
вербального текста романа может оказаться перечитыванием 
инсценировки или экранизации этого романа. Синхронические 
процессы восприятия в культуре смешивают порядок каналов 
восприятия и в результате перцептивное единство текста 
зависимо от этих относительно случайных обстоятельств. Интер­
семиотическое перечитывание сравнимо с интерсемиотическим 
переводом в смысле Р. Якобсона, понимаемым как интерпрета­
ция вербальной знаковой системы при помощи знаков других 
знаковых систем (Jakobson 1971, Тогор 2000). Но одновременное 
существование разных интерсемиотических переводов вынуж­
дает поставить вопрос не просто о перцептивном единстве вос­
приятия в случае каждого отдельного перевода, но и о пер­
цептивной неопределенности или искаженности в результате
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смешения разных трансформаций одного текста. Как на уровне 
отдельного текста или его интерсемиотической трансформации, 
так и на уровне всего комплекса возможных трансформаций 
одного текста справедливы слова Н. Гудмана: “Концепция без 
перцепции пуста, перцепция без концепции слепа” (Goodman 
1978: 6). Концептуализация и деконцептуализация (как и ре­
концептуализация) одинаково возможны в культуре и зависят от 
типа процессов автокоммуникации культуры, то есть, от того, 
каким образом осмысляются тексты, типы текстов и их транс­
формаций.
Кризис больших нарративов и нарративности вообще во 
многом имеет перцептивную основу. В соотнесенности действи­
тельного и воображаемого, в идентификации действительности в 
имагинарном трудно стыковать увиденное определенным обра­
зом (seeing as) и видимое на самом деле (actual seeing: Kearney 
1997: 191). В этом контексте по-новому поднимается вопрос 
наблюдателя или повествователя. В культуре повествуют и 
наблюдают не только люди, но и дискурсы и медии в виде 
конкретных изданий, радиостанций или телеканалов и т.п. Таким 
образом, на фоне недоверяемого нарратива выделяется вопрос 
недоверяемого повествователя. Конечно же эту ситуацию нельзя 
смешивать с открытостью нарратива и имплицитностью повест­
вователя как приемом поэтики. И в случае вербального, и в 
случае аудиовизуального сообщения недоверяемость повество­
вателя означает необходимость различать (видимого) повество­
вателя переднего плана и (скрытого) повествователя заднего 
плана, и в обоих случаях необходимо различение проверяемости 
и непроверяемости повествователя, что в свою очередь зависит 
от роли имплицитного автора в структуре текста (см. подробнее: 
Currie 1995).
Определение степени доверяемости или недоверяемости раз­
ных трансформаций одного текста лежит в основе их иерархи- 
зации и облегчает восстановление перцептивного единства 
существования текста в культуре.
Практический анализ текстов культуры, их интерсемиотич- 
ность в смысле одновременного существования в форме самых 
разных трансформаций посредством самых разных знаковых 
систем, приводит к проблеме сопоставления анализируемости 
отдельного текста и анализируемости текста в интерсемио­
тическом пространстве. В первом случае изучается построение 
текста, во втором случае трансформируемость текста.
Интерсемиотическое пространство является пространством 
интерсемиозиса, в котором элементы или знаки текстов могут 
быть интерпретированы одновременно при помощи разных 
знаковых систем и эта возможность нескольких типов синтак­
сических связей усложняет осмысление, установление значения 
каждого конкретного знака.
В интерсемиотическом пространстве необходим парамет­
рический анализ текстов. Первым параметром является материал 
текста. В случае текстов, материалом которых является естест­
венный язык, возможен уровневый анализ в логическом порядке 
от минимальных языковых единиц в сторону целого текста или 
наоборот. Языковые уровни составляют и иерархическую сис­
тему, поэтому симптоматично, что в семиотике был интенсивный 
период сведения многих языков культуры к типу построения 
естественного языка. Поиски фонем, морфем, слов и высказы­
ваний в языке кино или театра обогатили понимание специфики 
разных знаковых систем и трудностей их описания. Оказывается, 
что анализ материала нелингвистических артефактов приводит к 
описанию нескольких знаковых систем одновременно или к 
некоторому списку элементов, причем членение материала не 
является логическим и иерархические связи не вытекают из 
самого материала. Кадр фильма можно анализировать как фото­
графию или картину, но и как элемент монтажа, актуализацию 
плана или ракурса и т.д.
Гибкий переход от парадигматики к синтагматике дости­
гается при помощи второго параметра, которым является ком­
позиция. Уровни материала отражают членимость текста на 
имманентные элементы, уровни композиции отражают типы 
связности элементов в линеарном протекании текста как 
повествования. Параметр композиции охватывает и проблемы 
соотношения элементов минимальных единиц композиционного 
членения: кадр в фильме, сцена в театре или в живописи, мотив 
в литературе являются соединением или конфигурацией разных 
элементов.
Материал и композиция являются внутренними параметрами 
текста. Но культура как система текстов, с одной стороны, и 
текст как не только материальный артефакт, но и сумма или 
потенциал своих возможных трансформаций (то есть, текст как
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множество разнотипных и разнородных текстов) нуждаются в 
сравнительном целостном анализе. Для анализа столь сложного 
объекта необходим внешний по отношению к материалу текста 
параметр. Таким внешним универсальным параметром является 
хронотоп. Именно параметр хронотопа соответствует нуждам 
анализа текстов в интерсемиотическом пространстве.
Хронотопный анализ стал после работ М. Бахтина вновь 
актуальным именно в связи с новым интересом к интерсемио­
тическому анализу. Универсальность этого анализа вытекает из 
автономного от материала текста структурирования текстов по 
сопоставимым критериям. Литература и экранизации легче 
поддаются сопоставительному анализу при применении понятия 
хронотопа (Тогор 2000). Независимое от материала текстов 
измерение целостности необходимо для избежания растворения 
текстов в культуре. Поэтому с целью целостности описания 
обращаются к понятию хронотопа в анализе фильмов с раздвоен­
ным хронотопом и фильмов с нормальным хронотопом (Rosolow- 
ski 1996: 109). В хронотопный анализ органически включается 
социальный аспект, сближающий понятие хронотопа с другим 
бахтинским понятием карнавала (Gömez-Moriana 1997-1998). И, 
кроме того, хронотопный анализ гибко учитывает возможность 
разного функционирования одних и тех же знаков на разных 
уровнях текста (Osadnik 1994). Наконец, хронотопный анализ 
включает и антропологический аспект и, например, уровни 
хронотопов сопоставимы с антропологическим описанием про­
странства личности, состоящего из телесно-предметного жилого 
пространства (lived space), личного психологического про­
странства (personal space) и связанного с потусторонним экзис­
тенциального пространства (existential space: Etlin 1998).
Хронотопный анализ имеет две разновидности. Во-первых, 
текстовый хронотопный анализ или анализ индивидуального 
текста по хронотопным уровням. Во-вторых, интертекстовый 
(интердискурсивный, интермедиальный) хронотопный ана­
лиз как анализ ментального текста, его множественности в 
культуре. Хронотопный уровневый анализ сопоставим с семио- 
сферическим анализом. Если хронотопные уровни отражают 
универсальную семиотическую структуру текстов, то разные 
семиосферы различимы на основе градаций части и целого, 
своего и чужого:
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Пронизанность семиосферы частными границами создает много­
уровневую систему. Определенные участки семиосферы могут на 
разных уровнях самоописания образовывать семиотическое единст­
во, некоторое непрерывное семиотическое пространство, ограни­
ченное единой границей, или группу замкнутых пространств, 
дискретность которых будет отмечена границами между ними, или, 
наконец, часть некоторого более общего пространства, отграничен­
ную с одной стороны фрагментом границы, а с другой открытую 
(Лотман 1996: 185-186).
Затронутые выше проблемы перцепции сопоставимы с семио- 
сферическим пониманием культуры и текста:
“Замкнутость” семиосферы проявляется в том, что она не может 
соприкасаться с иносемиотическими текстами или с не-текстами. 
Для того чтобы они для нее получили реальность, ей необходимо 
перевести их на один из языков ее внутреннего пространства или 
семиотизировать факты. Таким образом, точки границы семиосферы 
можно уподобить чувственным рецепторам, переводящим внешние 
раздражители на язык нашей нервной системы, или блокам перевода, 
адаптирующим данной семиотической сфере внешний для нее мир 
(Лотман 1992: 13).
Целью настоящей работы не является сопоставление понятий 
хронотопа М. Бахтина и семиосферы Ю. Лотмана, хотя между 
ними существует бесспорная связь. Нам важно подчеркнуть 
близость этих понятий как метаязыковых средств анализа интер­
семиотического пространства. В связи с понятием хронотопа нет 
четкого представления о его полной систематике и методологи­
ческом потенциале. Даже М. Холквист как один из виднейших 
исследователей наследия М. Бахтина вынужден признаться, что 
хронотоп трудно поддается анализу (Holquist 1994: 109). В 
контексте настоящего подхода напомним о двух типах хроно- 
топного анализа. Интертекстовый хронотопный анализ исходит 
из ментального текста, из текстовой множественности:
Произведение и изображенный в нем мир входят в реальный мир и 
обогащают его, и реальный мир входит в произведение и в изо­
браженный в нем мир как в процессе его создания, так и в процессе 
его последующей жизни в постоянном обновлении произведения в 
творческом восприятии слушателей-читателей. Этот процесс обмена, 
разумеется, сам хронотопичен.../.../ Можно даже говорить об особом  
творческом хронотопе, в котором происходит этот обмен произ­
ведения с жизнью и совершается особая жизнь произведения (Бахтин 
1975: 402-403).
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Оставляя в стороне частные типы хронотопов в текстах, при­
ведем одну позднюю (1970-1971) запись М. Бахтина, свиде­
тельствующую о желании установления методологических рамок 
для осмысления проблем текстового хронотопного анализа:
Хронотопичность художественного мышления (особенно древнего). 
Точка зрения хронотопична, то есть включает в себя как пространст­
венный, так и временной момент. С этим непосредственно связана и 
ценностная (иерархическая) точка зрения (отношение к верху и 
низу). Хронотоп изображенного события, хронотоп рассказчика и 
хронотоп автора (последней авторской инстанции) (Бахтин 1979: 
338).
И соединяет эти высказывания рассуждение М. Бахтина о вклю­
чении любого осмысливаемого явления в пространственно- 
временную и смысловую сферы:
... каковы бы ни были эти смыслы, чтобы войти в наш опыт (притом 
социальный опыт), они должны принять какое-либо временно­
пространственное выражение, то есть принять знаковую форму, слы­
шимую и видимую нами (иероглиф, математическую формулу, 
словесно-языковое выражение, рисунок и др.). Без такого временно­
пространственного выражения невозможно даже самое абстрактное 
мышление. Следовательно, всякое вступление в сферу смыслов 
совершается только через ворота хронотопов (Бахтин 1975: 406).
Текстовый хронотопный анализ, позволяющий анализировать как 
отдельно, так и сопоставительно тексты, оформленные в разных 
знаковых системах, предполагает выделение оптимального коли­
чества хронотопных уровней. Топографический хронотоп охва­
тывает уровень сюжета или изображения некоторого события или 
истории. Психологический хронотоп формируется под влия­
нием персонажных точек зрений и метафизический хронотоп 
определяет концепцию текста как типа соотношения этих трех 
хронотопных уровней. В своих исследованиях по творчеству 
Ф. Достоевского (Тороп 1997) мы соединили хронотопные 
уровни творчества Ф. Достоевского с его идеологическим 
двумирием. В результате получилась работающая схема:
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УРОВНИ АНТРОПО- СЕМИОСФЕРА ТЕОЦЕНТРИЗМ
ЦЕНТРИЗМ
топографический
хронотоп
гомофония
сюжет мир знаков 
(знаковых 
предметов, имен, 
ситуаций, 
поступков)
архисюжет
психологический
хронотоп
полифония
самосознание мир знаковых
(само-)
ощущений,
переживаний,
мыслей,
слов персонажей
бессознание
метафизический
хронотоп
гетерофония
профанная
идейность
мир профан- 
ных текстов
мир гипертемы и 
идеологического 
ядра
сакральная
идейность
мир сакральных 
и сакрализо-
ванных текстов
Приведенная схема является примером естественного сопри­
косновения хронотопного и семиосферического анализа и 
доказала свою продуктивность в анализе творчества Ф. Достоев­
ского. Но в данном случае нам хочется в качестве примера 
проанализировать одну страницу из записной тетради Ф. Дос­
тоевского с записями к роману “Преступление и наказание”.
В издании текстов Достоевского существует одна тексто­
логическая проблема. На определенном предварительном этапе в 
подготовительных материалах к крупным произведениям появ­
ляются рукописные страницы, на которых сосуществуют записи 
разного типа. Прежде всего это заметки к романам (сюжетные 
ходы, характеристики персонажей и т.п.), где рядом с собственно 
текстом находятся каллиграфически написанные слова (чаще 
всего имена) и рисунки (часто портреты). Мне уже приходилось 
писать о структуре рукописного листа Достоевского, а также о 
том, что каллиграфия играет важную роль в формировании, а с 
точки зрения исследователя в понимании интертекстуального 
пространства романов Достоевского (Тороп 1997). В то же время 
издатели полного собрания сочинений ( Достоевский 1972-1990) 
не считали каллиграфически написанные слова элементами
текста и даже не перечислили их. В результате этого спорного 
текстологического принципа из поля зрения исследователей 
выпал интересный и полезный для понимания творческого мира 
Достоевского материал. И, конечно же, разрушено единство 
рукописного листа. Иногда же именно структура рукописного 
листа может быть основой реконструкции времени листа, т.е. 
порядка заполнения. Приведу один пример. В подготовительных 
материалах к роману “Преступление и наказание” есть страница 
записной тетради, где относительно легко восстановить хроноло­
гический порядок работы писателя.
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Страница озаглавлена: Отметки о  С в и д р и га й л о в е .  После этого 
появляются рисунки (2 портрета, один из которых заштрихован) 
и каллиграфически написанные слова и фрагменты слов: Соня, 
Napoleon Buonaparte, Bonaparte, Istria, Capo d’Istria, Pozzo di 
Borgo. Последним этапом заполнения страницы является уже 
появление того текста, который нам известен по полному 
собранию сочинений:
Свидригайлов. Еслиб я был социалист, ну, конечно, остался бы жить. 
Остался бы жить, потому что было б что делать, — нет убежденнее 
народа, как социалисты. А ведь в жизни главное убеждение. Подите- 
ка, разубедите его. Да ведь он же чувствует, что весь жизненный 
материал потеряет. Для него главное — убеждение. А в чем его 
убеждение? Главная мысль социализма — это механизм. Там 
человек делается человеком механикой. На всё правила. Сам человек 
устраняется. Душу живу отняли. Понятно, что можно быть 
спокойным,- настоящая китайщина, и эти-то господа говорят, что 
они прогрессисты! Господи! Если это прогресс. То что же значит 
китайщина!
NB. Верите ли в будущее?
Много неверия.
Социализм — это отчаяние когда-нибудь устроить человека. Они 
устроивают его деспотизм(ом) и говорят, что это самая-то и есть 
свобода!
А чтоб он не очень куражился, то ужасно любят мнение о том, что 
человек сам одна только механика. (7: 161)
С методологической точки зрения у исследователя теперь не­
сколько возможностей: во-первых, сопостовление всех калли­
графически написанных слов в материалах одного произведения 
и попытка их изучения в качестве единого текста; во-вторых, 
ассоциативное или концептуальное сопоставление каллиграфи­
ческой и некаллиграфической частей каждого рукописного листа 
как целостного микротекста; в-третьих, сопоставление рукопис­
ного листа как целого с окончательным беловым текстом в 
рамках целостного возможного мира произведения.
Подготовительные материалы к “Преступлению и наказанию” 
допускают возможность всех трех подходов. Например, в общем 
списке каллиграфически написанных слов есть географические 
названия (Крит, Константинополь) и собственные имена 
(Менотти, Capo d Istria, Pozzo di Borgo, Nero, Ariman, Arius, 
Caligula, Aaron, Raphael Santio d'Urbino и др.), которые могут
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быть разделены на группы на основе идеологических или 
исторических доминант, т.е. допускают некоторую общую интер­
претацию. В некоторых случаях ощутима прямая связь между 
каллиграфическим и некаллиграфическим. Например, на одной 
из страниц записных тетрадей, посвященной характеристике 
Свидригайлова, дается подробный список разных типов наслаж­
дений, составляющих суть амбивалентности этого персонажа:
Непомерная и ненасытимая жажда наслаждений. Жажда жизни 
неутолимая. Многообразие наслаждений и утолений. Совершенное 
сознание и анализ каждого наслаждения, без боязни, что оно оттого 
ослабеет, потому что основано на потребности самой натуры, 
телосложения. (7: 158)
Сопровождается же этот текст каллиграфическими именами 
Нерона, Аримана, Ария, а на следующей странице и Калигулы. 
Есть пример и устойчивой взаимосвязи каллиграфического и 
некаллиграфического. Например, имя Рафаеля упоминается 
несколько раз и всегда на страницах, посвященных Соне 
Мармеладовой.
Меня же интересует сопоставимость каллиграфических слов с 
целым текстом и осмысление трудно интерпретируемых мест в 
рамках возможного мира произведения. Уже указанная страница 
записной тетради под названием Отметки о Свидригайлове 
может послужить материалом. Одна возможность исходить из 
амбивалентности образа Свидригайлова и проследить эту амби­
валентность в историческом интерсубъективном пространстве, 
где рядом оказывются Наполеон Бонапарт и два видных деятеля 
антинаполеоновского движения. Карл-Андрей Поццо ди Борго 
родился на Корсике в один год с Наполеоном, был президентом 
государственного совета Корсики, затем ненавистником Напо­
леона и русским дипломатом, составившим в 1813 году прокла­
мацию держав против Наполеона и его династии. Граф Иоанн 
Каподистрия родился на острове Корфу, но предки его родом из 
австрийского городка Капо д ’Истрия, расположенного на ска­
листом острове Триестского залива и напоминающего Венецию. 
В 1813 году был связан с привлечением Швейцарии в движение 
против Наполеона, с 1816 по 1822 год был министром ино­
странных дел России, а в 1827 году был избран на семь лет 
президентом Греции. В 1831 году был убит.
На фоне истории наполеоновской династии становятся более 
осмысленными и некоторые мотивы в изображении Свидри-
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гайлова. Если вспомнить про его вояж, упоминание путешествия 
в Америку, то в возможном мире “Преступления и наказания 
оказываются и два Наполеона: Наполеон I, планировавший 
бегство в Америку, и Наполеон III, участвовавший в 1831 в 
Модене в заговоре Чиро Менотти, имя которого также зафикси­
ровано каллиграфически, и высланный в 1836 году в Америку, 
где пробыл год.
Так как наполеоновская тема выражена в тексте достаточно 
эксплицитно, то такие проекции разных мотивов в романе на 
наполеоновскую историю реализуемы относительно легко.
Все такие возможности входят в общую почвенническую поэ­
тику времени, в историческую симультанность, интертекстуаль­
ность и интерсубъективность.
С временем неотрывно связано пространство. О топографии 
Петербурга в романах Достоевского много написано, но даже
Н. Анциферов вынужден признать, что писатель иногда пере­
ставлял архитектурные объекты, т.е. концептуализировал про­
странство. Исходя из конкретного рукописного листа хочется 
указать на некоторые признаки, о маркированности которых нет 
свидетельств и осмысление которых допустимо лишь в воз­
можном мире произведениия.
Поццо ди Борго и Каподистрия островитяне —  вспомним роль 
островов в романном пространстве, с одной стороны, и отно­
шение Свидригайлова к воде, с другой стороны. Кроме того, это 
два иностранца, служивших России. Имя Свидригайлова Арка­
дий этимологически означает человека из Аркадии. По типу 
построения имени он находится в интертекстуальном про­
странстве между Каподистрией и Иудой из Кариота. Сближение 
имен Аркадия Ивановича и Иоанна Каподистрии актуализирует 
греческую тему и создает возможность понимания амбивалент­
ности Свидригайлова и сквозь призму этой темы. Менее слу­
чайным кажется на данном фоне упоминание Свидригайловым в 
разговоре с Раскольниковым одного события восьмилетней 
давности: "А все-таки посадили было меня тогда в тюрьму за 
долги, гречонка один нежинский.”(6: 218). Дополнителная 
возможность осмысления концептуальности эпизода последнего 
вояжа Свидригайлова, его пути на место самоубийства, возникает 
с появлением в романе несуществующей в тогдашнем Петербурге 
гостиницы “Адрианополь”:
Интерсемиотическое пространство 131
Он шагал по бесконечному -ому проспекту уже очень долго, почти с 
полчаса, не раз обрываясь в темноте на деревянной мостовой, но не 
переставал чего-то с любопытством разыскивать по правой стороне 
проспекта. Тут где-то, уже в конце проспекта, он заметил, как-то 
проезжая недавно мимо, одну гостиницу деревянную, но обширную, 
и имя ее, сколько ему помнилось, было что-то вроде Адрианополя. 
Он не ошибся в своих расчетах: эта гостиница в такой глуши была 
такою видною точкой, что возможности не было не отыскать ее, 
даже среди темноты. (6: 388)
Напомним, что Каподистрия стал президентом Греции до и был 
убит после Адрианопольского мира 1829 года, гарантировавшего 
автономию Греции. Для Свидригайлова, человека из Аркадии, 
гостиница “Адрианополь” стала лишь временным убежищем. Из 
“Адрианополя” он направляется к другому “греку” —  Ахиллу, 
перед которым и застрелится.
Таким образом, актуальные события романа, протекающие в 
конретном времени и пространстве, помещаются Достоевским в 
возможный мир всемирного исторического процесса. Одни эпохи 
являются архисюжетной основой романа и нуждаются в осмыс­
лении в интертекстуальном пространстве в качестве органиче­
ских элементов поэтики романа. При помощи других эпох могут 
быть осмыслены отдельные эпизоды или черты персонажей. В 
нагнетании разных эпох можно увидеть почвенническую основу 
поэтики Достоевского —  желание выделения универсальных 
процессов в истории, причем универсальность доказывается 
преемственностью имен, составлящих по словам А. Григорьева 
“душу процесса”. Поэтому к именам в творчестве Достоевского 
необходимо относиться внимательно, будь они в тексте или в 
черновике.
Этот краткий пример показывает аналогию между отдельным 
рукописным листом и культурой как системой разнородных 
текстов. Это два интерсемиотических пространства. Данный 
рукописный лист является целым текстом с точки зрения семио­
тической оформленности и места в истории романа “Пре­
ступление и наказание”. Каждый элемент текста (рисунок, 
каллиграфию, текст) можно атрибутировать отдельно. Но в той 
же мере важно атрибутировать взаимосвязи между элементами, 
так как имен Поццо ди Борго и Каподистрии в окончательном 
тексте нет. Хронотопная структура романа содержит целый ряд 
исторических и пространственных аллюзий. Действие романа 
происходит в Петербурге, но Аркадий Свидригайлов связан через
132 ПеэтерТороп
имя с Аркадией, собирается уехать в Америку, останавливается в 
Адрианополе, и одним из его прототипов является Иуда из 
Кариота. Проанализировав в интерсемиотическом пространстве 
рукописного листа процесс порождения концепции текста, мы 
можем реконструкцию этого процесса проверить на особенностях 
белового текста. Существование “Преступления и наказания в 
интерсемиотическом пространстве культуры является бесконеч­
ным процессом рецепции, который может быть сопоставлен с 
процессом порождения и в результате можно проанализировать 
семиотические особенности существования этого текста в 
культуре, степень его трансформируемости или интерсемио­
тической переводимости.
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Intersemiootiline ruum:
Adrianopol F. Dostojevski “Kuritöö ja karistuse” 
Peterburis
Artikkel on pühendatud intertekstuaalse kultuuriruumi eripärale ja  
analüüsivõimaluste otsim isele. Kõrvutatakse tasandi-, kom positsiooni- ja  
kronotoobilist analüüsi. Eraldi viidatakse tekstilisele ja intertekstilisele 
kronotoobilisele analüüsile. Vaadeldakse kaht teksti protsessuaalsuse 
aspekti: teksti saamislugu, käsikirjalehe struktuuri osa selles stiili ja kir­
janiku m õtlem isviisi peegeldajana (eriti intersemiootilises pildi, graafika, 
sõna vahekorras) ja teksti retseptsioonilugu, tema intersemiootilist tõlki­
mist erinevate märgisüsteemide abil ja pihustunud kujul kultuuris ek­
sisteerimist. Sellega seoses kõrvutatakse individuaalse ja mentaalse teksti 
mõistet.
Näiteks on toodud üks lehekülg F. Dostojevski taskuraamatust, millel 
pildi, kalligraafia ja teksti keeruline kooslus pakub huvitavat informat­
siooni teose kontseptsiooni kujunemise viisist.
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Text semiotics:
Textology as survival-machine
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Van Alkemadelaan 806, 2597 BC’s-Gravenhage, The Netherlands 
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Abstract. Signifying practices by which living creatures communicate, 
are, according to Sebeok, the survival-machines. Accordingly, as repre­
sented by the semiotic text analysis or Bakhtin’s textology, one can speak 
about a human survival-machine. This has been studied by different semi­
otic schools (including the Moscow-Tartu school) referring to language, 
culture, genre and, importantly, text ideology. In this article, the aspects of 
textology in Peirce’s generalized theory o f signs become analysed. After a 
discussion o f  the concept o f text in Peirce’s (published and unpublished) 
writings, its relationship with semiosis and other Peircean categories is 
shown. The project o f elaborating Peirce-based text-semiotics expects that 
it must be dramatically different from other sign-theoretical text-theories. 
This may be a path towards more inter-subjective and creative textology.
Textology
The application of a semiotic paradigm to text analysis, which char­
acterizes the analysis of written verbal utterances, also called text 
semiotics, is finally what distinguishes the formalized approach of text 
grammar from a more comprehensive point of view, that of communi­
cation in the broad sense of the term. Indeed, texts are objects or ar­
tifacts containing and conveying information; messages encoded, sent, 
transmitted, received, decoded, and given some interpretation1.
For text and textuality, see further Gorlee 1997a and 1998.
Semiotics in the broad sense is precisely concerned with the study of 
all signifying practices (verbal, non-verbal, or a combination of both) by 
which living creatures, human and non-human, communicate. How vital 
this pursuit is, has been repeatedly emphasized by Sebeok, who refers to 
it as life’s, and thus also man’s, “survival-machine” (Sebeok 1986: 5). 
In order to study the many different ways in which signs can function, 
semiotics has developed a fullfledged repertoire of concepts. Semiotics 
is therefore in the unique position to describe, explain, as well as to pre­
dict human thought as operative in the sign process. Moreover, a semi- 
otic analysis does not peculiarly involve a value judgment, neither a 
priori nor a posteriori; because as the radically general theory of signs it 
is, at least in its purest form, incompatible with ideological discoloration 
of the facts it pretends to study.
Textual production and textual interpretation are, among innumer­
able other human practices, forms of communication through signs. The 
text-phenomenon can therefore be studied from the perspective of a 
theory of signs. Obvious as this may perhaps seem, a “semiotic textol- 
ogy” (Petöfi 1986b)2 is nevertheless a relatively recent emprise within 
semiotics, and remains in many ways a little-explored field of applied 
semiotic investigation. One important reason for this is that text semi­
otics as it has so far been practices has often concentrated rather one- 
sidedly on what is called linguistic semiotics, or descriptive sign theory 
in the Saussurean tradition. Examples abound3. Whereas, on the other 
hand, the semiotic project of a textology from the point of view of 
Peirce’s semiotics has as yet received scant attention (Gorlee 1992).
Without going into the details of the sectarian “warfare” between 
followers of the two sign-theoretical traditions, the discussion here 
will concentrate instead on their respective relevance to the textologi- 
cal case in point. On the other hand, the insights as developed in the 
former Soviet Union, the Moscow-Tartu school, will also, whenever 
relevant, be drawn upon. Bachtin’s novel textological propositions, 
from the Leningrad school of semiotics, has been mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, who rejected the Saussurean dichotomy of syn­
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2 The term “textology” was originally an invention o f  Bachtin’s from the Leningrad 
school o f  semiotics. See his 1959-1961 article “Das Problem des Textes” (Bachtin 
1990: 437-438, note 2 [composed by the translators]).
3 y
See Linguistique et discours litteraire. Theorie et pratique des textes by Adam, 
published in 1976, still in use. Jointly with Saussurean terms the following (always 
literary) texts are analyzed, for instance, Colette’s La maison de Claudine, Chretien de 
Troyes’s Perceval ou le Conte du Graal, Flaubert’s Madame Bovaiy, Andre Breton’s 
Poisson soluble, Zola’s Germinal, Montesquieu’s Lettres persanes, and so forth.
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chrony and diachrony and statics versus dynamics, as against the re­
vival of post-Saussurian descriptive tradition in France (see Levi- 
Strauss) and parts of North America. No attempts will therefore be 
made here to resolve semiotic disputes. It will instead be argued that 
Peirce’s theory of signs has been unduly neglected in text theory, and 
that its potential for text-theoretical study fully deserves further explo­
ration. To explore this well-nigh pristine ground will be the primary 
aim, and indeed the privilege, of this study.
Text semiotics
Different semiotic theories have defined the text by establishing a re­
lation between the concept of text and that of sign. This does, how­
ever, not mean that there is agreement among semioticians about what 
precisely is a text. Indeed, what is meant by it varies according to the 
different definitions, explications, or descriptions given, explicitly or 
implicitly, to the concept of the (linguistic) sign.
In what has been denominated “linguistic semiotics”, the written 
verbal sign is regarded as a graphic utterance-sign occurring as a se­
quence of word-signs, that is, as an “entity endowed with meaning 
prior to any linguistic or logical analysis” (Greimas and Courtes 1982: 
362). It is not until the object in question is analyzed (or described) 
that it becomes a signifying whole, or text. It is thus only as a result of 
the descriptive process of what is called “signification” that articulated 
meaning comes into existence and is made visible to the reader. This 
means that a text is “made up only of those semiotic elements fitting 
the theoretical goal of the description” (Greimas and Courtes 1982: 
340). Different types of analysis will perceive different pertinent traits, 
will choose, retain, and process different signifying features, and will 
consequently produce different non-equivalent texts.
This sign-theoretical approach studies how the utterer (who in this 
predominantly literary-oriented tradition is often referred to as “nar­
rator”) addresses himself to the reader. As it concentrates on retracing 
the process in which meaning is encoded and textualized, linguistic 
semiotics is primarily concerned with text production, and hence with 
sign production. This agrees with Barthes’s concept of the text (or 
Text, as he often called it), which hinges on the sign qua signifier; 
while its counterpart, the signified, can be endlessly explored (this is 
Barthes s semiological adventure”), yet its true scope must remain
elusive. After making a round through textuality in his structuralist 
colleagues (Propp, Kristeva, Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Tel Quel) as 
Barthes formulated his textness (originally in 1974):
And what is the Text? I shall not answer by a definition, which would be 
to fall back into the signified.
The Text, in the modern, current sense which we are 
trying to give this word, is fundamentally to be distinguished from the lit­
erary work:
it is not an esthetic product, it is a signifying practice;
it is not a structure, it is a structuration;
it is not an object, it is a work and a game;
it is not a group o f closed signs, endowed with a meaning to be redis­
covered, it is a volume o f traces in displacement;
the instance o f the Text is not signification but the Signifier, in the semi­
otic and psychoanalytic acceptation o f that term;
the Text exceeds the old literary work; there is, for example, a Text o f  
Life ... (Barthes 1988: 7)
In so far as the often cryptic nature of Barthes’s idea-world and the 
daunting nature of his parlance do permit a transparent and unambigu­
ous interpretation, a structuralist concept of text seems to de- 
emphasize what is central to other semiotic theories, namely that a text 
serves first and foremost a communicative target. Yet to conceive of a 
text as a self-contained entity with its own internal structure, inde­
pendent (at least in principle) of whatever interpretations it may at any 
time be able to receive, is to ignore the almost obvious, namely that 
this structure or form is as it is precisely to efficiently organize and 
convey a particular message. Before anything else, a written text must 
therefore be considered as a communicative event, a writer’s device 
for telling something to somebody, his particular reader(ship).
In non-structuralist semiotic theories, and in semiotic theories 
which, while bearing the stamp of Saussure, are not as directly Saus- 
surean as structuralism is, communication does take central stage. In 
the former Soviet Union, this was clearly prefigured in the text- 
theoretical work by Jakobson and Bachtin, which focuses upon the 
(preferably artistic) verbal text qua individual utterance (written as 
well as spoken), and which is conceived as a polemical dialogue be­
tween Saussurean linguistics and “metalinguistics”, the latter a Bach- 
tinian concept (not coextensive with Jakobson’s 1960 notion of meta­
language) emphasizing the diachronical and cumulative aspects of
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literary hermeneutics instead of the static nature of Saussure’s model . 
This marks the transition, in so-called Soviet semiotics, from a cyber­
netic and scientistic approach to a cultural approach.
In the sense of the Moscow-Tartu school of semiotics, originally 
headed by Lotman, communication is approached as a fact of culture, 
and its manifestations, both linguistic and non-linguistic, are called, in 
consequence, “texts of the culture.” In his article “Problems in the 
typology of texts”, Lotman gives the following, deliberately broad 
characterization of the (linguistic) text:
A text is a separate message that is clearly perceived as being distinct 
from a “nontext” or “other text” ... The distinctive character o f a text is 
not randomly distributed among semiotic levels. For a linguist, a sequence 
o f sentences may be perceived as distinct from what precedes and follows 
in a linguistic relation, syntactically for instance, and thus as forming a 
text; and yet it may not possess such a delimitation according to certain 
legal standards. For a lawyer, a sequence o f sentences is part o f a text if  it 
belongs to a broader unity, and is a nontext if it does not belong to such a 
unity. From this follows: ... A text has a beginning, end, and definite in­
ternal organization. An internal structure is inherent by definition in every 
text. An amorphous accumulation o f signs is not a text. (Lotman [1977] 
1988:119)
Considered as a semiotic sign, the text is for Lotman a delimited 
whole. First, the text must have clear external boundaries, which set it 
apart from other texts in the same linguistic code. Second, and in ad­
dition to its outward demarcations, the text often has an inner dis­
tinctiveness, insofar as it consists of parts (strophes, chapters, para­
graphs, etc.). The text is hierarchically organized in a variety of sub­
signs corresponding to levels of structural-semantic organization, or 
subtexts5. In order to be understandable as a coherent unity, both in 
terms of form and in terms of meaning, texts must for Lotman be 
viewed as rooted in a given culture in its plurality of codes. As 
Shukman points out, the concept of “code,” “in Lotman’s usage, may 
refer to semantic level, literary convention, level of consciousness or 
ideology. Used in this way, it is a heuristic device not strictly or ideo­
logically defined” (Shukman 1986: 1088). What is important here is 
not so much how texts are interpreted (because widely divergent in-
4 See, e.g., Bachtin 1990, an essay composed in 1959-1961, mentioned in note 2.
In addition to its hierarchism. the concept o f  text is defined by Lotman in terms o f  
(1) expression, (2) demarcation, and (3) structure. In my survey, these features do not 
appear seriatim, but are blended into the discussion.
terpretations are often possible, all integral), but the fact that they 
make sense in a community or culture and can be efficiently inter­
preted by its members. Herein lies perhaps the difference between 
Lotman’s and Barthes’s ideas of text. While both scholars consider the 
text as an autonomous object, Barthes’s analyses disregard all ex- 
tratextual properties and ideological relations, whereas these play a 
decisive role in Lotman’s textual approach.
As argued in Lotman and Pjatigorskij ([1977] 1988)6, culture con­
sists in a collection of rules which functions as a system of signs. The 
(written) text is a cultural product and may be regarded as a ‘“ semiotic 
space’ in which the various codes combine in a unique manner” 
(Shukman 1986: 1088). In order to become texts, verbal messages 
must function semiotically, that is, they must possess a special cultural 
significance. This means that they must have a meaningful relation not 
only with other texts, but they must also function meaningfully within 
the relevant system of social and cultural codes governing religion, 
law, medicine, politics, art, etc. All texts are embedded in and, to a 
certain degree, conditioned by certain sociocultural rules. This relation 
can be simple and straightforward, or it can be polemic and am­
biguous; but a verbal message lacking a cultural impact cannot be en­
dowed with a textual status.
This means that the everyday utterance, or linguistic communica­
tion without a particular cultural meaning beyond the purely utilitar­
ian, does for this reason not qualify as a semiotic sign, or text. It is 
called a “nontext”. That the division between a text and a nontext is 
neatly defined only in theory, may be exemplified by the New York 
stock-index, a sports report, a shopping list, or the weather report; 
mundane texts, true, but not devoid of cultural relevance. It must be 
underscored that in the text-semiotic perspective as developed in the 
former Soviet Union, strictly linguistic well-formedness ä la Chomsky 
is not as such decisive in verbal utterances, because what would at 
first blush seem like a random sequence of words (for instance, a 
magic formula, children’s nonsense rhymes, a Dada poem) can nev­
ertheless make perfect sense to specific interpreters and/or in specific 
sociocultural contexts. Of the three semiotic dimensions (Morris’s 
syntactic, semantic, pragmatic factors) which may be distinguished in 
the text, the first two are thus integrated in, and overshadowed by, the 
third: “Eeny Meeny Mo” does function as what Lotman conceives as a 
“real text” ([1977] 1988: 124).
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In spite of the wide range of their interests, Lotman and his associ­
ates (such as Ivanov, Uspenskij, Toporov, and many others) gravitate 
towards a concept of text which is particularly applicable to dividing 
texts into “artistic” and “non-artistic” texts (see Shukman 1986). This 
is hardly surprising, because they are especially interested in how 
culturally-functioning signs (Lotman’s “real texts”) not only reflect a 
certain encoded meaning, but also how they enable interpreters to 
generate new and unexpected meanings of them, for example by 
placing them within the novel context of a different cultural (sub)code 
than the original or “natural” one:
In the course o f  the cultural functioning o f the text, its original meaning is 
subjected to complex re-makings and transformations, which result in an 
increase o f meaning. This may therefore be called the creative function of 
the text. In contrast to its communicative function, where the slightest 
change represents an error and a distortion o f meaning, a text in its crea­
tive function tends to produce new meanings (cf. E. T. A. Hoffmann’s 
words in the preface to his Lebensansichten des Katers where errors, slips 
o f Murr about the creative role o f misprints, and also the numerous inci­
dents mentioned by Tolstoy, Akhamatova, and others, the pen, etc., have 
played a part in the creative process). If in the former function noise 
swallows up the information, it may creatively transform it in the latter. 
(Lotman 1987: 161)
By concluding that “the text in its modem semiotic definition, is no 
longer a passive carrier of meaning, but appears as a dynamic, intrin­
sically contradictory phenomenon, as one of the fundamentals of 
modem semiotics” (Lotman 1987: 163), Lotman transforms the text- 
sign from a mere vessel of meaning into an active meaning-generating 
agency, hereby moving textuality away from the statics of the post- 
Saussurian tradition and towards new horizons.
Text ideology
In the final analysis, this dynamic conception of the text as semiotic 
sign would seem more germane to “semiosis” in Peirce’s sense of tri­
adic sign-action, than to Saussure’s dyadic sign-relation, between a 
signifier in opposition to a signified. It is true that the semiotic tradi­
tion in the former Soviet Union is conceptually closer to Saussure and, 
to some degree, to Hjelmslev, than to Peirce. One example of this is 
the notion of culture, which echoes langue, and the vision of the text
as parole; another, that Lotman operates with binary oppositions (such 
as systemic/non-systemic, univocal/ambivalent, center/periphery). 
Moreover, Lotman’s focus (in tandem with Saussure’s) is on man- 
made signs interpreted by human interpreters; while Peirce conceived 
of the sign, in a much broader way, to include all signs, man-made 
and/or natural. Yet it can perhaps be suggested that in Lotman’s per­
spective, as in Peirce’s, the text’s meaning is not reducible to the sys­
tem in which it is inscribed; it is an ongoing process whereby new 
relations with the world are being established and revived, and hence 
new meanings are being forged. Lotman’s conception of the “real” 
sign as determined by culture can be regarded as akin to Peirce’s 
“genuine” sign (at least in one of the senses in which Peirce uses this 
term): this is, in addition to being an entity in itself, a two-faced 
agency mediating meaningfully (that is, both functionally and crea­
tively) between “reality” as represented in the sign and “reality” as 
interpreted by an interpreting mind; whereas Saussure’s sign consists 
of, and is therefore reducible to, the sign-internal interaction and mu­
tual dependence between its material side (signifier) and the “content” 
(signified) with which it is descriptively connected. This is textual 
ideology in structuralism, that is “in the restricted, semiotic, meaning 
of this word” (Greimas and Courtes 1982: 149).
Next, let us consider Eco’s concept of the written text, which is 
radically eclectic as it seeks to harmonize and integrate many different 
semiotic traditions, particularly East Europan semiotics, “French” se­
miology, and “American” semiotics. In tandem with semiology (more 
commonly called structuralism), Eco concentrates, in his classic 
A Theory o f  Semiotics and later work, on modes of text production, 
while borrowing his textual concepts and terminology mainly from the 
communication model deviced by information theoreticians. At the 
same time, however, Eco began to develop a text theory emphasizing 
textual interpretation. In consequence, his exploration of the “role of 
the reader” in interpreting texts has been guided expressly by Peircean 
concepts (Eco’s The Role o f  the Reader [1979] 1984).
In A Theory o f  Semiotics, Eco notes that “usually a single sign- 
vehicle conveys many intertwined contents and therefore what is 
commonly called a ‘message’ is in fact a text whose content is a mul­
tilevelled discourse” (1979: 57; Eco’s emphasis)7. If a text can express
Text semiotics: Textology as survival-machine 141
7 Eco inverts the use of “text” and “discourse” as found in, for example, the work o f  
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several coexisting messages, Eco argues, it is because the codes ac­
cording to which it is encoded, are ideally shared by the utterer and 
the interpreter of the text. Except in the rare case of the absolutely 
simple and rudimentary sign, every sign constitutes for Eco a text; and 
a complex sign such as a painting is thus, for Eco, “not a sign but a 
text” (1979: 20, 250).
Eco realizes, of course, that while every sign is a vehicle of mean­
ing, in order to do so it does not necessarily have to be produced by a 
human individual. Many signs, such as the so-called “natural” signs 
(signs of the weather, medical symptoms, etc.) have no utterer. But a 
sign does not function as a sign until it be recognized and understood 
as such, and interpreted by some (real or potential) interpreter. What 
is, however, crucial in making the sign (whether verbal or non-verbal) 
a text, is for Eco solely its multiple meaning-potential; as opposed, it 
must be reminded, to Lotman’s above-discussed, more diversified 
requirements. A sign must be susceptible of receiving more than one 
meaning, including non-intended and even fanciful ones. In the inter­
pretive act or acts new meanings can emerge as a result of the appli­
cation by the interpreter of non-intended (by the sign producer) codes. 
In Eco’s favored expression, the sign must be capable of lying.
Eco’s identification of sign with text holds also true for the inverse 
operation, the written text as a semiotic sign — intentionally produced 
and conventionally interpreted. When Eco considered the sign as a 
text, he really used “text” in an extended, even metaphorical sense; 
while in his consideration of the verbal text as a sign Eco uses the 
term “text” also, and primarily, in reference to the particular written 
object, thereby using “text”, somewhat confusingly, in two senses, 
literal and figurative, concrete and abstract. As it happens, Eco’s ar­
gument concentrates upon the latter (the concept of text) while as­
suming a general acquaintance with the former (the object called text). 
Poorly defined, if defined at all, this object can only be known through 
the (fragments of) verbal texts which Eco uses as examples illustrative 
of his text theory. These include, in Eco ([1979] 1984), texts as hetero­
geneous as a short story (Un drame bien parisien, by Alphonse Al- 
lais), an excerpt from a poem (Toto-Vaca, by Tristan Tzara), a para­
graph from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, and Peirce’s 
definition of the words “hard” and “lithium”). With such a wide topi­
cal selection of texts (from literary, philosophical and chemical gen­
res), Eco shows a universal, Peircean spirit and departs from other 
semiotic traditions which either limit textual study to the study of lit­
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erary texts, or define what constitutes a text in terms of culture, high 
and/or popular. Following Peirce’s line of reasoning, the crucial dis­
tinction is not, as usually, between the artistic and the non-artistic, the 
verbal and the non-verbal, the cultural and the natural, but (as shall be 
shown in more detail in the next section) between the genuine, or tri­
adic sign and signs which do not function triadically. In short, Peirce 
opposes semiosis to non-semiosic forms of textual sign-action.
In The Role o f  the Reader Eco states that the literary, philosophi­
cal, etc. text as “what one calls ‘message’ is usually a text, that is, a 
network of different messages depending on different codes and 
working at different levels of signification” ([1979] 1984: 5). At the 
same time he points out that “every text is a syntactic-semantico- 
pragmatic device whose foreseen interpretation is part of its generative 
process (Eco [1979] 1984: 3, 11). This last definition of the text as 
concept not only accomodates all three semiotic dimensions of the 
text; it also emphasizes the crucial role which text interpretation cru­
cially has to play, in tandem with the earlier text production; and the 
use of the designation “device”, rather than “sign”, underscores that 
the text is however a complex human construction, something con­
trived by human design; and at the same time a means for bringing 
about a result, a kind of tool requiring, from both its maker and its 
user, a combination of workmanship and creativity, skill and imagina­
tion.
In “Peirce and the semiotic foundations of openness: Signs as texts 
and texts as signs” (Chapter 7 of Eco [1979] 1984), written in 1976, 
Eco deploys his ideas on a Peircean text theory by developing some of 
Peirce’s concepts in a suitable textual direction. These concepts are 
not so much Peirce’s well-known triad, icon-index-symbol, as his the­
ory of the “interpretant”. In other words, of the three relations which 
the sign has (with itself, with its referent, and with the meaning it is 
given), Eco goes beyond what the sign stands for and also concen­
trates on the dynamic process by which the sign (text) arouses an in­
terpreting sign (meaning) in some interpreting mind (reader). Such a 
pragmatic approach includes and presupposes an approach from both 
semantics and syntactics, in the same way as Peirce’s Thirdness in­
cludes and presupposes Secondness and Firstness. In fact, it is one of 
the many concrete manifestations of Peirce’s three modes of being. 
Rather than giving here a detailed account of Eco’s reading, interpre­
tation, and application of Peirce’s ideas, let us in what follows take a
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closer look at how Peirce himself equated, or otherwise connected, 
text (as defined for the purpose here) with the adventure of the sign.
Peirce, text, and sign
Peirce did occasionally use “text” in a modem sense of the term . 
Nevertheless, in Peirce’s days “text” was commonly used in classical 
philology, religious studies, and related disciplines, to refer to the 
words of Greek and Latin authors, and other, preferably “ancient” 
(N1:158,1892), pieces of writing, or manuscripts, invested with spe­
cial authority, the Bible, especially9, and referring to Aristotle’s writ­
ing, his “Greek text, the context of the book calls more emphatically 
for a chapter of very different meaning from that which we read in the 
present text” and “the meaning that can be attached to the existing 
text”, written by Aristotle (MS 756: 10-11, c. 1906). This is how the 
term is commonly used by Peirce, and this is likewise how Peirce’s 
contemporary, Saussure, spoke of “written texts” (Saussure [1916] 
1959: 1, 7), namely, as objects of comment and exegesis.
See, particularly, Peirce’s review-articles for The Nation, where he referred, for 
example, to “the illustrations, which are wood-cuts in the text” (N 2: 62, 1894); “there 
was a date, 10 Nov. 1619, in the text, and 11 Nov. 1620, in the margin” (N 2: 93, 
1889); “its pages were filled with solid text” (N 2: 197, 1899); “The text occupies less 
than six hundred pages” (N 2: 265, 1900); “a text o f  half a million words” (N 3: 34, 
1901); “the Appendix to the book ... fills more than half again as many pages as the 
body o f the text” (N 3: 62,1890); “Heiberg prints for the first time the Greek text o f  
Anatolius on the first ten numbers” (N 3: 87, 1902). From Peirce’s other works, see the 
following examples: “End o f  footnote” is immediately followed by “Text resumed” 
(MS 646: 8, 1910); and apropos o f  the opera Peirce remarked: “The business o f  the 
composer was to invent 'beautiful m elodies’. The text that was written below it was a 
secondary affair. Music and words were yuxtaposed, as it were” (MS 1517: 31, 1896). 
The latter quote is from Peirce’s translation o f  William Hirsch’s Genius und Degen­
eration (1998), and Peirce’s use o f  “text” here is evidently a transposition o f the origi­
nal German Text (as an addendum, see publications on this theme, Gorlee 1996, 1997). 
See also the following passage: “I hold that it is necessary to make an emendation to 
the text o f  the 25th chapter o f  the Second Prior Analytics ...” (MS 318: 187, 1907), 
where Peirce also used “text” in the sense o f  “words”. In this connection it is interest­
ing to note the following quote: “ ... if  we take a piece o f blank paper, and form the 
resolve to write upon it some part o f  what we think about some real or imaginary con­
dition of things, then, that resolve being made and the whole sheet (called the [)] hav­
ing been devoted to that purpose exclusively,...” (MS 678: 42, 1910; underlining in the 
handwritten original). Here, the word which Peirce was apparently looking for to fill 
the blank space, could perhaps have been “text”, or an equivalent.
9 See further Segre 1988.
In respect to the modem meaning of “text” as constituting the ob­
ject of research in these pages, Peirce, as a sign-theoretician, used 
terms such as symbol”, “discourse”, “proposition”, and “argument”, 
thereby addressing himself to logical properties of the text, which will 
be elaborated later in greater detail. Here it must suffice to character­
ize the several concepts through which Peirce approached the phe­
nomenon of text, briefly and seriatim, as follows: A symbol is a sign 
requiring intelligent or skilful interpretation to become meaningful. It 
is the vehicle of thought, and “all thinking is conducted in signs that 
are mainly of the same structure as words ..., or symbols” {CP 6.338, 
c. 1909). Reasoning, that is interpretation of signs by signs, whether 
spoken, written, or otherwise (such as pictorial), takes always a dis­
cursive form. Peirce wrote that
Reasoning by our older authors Shakespeare, Milton, etc. is called “dis­
course of reasoning”, or “discourse” simply. The expression is not yet ob­
solete in the dialect o f philosophers. But “discourse” also means talk, es­
pecially talk monopolized. That these two things, reasoning and talk, 
should have come to be called by one name, in English, French, and 
Spanish, a name that in classical Latin means simply, running about, is 
one of the curious growths o f speech. (MS 597: 2, c. 1902)
However, Peirce hastened to add to this that discourse, or reasoning, is 
“communication”, and hence not “a sort of talk with oneself ... ad­
dressed to oneself’ (MS 597: 3, c.1902). Accordingly, a “proposition” 
is, for Peirce, “any product of language, which has the form that 
adapts it to instilling belief into the mind of the person addressed, 
supposing him to have confidence in its utterer” (MS 664: 8, 1910); 
and in what Peirce called “argument”, “[cjertain facts are stated in 
such a way as to convince a person of the reality of a certain truth, that 
is, the argumentation is designed to determine in his mind a represen­
tation of that truth” (MS 599: 43, c.1902). Applied to written texts, 
these concepts (symbol, discourse, proposition, argument, inter alia) 
enable us to deal logically (that is, semiotically) with the text as a de­
vice for verbal definition, suggestion, persuasion, instruction, and 
other forms of communication through words.
First, it is necessary to consider the text as a material object. Con­
strued in Peircean terms, it is a sign and, more specifically, a verbal 
sign. As a sign it must be seen on a par with all other objects which in 
Peirce’s logic are susceptible of signhood. In a Peircean semiotics, 
anything (any object, event, phenomenon, concept, etc.) can, in certain 
circumstances, be a sign. Fisch underscores that “Peirce’s general the­
Text semiotics: Textology as survival-machine 145
ory of signs is so general as to entail that, whatever else anything may 
be, it is also a sign” (1983: 56). According to Peirce, signs in general 
are “a class which includes pictures, symptoms, words, sentences, 
books, libraries, signals, orders of command, microscopes, legislative 
representatives, musical concertos, performances of these ... (MS 634: 
18, 1909). In short, “[a] sign is any sort of thing” (MS 800: 2, [1903?], 
provided it is a “representation” and thus “stands for something to the 
idea which it produces, or modifies; or it is a vehicle conveying into 
the mind something from without” (NEM 4: 309, 1895)10.
It has been frequently noted, and commented upon, by Peircean 
scholars that Peirce’s concept of the sign is very broad; much broader, 
at any rate, than all other semioticians’s conception of signhood, 
which it encompasses. According to Greenlee, it is “deliberately 
broad” (1973: 24); but note Peirce’s own affirmation that it “is a very 
broad conception, but the whole breath of it is pertinent to logic” 
(NEM  3: 3: 233, 1909). Indeed, despite Peirce’s numerous definitions 
and redefinitions of the sign throughout his intellectual career11, he 
never abandoned the broadness of its scope; nor did he change the 
essence of the logical properties of the sign as “something, A, which 
denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C” (CP:
1.346, 1903).
There is substantial evidence from Peirce’s work that he had a keen 
interest in language and linguistics, in addition to many other fields of 
research, theoretical and applied. Peirce’s numerous linguistically- 
oriented essays (the first of which is his 1865 Harvard Lecture I (W  1: 
162ff., 1865)) are manifestations of a deeply-felt concern with language 
as a logical (i.e., for Peirce, as a semiotic) sign system. This interest 
manifests itself most peculiarly in Peirce’s later period (from 1902), 
when the idea of a phenomenology governed by the three modes of be­
ing (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) had crystallized in the philoso­
pher’s mind12. Unlike phenomenology in the more customary sense,
10 Pharies notes that “Peirce’s definition o f  the term as anything capable o f standing 
for something else is so broad that it includes many things that would not normally 
qualify for the term in everyday English (tokens, marks, badges, signals, ciphers, sym­
bols; objects, animals, persons; propositions, arguments, sentences, paragraphs, books; 
mountains, seas, planets, stars, galaxies, universes), although it would be possible to 
say, for example, that a robin on the lawn is a sign o f  approaching spring, that a book is 
a sign o f  the author’s labors, or that a galaxy is a sign that the laws o f  physics continue 
to operate” (1985: 14).
11 For bibliographical key references, see Parmentier 1985: 45. n. 2.
12 For a further discussion o f Peirce’s categories Firstness, Secondness, and Third­
ness, see Gorlee 1994: 40-42.
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Peirce s idea of phenomenology is the science studying “the collective 
total of all that is in any way present to the mind, quite regardless of 
whether it corresponds to any real thing or not” (CP: 1.284, 1905). Ob­
ject of study can thus be, in a Peircean phenomenology, all that can pos­
sibly be perceived or thought. Thus we find linguistic phenomena rub­
bing shoulders with the myriad phenomena of a non-linguistic nature 
which call our attention. Peirce’s doctrine of the three categories pro­
vides a means of dealing with all such phenomena indiscriminately, 
though not equally. To place Peirce’s thought under the banner of phi­
losophy of language is, nevertheless, a serious misconstrual of the facts, 
because it would fail to do justice to the universal scope of Peirce’s 
logic. This is brought out beautifully by Jakobson, thus:
Peirce’s semiotic edifice encloses the whole multiplicity o f significa­
tive phenomena, whether a knock at the door, a footprint, a spontaneous 
cry, a painting or a musical score, a conversation, a silent meditation, a 
piece o f writing, a syllogism, an algebraic equation, a geometric diagram, 
a weather vane, or a simple bookmark. The comparative study o f  several 
sign systems carried out by the researcher revealed the fundamental con­
vergences and divergences which had as yet remained unnoticed. Peirce’s 
works demonstrate a particular perspicacity when he deals with the cate­
goric nature o f language in the phonic, grammatical and lexical aspects o f  
words as well as in their arrangement within clauses, and in the imple­
mentation of the clauses with respect to the utterances. At the same time, 
the author realizes that his research “must extend over the whole o f gen­
eral Semeiotic,” and warns his epistolary interlocutor, Lady Welby: “Per­
haps you are in danger o f falling into some error in consequence o f limit­
ing your studies so much to Language.” (1987: 442)
By categorizing signs not by their material aspects but by the different 
ways in which they may be meaningful, Peirce conceived of many 
human languages (speech, gestures, music, and others), in which ex­
perience may be differently communicated. Verbal language (that is, 
language consisting of verbal signs) is, of course, pivotal among these 
languages. Peirce said that “[b]y a ‘verbal sign’ I mean a word, sen­
tence, book, library, literature, language, or anything else composed of 
words” (MS 318: 239, 1907)13. This list, from Peirce’s later period, is 
nearly echoic of earlier enumerations, such as “words and phrases, and
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linguistic sign only in the narrowest sense: “Peirce would use it to refer to any linguis­
tic representation, including words, sentences, conversations, even whole books. I am 
employing it in the sense that has become traditional in linguistic literature, namely, 
that is ‘word’" (Pharies 1985: 9, n. 7). This limits the value o f this book.
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speeches, and books, and libraries” (MS'404: 5, 1893). As Fisch inter­
prets Peirce,
It goes without saying that words are signs; and it goes almost without 
saying that phrases, clauses, sentences, speeches, and extended conversa­
tions are signs. So are poems, essays, short stories, novels, orations, plays, 
operas, journal articles, scientific reports, and mathematical demonstra­
tions. So a sign may be a constituent part o f a more complex sign, and all 
the constituent parts o f a complex sign are signs. (1983: 56-57)
Scattered throughout Peirce’s works there are numerous references to, 
and discussions of, written signs of all kinds and genres, from isolated 
simple word-signs to complex verbal structures. For instance, the 
words “witch” (MS'634: 7, 1909), “Hi!” (MS 1135: 10, [1895] 1896), 
“runs” (MS 318: 72, 1907), and “whatever” (CP: 8.350, 1908) are for 
Peirce signs; so is “the word ‘man’ [which] as printed, has three let­
ters; these letters have certain shapes, and are black” (W  3: 62, 1873; 
cf. MS 9: 2, 1904). Peirce considered as a sign “[a]ny ordinary word, 
as ‘give’, ‘bird’, ‘marriage’” (CP: 2.298, 1893)14 and combinations of 
words, such as “all but one”, “twothirds o f ’, “on the right (or left) o f ’ 
(CP: 2.289-2.290, c. 1893).
In his writings, Peirce further presented and analyzed many sen- 
tence-signs (grammatically complete or elliptic), such as “Napoleon 
was a liar” (MS 229C: 505, 1905), “King Edward is ill” (MS 800: 5, 
[1903?]), “Fine day!” (MS 318: 69, 1907), “Let Kax denote a gas fur­
nace” (CP: 7.50, 1867), “Burnt child shuns fire” (MS 318: 154-155,
1907), and “Any man will die” (MS 318: 74, 1907). By the same to­
ken, Peirce wrote that “if — then —”, “— causes —”, would be —”,
14 In July of 1905, Peirce wrote to Lady Welby, in a draft of a letter which was never 
sent to his correspondent: “The dictionary is rich in words waiting to receive technical 
definitions as varieties of signs” (PW: 194, 1905). His long list includes many in­
stances of verbal communication, spoken and/or written: “Then we have mark, note, 
trait, manifestation, ostent, show, species, appearance, vision, shade, spectre, phase. 
Then, copy, portraiture, figure, diagram, icon, picture, mimicry, echo. Then, gnomon, 
clue, trail, vestige, indice, evidence, symptom, trace. Then, muniment, monument, 
keepsake, memento, souvenir, cue. Then, symbol, term, category, stile, character, em­
blem, badge. Then, record, datum, voucher, warrant, diagnostic. Then, key, hint, 
omen, oracle, prognostic. Then, decree, command, order, law. Then, oath, vow, prom­
ise, contract, deed. Then, theme, thesis, proposition, premiss, postulate, prophecy. 
Then, prayer, bidding, collect, homily, litany, sermon. Then, revelation, disclosure, 
narration, relation. Then, testimony, witnessing, attestation, avouching, martyrdom. 
Then, talk, palaver, jargon, chat, parley, colloquy, tittle-tattle, etc.” (PW: 194, 1905). 
Regrettably, the rest of this text — possibly containing Peirce’s comments on the 
catalogue — did not survive.
and is relative to -  for are “among linguistic signs” (CP: 8.350,
1908). Peirce s favorite examples of sentence-signs were perhaps, 
chronologically, “This stove is black” (e.g., CP: 1.551, 1867), the 
military command “Ground arms!” (e.g., CP: 5.473, 1907 and MS 
318: 37, 175, 214, and 244, 1907), and “Cain killed Abel” (e.g., NEM  
3: 839, 1909 and CP: 2.230, 1910), all of these repeatedly used by 
Peirce as illustrative examples.
Pieces of writing (that is, texts) are signs. Though a sentence may 
sometimes be a text in itself, texts are more commonly combinations 
of sentences, complex signs consisting in their turn of signs, which 
again consist of signs. This may be exemplified by the syllogism: a 
compound sign built up, logically as well as linguistically, of three 
subsigns, which are again divisible, and so on: “All conquerors are 
Butchers / Napoleon is a conqueror / л  Napoleon is a butcher” (W  1: 
164, 1865). The theater directory and the weather forecast published 
in the newspaper are, for Peirce, predictive signs (MS 634: 23, 1909); 
so are “the books of a bank” (MS 318: 58, 1907) and “an old MS. let­
te r ... which gives some details abou t... the great fire of London” (MS 
318: 65, 1907). As a further example of a verbal text-sign mentioned 
by Peirce we might finally mention “Goethe’s book on the Theory of 
Colors ... made up of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs, etc.” 
(MSI: 18, 1904).
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Text and semiosis
All linguistic signs, regardless of size or complexity, are first and 
foremost signs of Thirdness: Peirce’s symbolic signs (see CP: 5.73, 
1903). “All words, sentences, books and other conventional signs are 
Symbols” (CP: 2.292, c.1902): they stand for the object not because 
they have a (qualitative or structural) similarity to it (which would 
make them iconic signs); nor are they (physically or causally) con­
nected with their object (as is the case of indexical signs). A symbolic 
sign is a sign “simply because it will be understood to be a sign” (MS 
307: 15, 1903) and it “is applicable to whatever may be found to real­
ize the idea connected [with it]” (CP: 2.298, 1893).
As Thirds, symbolic signs only function fully in a triadic sign rela­
tion including the sign itself, the object it stands for, and the sign in 
which the “first” sign is interpreted, its interpretant-sign. Every inter­
pretant is a sign, every sign is not an interpretant:
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If this triple relation is not o f  a degenerate species, the sign is related to its 
object only in consequence o f a mental association, and depends upon 
habit. Such signs are always abstract and general, because habits are gen­
eral rules to which the organism has become subjected. They are, for the 
most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general words, the 
main body o f speech, and any mode o f conveying a judgment. (CP: 3.13, 
1867)15
“Habit” must here be understood in the Peircean sense: not as an eti­
quette fixed once and for all, but, on the contrary, as a rule of proce­
dure adopted for the practical purpose of successfully interpreting a 
sign. Phenomenologically, a phenomenon is considered a First when 
looked at “in itself’; it is considered a Second when compared with 
either internal or external characters or with its own context; and it is 
considered Third when regarded as a totality of influences within a 
postulated unity predicting the future. All signs dealing not with fee­
ling (Firstness) nor with action (Secondness) but with thought (Third- 
ness), that is Peirce’s “intellectual concepts” (CP:5.467, 1907), are in 
this sense habit-bound or habitual. The understanding and interpreta­
tion of a linguistic signs is an intellectual (or better, expert or profi­
cient) activity, and therefore a habitual, rule-governed activity.
However, the rule must always be conceived as being ultimately 
based upon some deliberate resolution adopted by the language users 
to give certain linguistic signs certain meanings. The implication of 
this is again that language users as a group may also at any point de­
cide to change the rules, while the “new” rules may be overruled in 
their turn by any following decision. Change and development are, as 
repeatedly argued by Sebeok, essential to language, or better all hu­
man languages. Though the concept of the linguistic sign as an ad hoc 
rule of procedure would make linguistic change into an arbitrary en­
tity, one which, paradoxically, would be unfit for efficient communi­
cation, yet the fact that the linguistic sign is habit-bound means, at the 
same time, that it is also conventional inasmuch as a word, sentence, 
or text can only function as a means of communication if the rule or 
habit is, to some extent, somehow agreed upon by a consensus in the 
community of language users.
In order to communicate its message the text-sign must function in 
a tripartite (sign-object-interpretant) relation called “semiosis”. 
Semiosis as Peirce conceived it, seems to be both the action of the
The first sentence o f this quote speaks on the concept o f  degenerate signs as op­
posed to genuine or regenerate signs, see the discussion in Gorlee 1990.
sign itself and the process of its interpretation. These are in fact two 
aspects of the same activity, because a sign is only capable of pro­
ducing an interpretant in a thinking mind if it is an element of a triadic 
relation. Only the latter constitutes a real thought-sign, as opposed to 
the quasi-sign which is governed by “automatic regulation” (CP: 
5.473, 1907) between sign and object.
In a dyadic sign relation, such as bounds linguistic semiotics or 
structuralism, the sign is “physically connected with its object; they 
make an organic pair, but the interpreting mind has nothing to do with 
this connection, except remarking it, after it is established” (CP: 
2.299, C.1902). In order to be meaningful and genuine a non-triadic 
sign does not require intelligent interpretation (that is, an interpreta­
tion which is at the same time habitual and habit-changing, conven­
tional and creative), either because the sign immediately exhibits its 
meaning or because it directly points toward it. That there is no real 
action in the interpretation of a one-place, iconic sign, a First, should 
be clear; but the two-place, indexical sign, a Second, equally disquali­
fies itself from semiosis, because it signifies its object either by law or 
by “brute force with no element of inherent reasonableness” (CP: 
6.329, c. 1909). It needs Thirds in their combination.
Peirce emphasized explicitly that by semiosis he meant “an action, 
or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, 
such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence 
not being in any way resolvable between pairs” (CP: 5.484, 1907). 
Text semiosis means that it is essential for the text-sign to embody 
predictive ideas, thoughts, a message, because they are what the text is 
about, its object. However, it is not sufficient for a text-sign to have or 
possess a meaning-content in itself; its persona must be recognized, 
identified, and interpreted as such in order to operate as a full-fledged 
symbolic sign. It may on occasion even be misunderstood or manipu­
lated (see Eco’s lying), because from a strictly Peircean perspective 
the nature of the interpretation produced is, in the final analysis, as 
irrelevant as is the person of the individual interpreter. The text-sign 
itself is endowed with a power which, coming from the object and 
ultimately referring back to it, must in order to realize its full semiotic 
effect, appeal forward through it (the sign) to what is potentially an 
endless series of interpretant signs, each one interpreting the one pre­
ceding it. Textual semiosis teaches ultimately that the “real” meaning 
of the text-sign is not necessarily identical with the prima facie object 
which the text refers to, but rather with the rule or habit (its interpre-
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tant) by which one would, under certain conditions, read, understand, 
and interpret it.
This can be illustrated by Peirce’s account from the “life” of one 
text-sign, thus:
Take, for example, that sentence o f Patrick Henry which, at the time o f  
our Revolution, was repeated by every man to his neighbor: “Three mil­
lions o f people, armed in the holy cause o f Liberty, and in such a country 
as we possess, are invincible against any force that the ennemy can bring 
against us.” Those words represent this character o f the general law of  
nature. They might have produced effects indefinitely transcending any 
that circumstances allowed them to produce. It might, for example, have 
happened that some American schoolboy, sailing as a passenger in the Pa­
cific Ocean, should have idly written down those words on a slip o f paper. 
The paper might have been tossed overboard and might have been picked 
up by some Jagala on a beach o f the island o f Luzon; and if  he had them 
translated to him, they might easily have passed from mouth to mouth 
there as they did in this country, and with similar effect. (CP: 5.105, 
1902)
The history of Henry’s pronunciamento is, at least potentially, the life 
history of all text-signs. Texts need to receive a (real or potential) in­
terpretation in order to be able to operate as signs in different spatial 
and/or temporal settings, that is, they must be meaningful in shifting 
time/place semiosic relations. If a combination of verbal signs does 
not draw the attention toward itself as a sign and does not manifest 
itself as mediating between what it can mean and what it is interpreted 
to mean, it remains a non-text (see Lotman’s concept of non-text). A 
text which, when transplanted in time and/or place, loses its power to 
appeal to an interpreting mind, becomes thereby a non-semiosic (that 
is, a dead) entity. From the perspective of a Peircean semiotics, the 
text-sign is characterized by unlimited semiosis, by the ongoing proc­
ess of growth through interpretation. What keeps the text-sign alive is 
precisely that it elicits an interpretant again and again, and that these 
interpretants (and the interpretants of the interpretants) are not only 
rule-governed entities but also (whether virtually or really) rule- 
changing and rule-creating activities. This is vital for semiosis.
It is apparent that for Peirce, a written text was a complex verbal 
sign partaking of the basic properties common to semiotic signhood. 
Unfortunately, Peirce himself did not develop an explicit text- 
semiotics, he was no textologist in the modern sense, so that the sig­
nificance of his theory for the purpose of a text-semiotics will require 
some interpretive extrapolation. The project of elaborating a Peirce-
based text-semiotics expects that it has at this point been sufficiently 
argued that it must be dramatically different from other sign- 
theoretical text-theories, particularly from Saussure-based text- 
theories. As opposed to French semiology with its emphasis on text 
production, pragmatic semiotics (that is, semiotics in the Peircean tra­
dition) proceeds to the contrary and manifests itself first and foremost 
as a theory of sign interpretation. The sign as Peirce conceived it is, in 
contradistinction to its semiological counterpart, not defined in terms 
of an utterer and/or interpreter but in terms of its dynamic relations, 
with itself, with its object, with its interpretant. Through semiosis, the 
sign deploys its meaning; its full meaning is thus ideally knowable, if 
only in some hypothetical future. Sign-action and sign-interpretation 
are not necessarily determined by a human utterer nor interpreter. 
Peirce’s semiosis is self-generating triadic action. As all semiotic 
signs, the text-sign is a living agency actively seeking to realize itself 
through some interpreting mind rather than passively waiting to be 
realized by it, as is the case in linguistic semiotics.
One reason why a Peircean concept of text, and hence a Peircean 
text-semiotics, may at first seem fanciful is that it diminishes the sig­
nificance of the reader/interpreter. In a semiological (structuralist) 
text-theory, the reader/interpreter is customarily looked upon as the 
sole discourse-producing subject, as the one agency giving the text- 
sign its meaning by matching signifier with signified. By moving in­
stead to a pragmatic, Peircean paradigm, the presence of an interpreter 
is somehow subsumed but at the same time deemphasized. Appar­
ently, Peirce did not have in mind one single person or not even one 
specific mind, but in an abstract way any receptive organism capable 
of generating textual interpretants. Peirce called this an intelligent 
“quasi-mind”. As Peirce wrote, semiosis “not only happens in the 
cortex of the human brain, but must plainly happen in every Quasi­
mind in which Signs of all kinds have a vitality of their own” (N E M 4: 
318, C.1906); and a “quasi-interpreter” is one example of such a 
“quasi-mind” (CP: 4.51, 1906).
Peirce did therefore not include the interpreter as a fourth compo­
nent of semiosis, in addition to the interpretant. This is not to say that 
Peirce did not recognize the existence of the interpreter, because he 
did in fact refer to an interpreter occasionally, e.g., in his often-cited 
definition of a sign as
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... something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or 
capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind o f  that person 
an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. (CP: 2.228, c.1897)
On the whole, however, Peirce seems to indicate that the meaning of 
the text-sign must be logically conceived as relatively independent 
from the reader/interpreter and transpires wholly in what is an endless 
series of individual semiosic events. This proposition argued and 
documented in this essay, provides a new and fruitful perspective on 
the phenomenon of text, one which undercuts subjective signification 
and elevates semiotics to the plane of intersubjective and objective 
inquiry, thereby enhancing, not restraining, its creative and innovative 
component of textology16.
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Семиотика текста: 
текстология как машина выживания
Сигнификативные практики, с помощью которых живые существа 
общаются, являются, по Себеоку, машинами выживания. Соответст­
венно, в применении к семиотическому анализу текста или тексто­
логии Бахтина мы можем говорить о человеческой машине выжи­
вания. Она изучалась разными семиотическими школами (включая 
Московско-Тартускую школу), с обращением к языку, культуре, 
жанру и, что важно, к идеологии текста. В данной статье аспекты 
текстологии изучаются в свете пирсовской общ ей теории знаков. 
Обсуждается понятие текста в опубликованных и неопубликованных 
сочинениях Пирса и демонстрируется его соотношение с семиозисом  
и другими категориями Пирса. Наш проект разработки пирсовской 
текстовой семиотики основывается на презумпции ее существенного 
отличия от других знаковых текстовых теорий и указывает нам путь 
к более интерсубъективной и креативной текстологии.
Text semiotics: Textology> as survival-machine 157
Teksti semiootika: 
tekstoloogia kui ellujäämismasin
Signifikatiivseid praktikaid, millede abil elusolendid suhtlevad, nimetab 
Sebeok ellujäämismasinateks. Vastavalt võiks teksti semiootilise analüüsi 
või Bahtini tekstoloogia puhul rääkida inimese ellujäämismasinatest. Seda 
on uuritud erinevate semiootikakoolkondade poolt (ka nõukogude 
semiootikas) pöördumistega keele, kultuuri, žanri ja, mis on oluline, 
ideoloogiliste käsitluste poole. Antud artiklis pööratakse tekstoloogiale 
tähelepanu Peirce’i üldise märgiteooria valguses. Teksti mõiste üle arut­
lemine Peirce’i avaldatud ja avaldamata kirjutiste põhjal seostatakse 
semioosise ja teiste Peirce’i kategooriatega. Peirce’i põhise tekstisemioo- 
tika väljatöötamise projekt toetub tema eripärale teiste märgiliste teksti- 
teooriate suhtes ja näitab meile teed intersubjektiivsema ja kreatiivsema 
tekstoloogia juurde.
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Abstract. Among the national scientific groups, it was the Prague Lin­
guistic Circle that had the most decisive affinity to the work of the Mos- 
cow-Tartu school. This paper examines the work of one of the most tire­
less contemporary Czech interpreters of the Lotman school, Vladimir 
Macura (1945-1999), whose work on Czech literary and historical texts 
are outstanding examples of the reverberation of Lotmanian semiotics of 
culture in the Czech Republic. This is particularly the case in Macura’s 
reevaluations of the texts of the Czech National Revival of the late eight­
eenth and early nineteenth centuries, especially in two books, Znameni 
zrodu (Signs of Birth) (1995) and Cesky sen (The Czech Dream) (1998). 
In these works Macura looked at this critical period in Czech national 
history as a multi-layered semiotic text in both the verbal and visual 
spheres. The present paper is an attempt at an exploration of Macura’s 
treatment in this manner of the following: the Czech, language, the city of 
Prague, the question of Czech national self-identification in general and as 
part of a larger category, the world of the Slavs. An important aspect of 
this project is an examination of Macura’s exploration of the value func­
tions of symbolic animals and plants in Czech Revival culture, and its re­
1 I am indebted to Pavel Janoušek, Director o f  the Institute for Czech Literature o f  
the Academy o f Sciences o f  the Czech Republic, for his great bibliographic assistance.
I wish to express my gratitude to dr. Nadežda Macurovä for her kind permission to 
publish illustrations from Macura’s works.
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lation to the axiology of Czech (Slavic) cultural identity. The paper is 
dedicated to Macura’s memory.
1. Introduction
The Prague Linguistic Circle of the 1920s and 1930s and the Tartu- 
Moscow school of cultural semiotics are complexly interconnected. 
Both groups start from Saussurean linguistics and semiotics. However, 
the Prague group, and some of the later Russian “formalists,” especially 
Jurij Tynjanov, and the Moscow-Tartu school broke with Saussure’s 
rigid dichotomies (langue/parole, synchrony/diachrony, etc.). The first 
critique of Saussure was expressed in 1929 in a notable statement by 
Roman Jakobson and Jurij Tynjanov (1929) in which the authors as­
serted that each synchronic slice of a verbal text also has a strong dia­
chronic character, for example in stylistic archaizing, and each dia­
chronic system is not free of synchronic layers. Thus the static and the 
dynamic were now united. For Jakobson and Tynjanov, Saussure’s bi­
lateral sign was not sufficient; the significant unit was the text. But the 
literary text was also insufficient, and since, in the view of Jakobson and 
Tynjanov, such semiotic units need not be limited to verbal ones, the 
beginning of a semiotics of culture was laid. For particular signs were 
embedded in other signs of the text, and the boundaries of texts were 
permeable. As Mukarovsky was to point out several years later (1936), 
external stimuli entered the text through the intention of the creating and 
observing subjects. Mukarovsky saw the literary text in Hegelian terms 
as autonomous, subject to internal changes brought about by Hegel’s 
Selbstbewegung (Czech samopohyb), but also vulnerable to outside 
stimuli. For Mukarovsky the individual sign was infected by the context 
of other signs in the same text, and the text itself interacted with other 
literary texts cast in similar stylistic traditions (e.g. Romanticism), and 
national traditions as well (French literature). This position applied to all 
the arts. And toward the end of his life Mukarovsky postulated a “Sys­
tem of Systems” which, while only sketchily defined, prophesied the 
Tartu-Moscow semiotics of culture and Lotman’s semiosphere.
From the late 1920s to our days Euro-American semiotics has di­
verged, taking different paths: those who base themselves on Saus­
sure’s signifier and signified2 (primarily French and American semi-
This led to such verbal concoctions as the concept o f  post-structuralism which 
reinvented semiotic contextuality. I have discussed this in Winner (1995: 243-275).
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otics3) and those who broke through Saussurean boundedness, pri­
marily the Prague and Tartu schools and the continuation of the Pra­
gue tradition by Jakobson during his American period (1942 until his 
death in 1982).
2. The Prague Linguistic Circle and 
the Tartu-Moscow school
The Prague Linguistic Circle and the Moscow-Tartu school chrono­
logically overlapped. In 1973 in Moscow, during our first face-to-face 
meeting Jurij Lotman told me that he was in correspondence with 
Mukarovsky, and that he was concerned about the harsh political cli­
mate under which Mukarovsky had to live and work at that time.
While in the 1920s Mukarovsky, the chief aesthetician of the Pra­
gue group, was still drawn to the Russian Formalists, by the early 
1930s he had repudiated the principles of their project in his sharply 
critical review (1934) of the Czech translation of Viktor Šklovskij’s 
most radical formalist statement, his programmatic Theory o f  Prose 
(O teorii prozy).
It is thus important to see the pivotal differences between, on the 
one hand, French and American “structuralism,” firmly placed into the 
Saussurean mold, and the program of the Prague group whose agenda 
was launched in renunciation of Saussurean statism and advanced in­
stead the notion of system or structure as relational and dynamic, for­
ever in motion and implying multifunctionality and polysemy, thereby 
launching Prague structuralism and later semiotics as an original ini­
tiative which led to the path-breaking sign theory in various domains, 
not only verbal, but also visual, audial, gustatory and tactile texts, and 
to the first study in semiotics of culture, without naming it as such, 
Bogatyrev’s investigation of the function of folk costumes in 
Moravian Slovakia (Bogatyrev 1936), and was later to lead to the 
broad Lotmanian program of semiotics of culture and, towards the end 
of his life, to his formulation of the principle of the semiosphere
J Peirce was not a perceptible influence on either French or Prague-Tartu-Moscow 
semiotics until relatively recently, except for the work o f  Jakobson during the 70s and 
80s and the pioneering work o f  semioticians like the late Max Fisch and his group, 
Kenneth Kettner, the late Richard Martin in the United States, Gerard Deledalle in 
France, Elizabeth Walter and the late Max Bense in Germany, and Jerzy Pelc and his 
school o f  logical semiotics in Poland. It is therefore not part o f our consideration in this 
paper.
(Lotman 1990). The Prague school thus foreshadowed Tartu semiotics 
of culture in their rejection of the Saussurean dichotomies, their 
teleological model, their view of literature not as an isolated series but 
as related to other artistic and broadly cultural domains, including eve­
ryday behavior and history, thus abandoning Saussure’s logocentrism. 
Whereas the Tartu-Moscow school initially posited natural language 
as the primary modeling system, and all so-called secondary modeling 
systems as structured along the model of this primary system, by the 
1980s this school had cast off this split into the two classes of model­
ing systems and emancipated non-verbal semiotic systems from the 
hegemony of the linguistic model as the primary modeling system, as 
had the Prague group earlier.
3. Vladimir Macura (1945-1999) and 
the Tartu-Moscow school
I turn now to one of the most persistent interpreters of the relation of 
the Prague school and the Moscow-Tartu school who, unfortunately 
died at a very young age this past April, whose works were of signal 
importance and uniquely original, but who, because of his premature 
death is not known to any extent outside the Czech-speaking world.
I am thinking of Vladimir Macura (1945-1999) to whose memory 
this paper is dedicated (Fig. 1). He was an admirer of Lotman and his 
school and examined literary and historical texts in the manner of 
Tartu semiotics of culture, and he also had a significant interest in 
Estonian language and culture in which he found many parallels to the 
evolution of Czech culture and language. He was struck by the fact 
that both the Czech and the Estonian nations, both small in size, found 
themselves, in the nineteenth century, overwhelmingly dominated, 
politically, culturally, and linguistically, by other cultures, German in 
the case of the Czechs, Russians and Germans in the case of Estonia. 
Macura learned Estonian, and translated some works of Estonian lit­
erature into Czech, and some of his works were also translated into 
Estonian. Only a few examples of his work with or on Estonian topics 
must suffice here4: They are “Legendaarne Kangelanna” (Horisont, 
Tallinn) (Macura 1998 (an Estonian interpretation of the Czech Libuše 
myth); “Kümme XX sajandi tšehhi luuletajat” [Twenty Czech Poets of
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ences below.
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the 20th Century) (as editor), Eesti Raamat, Tallinn (Macura 1996); 
“Eesti keel ja kirjasõna tšehhi ajakirjas aastal 1946”, Keel ja  Kirjan­
dus (Macura 1974). He also became interested in Czech-Estonian lit­
erary relations (1976) and introduced several Estonian writers to 
Czech readers (A. Tammsaare (1976), D. Vaarandi, E. Niit, V. Luik 
(1988), Lennart Meri (1991)). He interviewed Lotman and published 
this dialogue both in Czech and in Slovak (1991, 1992), and his many 
studies on the Moscow-Tartu school (1994, 1995a, 1995b) are of 
great interest.
Figure 1. Vladimir Macura 1945-1999.
In 1974 Macura co-founded (with V. Novotny) the then illegal Society 
of Friends of the Baltic (Balticky svaz), illegal in communist Czecho­
slovakia which published a samizdat journal called Läänemere Liidu
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Liige. After the “velvet revolution,” the journal became official under 
the new name o f Buletin cesko-estonskeho klubu Baltica. When writ­
ing about Estonia during the communist reign, Macura frequently used 
the nom de plume Vladimir Kreutzwald, after the name of the Esto­
nian Revivalist, F. R. Kreutzwald (1803-1882) who recorded Estonian 
folklore and produced the epic Kalevipoeg, the story of the mythical 
founder of the Estonian nation.
4. Macura’s original work on semiotics of culture
Macura’s writings covered many genres: novels, scholarly essays on 
literary theory, book reviews, journalistic feature articles, and transla­
tions, mainly from Estonian to Czech. His studies at Charles Univer­
sity in Prague in the tradition of the Prague Linguistic Circle (he was a 
student of Felix Vodicka), shaped his structuralist and semiotic ap­
proach in the analysis of literary and historical texts. In the 1980s, 
when Moscow-Tartu writings became more freely available, he was 
strongly attracted to Lotmanian semiotics of culture, which is evi­
denced in his historical writings on the Czech National Revival 
(Narodni obrozeni) of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu­
ries. This new perspective characterized his book, Signs o f  Birth 
(Znameni zrodu, 1995) and his last published monograph Cesky sen 
[The Czech Dream] (1998). In Signs of Birth he saw the critical period 
of the Czech National Revival as a multi-layered semiotic web, char­
acterized by a certain artificiality, mystification and game-playing on 
the part of the Czech intelligentsia. This was a radical departure from 
the traditional Czech view of the popular romantic Herderian nation­
hood. Macura’s whimsically entitled Masaryk’s Boots and other- 
semi(o)feuilletons [Masarykovy boty a jine semi(o)fejetony] (1993), 
incorporates selections from his feature articles that appeared in the 
weekly Tvar (Form) during 1992-1993. Themes of Czech history and 
disquisitions on the Czech language and Czech literature are inter­
spersed with semiotically interpreted popular pieces, on advertising, 
Czech banknotes after the “divorce” from Slovakia, the Czech flag, 
Romas as “others,” the history of Czech toponymies, and on other 
themes. In The Czech Dream (Cesky sen, 1998), the last book before 
Macura’s death Macura focuses on the image of the Revival as an 
awakening (probuzeni) from sleep or from a dream, which suggests 
the Lotmanian semiosphere, as I will note.
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What was the historical background for these treatments of the Czech 
National Revival? I digress to discuss this very important question.
As a result of their defeat in 1621 by the Imperial forces in the 
Battle of the White Mountain [Bila hora], the Czechs were deprived 
for a long period not only of their political independence, but also of 
much of their cultural and artistic life since after the Czechs were van­
quished in 1621, all aspects of Czech culture were threatened or nearly 
obliterated. The Protestants were persecuted and expelled from the 
country, the Czech aristocracy was decimated; Czech books were 
burned. German and Latin replaced Czech in many cultural spheres 
especially in the eighteenth century, leading to the virtual obliteration 
of Czech as a written language. During this period, especially during 
the reigns of Maria Theresa (1740-1780) and of her son Joseph II 
(1780-1790), the Austrian empire followed a policy of intense cen­
tralization and Germanization. Joseph’s educational reforms essen­
tially Germanized all levels of the school system, including elemen­
tary schools in the Bohemian and Moravian crown lands, down to the 
level of village elementary schools. Czech books were no longer 
printed.
Nevertheless, the baroque, as a quintessentially counter-reforma- 
tional artistic movement, blossomed following the Czech defeat. Mag- 
nifcent architectural objects and a superb lyric tradition persisted; but 
by the eighteenth century Czech literature could no longer remain un­
affected by the intense Germanization efforts by the Viennese court. 
Thus, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a Czech 
National Renewal (narodni obrozem) took shape, rejecting the cul­
tural imperialism of Vienna. The Czech language, long dormant, was 
recodified and became again the basis of a literary tradition. Some 
exquisite romantic poetry by Karel Hynek Mächa, was an exception to 
the predominantly politicized writing, directed toward the cause of the 
National Revival of ethnic and linguistic identity.
Thus by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century the 
Czechs regained their written language. No longer was Czech rejected, 
even by some Czech intellectuals, as an insignificant language re­
duced the unwritten vernacular of the peasants and the urban prole­
tariat, while the elite wrote in Latin and German and often spoke only 
German. Two types of Czech had survived during the eighteenth cen-
5. Macura’s semiotics of the Czech National Revival
Czech aud Tartu-Moscow semiotics 165
tury: the archaic and conservative language of the courts, and a popu­
lar oral type, spoken primarily by the peasants and urban proletariat 
(cf. Havränek 1936: 80). During the National Revival during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Czech was recodified first by 
Josef Dobrovsky (1753-1829), and later again by Josef Jungmann 
(1773-1847). It was illustrative for the unfortunate state of Czech of 
that time that Dobrovsky’s fundamental Czech grammar was written 
not in Czech but in German (Lehrgebäude der böhmischen Sprache) 
(Dobrovsky 1909), and that many of the language reformers them­
selves had only a minimal academic knowledge of the Czech language 
gleaned from the pages of the pre-1621 literature (cf. Havränek 
1936:84). Later, however, Jungmann’s works on the Czech language, 
Slovesnost [Literature] (Jungmann 1829), Historie literatury ceske 
[History of Czech Literature] (Jungmann 1825), and his monumental 
Slovnik cesko-nšmecky [Czech-German Dictionary] (Jungmann 
1835-1839), were written in Czech.
Macura saw the Czech Revival as a self-conscious process, as an 
intentional pedagogical design on the part of certain intellectuals, 
among them Josef Dobrovsky and Josef Jungmann as a complexly 
structured sign system (cf. Janoušek 1999: 334) which led him to the 
notion of Revivalist culture as a game, appropriating Lotman’s differ­
entiation of “play” and “art.” In play the situation is conventionally 
treated “as though” it were real, assuming the player “lives” in the 
game and follows its unconscious rules. In such a case a stuffed tiger 
is accepted as “pretend-true”, inspiring “pretend-fear,” whereas a 
work of art makes no such pretensions. Accordingly, Macura holds 
(1995: 102-103) that the National Revival was looked upon as an 
ideal, embodying the human ability to create something higher than 
reality, namely a design for striving toward the divine. But at the same 
time, there existed a profound pessimism, casting doubt on the human 
ability to achieve so lofty a goal. Could the gap between the small 
group of intellectual “Awakeners,” and the unlettered masses be 
closed? For the Czech language no longer existed as a general means 
of communication, and thus it must have appeared to the small group 
of recodifiers of the Czech language that they were creating a game­
like reality. As the poet Jan Kollar (1793-1852) facetiously wrote, 
“We play on a piano that perhaps does not have any strings” (Kollar 
1952: 351 in Macura 1995: 105). Thus the contrast between play and 
life in Czech Revivalist culture, often seen by contemporaries as ironic 
and playful, or at best as naively optimistic.
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1. Linguocentrism
The central issue became the recodification of the Czech language and 
the propagation for its use in daily life in an urban population, including 
the intellectuals. And this led to such epithets as Czech as a philological 
nation (abecedarsky narod [Šafank]). Especially in the first half of the 
nineteenth century linguistic questions transcend the boundaries of lin­
guistics and become reflections of a specific cultural and social per­
spective. For example, the complex Czech case system was not only 
seen as a morphological trait of the language, but, it took on axiological 
dimensions of such positive values connected to the language as musi- 
cality and harmony, in contrast to the less valued non-inflectional or 
part-inflectional, languages. The latter were metaphorized as a wall con­
structed so that the nails (the prepositions that act like case endings) are 
openly visible, whereas in Czech and other inflected languages, as most 
other Slavic ones, the nails are hidden, making for greater elegance 
(Macura 1995: 43). Nor was orthography seen as an arbitrary system of 
rendering the sounds of a language. It also became an autonomous value 
fused to aesthetic and political phenomena. For example, after Russia’s 
victory over Napoleon in 1912 there were various calls on the part of 
the, Awakeners to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet (Jungman 1948: 155). 
Thus the Czech National Revival, and even much of modem Czech 
culture, took on a strongly metalinguistic character, and this linguocen­
trism is still active today, and comes strongly to the fore in the language 
games of the interwar Czech literary avantgarde.
2. The city —  Prague
As in other European cultures, the axiology of the city begins to 
change during the nineteenth century. As is seen in the works of Dick­
ens, Sue, and Balzac, the city, which until the end of the eighteenth 
century was valued negatively by the pre-Romantic writers who ide­
alized the countryside, began to be valued positively, as it was by 
Karel Hynek Mächa, the Czech Romantic poet par excellence. Mächa 
now praised the city’s picturesque charm. Thus Mächa writes “towns 
like small white markers peeked out of the dark shadows; and light
5.1. Other semiotic systems of the National Revival
smoke curled up from them” [“mesta, со bila znammka vyhližela z 
šerych stmü; nad nimi se kroužil lehky kour”] (Mächa 1961, 11.210 in 
Macura 1995: 178). Yet the situation was different from that in other 
European countries, for the image of Prague enters the literature of the 
Revival often by the back door, by way of the little valued peripheral 
genres of art, the urban dramatic farce, especially Czech adaptations 
and/or translations of Viennese humorous folk plays. In Macura’s ex­
ample, the Czech play Alina or Prague in another Part o f the World 
[Alina aneb Praha v jinem dilu svšta] by Štepänek, was simply a free 
translation of the Viennese folk play by Karl Ruber, Aline, oder Wien 
in einem anderen Weltteil. Viennese localized details are simply 
transposed to Prague equivalents (street names, landmarks, etc.).
Macura sees Prague as having a dual sign function in this period: it 
is depicted both in its realities, its streets, houses and inhabitants, and 
as an allegory. The former function is realized on what Jakobson 
called the axis of combination (syntagmatic axis), indexically. In the 
allegorical aspect, on the other hand, elements are based on similarity, 
iconically (Macura 1995: 180). Allegorically Prague is personified as 
a female, as its Czech name, Praha, is grammatically feminine. Prague 
then is metaphorized as “Mother” (during the Interwar first Czecho­
slovak Republic, the motto “Praha matka mest’ [Prague, Mother of 
Cities] was painted on the red-yellow streetcars of the city. The figure 
of Prague as “mother,” “bride,” “widow” (of kings) brings it near to 
the Revival theme of vlast (one’s home country, equivalent to the 
Russian rodina and the French patrie. Again, like its French and Rus­
sian equivalents, but unlike the German Vaterland (grammatically 
neuter, vlast is grammatically feminine, and is axiologically tied to the 
symbolism of the Czechs as a family of father, mother, and children 
(Macura 1995: 181)). (Fig. 2-3).
In Lotman’s terms, boundaries become signs; Prague is split into 
two parts, an “old” and a “new”, where “old” is identified with the 
allegorical (iconic) past expressed in such attributes as “old,” “vener­
able” (staroslavna), and “brave” (chrabrä), whereas “new” is repre­
sented by the contemporary realities of the city, its physical shape, its 
streets, real people, etc. In Czech mythology the allegorical aspect of 
the city is a meeting of this world and the divine world (Macura 1995: 
183), suggesting the traditional folk image of the cosmological tree, 
the “tree of life”. Here Macura comes very close to the Lotmanian 
function of myth as a device for creating a picture of the world, and to
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Figure 2. National symbols which had become established in the culture of 
the National Revival, had become accepted as natura andl traditional in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Tracesof Revival culture are seen in the 
stylization of Pragueas a sacred space, the Масса of Czechdom, etc. Illustra­
tion from the cover of the annual Zlata Praha (Golden Prague) (1864).
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Figure 3. M other Slavia with her children. Image of the Panslavic “family”. 
(Humoristicke listy [Humor Magazine] vol. 5. 1863, p. 328).
establish an identity to distant spheres (Lotman 1990: 152). The tree 
of life, frequently supplanted by the image of the mountain represents 
the link between humans and the gods. In Bakhtin’s sense, its axiol­
ogy is spatial-vertical, it moves from the bottom of the mountain, the 
actual reality, the bowels of the earth, man, and even lower the 
devil(s), upwards to the mountain summit which reaches to the ideal, 
the godhead. The mountain summit and Prague both are bipolar 
mythemes, interchangeable images and their iconographies share the 
metaphoricity of “cathedral,” “castle,” “crown,” “throne,” etc. 
(Macura 1995: 185). Similarly, the Slovak emblem are the Tatra 
mountains. Indeed, a specific tree, the linden tree ([lipa) became the 
Czech (or Slavic) mythical tree par excellence. (Fig. 4-5).
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Figure 4. The symbol of the “Slavic linden tree” arose in the first quarter of 
the 19th century as the opposite of the German oak. The female linden tree 
(the Szech lipa is grammatically feminine) with its soft wood, a source of 
honey, was opposed to the (German) oak and exploited as as central emblem­
atic item: Slavic honey vs. bitter German acorns, Slavic busy bees vs. German 
parasitical drones, Slavic softness and benevolence vs. German severity and 
harshness, a.s.o. The illustration is by the Czech painter Mikoläš Aleš. It 
shows Czech cultural and political figures as the roots, and titles of Czech 
songs and poems as the branches of the linden.
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Figure 5. Alfons Mucha “Youth Under the Linden Tree” (1926).
3. The Czech nation (narod, vlast)
The problem of nationhood permeated the National Revival. What is a 
nation, and how it can be defined as something specific, was, after all, 
an important theme of he Romantic nationalism pervading Europe. 
But while it was no problem to define what characterized the German 
or the French nation by territory and distinctive language, the defini­
tion of what constituted Czech nationhood was far more complex. For 
the Czech nation could not easily be defined by language. Macura 
cites an anecdote involving the Czech writer Jan Neruda (1834-1889). 
In a Czech small town Neruda initiated a conversation with a woman 
innkeeper concerning a recent Czech national celebration that had 
taken place in this town. “Yes, the Czechs had a celebration here,” 
agreed the innkeeper in perfect Czech. “But there live only Czechs 
here,” was Neruda’s reply; “and aren’t you a Czech yourself?” “I,” 
replied the innkeeper, “I am neutral”. (Neruda 1961: 375-376 cited in 
Macura 1998: 54). To what nationality did this lady feel she belonged, 
asks Macura. Was it Austrian, as a subject of the Habsburg monarchy? 
Or did she feel that she belonged to the Kingdom of Bohemia, But the 
epithet Bohemus or Bohemicus did not necessarily identify a language, 
and could simply mean a subject of the Kingdom of Bohemia which
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was part of the Habsburg empire. And this subject, especially in the 
cities, might more probably speak German than Czech. A Czech could 
also be called a German, even a Czech speaking peasant, as a subject 
of the Holy Roman Empire. Similarly, the German label Böhme could 
be applied to both German and Czech speakers. But “Czech” could 
also be seen as part of a larger unit, the world of the Slavs (Slovan- 
stvi). The association of Czech with Slav led to attempts at creating a 
universal Slavic language (e.g. Jan Herkel’s Elementa universalis lin­
guae slavicae (1826), and Kollär’s notion of Slavic Solidarity (Slo- 
vanskd vzajemnost) (Macura 1995: 157).
4. Smallness: the new ideal of nationhood
The view of Czechs as part of a larger unit, Slavdom, was weakened by 
the appearance of an article by the Czech historian Erazim Vocel 
(1864). It appeared in the Journal of the Czech Museum (Casopis 
Ceskeho Muzea in its 20th volume, entitled “The Estonian Learned So­
ciety in Derpt” (Ucenä spolecnost estonskä v Derptu”) (Derpt is today’s 
Tartu). The article was a paraphrase of some texts in the Estonian 
Learned Society’s Verhandlungen der gelehrten estnischen Gesell­
schaft. Two points strike us. The first is that the language of the Ver­
handlungen is not Estonian but German, thus a situation analogous to 
that in the Czech lands through the early period of the National Awak­
ening. The second interesting matter is Vocel’s choice of texts in the 
Estonian journal for paraphrasing, namely two historical essays in Ger­
man by D. H. Jürgensen one on the Estonian language and the second 
one on Estonian literature, “Über die Entstehung der beiden 
Hauptdialekte der estnischen Sprache” and “Kurze Geschichte der est­
nischen Literatur” (1846: I: 19-25; I I: 41-52; I I I: 61-73). It is clear 
why Vocel chose just these two texts and added to them two translations 
from the German translation of two Estonian folk texts, (“Wanne- 
munna’s Sang” and “Koit and Hämarik”) while omitting other learned 
articles on historical topics and other fields. This choice was clearly 
engendered by the interest in the late Czech National Revival of ques­
tions of the nature of national languages and the related fields of litera­
ture and oral art. Vocel knew German but not Estonian, nor could he 
have had any knowledge of Estonian literature and folklore, but he en­
thusiastically foretold a great future for the reawakening of Estonian 
culture, in which he saw a promising analogy to the Czech situation.
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Hence an enthusiasm for the culture of a nation, even smaller than the 
Czechs, took precedence over the desire of Czech intellectuals to iden­
tify with a larger body of related cultures, all of Slavdom, that had 
dominated Czech Revivalist thought in the early decades of the nine­
teenth century. It was not only Estonian culture that fascinated the 
Czechs now, but they began to identify with other smaller nations re­
belling against foreign dominance, namely the Irish, the Basques, the 
Flemish, and the Greeks. This new self-identification of the Czechs with 
other small nations expressed changed values in which the powerful 
attributes of largeness were gradually displaced by those of the spiritu­
ality, modesty, simplicity of the cultures of small ethnic groups (Macura 
1995: 166). The positive value of the concept of the “Middle” (stred) 
evolved with the process of the creation of a Czech philosophy, akin to 
Herder’s concept of the golden middle (“die goldene Mitte”). For the 
Czech historian František Palacky the Czech nation mediated between 
and bridged East and West (Palacky 1848). Such notions continue to 
characterize the Czech nation as moderate and eschewing the radical 
extremes which still has significance today.
5. The mythological function of nature: animals and plants
Macura semioticized properties of the Czech Revival culture such as the 
axiological function of flowers, plants, trees, and animals (Macura 
1995: 20-30). The medieval flower symbolism was transformed in the 
nineteenth century language of sentiment and love of the Biedermeier 
period, similar to other European cultures. Just one example must suf­
fice here: the oriental flower symbolism of the rose as a symbol of per­
fection and love was taken over by Christian medieval iconography as 
the sign of the Holy Grail, the heart of the Virgin Mary and, in general, 
as a metaphor for the Holy Virgin. This metaphor and other oriental 
flower metaphors became secularized and eroticized in the Czech lit­
erature of the National Revival (the rose as a metaphor for love and the 
lily as a sign for innocence). The Czech identification of the red of the 
rose and the white of the lily with Red and White combination of the 
Czech national colors (Macura 1995: 22) become a strong extended 
metaphor for Czechness. Furthermore, in the National Revival two ani­
mal and plant species conveyed the idea of Slavdom and of Czech iden­
tity, namely the dove (holub) and the linden tree (lipa). For the Czech 
Revival the dove was a Slavic symbol, and the abundance of pigeons on
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Venice’s St. Mark’s Square was seen as evidence of an earlier Slavic 
influence. And this lead Czech writers to such pseudo-etymologies that 
related the Czech word holub to the Slavic stem -ljub- (love-), as is done 
by Jan Kollar in a special study which connects ljub{love) to the dove 
(holub), e.g. holub >holjub, holub>spoljub (mutual love) (Kollar 1862: 
329-348 in Macura 1995: 90.)
Among the plants, it is the linden tree (lipa) that became an im­
portant symbol for Slavdom, and especially for Czechness, as it is to 
this day, creating such expressions as ceska lipa (the Czech linden 
tree). (Fig. 4-5). The Czech feminine gender for the linden tree (lipa) 
are bonded to many of the attributes ascribed to the dove (gentleness, 
sweetness, peace). In Czech Revivalist literature the linden tree is of­
ten opposed to the oak with its Czech masculine gender (dub), signi­
fying Germanness, not only in Czech but also in German mythology 
(die deutsche Eiche, Er ist deutsch wie eine Eiche /the German oak, he 
is German as an oak). In Kollär’s epic poem Slävy dcera (Släva’s 
Daughter) (Kollar 1832)э, and even earlier, at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Macura quotes the Czech writer Vaclav Stach as 
writing as early as 1805 (1805: 15) “The oak is a shade giver and or­
nament of the German fortune teller (veštec). Cannot then the linden 
tree be that of the Czech soothsayer? (Macura 1995: 91). Here we can 
see an early example of Jakobson’s semantization of grammatical 
morphology in his example from Heine’s poem liDer Fichtenbaum 
und die Palme” [The Fir Tree and the Palm Tree] which he cites in his 
“The Grammar of Poetry and the Poetry of Grammar” (Jakobson: 
1981). As Jakobson notes, Heine here suggests an erotic relation be­
tween the two trees the grammatically masculine fir tree (Der 
Fichtenbaum) and the grammatically feminine palm tree (die Palme) 
interact erotically. To strengthen this idea, Heine chose to name the fir 
tree not by its common German name, die Fichte, which is feminine, 
but chose the combination with the masculine -baum which makes the 
entire compound noun masculine. The same grammatical semantiza­
tion is cited by Jakobson in his discussion of the Russian bylina about 
“Vasilij and Sofija,” in which a cypress (R. Masculine noun kiparis) 
and the willow tree (R. Fem. verba) grow out of Sofija’s and Vasilij’s 
graves respectively, and “wove together with their heads? And stuck
As Mešt’an points out (1984: 69). Kollar uses a conscious “Revivalist” etymology. 
The noun sldva, in Czech and Slovak, as well as in other Slavic languages, has the 
meaning of gloiy. And for Kollar and other writers of the National Revival, the ety­
mology of the word for Slav (Slovan) is derived from this Slavic root for glory, fame.
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together with their leaves.” (Jakobson 1981: 92). Macura notes (1995: 
91) that this semantization still exists in some rural areas of Bohemia 
and Moravia where an oak is planted at the birth of a boy, and a linden 
tree at the birth of a girl. Furthering the thesis of feminine ideal for 
Czechness, Macura notes the frequency of the figure of the Czech 
amazon fighting for freedom in the 1848 revolution, a theme which 
became a favorite of illustrators in the Czech press, frequently with 
striking similarity to Delacroix’s famous amazone picture. (Fig. 6-7).
The opposition linden tree / oak tree for Czechness or Slavdom in 
general vs. Germanness is accompanied by secondary semantizations 
that also model the same dichotomy of Czech vs. German. For the 
Czech/Slavic side, they are honey (sweetness), the bee (as the pro­
ducer of sweetness with a secondary semantization of industriousness 
(Cz: pile, also of feminine gender)) on the Slavic side, and the bitter 
acorn and aggressive boar on the German side. Macura develops the 
following model of the Czech-German opposition (1995: 92):
Slavic (Czech)
the linden tree (lipa, fern.)
honey
bee (vcela, f., pile, f.)
Female vs. Male principle 
softness vs. hardness 
Peace loving vs. Aggressive 
sweetness vs. bitterness 
Industrious vs. Aggressive
German
oak (dub, masc.)
acorn
boar (kanec, m.)
6. Czech “dreams” of the Revival period
In his last book, The Czech Dream (Cesky sen) (1998), Macura returns 
again to his pivotal topic of the Czech National Revival, which he 
semioticizes by another opposition, that of sleep-dream (sen) vs. 
awakening (probuzeni, buditef). Here Macura analyzes fifteen Czech 
myths (he calls them “dreams about...”), and in the Introduction and 
Conclusion, he provides a meta-analysis of the Czech Revival Move­
ment, often shown as characterized by the artificiality of a dream. In 
the Introduction, he demonstrates how the “Czech Dream” of nation­
hood in the National Revival extends into the “dreamings’ of the In­
terwar first Czech Republic under Masaryk, and how this “dream” is
6 The leaders in the National Revival movement were also called buditele [Awaken- 
ers]
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Figure 6. Amazone on the barricades under the Charles Bridge Tower on the 
Old Town side in Prague. From a leaflet of 1948.
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Figure 7. The mythical Czech amazone, Vlasta. Painting by Josef Navrätil.
shifted into a new semiotic model after the communist putsch of 1948. 
As we have seen, the “dreaming” of the time of the Awakening was a 
sign of a transition towards a Czech national identity defined in con­
trast to German culture; Macura’s analogy is the “dreaming” after the 
communist putsch of 1948 of the communist ideology, which is al­
ways presented as a transition to the ideal society of communism. This 
new “dreaming” revalued the anti-Germanism of the National Revival 
into the image of the hostile imperialist war-mongering West, while 
the Slavophilism of the Awakening was transformed into Russophi- 
lism or Sovietophilism (Macura 1998: 11-12).
Today the Czechs are again striving for a national identity, and the 
“bridge” is replaced by a desire for becoming part of the European 
Union on Czech independent terms. And Estonia also shares this new 
dream. In both cases, then, the search for a national identity is cast in 
quite new terms.
Macura, like a poet, has the ability to treat metaphorically relation­
ship that are not always noted so clearly, and then they become a se­
miotic documentation of Czech culture since the Habsburg monarchy
to our days.
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Чешская и Тартуско-Московская семиотика: 
культурная семиотика Владимира Мацуры (1945-1999)
Среди национальных научных групп деятельность Пражского линг­
вистического кружка была наиболее сходна с работой Московско- 
Тартуской школы. В данной статье исследуется работа одного из 
самых неутомимых современных чешских интерпретаторов лотма- 
новской школы Владимира Мацуры, чьи труды по чешской литера­
туре и истории представляют собой замечательный пример отзвуков 
лотмановской семиотики в Чешской Республике. Это особенно 
касается переоценки Мацурой текстов чешского национального 
возрождения конца 18 -  начала 19 веков, особенно в книгах “Знаки 
рождения” (1995) и “Чешский сон” (1998). В этих работах Мацура 
рассматривает этот критический период чешской национальной 
истории как многослойный семиотический текст и в вербальной, и в 
визуальной сферах. Настоящая статья представляет попытку иссле­
дования такого подхода Мацуры к чешскому языку, городу Праге, к 
проблеме чешской национальной самоидентификации в целом и, как 
части более широкой категории, славянского мира. Особое внимание 
уделяется исследованию Мацурой ценностных функций символи­
ческих животных и растений в культуре чешского Возрождения в 
соотношении с аксиологией чешской (славянской) культурной иден­
тичности. Статья посвящена памяти Мацуры.
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Tšehhi ja Tartu-Moskva koolkonna semiootika: 
Vladimir Macura (1945-1999) kultuurisemiootika
Rahvuslike teaduskoosluste hulgast oli Praha lingvistikaringi tegevus kõi­
ge samasem Tartu-Moskva koolkonna suunitlusega. Artiklis vaadeldakse 
tänapäeva Tšehhi ühe kõige väsimatuma Lotmani koolkonna interpre­
teerija Vladimir Macura tegevust, kelle tööd tšehhi kirjanduse ja ajaloo 
alalt kujutavad endast suurepärast näidet lotmanliku semiootika mõju­
väljast Tšehhi Vabariigis. Eriti puudutab see Macura-poolset tšehhi rah­
vusliku ärkamisaja tekstide ümberhindamist, eelkõige raamatutes “Sünni­
märgid” (1995) ja “Tšehhi unenägu” (1998). Neis tekstides vaatleb 
Macura seda tšehhi rahvuse ajaloo kriitilist perioodi kui mitmekihilist (nii 
verbaalses kui visuaalses sfääris) semiootilist teksti. Artiklis lahatakse 
Macura semiootilist lähenemist tšehhi keelele, Praha linnale, tšehhi 
rahvusliku enesemääramise probleemile tervikuna ja, laiemalt, slaavi 
maailmale. Erilist tähelepanu pööratakse Macura uurimusele sümboolsete 
loomade ja taimede väärtusfunktsioonidest tšehhi ärkamisaja kultuuris, 
suhestatuna tšehhi (slaavi) kultuurilise identiteediga. Artikkel on pühen­
datud Macura mälestusele.
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От “словообразов” к “главокадрам”: 
имажинистский монтаж 
Анатолия Мариенгофа
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P.O. Box 4 (Vuorikatu 5B), 00014 University of Helsinki, 
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Abstract. From “word-images’ to “chapter-shots: The imaginist mon­
tage of Anatolij Mariengof. The article discusses the three dominant 
imaginist principles of Anatolij M ariengof s (1897-1962) poetic tech­
nique, as they are translated into prose in his first fictional novel Cynics 
(1928). These principles include the “catalogue of images”, a genre intro­
duced by Vadim Shershenevich, i.e. poetry formed of nouns, which M a­
riengof makes use of in his longer imaginist poems. Another dominant 
imaginist principle, to which M ariengof referred in his theoretic articles 
and poetic texts, is similar to the creating of shocking images typical of 
Russian futurism. M ariengof s application is the juxtaposition of “pure” 
(chistyj) and “impure” (nechistyj), either a conflict between the vehicle 
and the object within a metaphor or a conflict between metaphors. This is 
an essential poetic feature in both M ariengof s poetry and prose. The 
third, maybe the most Mariengofian imaginist principle, relevant to the 
study of Cynics, is the poetics of transition (poetika sdviga), i.e. a certain 
fragmented structure of the text, which is related to M ariengof s use of 
heteroaccentual rhyme. All these principles can be treated as fundamental 
elements in M ariengof s use of montage technique in his fictional prose.
Если кому-нибудь не лень — создайте философию 
имажинизма, объясните с какой угодно глубиной 
факт нашего появления. Мы не знаем, может  
быть, оттого что вчера в Мексике был дождь, 
может быть оттого что в прошлом году у  нас
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ощелиласъ душа, может быть, еще от чего- 
нибудь, — но имажинизм должен был появиться, 
и мы горды тем, что мы оруженосцы, что нами, 
как плакатами, говорит он с вами.
Декларация 1919 г. (Цит. по ПИ 1997: 10.)
Вопрос об имажинизме в советской прозе 1920-х годов долгое 
время оставался без внимания, как и многие другие аспекты 
деятельности этой литературной группы. Снискав славу возму­
тителей спокойствия, имажинисты чаще всего интересовали исто­
риков русской литературы не столько художественным качеством 
своих произведений, сколько эпатажностью поэзии и поведения, а 
также декларативными текстами и, в дальнейшем, мемуарами . По 
нашему мнению, этот вопрос (как и вся история имажинизма) 
представляется заслуживающим большего внимания, чем ему уде­
лялось до сих пор. При этом следует учитывать, с одной стороны, 
постепенно увеличивающийся интерес к имажинизму, а, с другой 
стороны, некоторые общие признаки послереволюционной совет­
ской культуры, которые отражаются в теории и практике (в стихах 
и в быту) этой малоизвестной литературной группы. На наш взгляд 
именно несоответствие поведения и текстов, оказавшееся наиболее 
существенным с самого начала существования имажинизма, могло 
бы объяснить не претерпевший изменений противоречивый инте­
рес к мемуарам имажинистов.
Ниле Оке Нилссон в своей пионерской работе о русском има­
жинизме The R ussian  Im aginists приходит к выводу, что прямого 
влияния имажинизма на прозу не существует2. Отчасти об этом 
свидетельствует аналогичная имажинизму т.н. орнаментальная 
проза этого времени. Действительно, не составит труда найти 
аналоги имажинистской поэтики в произведениях И. Бабеля,
А. Белого, Б. Пильняка, Е. Замятина или Г. Газданова3, — и
' Имеются в виду прежде всего воспоминания А. Б. Мариенгофа, недавно 
вышедшие в одном томе (Мариенгоф 1998) в соответствии с авторской волей и 
по-прежнему вызывающие резкие оценки критиков (в особенности это касается 
Романа без вранья, 1926).
По его мнению, вопрос об имажинизме в прозе не уместен, т.к. роль образа 
широко обсуждалась в русской литературе 1920-х гг. вне имажинистского 
контекста (см. Nilsson 1970: 92).
О подобных аналогах см., например, Schreurs 1989: 117, Кабалоти 1998: 320- 
321. Георгий Устинов в свою очередь охарактеризовал Пильняка, Вс. Иванова, 
Зощенко и Никитина как продолжателей имажинизма в прозе (см. Markov 1980. 
110).
список этот можно было бы продолжить. В данном случае има­
жинизм понимается узко: прежде всего, как гиперболизм, насы­
щенность образностью или “самоцельность” образов, что декла­
рировалось членами группы в 1920 году (см. Шершеневич 1920: 
18). Вопрос о влиянии имажинизма на прозу представляется нам 
частным случаем более крупного, по характеру интерсемио­
тического культурного явления —  т.н. монтажного мышления 
1910—20-х годов.
Что касается прозы Анатолия Мариенгофа (1897-1962), мы не 
можем не учитывать влияния поэтики школы на одного из осно­
воположников школы и главных экспериментаторов имажинист­
ской акробатии (наряду с Вадимом Шершеневичем). С другой 
стороны, вряд ли уместно говорить о собственно имажинистской 
прозе, игнорируя тексты Мариенгофа. Имажинизм мариенгоф- 
ской прозы во многом определяется концепцией монтажа, охва­
тывающей разные явления авангардистской культуры 1920-х 
годов. Имажинисты занимались монтажной поэзией, как и другие 
представители авангарда. И все-таки именно в этой группе была 
создана развернутая теория монтажной поэзии4.
Если следовать широко распространенному пониманию литера­
турного монтажа как внешней фрагментарности, его можно рас­
сматривать как очевидную особенность мариенгофской прозы в 
целом. Мемуары Мариенгофа могут читаться как произведения, 
где под мнимой случайностью сцепления разных воспоминаний — 
т.е. под естественно фрагментарным восприятием истории, — 
скрывается глубоко мотивированный подбор фактов, некий мон­
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4 Имажинисты ни разу не упоминают термин “монтаж” в своих работах, что, 
как нам кажется, свидетельствует прежде всего о распространенности т.н. 
монтажного мышления в русской культуре первой половины XX в. (см. Иванов 
1988, Булгакова 1988). О монтажности в авангардистской поэзии см. Тименчик 
1989 и Schaumann 1985. Об имажинизме в этой связи см. Nilsson 1970: 66-73, 
Kosanovic 1987 и Lawton 1979; 1993. Стоит также отметить другую группу, 
крайне маргинальную в русском контексте несмотря на свое широко известное 
название, — недолговечный пост- или околоимажинистский “экспрессионизм” 
(1919-22). Его лидером был молодой поэт Ипполит Соколов, который позднее 
работал в кино и в 1926-м году выпустил книгу Киносценарий — теория и 
практика. “Кружок” Соколова (И. Грузинов, С. Спасский, Е. Габрилович и др.) 
был “экспрессионизмом с имажинистской доминантой”. В своем “Бунте экспрес­
сиониста” (1919) Соколов обвиняет имажинистов в “гиперболизме” и “плохом 
футуризме” — экспрессионизм он объявил “синтезом всего футуризма”, заявив 
следующее: “Только мы, экспрессионисты, сможем осуществить [...] динамику 
нашего восприятия и динамику нашего мышления” (см. Терехина 1998: 51-55).
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тажный принцип, напоминающий композицию “записных кни­
жек”, — в первую очередь, Вяземского (см. Гинзбург 1929: 42).
Тем не менее, сопоставление монтажа с фрагментарностью 
отсылает к слишком широкой для того, чтобы реконструировать 
суть теории монтажной поэзии имажинистов, проблематике. 
Определение монтажности текста требует уточнения. В русских 
теориях монтажа внимание уделяется определению монтажного 
элемента. Вслед за С. М. Эйзенштейным (не игнорируя при этом 
работ других теоретиков кино —  Д. Вертова, JI. Кулешова,
В. Пудовкина или Ю. Тынянова) можно ввести некоторое обоб­
щающее определение, подчеркивающее относительную авто­
номию отдельно взятых элементов, их поливалентность и смыс­
ловой потенциал, который реализуется лишь при сопоставлении 
с соответствующими элементами. В пространстве текста данный 
элемент часто оказывается многофункциональным, способным к 
сцеплению с разными элементами и к порождению новых 
смыслов.
В монтажном тексте подбор фактов и разнородных элементов, 
их организация в смысловое целое оказывается значимым прие­
мом, —  например, в работах Дзиги Вертова. Если сопоставить 
идеи Вертова с эйзенштейновской теорией монтажа, мы обна­
ружим, что в его работах подчеркивается риторическая спо­
собность документального кинематографа и монтажной органи­
зации материала менять наше видение мира5. Риторика Эйзен­
штейна, со своей стороны, основывается на резких столкновениях 
и процессуальном соотношении авторской фрагментации и чита­
тельской интеграции6. В общем и целом, здесь можно выявить 
три основных типа русского монтажа: кулешовский нарративный 
(монтаж сцепления), эйзенштейновский манипулятивный (мон­
таж столкновений7), и вертовский риторико-трансформативный
5 Критик русского монтажа Андре Базен ставит под сомнение риторическую 
основу документов Вертова: “У зрителя возникает иллюзия, будто перед ним бес­
спорное в своей очевидности доказательство, в то время как в действительности 
это лишь серия двусмысленных фактов, сцементированных только словами ком­
ментатора" (Цит. по Соколов 1988: 35-36). См. также Tupitsyn 1992: 87.
6 См. Эйзенштейн 1964: 163.
Как известно, Эйзенштейн выделяет всего четыре или пять типов монтажа 
(метрический, ритмический, тональный, обертонный), но здесь мы остановимся 
лишь на тех чертах его теории, которые так или иначе сопоставимы с другими 
вариантами русских теорий монтажа.
(монтаж интервалов8). Последний тип в большей степени, чем 
остальные, представлен в воспоминаниях Мариенгофа и прежде 
всего в его первой книге художественной прозы, — монтажном 
романе Циники, написанном в форме дневника. Тем не менее, в 
этом романе можно найти и яркие отголоски эйзенштейновского 
монтажа, подчеркивающие столкновение сопоставимых элемен­
тов. Как мы попытаемся доказать в дальнейшем, это сопряжено 
именно с имажинистскими особенностями романа.
Имажинистская теория монтажной поэзии строится на двух 
основных принципах. Первый из них —  “каталог образов”, номи­
нативная поэзия без глаголов. Ее главным теоретиком и прак­
тиком является Шершеневич, хотя ее влияние можно также обна­
ружить в поэмах и романах Мариенгофа. Второй околофуту- 
ристический принцип — конфликт внутри языкового образа и 
между образами (столкновение “чистого” с “нечистым”) — 
характеризует поэзию и прозу Мариенгофа.
В своих манифестах имажинисты заявляют о том, что в поэзии 
образ является самоцелью, а также что образность языка содер­
жится в существительных. Шершеневич воспринимает образ­
ность как органичную часть русского языка:
В самом деле, в русском языке образ слова находится обычно в 
корне слова [...] Слово вверх ногами: вот самое естественное поло­
жение слова, из которого должен родиться новый образ. Испуганная 
беременная родит до срока. Слово всегда беременное образом, 
всегда готово к родам. (Ш ершеневич 1920: 39).
В этом метафоричном жаргоне интереснее всего идея о стихо­
творной единице, несущей смысловой потенциал —  “беременном 
слове” или “словообразе”. В теории Эйзенштейна она соотно­
сится с кадром, относительно автономным элементом, окон­
чательное значение которого устанавливается при сопоставлении 
с другими соответствующими элементами. Ведь одна из основ­
ных идей теории Эйзенштейна (1964: 158) заключается в том, что 
возникающий новый смысл при сопоставлении двух фрагментов 
является не их суммой, а произведением в мыслях восприни­
мающего. Монтажный текст следует понимать как участника 
взаимодействия — некое устройство, рассчитанное на читателя с 
“монтажным мышлением”. Для имажинистов поэзия есть искус­
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1992.
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ство самоориентируемых слов или “словообразов”, а стихотвор­
ный текст — всегда цепь образов, возникающая в мыслях чита­
теля при восприятии текста.
Имажинистская “революционная” борьба против грамматики 
направлена на уничтожение глаголов. Восприятие поэзии без 
глаголов требует от читателя активного участия, т.к. необходимая 
предикация происходит лишь при взаимодействии текста с чита­
телем. Таким образом, здесь мы сталкиваемся с проблематикой 
монтажных метафор: “родится глагол, процесс из сопоставления 
двух результатов: начального и конечного, например, кино­
феномен как мы его описали из двух рядом стоящих клеток. Или 
практика китайского иероглифа, которая дает понятию действия 
“подслушивать” родиться из столкновения двух (существитель­
ных) предметов: изображения “двери” и изображения “уха””. 
(Эйзенштейн 1964: 429). Как было отмечено Нилссоным, имажи­
нисты использовали разные возможности русского языка для 
построения безглагольных предложений: нулевую связку, опу­
щение глагола, краткие прилагательные, компаративные формы, 
конструкции с управлением в творительном падеже, предлоги (при 
употреблении глаголов движения), наречия или междометия (см. 
Nilsson 1970: 88-91). Таким образом, здесь нет принципиального 
лингвистического новаторства, поскольку члены группы концент­
рируют внимание на одной из особенностей русского языка — 
возможности выражать сказуемость, не употребляя глаголов.
Имажинистский каталог образов также является одной из 
основ монтажной композиции Циников. Роман представляет 
собой сборник разнородных, кажущихся не связанными друг с 
другом текстовых фрагментов и может быть прочитан как про­
заический аналог каталога образов, где “словообразы” выстраи­
ваются как “главокадры”. С точки зрения целого произведения 
(стихотворения или романа), поливалентность и многофункцио­
нальность “словообраза” и “главокадра” тождественны. Реконст­
рукция соотношений фрагментов и порождение при этом нового 
смыслового уровня, т.н. “третьего”, является задачей для чита­
теля, активного участника смыслопорождения текста.
Что касается взаимоотношения языков прозы и поэзии, стоит 
отметить еще одну особенность мариенгофской поэзии, которая 
переводится на язык прозы именно в Циниках. Это т.н. “поэтика 
сдвига”, на которую обратил внимание В. Ф. Марков (1983), 
изучая проблематику разноударной рифмы в стихах Мариенгофа.
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Например, в поэме Магдалина Мариенгоф использует удаленные 
друг от друга (часто разноударные9) рифмованные пары, что 
безусловно усложняет чтение текста, но вместе с тем подчерки­
вает монтажность композиции поэмы. Здесь выявляется идея о 
памяти текста и его способности напоминать с помощью повтора, 
а также существенная с точки зрения монтажа идея о чередо­
вании фрагментации и интеграции. В этом можно усмотреть одну 
из существенных особенностей мариенгофской поэзии10. Анало­
гичные решения находим в Циниках, рассматривая соотношения 
удаленных друг от друга фрагментов или отдельных изобра­
жений. Эти рассыпанные части текста сцепляются по принципу 
текстовой организации далекого расстояния.
На уровне соотношения фрагментов Циников наиболее яркий 
пример “поэтики сдвига” отмечается в мотиве “декапитуляции”, 
тематически многофункциональном рассказе об оторванных 
головах. У этого повторяющегося мотива несколько разных 
функций, связанных прежде всего с кинематографичностью 
текста11.
Любопытное проявление имажинизма и “поэтики сдвига” в 
прозе Мариенгофа — нарративный характер относительно авто­
номных изображений. Определенные повторяющиеся образы- 
мотивы сцепляются в романе как рассыпанные детальные изо­
бражения. Наиболее яркие примеры этого —  вариативные описа­
ния персонажей. По сути дела, все образы персонажей строятся 
по принципу монтажного немого кино: они изображены мето­
нимически с помощью ассоциативных деталей, при этом задача 
читателя — реконструировать цельные образы из этих рассыпан­
ных частей. Например, изображение большевика Сергея, брата и 
соперника по любви Владимира, оказывается своего рода 
повествовательным текстом, отражающим отрицательное отно­
шение рассказчика к своему брату:
9 См. Марков 1983: 255, где перечисляются все разноударные рифмы в т.ч.
Магдалины.
10 По мнению Маркова (там же: 241), именно Мариенгоф избавил разноудар­
ную рифму от "упреков” в том, что она редко встречается и не играет сущест­
венной роли в русской поэзии. В связи с этим исследователь попытался доказать, 
что на изобретательном использовании данного приема “стоит прочно почти вся 
его поэзия” (там же: 243).
11 Подробнее об этом см. нашу статью Хуттунен 1998: 232-233.
У Сергея веселые глаза [...] оттопыренные уши [...] голова с синими 
глазами полетит [...] Во всю правую щеку [...] розовое пятно [...] 
вроде лохматого большого пса. (Мариенгоф 1928: 13-14).
Он опять похож на большого уродового пса [...] Розовое пятно на 
щеке Сергея смущенно багровеет (там же: 30-31).
Он кажется мне загадочным, как темная, покрытая пылью и 
паутиной бутылка вина в супручной феске (там же: 35).
[...] на голову Сергея, прыгающую в плечах, как сумасшедшая 
секундная стрелка (там же: 97).
[...] голова Сергея, разукрашенная большими пушистыми гла­
зами, беспрестанно вздрагивает, прыгает, дергается, вихляется, кор­
чится. Она то приседает, словно на корточки, то выскакивает из плеч 
наподобие ярмарочного чертика-пискуна (там же: 105.)
По этому образцу все персонажи описываются с помощью 
деталей-доминант: голова Сергея; ладони (“которыми хорошо 
забивать гвозди”) нэпмана Докучаева, бьющего свою жену; глаза 
героини Ольги (“серая пыль” —  признак, который к концу романа, 
к моменту ее самоубийства, исчезает); босые ноги служанки 
Марфуши, “восторженная слюна” тов. Мамашева и т.д. То же 
самое касается случайных второстепенных изображений людей, 
часть из которых существуют лишь как метонимические эпитеты: 
“сопящие носы”, “потеющие шеи”, “черные ниточки” (вместо ног) 
и т.д. С помощью повтора строится галерея рассыпанных по всему 
произведению доминантных черт, по которым активный читатель 
должен реконструировать образы персонажей. Аналогичный 
прием широко использовался в немом кино — образ человека был 
раздроблен в монтаже и превращен в знаковую цепь12.
Общемодернистскую идею о новом восприятии художествен­
ного текста Мариенгоф понимает достаточно агрессивно (отчасти 
по-эйзенштейновски), выявляя в своей статье “Буян-Остров” 
(1920) манипуляторскую функцию поэзии и подчеркивая тем 
самым монтажную цельность имажинистского текста:
Одна из целей поэта: вызвать у читателя максимум внутреннего 
напряжения. Как можно глубже всадить в ладони читательского вос­
приятия занозу образа. Подобные скрещивания чистого с нечистым 
служат способом заострения тех заноз, которыми в должной мере 
щетинятся произведения современной имажинистской поэзии [...]
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12 См. Эйзенштейн 1964: 170, 310. Ср. Лотман (1973: 112): “Способность кине­
матографа разделить образ человека на “куски” и выстроить эти сегменты в 
повествовательную во временном отношении цепочку превращает внешний 
облик человека в повествовательный текст”.
Предельное сжатие имажинистской поэзии требует от читателя 
наивысшего умственного напряжения —  оброненное памятью одно 
звено из цепи образов разрывает всю цепь. Заключенное в строгую 
форму художественное целое, рассыпавшись, представляет из себя 
порой блестящую и великолепную, но все же хаотическую кучу, —  
отсюда кажущаяся непонятность современной образной поэзии. 
(Мариенгоф 1997: 36).
Активное участие читателя в смыслопорождении текста тесно 
связано как с выбором максимально эпатирующих сопоставле­
ний, так и с “предельным сжатием” структуры текста, заставляю­
щим воспринимающего (пользуясь терминологией, соответст­
вующей выбранной нами точке зрения, —  имплицитного чита­
теля, несущего монтажное мышление) реконструировать синте­
тические смыслы, вложенные автором в текст. Изучая поэтич­
ность мариенгофской прозы, Й. Й. ван Баак (Van Baak 1997: 268) 
видит имажинизм Циников именно в его образности, в т.н. “поэ­
тике занозы”, подчеркивая тем самым тот важный факт, что в 
прозе имажинистская акробатия всегда подчинена сюжетной 
структуре и неизбежно сталкивается с конкретным контекстом. 
Действительно, постоянное эпатирующее сопоставление “чисто­
го” с “нечистым” является одной из наиболее ярких особенностей 
образов романа. В мыслях рассказчика Владимира положитель­
ное и прекрасное сопоставляется с чем-то отвратительным: цве­
ты — с оторванными головами, возвышенные чувства — с гигие­
ническими проблемами, любовь —  с клизмой:
Любовь, которую не удушила резиновая кишка от клизмы, —  
бессмертна. (Мариенгоф 1928: 21).
В романе объекты описываются сравнениями, а возникающие в 
результате образы чаще всего оказываются отвлеченными от 
исходных элементов (как изображающего слова, так и изобра­
жаемого объекта), что соответствует имажинистским преставле­
ниям об “образе как самоцели”, но одновременно свидетель­
ствует о монтажном начале мариенгофского имажинизма13.
Помимо имажинистских особенностей Циников —  компози­
ции по принципу каталога и образного языка романа, —  сущест­
вует другой любопытный историко-литературный аспект его 
монтажа, связанный с фактографизмом. Эта околофутуристская
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13 Ср. представление “третьего” у Эйзенштейна (1964: 158). По его мнению, 
образ всегда качественно отличается от сопоставимых элементов.
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линия представляет собой определенную пост-имажинистскую 
фазу творчества Мариенгофа. В соотношении вымысла и факта 
(гетерогенных фрагментов) скрыта особая динамика романа. 
Хотя Мариенгоф, насколько нам известно, не участвовал в работе 
т.н. “фактовиков”, его связь с утилитаристскими тенденциями 
ЛЕФа очевидна. Из ряда документов следует, что в 1928-м 
году—  во время создания Циников, — он пытался организовать 
(вместе с Рюриком Ивневым) литературную ассоциацию “Лите­
ратура и быт”. В докладной записке, поданной в НКВД, заяв­
ляется следующее:
Повесть, рассказ, роман, поэма требуют обязательной увязки с реаль­
ным материалом, вне которого немыслима советская специфика [...] 
Получаемые в результате такой работы на реальном материале 
произведения значительно выше и художественнее в социальном 
значении произведений, написанных исключительно по “вдохнове­
нию”. (Цит. по Галушкин & Поливанов 1996: 59).
Программа нового общества, безусловно, более близка к утили­
таризму ЛЕФа14, чем к имажинизму, но, с точки зрения монтажа, 
не менее важна для восприятия мариенгофской прозы. Данный 
факт, с одной стороны, указывает на основания поверхностной 
структуры Циников, и, с другой, позволяет предположить, что 
документы, включенные в роман, являются подлинными. В 
Циниках Мариенгоф воспроизводит эту идеологию, смешивая 
при этом подобранные документы (в “хронологическом беспо­
рядке”, по словам рассказчика) с фикциональным повество­
ванием и имажинистской образностью. Таким образом, он строит 
конфликтный гетерогенный монтаж, который, как нам кажется, 
мог быть одним из причин того, что публикация романа в СССР 
была запрещена. В постановлении Московского Отдела Всерос­
сийского Союза Советских Писателей ссылались именно на это:
Тенденциозный подбор фактов в романе “Циники”, искажающий 
эпоху военного коммунизма и первого периода нэпа, делает книгу 
объективно вредной и неприемлемой для советской общественности. 
(Цит. по ПИ 1997: 194).
Особенно близки идеи Осипа Брика о том, что “поэты не выдумывают тем, 
они берут их из окружающей среды (Брик 1923: 214) и доминирующее в статье 
Ближе к факту (Брик 1927) требование сосредоточиться на реалиях советского 
быта.
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Тем не менее, документы, включенные Мариенгофом в роман, не 
воспринимаются как подлинные, т.к. их интекстовость — необ­
ходимое смысловое соотношение с “имажинистским” и дневни­
ковым текстами романа, — безусловно влияет на их декодиро­
вание. В смысловом соотношении с основным пространством 
текста документальные интексты теряют свое документальное 
значение и становятся материалом художественного текста. 
Основное пространство текста оказывается более реальным, чем 
инородные включения, которые по своей природе — вещи исто­
рического мира. В конечном счете, документы оказываются ими­
тациями подлинных документов15. Приведем пример сопостав­
ления фрагментов, первый из которых, будучи документом, взят 
в кавычки и сопровожден указанием на источник. Сам по себе 
этот интекст акцентирует внимание читателя на документах как 
знаках “реальности” внутри романа:
[1922: 47]
“Людоедство и трупоедство принимает массовые размеры” (“Прав­
да”).
[1922: 48]
Вчера в два часа ночи у себя на квартире арестован Докучаев.
(Мариенгоф 1928: 134).
Первый фрагмент следует трактовать как титровый кадр к но­
вости об аресте нэпмана Докучаева, но, тем не менее, он 
полифункционален и сцепляется с рассыпанным по всему роману 
рассказом о каннибализме.
Любопытное обоснование сопоставления фрагментов (чаще 
всего конфликтного) имажинистского текста и декларирующих 
свою аутентичность документов находим в статье “Почти декла­
рация” (1923), автором которой, предположительно, является сам 
Мариенгоф16. В первых строках текста проводится четкое 
разделение:
Два полюса: поэзия, газета.
Первый: культура слова, то есть образность, чистота языка, гармо­
ния, идея.
Второй: варварская речь, то есть терминология, безобразность, арит­
мичность и вместо идей: ходячие истины. (ГПП2 1923: 1).
15 Ср. Лотман 1992, т. I: 180.
16 См. ПИ 1997: 467.
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В контексте мариенгофского конфликтно-монтажного мышления 
данная оппозиционная пара представляется закономерным вопло­
щением пары “чистого” и “нечистого”. Учитывая вышеупомя­
нутые контекстуальные связи, монтажная композиция Циников, 
как нам кажется, становится более понятной. В коктейль-романе 
мы можем обнаружить смешение культурных языков, жанровых 
границ, литературных школ и, в конечном счете, вымысла и 
факта. Гиперболизированная визуальность, сочленение “чистого” 
и “нечистого”, поверхностная структура каталога образов и 
смысловое соотношение фрагментов (требование активного 
участия от читателя) являются последствиями мариенгофского 
имажинизма (по своей природе изначально анти-футуристского) 
и скрытого в нем монтажного мышления17.
Теперь обратимся к имажинистской тематике Мариенгофа, 
которая также существенна для текста Циников. В имажи­
нистском творчестве Мариенгофа вырисовывается определенный 
тематический треугольник или цепочка трех образных концеп­
тов: любовь —  библейские сюжеты — революция. В одном из 
мариенгофских стихотворений, опубликованном в пензенском 
прото-имажинистском альманахе Исход (1918), можно обнару­
жить все существенные элементы этого треугольника:
Из сердца в ладонях 
Несу любовь.
Ее возьми —
Как голову Иоканаана,
Как голову Олоферна...
Она мне, как революции —  новь,
Как ножь гильотины —
Марату,
[••]
Как, за Распятого,
Иуде —  осины
Учитывая приведенные выше основные типы русского монтажа в кино­
теории, здесь можно отметить признаки всех линий: эйзенштейновской мани- 
пулятивно-конфликтной (столкновение образов, необходимость реконструиро­
вания новых смыслов читателем), кулешовский нарративный (сцепление фраг- 
мен гов в целые рассказы ) и вертовский риторический (соотношение вымысла 
и факта, проблематика документации). Хотя в данном случае мы не рас­
сматриваем собственно кинематографические основы композиции романа, не 
следует забывать о взаимосвязи кино и литературы в деятельности Мариенгофа. 
С 1924-го по 1925 год он работал заведующим сценарного отдела Пролеткино, а 
в конце 1920-х гг. был соавтором многих сценариев.
Сук...
Всего кладу себя на огонь 
Уст твоих,
На лилии рук.
(Мариенгоф 1996: 5).
Представляется интересной функция многочисленных повторяю­
щихся библейских цитат в этой цепи, так как именно они 
усложняют интерпретацию сопоставления любви и революции в 
текстах Мариенгофа. Библейские мотивы оказываются границей 
между этими двумя полюсами —  своего рода переходами от 
любви к революции, одновременно соединяющими и отталки­
вающими. Естественным образом напрашивающееся сопостав­
ление высокой, библейской любви с низким общественным поло­
жением оказывается амбивалентным, так как библейские мотивы 
в текстах Мариенгофа используются не только как источник 
“чистой любви”, но и как источник свойственного раннему 
Мариеногофу революционного “богохульства”:
Кровью плюем зазорно 
Богу в юродивый взор.
Вот на красном черным:
Массовый террор. [...]
По тысяче голов сразу 
С плахи к пречистой тайне.
Боженька, сам ты за пазухой 
Выносил Каина, [...]
Молимся Тебе матерщиной 
За рабьих годов позор
(Мариенгоф 1996: 18).
К тому же, библейские мотивы тесно связаны с многофункцио­
нальным мотивом декапитуляции, “рассказом” об оторванных 
головах. Данный мотив зачастую оказывается образом револю­
ции 1917 года, сопоставление которой с французской революцией 
также является исходным пунктом в Циниках:
Ольга разводит плечи:
—  Странная какая-то революция.
И говорит с грустью:
—  Я думала, они первым долгом поставят гильотину на Лобном
месте. (Мариенгоф 1928: 9).
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Когда Владимир пытается романтически описать свою жену, 
неожиданно возникает сюжет о голове Иоанна Крестителя 
(ср. Евангелие от Матфея 14: 3-4):
Ее голова отрезана двухспальным шелковым одеялом. На хрустком 
снеге полотяной наволоки растекающиеся волосы производят впе­
чатление крови. Голова Иоканаана на серебряном блюде была менее 
величественна [...] Я горд и счастлив, как Иродиада. Эта голова 
поднесена мне. Я благодарю судьбу, станцевавшую для меня танец 
семи покрывал. (Мариенгоф 1928: 22-23).
Библейский мотив оторванных голов отражает амбивалентное 
отношение Мариенгофа к революции и, с другой стороны, двоя­
кую соотнесенность любви и революции в его творчестве. 
Любовь сливается с революцией, индивидуальное превращается в 
коллективное, но в то же время они сталкиваются. Так проис­
ходит в поэме Магдалина (1920), в которой безумная любовь 
сопоставляется с циничной любовью героев Циников. В обоих 
случаях кровавая революция оказывается, с одной стороны, оппо­
зицией любви, а, с другой стороны, ее необходимым контекстом, 
своего рода источником:
Магдалина, мы в городе —  кровь как из водопровода;
Совесть усовершенствованнее канализации.
Нам ли, нам ли с тобой спасаться,
Когда корчится похоть, как женщина в родах. (Мариенгоф 1996: 3 7 - 
38).
При этом в монтажном романе выводы остаются задачей для 
читателя, который должен собрать фрагменты в смысловое целое:
[1918: 18]
Сегодня ночью я плакал от любви.
[1918: 19]
В Вологде собрание коммунистов вынесло постановление о том, что 
“необходимо уничтожить класс буржуазии”. Пролетариат должен 
обезвредить мир от паразитов, и чем скорее, тем лучше.
[1918: 20]
—  Ольга, я прошу вашей руки.
Это очень кстати, Владимир. Нынче утром я узнала, что в нашем 
доме не будет всю зиму действовать центральное отопление. Если 
оы не ваше предложение, я бы непременно в декабре месяце прев­
ратилась в ледяную сосульку. Вы представляете себе, спать одной в 
кроватище, на которой можно играть в хоккей?
—  Итак...
—  Я согласна. (Мариенгоф 1928: 21-22).
Что касается интерпретации романа, одна из его немногих воз­
можных трактовок непосредственно связана с судьбой имажи­
нистской школы: прототипы главных героев можно найти среди 
имажинистов, тогда как самоубийство героини Ольги отсылает к 
реальным событиям. Это подтверждает тезис, согласно которому 
Циники были мариенгофским эпилогом истории имажинизма, 
противоречивым и проникнутым автопародией, как в следующем 
эпизоде, кажущемся случайным, но с точки зрения монтажа 
очень показательным:
[1919: 16]
Ольга почему-то не осталась ночевать у Сергея. Она вернулась 
домой в два часа.
Я слышал, с оборвавшимся дыханием, как повернулся ее ключ в 
замке, как бесшумно, на цыпочках, миновала она коридор, подняла с 
пола мою шубу и прошла в комнаты.
Найдя кровать пустой, она вернулась к Марфушиному чуланчику
и, постучав в перегородку, сказала:
—  Пожалуйста, Владимир, не засыпайте сразу после того, как 
“осушите до дна кубок наслаждения” ! Я принесла целую кучу новых 
стихов имажинистов. Вместе повеселимся.
[1919: 17]
Тифозники валяются в больничных коридорах, ожидая очереди на 
койки. Вши именуются врагами революции. (Мариенгоф 1928: 66).
Итак, роман Циники парадоксален в своем противоречивом има­
жинизме и пост-имажинизме. Он представляет собой не только 
исключительный в русской литературе пример имажинистской 
прозы (на уровнях структуры и образов), но и важный художест­
венный эпилог в истории имажинистской школы. Имажинистская 
проза оказалась кратким отрезком творческого пути Мариенгофа. 
Вместе с тем в данном романе возник еще один предмет его 
рефлексии —  проблема вымысла и факта. Факт начал играть 
первостепенную роль, и как показывает замысел создания нового 
литературного общества “Литература и быт”, художественная 
проза осталась в стороне18. Мариенгоф перешел к мемуарам.
Ih Не следует, однако, забывать о романах Бритый человек (1930) и Екатерина 
(конец 1950-х). Первый полон автобиографических мотивов и прототипов, 
второй не что иное как исторический роман, типичная для Мариенгофа фраг­
ментарная проза.
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“Sõnakujunditelt” “peatiikikaadriteni” :
Anatoli Mariengofi imažinistlik montaaž
Artiklis vaadeldakse Anatoli Mariengofi (1897-1962) poeetilise tehnika 
kolme põhilist imažinistlikku printsiipi, mis on leidnud kasutamist tema 
esimeses romaanis “Küünikud” (1928). Need printsiibid hõlmavad esiteks 
“kujundite kataloogi” — nimisõnadest koosnevat poeesia liiki, mis on 
pärit Vadim Šeršenevitšilt ja mida Mariengof kasutas oma suurtes 
imažinistlikes luuletustes. Teine domineeriv imažinistlik printsiip, mis 
sisaldub nii Mariengofi teoreetilistes töödes kui ka poeetilistes tekstides, 
on analoogne vene futurismi jaoks tüüpilise šokeerivate kujundite loomi­
sega. Mariengofil väljendub see “puhta” ja “ebapuhta” koosluses, keele­
liste kujundite vahelistes ja kujundisisestes konfliktides, mis iseloomusta­
vad nii Mariengofi proosat kui ka poeesiat. Kolmas, võibolla Marien- 
gofile kõige iseloomulikum imažinistlik printsiip, mis on oluline “Küüni­
kute” puhul, on nihke poeetika {poetika sdviga), st teksti fragmentaarne 
struktuur, mis on Mariengofil seotud erirõhuliste riimide kasutamisega. 
Kõiki neid printsiipe võib vaadelda kui Mariengofi poolt proosatekstides 
kasutatava montaažitehnika põhielemente.
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Abstract. On the definition of genre of Dostoevsky’s works. The arti­
cle mostly addresses Dostoevsky’s own definitions of genres of his works, 
either explicated in the texts (subtitles, prefaces) or contained in the writer’s 
letters; or rather the relationship between the scholarly strategies of defining 
genres and the writer’s own view, as evidenced by subtitles which, in some 
sense, are part of the text (in nearly, but not precisely, the same way as the 
titles themselves are). The writer’s own definitions, then, can be regarded as 
possible objects of the scholarly interpretation. Agreement, or lack thereof, 
between the author’s and the scholars’ definitions may be due both to simi­
larity vs dissimilarity between the definition standards inherent in the re­
spective epochs and to specific interpretation aspects. In the latter case, 
agreement is more common in studies focusing on vastly different problems 
unrelated to genre, whereas disagreement is more frequent in studies con­
cerned with the genres of Dostoevsky’s works. One of the reasons why his 
own definitions must be critically revisited is that certain titles of his works 
can be basically viewed as subtitles or genre definitions insofar as they in 
some way define the variety of the text regardless of the underlying crite­
rion: narrative, “discourse”, type of source, genre, or genre variety. Indeed, 
both these subtitles and, sometimes, the writer’s own genre definitions turn 
out to be pretense, an imitation of “standard” subtitles or genre definitions, 
respectively. Titles themselves sometimes look like subtitles, thus “expos­
ing the device” and demonstrating this mimicry not merely by violating se­
mantic and syntactic relations in the case of subtitles (sign/name/title/ sub­
title and virtual reference/“reality” of text — and relationships such as those 
between title and subtitle; title and the principal text; and subtitle and prin­
cipal text), but also by the fact that their position is “marked”. Dostoevsky 
not just failed to follow his own “final genre definitions” within the text, as 
reflected in the subtitles, and not just changed them repeatedly in his letters,
but in the official documents, too, he sometimes defined genres m a way 
which did not agree with either the subtitles or his own definitions given in
his letters. . . ,
Dostoevsky frequently changed the genre definitions not merely aur­
ing his work on a text, which would be only natural, and not merely many 
years after it had been completed, published, revised, and republished 
(which might be ascribed to memory errors), but also shortly after the 
completed manuscript had been shipped to the publishers or after the text 
had been published or republished. W hile the logic underlying these 
changes must be studied and interpreted, it is evident that the scholars are 
often unable to accept the author’s own “final genre definitions” both be­
cause these are often unavailable in subtitles, and because of the “Proteic” 
nature of their use by the writer in various contexts.
В предлагаемой статье речь пойдет преимущественно об автор­
ских жанровых дефинициях, либо эксплицированных в тексте 
(подзаголовок, предисловие), либо рассеянных в письмах писа­
теля, точнее, —  о соотношении исследовательской стратегии 
жанровой дефиниции с авторской. Очевидно, что исследователь 
может как солидаризироваться в этом вопросе с автором, так и 
“противоречить” ему, поскольку авторские жанровые наименова­
ния зависят от самых разнородных причин, среди которых стрем­
ление к максимально адекватной характеристике типа произве­
дения, как бы спрессованной в однозначном слове-термине, явно 
не всегда стоит на первом месте.
Поскольку нас интересует главным образом поэтика новеллы 
Достоевского, начнем с рассмотрения вопроса о правомерности 
употребления в данном случае самого термина “новелла”. Тот 
факт, что Достоевский, снабжавший почти все свои произведения 
подзаголовками, определявшими их жанровую принадлежность 
(или же “мимикрировавшими” под жанровые дефиниции, о чем 
речь пойдет дальше), ни разу при этом не употребил слово 
"новелла”, на наш взгляд, не является препятствием для приме­
нения этого термина по отношению к отдельным произведениям 
малой прозы писателя1.
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Как полагает автор монографии, посвященной системе жанров Достоевского, 
выделение такого жанра у Достоевского не то что спорно —  просто неверно 
<...> Достоевский не ‘‘ощущал новеллу как жанр и новелл не писал” (Захаров 
985. 7). Поскольку в этой работе основанием для «выделения типологических 
рядов взяты жанровые определения самого Достоевского» (там же), что, как мы 
попытаемся показать, просто невозможно осуществить по целому ряду причин
Во-первых, авторская жанровая дефиниция, отраженная в 
подзаголовке, является в определенном смысле частью текста 
(так же —  хотя и в ином ключе —  как и само заглавие), тем 
самым становясь возможным объектом исследовательской рефле­
ксии. Примеры несовпадения (или совпадения) авторского жан­
рового наименования с исследовательским могут быть обуслов­
лены как различием (или совпадением) между нормами жанро­
вых дефиниций, принятыми в эпоху создания текста, и нормами, 
имеющимися в момент его исследовательской интерпретации, — 
так и самим аспектом рассмотрения текста. В последнем случае, 
как правило, совпадения встречаются в работах, посвященных 
самым различным, но не связанным с проблемой жанра, воп­
росам, тогда как несовпадения чаще встречаются в исследова­
ниях, затрагивающих проблему жанровой природы текста. Что 
же касается жанровых определений применительно к произведе­
ниям так называемой малой прозы, то сама нечеткость границ 
между ними (отсутствие явных различительных признаков у 
повести, рассказа и новеллы) приводят к тому, что зачастую 
становится неизбежным “исследовательский произвол”.
Во-вторых, многие жанровые определения Достоевского дают 
основание предположить их отнюдь не терминологическую, а 
скорее метафорическую природу. Так, вряд ли возможно иначе 
квалифицировать такие подзаголовки Достоевского, как “петер­
бургская поэма” (“Двойник”), “сентиментальный роман” (“Белые 
ночи”), и “фантастический рассказ” (“Кроткая”).
Определение повести “Двойник” “петербургской поэмой” под­
ключает это произведение к гоголевской традиции, ориентируя
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то ограничимся указанием на то, что Достоевский и новеллы Э. По называл 
рассказами (Достоевский 1979: 19; 88-89). Неупотребление (или употребление в 
ином значении) писателем или поэтом того или иного термина не свидетельст­
вует о том, что и исследователи должны следовать его примеру, иначе им 
придется отказаться и от изучения жанров Достоевского, поскольку, по словам 
того же автора, ‘"в языке Достоевского нет слова “жанр” в современном 
значении. “Жанр” был для него искусствоведческим термином” (там же: 23). 
Разумеется, автор монографии и не отказывается: “Отсутствие слова “жанр” 
отнюдь не значит, что в его художественном мышлении нет этой категории. 
Жанр был для Достоевского не абстрактным, а конкретным понятием: романом, 
повестью, поэмой, рассказом” (там же). Не берясь судить о том, что “ощущал” 
или воспринимал в качестве конкретного понятия Достоевский, мы употребляем 
термин “новелла” по отношению к определенным произведениям писателя на 
основании того, что анализ их композиционно-сюжетной структуры позволяет 
именно таким образом определить их жанр (см.: Аврамец 1987, 1988, 1990, 
1990а, 1995).
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читателя на восприятие “поэмы” “Двойник” сквозь призму поэмы 
“Мертвые души”. Правда, этот подзаголовок появляется лишь во 
второй редакции “Двойника”, в издании 1866 года, тогда как в 
первом издании (в журнальной редакции 1846 года) фигурировал 
подзаголовок “Приключения господина Голядкина”, но факт 
соотнесенности ‘Двойника’’ в сознании Достоевского и его 
современников именно с “поэмой” Гоголя еще в 1846 году кос­
венно подтверждается в письме писателя к брату от 1 февраля, в 
день выхода номера “Отечественных записок”, где был опубли­
кован “Д в о й н и к “Наши говорят, что после “Мертвых душ” на 
Руси не было ничего подобного <...> Тебе он понравится даже 
лучше “Мертвых душ”, я это знаю” (Достоевский 1985: 28(1); 118).
Уникальное для Достоевского определение “сентиментальный 
роман” дано им только “Белым ночам”, и уже сама нерегуляр­
ность подзаголовка (почему, в таком случае, не названы 
“сентиментальными романами” “Бедные люди”, “Хозяйка”, “Уни­
женные и оскорбленные”?), а также сравнительно небольшой 
объем текста (40 стр.), который заставляет большинство критиков 
и исследователей, игнорируя авторскую “жанровую дефиницию”, 
называть произведение “повестью”, — позволяют предположить 
некоторую игру слов: название “сентиментальный роман” отно­
сится не столько к тексту как разновидности литературного 
жанра, сколько к описываемой в этом тексте ситуации. Иными 
словами, мы имеем дело с определением не столько типа знака 
(если рассматривать текст как знак), сколько типа денотата (или, 
если угодно, типа “виртуального референта”).
Что же касается наименования “фантастический рассказ” по 
отношению к “Кроткой”, то определение “фантастический” 
(объективно уместное по отношению к “Сну смешного человека” 
или, скажем, к такому произведению, как “Бобок”, который 
фантастическим как раз не назван, не говоря уж о “Двойнике” или 
“Крокодиле”!), —  учитывая невозможность для читателя вос­
принимать описываемые в этом произведении события как фан­
тастические в привычном значении этого слова, —  можно понять 
и счесть оправданным, лишь благодаря предисловию к “Крот­
кой  (“От автора”), о котором мы подробнее будем говорить 
ниже, а также в контексте многочисленных высказываний 
Достоевского о “фантастическом реализме”2. Отсутствие в
Подробнее об этом см.: Соркина 1969, Газер <Белобровцева> 1972 Захаров 
1974. ’
данном случае таких необходимых для термина качеств, как 
недвусмысленность и регулярность, как бы бросает тень и на 
слово “рассказ”, и не случайно в исследовательской литературе 
“Кроткая” именуется, как правило, повестью.
Необходимость критического отношения к авторским жан­
ровым наименованиям подтверждается и тем обстоятельством, что 
некоторые заглавия произведений Достоевского выполняют, в 
сущности, функцию подзаголовка или жанровой дефиниции, 
поскольку они как бы определяют разновидность текста (неважно, 
по какому принципу: тип наррации, “дискурса”, тип источника 
текста, жанр, жанровый подвид), при этом —  именно “как бы”, так 
как и подзаголовки писателя, а в некоторых случаях и жанровые 
определения, на наш взгляд, лишь “мимикрируют”, делают вид, 
что они —  жанровые определения или “нормальные” подзаго­
ловки, причем, зачастую делают это откровенно и намеренно 
плохо, т.е. непохоже. Заглавия же “подзаголовочного” типа еще 
более “обнажают прием”, демонстрируя эту мимикрию не только 
нарушением семантических и синтаксических связей (соотно­
шение знака/имени/названия/заглавия/подзаголовка и денотата/ 
виртуального референта/”реальности” текста — и соотношение 
между заглавием и подзаголовком, заглавием и основным текстом, 
подзаголовком и основным текстом), как в случае подзаголовков, 
но и самим фактом нахождения на месте названия:
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Таблица 1 
Заглавия
“Роман в девяти письмах' 
“Скверный анекдот"
Подзаголовки/жанровые определения
“Роман в четырех частях с эпилогом”
(“Униженные и оскорбленные", а также 
почти все романы “пятикнижия”) 
“Фантастический рассказ”
(“Кроткая", “Сон смешного человека'’) 
“Сентиментальный роман”
(“Белые ночи")
“Необыкновенное событие, или Пассаж в 
в Пассаже” (“Крокодил”)
“Происшествие необыкновенное”
С  Чужая жена и муж  под кроватью")
~ <или же, согласно первому изданию: 
“Уличная сцена” (“ Чужая жена"), 
“Происшествие необыкновенное”
(“Ревнивый муж")>
“Из записок неизвестного”
(“ Честный вор” <в журнальной редакции 
1848 г. заглавие было иным, более 
“подзаголовочным” : “Рассказы бывалого 
человека. (Из записок неизвестного).
I. Отставной. П.Честный вор”>, “Елка и 
свадьба”,
“Село Степанчиково и его обитатели”), 
“Из записок молодого человека”
(“Игрок”),
“Записки одного лица” (“Бобок”).
Таким образом, заглавия и подзаголовки как бы меняются своими 
местами. Особенно наглядно это демонстрирует история издания 
“Крокодила”: в журнальном издании текст имеет заглавие 
'''’Необыкновенное событие, или Пассаж в Пассаже”, при пере­
печатке же его в Собрании сочинений (в том же году, в 1865) 
Достоевский дает новое название, “Крокодил”, перенеся прежнее 
название в подзаголовок (Кийко 1973: 5; 393).
Следует указать, что произведения Достоевского можно раз­
делить на несколько типов по наличию/отсутствию жанрового 
(условно говоря) определения —  “рассказ”, “повесть”, “поэма” 
или “роман”, —  по наличию/отсутствию еще более условных 
определений источников текста —  “записки одного лица”, “из 
записок неизвестного”, “из воспоминаний мечтателя”, “из 
записок молодого человека”, “из мордасовских летописей”, “из 
неизвестных мемуаров”. Очевидно, что при таком подходе можно 
выделить 4 основных типа текстов:
1. тексты с авторской жанровой дефиницией и с определением 
источника;
2. тексты с авторской жанровой дефиницией, но без определения 
источника;
3. тексты без авторской жанровой дефиниции, но с опреде­
лением источника;
4. тексты без того и другого.
• К первому типу относятся такие произведения, как “Белые 
ночи. Сентиментальный роман. (Из воспоминаний мечта­
теля.)”, “Игрок. Роман. (Из записок молодого человека.)” 
(всего 2);
“Записки из М ерт вого  
дом а ”,
“Записки из подполья 
“Зимние заметки о летних 
впечатлениях”
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• ко второму — “Бедные люди. Роман”, “Двойник. Петербург­
ская поэма”, “Господин Прохарчин. Рассказ”, “Хозяйка. 
Повесть”, “Слабое сердце. Повесть”, “Униженные и оскорб­
ленные. Роман в четырех частях с эпшогом”, “Скверный 
анекдот. Рассказ”, “Преступление и наказание. Роман”, 
“Идиот. Роман в четырех частях”, “Вечный муж. Рассказ”, 
“Бесы. Роман в трех частях”, “Подросток. Роман”, “Крот­
кая. Фантастический рассказ”, “Сон смешного человека. 
Фантастический рассказ” и “Братья Карамазовы. Роман в 
четырех частях с эпилогом” (всего 15);
• к третьему — “Честный вор. (Из записок неизвестного.)”, 
“Елка и свадьба. (Из записок неизвестного.)”, “Маленький 
герой. (Из неизвестных мемуаров.) ” (разумеется, если учиты­
вать первоначальный вариант, то это произведение, названное 
Достоевским “Детская сказка”, следует отнести к четвертому 
типу, пополнив одновременно приведенный в первой таблице 
список заглавий “подзаголовочного” типа), “Дядюшкин сон. 
(Из мордасовских летописей.)”, “Село Степанчиково. Из за­
писок неизвестного” и “Бобок. Записки одного лица” (всего 6);
• к четвертому — “Роман в девяти письмах”, “Петербургская 
летопись” (очевидно, что нехудожественные жанры следует 
рассматривать особо, в том числе и в вопросах, связанных с 
поэтикой их заглавий и подзаголовков, но для нас в данном 
случае важно продемонстрировать перекличку заглавий меж­
ду собой, а также перекличку заглавий и подзаголовков), 
“Ползунков”, “Неточка Незванова” (в журнальном издании 
1849 имелся года подзаголовок “История одной женщины”), 
“Записки из Мертвого дома”, “Зимние заметки о летних 
впечатлениях”, “Записки из подполья” (всего 7).
Как видно, за рамками этой классификации остались два текста, 
снабженные подзаголовками, представляющими собой краткую 
характеристику описываемых в тексте событий: “Чужая жена и 
муж под кроватью. (Происшествие необыкновенное.)” (или, как 
уже говорилось выше, “Чужая жена. (Уличная сцена.)” и “Ревни­
вый муж. (Происшествие необыкновенное.)”) и “Крокодил. 
Необыкновенное событие, или Пассаж в Пассаже”. Что касается 
последнего, то он вообще отличается от всех остальных текстов, 
поскольку содержит в себе (помимо и без того двойного под­
заголовка!) еще и “подподзаголовок”: “Справедливая повесть о 
том, как один господин, известных лет и известной наружности,
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пассажным крокодилом был проглочен живьем, и что из этого 
вышло”. Собственно говоря, наличие здесь слова '‘повесть’’ дает 
основание причислить весь текст к первому типу, если взять за 
основу журнальный вариант, где был указан и источник текста. 
“Необыкновенное событие, или Пассаж в Пассаже, справедливая 
повесть <...> Семеном Стрижовым доставлено . Если же рас­
сматривать переработанный вариант, включенный Достоевским в 
Собрание сочинений 1865 года и ставший окончательным для 
последующих переизданий, то его можно, хотя и с оговорками, 
отнести ко второму типу. Что же касается текста “Чужая жена и 
муж под кроватью”, то, как отмечает комментатор, “оба эти 
рассказа <т.е. “Чужая жена” и “Ревнивый муж”, — И. А.>, по- 
видимому, должны были входить в цикл “Из записок неизвест­
ного”, о чем свидетельствуют первоначальные варианты рас­
сказов, связывающие их с “Елкой и свадьбой” <...>, а также 
единый для этих произведений образ повествователя” (Соломина 
1972: 479). Таким образом, похоже, что и этот текст, если и не 
вписывается в нашу классификацию прямо, то тяготеет к ее 
третьему типу.
Итак, вне зависимости от того, учитываем ли мы перво­
начальный, журнальный вариант текста, или исходим из окон­
чательной редакции, включаем или не включаем “нехудожест­
венные” произведения (“Петербургская летопись”, “Записки из 
Мертвого дома” и “Зимние заметки о летних впечатлениях” — 
при том, что последний тест был, как будет указано ниже, Назван 
Достоевским рассказом, а предпоследний —  романом), — со­
отношение между максимальным и минимальным классами 
текстов сохраняется: наиболее продуктивен второй тип (15), 
наименее —  первый (2); третий и четвертый располагаются 
посередине (6 и 7 соответственно), причем, если рассматривать 
только художественные произведения, то следует считать третий 
тип более “репрезентативным”, нежели четвертый (6 и 4).
Казалось бы, приведенная классификация свидетельствует 
лишь о том, что Достоевский, следуя распространенной в его 
время литературной традиции, предпочитает снабжать свои 
произведения жанровыми определениями, а также подзаголов­
ками, указывающими заведомо мнимые источники текста3. Но,
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3 Ср.: В. А. Соллогуб —  “Тарантас. (Путевые впечатления)”, 1840; Говорилин 
<А. Я. Кульчицкий> — “Необыкновенный поединок. (Романтическая повесть)*’, 
1845; А. В. Дружинин —  “Полинька Сакс. (Пролог в двух письмах)”, 1847;
как мы постарались показать выше, “хиастический” характер 
соотношения заглавий и подзаголовков, заглавий и авторских 
жанровых определений, подзаголовков и авторских жанровых 
определений —  не позволяет остановиться на такой интер­
претации картины. Включение же в состав заглавия квазижанро- 
вых определений вообще является универсальной традицией4 и 
поэтому невозможно без учета иных, более убедительных сви­
детельств возводить эту особенность заглавий Достоевского к 
каким бы то ни было литературным примерам. Так, “Роман в 
девяти письмах” назван таким образом явно с учетом появив­
шихся в 1830-1840-х годах рассказов, в заглавие которых вхо­
дило слово “роман”5. Наличие в “романе” Достоевского опреде­
ленных аллюзий на “Евгения Онегина” позволяет предположить 
пародийную соотнесенность заглавия “Романа в девяти письмах”,
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Н. Станицкий <А. Я. Панаева> — ‘‘Семейство Тальниковых. (Записки, найден­
ные в бумагах покойницы)”, 1848; Я. П. Бутков —  “Невский проспект, или 
Путешествие Нестора Залетаева. (Повесть)”, 1848.
4 Ср., например: поэма Данте “Божественная комедия” (как известно, первым 
назвал “Комедию” Данте «божественной” Боккаччо, но первое издание текста с 
новым заглавием было осуществлено лишь в 1555 г.; как писал С. Кржижа­
новский: “Вполне законная литературная традиция позволяет ответвлять загла­
вие от автора к автору. Получаются ряды: “Комедия” (Данте) —  “Божественная 
комедия" (дантески) —  “Небожественная комедия’’ (Словацкий) —  “ Человече­
ская комедия” (Бальзак) —  “Комедия человечества” (Мадач) —  и т.д.” (Кржи­
жановский 1931: 26)), трагедия (или драма) Шекспира “Зимняя сказка”, рассказы 
В. Ф. Одоевского “Пестрые сказки” (полное название —  “Пестрые сказки с 
красным словцом, собранные Иринеем Модестовичем Гомозейкою”), водевиль 
П.И.Григорьева “Петербургский анекдот с жильцом и домохозяином”, 
“Современная идиллия” Салтыкова-Щедрина, повесть Герцена “Легенда” и т.п. 
Что касается слова «записки” в составе заглавий (и тем более —  подзаголовков!), 
то оно встречается у очень многих русских (и не только русских —  ср. “По­
смертные записки Пиквикского клуба” Диккенса) писателей первой половины —  
середины XIX века применительно к произведениям самых разных жанров —  
романам, повестям, рассказам, очеркам, мемуарам: “Походные записки русского 
офицера’’ И. И. Лажечникова, “Записки гробовщика” и “Записки доктора” 
В. Ф. Одоевского, “Записки одного молодого человека” Герцена, “Записки 
замоскворецкого жителя” Островского, “Записки охотника” Тургенева, 
“Записки маркера” Толстого и др.
Как указано в комментарии к этому произведению Достоевского, “некоторое 
влияние на форму рассказа и тон вошедшей в него переписки героев мог оказать 
опубликованный незадолго до его написания и приписываемый в настоящее 
время Некрасову “Роман в письмах’’ <...> Название рассказа, вероятно, было 
рассчитано автором на живые еще в 1840-е годы литературные ассоциации: оно 
вызывало у тогдашнего читателя воспоминание о “Романе в семи письмах” 
А. А. Бестужева-Марлинского <...> Впрочем, одновременно появился и “Роман в 
двух письмах” О. М. Сомова” (Фридлендер 1972: 500).
объем которого всего 10 страниц, с подзаголовком "роман в 
стихах”6.
Как неоднократно отмечалось исследователями, Достоевский 
и некоторым другим произведениям давал жанровые опреде­
ления, явно им несоответствующие по их объему. Так, 
М. А. Петровский писал:
“Вечный м уж ” назван автором “рассказом”. Определенно решить, 
какое точное терминологическое содержание вкладывал Достоев­
ский в такой подзаголовок и вкладывал ли он вообще в него нечто 
подобное, —  у нас нет достаточных материалов. Во всяком случае он 
не связывался им с размерами произведения. Более короткие вещи 
он мог называть “повестями” (как “Х озяйку”, “Слабое сердце”, 
“Записки из подполья” и “К рокодил”) или даже романами (“Бедные 
люди", “Роман в девяти письмах”, “Белые ночи”); почти равный по 
размерам “Вечному м уж у” “И грок” назван Достоевским также 
романом. С этим последним подзаголовком, вероятно, связывалось у 
Достоевского “романическое” (любовное) содержание произведения 
(Петровский 1928: 116).
(Следует добавить, что Петровский дальше пишет, что он бы и 
роман Игрок ’’назвал бы рассказом безо всякой натяжки.)
Для того, чтобы отчетливее и полнее представить соотно­
шение между количественными параметрами произведений 
Достоевского с их жанровыми определениями (данными в под­
заголовках), приведем таблицу всех художественных текстов, 
упоминаемых в нашей статье, с указанием года первой и/или 
окончательной редакции (точнее — той редакции, которая взята 
за основу в академическом собрании сочинений 1972-1990 гг., и 
по которой велся подсчет страниц) и количества страниц 
(количество страниц дано с округлением до единицы). В случае 
изменения авторского жанрового определения, новое дается в 
квадратных скобках, в случае же отсутствия жанрового опреде­
ления в подзаголовках Достоевского (или же в случае несовпа­
дения писательских жанровых дефиниций с исследователь­
скими), в ломаных скобках указывается жанровая дефиниция 
комментаторов академического издания.
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6 Подробнее об этом см.: Аврамец 1988: 22-33.
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Таблица 2
Заглавие Жанровое Год Коли­
определение издания чество
страниц
“Бедные люди" “Роман” 1846, 1865 94
“Двойник” [“Петербургская
поэма”] <повесть> 1846,1866 121
“Лосподин Прохарчин” “Рассказ” 1846,1865 23
“Роман в девяти письмах” <рассказ> 1847 10
“Хозяйка” “Повесть” 1847, 1865 57
“Ползунков” <рассказ> 1848 11
“Слабое сердце” “Повесть” 1848, 1865 33
“ Чужая жена и муж под
кроватью” <рассказ> 1848, 1866 33
“Честный вор” <рассказ> 1848, 1865 12
“Елка и свадьба” <рассказ> 1848, 1866 6
“Белые ночи”
“Сентиментальный роман” <повесть> 1848, 1865 39
“Неточка Незванова” <повесть> 1849, 1866 125
“Маленький герой” <рассказ> 1857,1866 28
“Дядюшкин сон” <повесть> 1859, 1866 103
“Село Степанчиково и его
обитатели” <повесть> 1859,1866 163
“Униженные и оскорбленные” “Роман” 1861,1879 273
“Скверный анекдот” “Рассказ” 1862, 1865 40
“Записки из подполья” [“Повесть”] 1864, 1865 80
“Крокодил” “<...>повесть<...>”
<рассказ> 1865, 1865 27
“Игрок” “Роман” 1866 110
“Преступление и наказание” “Роман” 1866, 1877 416
“Идиот” “Роман” 1868, 1874 501
“Вечный муж ” “Рассказ”
<повесть>
1870, 1871 107
“Бесы” “Роман” 1871-1872,
1873
505
“Бобок” <рассказ> 1873 13
Подросток” “Роман” 1875, 1876 449
“Кроткая” “Фантастический
рассказ”
1876 29/30
“Cow смешного человека” “Фантастический
рассказ”
1877 15
“Братья Карамазовы” “Роман” 1879-1880,
1881
696
Как показывает эта таблица, амплитуда количественных пара­
метров тех текстов, жанр которых был определен в подзагаловке 
самим Достоевским, наиболее выразительна у рассказов и рома­
нов: рассказы могли быть в 15, 23, 30, 40 и 107 страниц (если 
учитывать определения комментаторов и большинства других 
исследователей, то эта амплитуда расширяется, благодаря под­
ключению еще семи текстов с количеством страниц: 6, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 28 и 33). Романы —  10, 39, 94, 110, 273, 416, 449, 501, 505 и 
696 (даже если не учитывать “Роман в девяти письмах”, цифры 
все же равно достаточно красноречивы). Что касается повести, то 
объем ее колеблется в весьма скромных границах (по сравнению 
с рассказом и романом): 27, 33, 57, 80. При подключении “вне­
текстовых” жанровых определений повесть имеет тенденцию 
только к увеличению объема: 39, 103, 107, 121, 125, 163.
Причем, что характерно, исследовательское “переименование” 
явно тяготеет к количественным критериям проведения границы 
между рассказом, повестью и романом: так, рассказом называется 
“Роман в девяти письмах” (10 стр.) и “справедливая повесть” 
“Крокодил” (27), повестью —  “роман” “Белые ночи” (39) и 
'“рассказ” “Вечный муж ’ (107). Сторонник “качественного”, 
"содержательного”, а не “количественного”, “формального” под­
хода к определению жанра, В. Н. Захаров полагает, что Достоев­
ский, как правило,
всегда знал, что собирался писать. Иногда замысел менялся, но 
весьма определенно и авторитетно Достоевский указывал (как пра­
вило, уже в заглавии произведения), что он написал, — роман, 
повесть или рассказ. Этой ясности и определенности жанровых 
дефиниций нет у исследователей его творчества: сплошь и рядом то, 
что Достоевский называл романом, называют повестью, а иногда и 
рассказом, повесть — рассказом или романом, рассказ — повестью и 
т.д. <...> Одно обстоятельство заставляет усомниться в том, что это 
принципиальные теоретические разногласия критиков с писателем: 
обычно жанровые переименования не то, что не доказаны, они 
просто не аргументируются исследователями (Захаров 1985: 5).
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7 “Для Достоевского количественные критерии определения жанра не имели 
принципиального значения <...>” (Захаров 1985: 42). Ср. также: “Жанр у Дос­
тоевского—  содержательная категория’'(Захаров 1983: 19).
Сам Захаров декларирует свое “принципиальное согласие с 
писателем5' , что явно не всегда возможно, поскольку, во-первых, 
Достоевский отнюдь не все тексты снабжал подзаголовками, 
содержащими жанровые определения, а во-вторых, он, как пра­
вило, давал различные жанровые определения: в подзаголов­
ках— и в своих письмах, упоминающих эти произведения, а 
также в “Дневнике писателя”, в подзаголовках —  и в  самих 
текстах. Так, “рассказ” “Господин Прохарчин” в письмах к брату 
называется Достоевским повестью9; рассказ “Маленький герой”, 
как упоминалось выше, был озаглавлен писателем “Детская 
сказка” и в письмах к тому же М. М. Достоевскому и к 
А. Н. Майкову был назван также повестью10. “Дядюшкин сон” 
назывался Достоевским то повестью, то романом11 а в процессе 
создания “рассказа” “Вечный муж” Достоевский в письмах 
употреблял все три типа наименования —  и роман, и повесть, и 
рассказ12. Уже после отправки законченной рукописи издателю 
(5/17 декабря 1869 г.) Достоевский называет это произведение 
повестью13. Даже “Бедные люди” неоднократно упоминались им в 
качестве “повести”, — например, в “Дневнике писателя” за 
1873 г. (Достоевский 1980: 21; 10), в “Дневнике писателя за
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Разумеется, при такой “солидаризации” с писателем в определении жанра, 
Захаров неизбежно сталкивается с противоречиями: отнюдь не причисляет к 
романам “Роман в девяти письмах” (об этом произведении он предпочитает 
вовсе не писать), “Двойник” определяет как повесть, а не “поэму”. Кроме того, 
Захаров выделяет у Достоевского 8 рассказов (“Господин Прохарчин”, “Пол­
зунков", “Чужая жена и муж под кроватью”, “Елка и свадьба”, “ Честный вор”, 
“Маленький герой”, “Скверный анекдот” и “Вечный муж”), т.е. в большинстве 
случаев (5 из 8) пользуется “внетекстовыми” определениями жанра, которые у 
Достоевского часто менялись. То же относится к повестям (выделено 6: 
“Двойник”, “Хозяйка”, “Слабое сердце”, “Дядюшкин сон”, “Записки из подполья” 
и “Крокодил”, т.е. 2 — по “внетекстовым” определениям) и романам (выделе­
но 11, среди которых “бесподзаголовочными” являются “Неточка Незванова” и 
иСело Степанчиково").
9 См. его письма М. М. Достоевскому от 26 апреля и 17 сентября 1846 
г. (Достоевский 1985: 28(1); 123, 126).
10 См. его письма М. М. Достоевскому от 22 декабря 1849 г. и 1 марта 1858 
г. (Достоевский 1985: 28(1); 162, 305), А. Н. Майкову от 11(23) декабря 1868 г. 
(Достоевский 1985: 28(2); 330).
11 См. его письма М. М. Достоевскому от 18 января 1858 г. и Е. И. Якушкину от
12 декабря 1858 г. (Достоевский 1985: 28(1); 300, 318).
12 См. его письмо А. Н. Майкову от 23 ноября (5 декабря) 1869 г. (Достоевский 
1986: 29(1); 77-78).
13 См. его письма А. Н. Майкову от 7(19) декабря и С. А. Ивановой от 14(26) 
декабря 1869 г. (Достоевский 1986: 29(1); 79-81, 88).
1877  г о д ” (Достоевский 1983: 25; 29), в “К рат ких би ограф и ­
ческих сведениях” (Достоевский 1984: 27; 120). Можно сказать, 
что жанровые определения (а зачастую и заглавия) писателя 
совмещают в себе все три типа классификации заглавий Кржи­
жановского: A n te-scrip tu m , In -scriptum  и P ost-scrip tu m  (Кржижа­
новский 1931: 21-23). Наконец, авторский подзаголовок “К рот ­
кой” (“фантастический рассказ”) становится предметом и обосно­
вания и опровержения в рамках самого текста (точнее —  в 
предисловии “От автора”):
Я прошу извинения у моих читателей, что на сей раз вместо 
“Дневника” в обычной его форме даю лишь повесть <курсив везде 
наш — И. А.>. Но я действительно занят был этой повестью боль­
шую часть месяца. <...> Теперь о самом рассказе. Я озаглавил его 
“фантастическим”, тогда как считаю его сам в высшей степени 
реальным. Но фантастическое тут есть действительно, и именно в 
самой форме рассказа, что и нахожу нужным пояснить пред­
варительно. Дело в том, что это и не рассказ и не записки 
(Достоевский 1982: 24; 5).
О том, как Достоевский сознательно обыгрывал многозначность 
жанровых обозначений, “активно употребляя жанровые дефи­
ниции в нежанровых значениях”, Захаров пишет:
<...> таких примеров, когда в одном контексте оказываются роман и 
рассказ, рассказ и повесть, повесть и роман, можно привести много. 
Резюмируя значения этих слов, можно сказать: роман у Достоев­
ского —  не только жанр, но и любовные отношения, иногда 
художественный вымысел героев <...>; повесть и рассказ, помимо 
жанровых значений, —  разные типы речевого сообщения. <...> 
Кроме того, есть у Достоевского произведения, жанровая природа 
которых недостаточно определенна. В таком случае принципиальное 
значение приобретают окончательные жанровые дефиниции писа­
теля. Включенные обычно в заглавие произведения, они являются 
элементом художественной структуры текста <...> (Захаров 1983: 
19-20)’4.
Эти замечания представляются справедливыми — за исключе­
нием утверждения о том, что у Достоевского всегда имелись 
“окончательные жанровые дефиниции” (как мы видим, у писа­
теля их было много...). Указывая на полисемию жанровых опре­
делений Достоевского (что, на наш взгляд, лишает их термино­
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14 Подробнее об этом см.: Захаров 1985: 23-51.
логического статуса) и на их вхождение в структуру текста (что, 
опять же, делает сомнительным их прямой перевод на уровень 
метаописания), Захаров, тем не менее, полагает правомерным для 
исследователя использование “жанровых дефиниций” самого 
Достоевского. Это неизбежно приводит к натяжкам, тем более, 
что автор, обосновывая закономерность выбора писателем тех 
или иных жанровых определений, в основу жанровой класси­
фикации кладет оценку “содержания”15.
Наконец, следует сказать о том, что Достоевский не только в 
пределах текста не придерживался собственных “окончательных 
жанровых дефиниций”, отраженных в подзаголовках, не только в 
письмах неоднократно их менял, но и в официальных документах 
мог давать жанровые определения, не совпадающие ни с “под­
заголовочными”, ни с теми, которые он обычно употреблял в 
письмах. Так, в договоре с А. Н. Сниткиной от 19 марта 1874 г. 
Достоевский указывает:
<...> я, Достоевский, уступил Сниткиной за две тысячи рублей в 
полную и неотъемлемую собственность авторское право на издание 
моих сочинений: романов: “Бедные люди”, “Записки из Мертвого 
дома”, “Белые ночи”, “Униженные и оскорбленные”, “Преступление 
и наказание”, “Идиот”, “Бесы" и “Село Степанчиково", — повестей: 
“Хозяйка", “Слабое сердце”, “Записки из подполья”, “Рулетенбург", 
“Неточка Незванова", “Двойник" и “Дядюшкин сон”, — и рассказов: 
“Крокодил", “Скверный анекдот", “Зимние заметки о летних 
впечатлениях", “Господин Прохарчин", “ Честный вор", “Маленький 
герой" и “Елка и свадьба” (Достоевский 1986: 29(1); 278-279).
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15 Так, вопрос о том, почему “Дядюшкин сон” является повестью, а “Село 
Степанчиково” — романом, Захаров решает однозначно: “Дядюшкин сон” —  
“история не о любви, а о незадачливом сватовстве», тогда как “Село Степан­
чиково” —  “произведение, в котором трагикомическое “воцарение” вчерашнего 
шута и приживальщика <...> развертывается в поле конфликтного взаимо­
действия полюсов романного притяжения и отталкивания —  социально и 
психологически осложненном чувстве любви полковника-вдовца и гувернантки 
его детей и суете вокруг сватовства к богатой, но безумной Татьяне Ивановне” 
(Захаров 1983: 18). Не говоря уж о правомерности приписывания Достоевскому 
“оценки содержания” в качестве “повода для жанрового определения”, отметим 
лишь, что такое противопоставление “повести и романа” явно не согласуется с 
самими произведениями: в “Дядюшкином сне” тоже имеется “социально и 
психологически осложненное чувство любви” Зины Москалевой к уездному 
учителю, а также “суета вокруг сватовства” к богатому, но в определенном 
смысле тоже безумному князю...
Как можно убедиться, авторское “жанровое переименование ’ — 
по отношению к “окончательным авторским дефинициям”, 
данным как в подзаголовках, так и в большинстве писем, — в 
данном случае происходит в соответствии именно с количест­
венным параметром (“романы” — “Записки из Мертвого 
дома” —  236, “Село Степанчиково” — 163; “повести” — “Руле- 
тенбург”, т.е. первоначальное название “Игрока”, — 110, “Яе- 
точка Незванова” — 125, “Дядюшкин сон” —  103; “рассказы” — 
“Крокодил” — 27, “Зимние заметки о летних впечатлениях” — 
52).
Таким образом, Достоевский неоднократно менял жанровые 
определения своих произведений (в подзаголовках, предисло­
виях, в письмах, в “Дневнике писателя”, в разного рода доку­
ментах), причем, не только в процессе их создания, что вполне 
объяснимо, не только по прошествии многих лет после написания 
и публикации или переиздания переработанных текстов, что 
можно было бы списать на ошибки памяти писателя, —  но и “по 
свежим следам” —  вскоре после отсылки готовой рукописи 
издателю или же после публикации/републикации текста. Разу­
меется, логику таких “переименований” можно и должно изучать 
и интерпретировать, но ясно одно: исследователи творчества 
Достоевского во многих случаях не в состоянии следовать 
авторским “окончательным жанровым дефинициям” как по 
причине их отсутствия в подзаголовках изрядного количества 
текстов, так и по причине “протеистического” характера их 
употребления писателем в разных контекстах.
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Dostojevski tekstide žanrimääratlus
A rtiklis tuleb ju ttu  eelkõige autori žanrim ääratlustest m is on eksplitsee- 
ritud kas tekstis endas (alapealkiri, eessõna) või laialipaisatuna kirjaniku 
kirjades; täpsem alt, uurijapoolse žanrim ääratluse strateegia seostest autori 
omaga, mis kajastub alapealkirjas ja  on m ingis m õttes teksti osa (sam a­
moodi, kuigi teises plaanis, nagu ka pealkiri ise), ning saab seega uurija- 
reflektsiooni võim alikuks objektiks. A utori- ja  uurijapoolse žanrim äärat­
luse kokkulangem ine (või erinem ine) võib olla tingitud nii teksti loom ise 
ajal kehtinud žanrim ääratluste norm ide kokkulangevusest (lahknem isest) 
uurijaaegsetega kui ka aspektist, m illes teksti vaadeldakse. V iim asel juhul 
kohtam e kokkulangevusi reeglina töödes, mis on pühendatud kõige erine­
vamatele (žanrimääratlusega mitte seotud) probleemidele, samal ajal kui 
lahknevusi leiame sagedamini teksti žanrilist olemust käsitlevates uuri­
mustes. Vajadust kriitilise suhtumise järele autori žanrimääratlustesse 
kinnitab tõik, et mõningad Dostojevski teoste pealkirjad täidavad oma 
olemuselt alapealkirja või žanridefinitsiooni funktsiooni, justkui määrat­
ledes teksti liigi (pole oluline, mis põhimõtteid järgides: narratsiooni, 
“diskursuse”, teksti allika tüübi, žanri, žanri alaliigi), seejuures just nimelt 
“justkui”, kuna nii kirjaniku alapealkirjad kui mõningatel juhtudel ka 
žanrimääratlused meie arvates vaid “mimkreeruvad”, teevad näo, et nad 
on žanrimääratlused või “normaalsed” alapealkirjad. “Alapealkirjalikud” 
pealkirjad aga “paljastavad võtet” veelgi enam, demonstreerides seda 
mimikrit mitte ainult semantiliste ja süntaktiliste seoste rikkumisega (suhe 
märgi/nime/nimetuse/pealkirja ja denotaadi/virtuaalse referendi/teksti 
“reaalsuse” vahel — ja suhe pealkirja ja alapealkirja, pealkirja ja põhi­
teksti, alapealkirja ja põhiteksti vahel), nagu alapealkirjades, vaid juba 
faktilise asetsemisega pealkirja kohal.
Seega muutis Dostojevski korduvalt oma teoste žanrimääratlusi, kus­
juures mitte ainult nende loomisprotsessi käigus, mis on täiesti mõistetav, 
mitte ainult palju aastaid pärast ümbertöötatud tekstide kirjutamist ja 
avaldamist, mida võiks seletada kirjaniku ebatäiusliku mäluga, vaid ka 
“mööda värskeid jälgi” — kohe peale valmis käsikirja kirjastajale saat­
mist või siis avaldamist/uuestiavaldamist. Muidugi võib taoliste “üm- 
bemimetamiste” loogikat mitut moodi interpreteerida, kuid selge on üks: 
Dostojevski loomingu uurijatel ei ole paljudel juhtudel võimalik järgida 
autori “lõplikke žanrimääratlusi” nii nende puudumise tõttu paljudes ala­
pealkirjades kui ka nende määratluste autoripoolse “proteistliku” kasu­
tamise tõttu erinevates kontekstides.
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A bstract. R ussian verse: Its m etrics, versification system s, and  p ros­
ody (G enerative synopsis). In the article the general verse metre theory 
and its application to Russian verse is adressed, allowing us, thereby, to 
observe not the single details, but only the most general characteristics o f 
verse. The treatment can be summarised in the five following points:
1) the basis for the phenomenon o f  verse is its metrical code: the spe­
cial feature o f verse text is the presence o f its metre (this feature is com­
mon to every verse type, to the most regular verse, as well as to vers 
libre);
2) the nature o f verse metre is extralinguistic, there is no metre within 
a language, the latter can only induce certain limitations in choosing a 
metre;
3) metre is an abstract chain o f  translational symmetry, the elementary 
period o f which is called verse foot (i.e. firstly, verse feet are contained in 
every versification system, incl. syllabic verse and free verse, and, sec­
ondly, verse feet can not be defined in terms o f  natural language, e.g., as 
the combination o f short and long or accented and unaccented syllables).
4) in verse text, metre appears through the medium o f natural lan­
guage: verse metre is coded in terms o f  natural language; the nature o f its 
codification is determined by the versification system. Hence, every verse 
metre can be realised in different versification systems, e.g. iambus can 
occur in syllabic-accentual, syllabic-quantitative, and some other versifi­
cation systems;
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5) verse prosody is a consequence of the influence of verse metre on 
the prosodies of language; the range of transformation of a language sys­
tem by verse metre extends from the unification of the strength of verse 
accents in accentual verse to such artificial formations as the origination 
of long syllables in languages which lack phonological quantity.
Предварительные замечания: 
генеративная метрика
Настоящая работа представляет собой обобщение результатов, 
полученных автором в области генеративного описания общего и 
русского стихосложения за более чем четвертьвековой период 
(Лотман и Шахвердов 1973, Лотман 1974, 1976, 1977, 1985, 1986, 
1987, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999; ср также общую характеристику 
генеративной метрики в Лотман 1975 и 1987а.). Объем публи­
кации определяет характер изложения: максимально обобщен­
ный, без примеров и иллюстраций.
В 1970-80-е годы генеративизм был ведущим направлением 
не только в области лингвистики, но и всего гуманитарного 
знания. Поэтому разработка стиховедческих генеративных моде­
лей представлялось занятием не только своевременным, но даже 
модным. Совершенно иной является ситуация, сложившаяся на 
рубеже тысячелетий: генеративистские разработки в большинст­
ве областей поэтики и языкознания (в частности, в областях 
синтаксиса и семантики, где они ранее абсолютно доминировали) 
занимают все более периферийное положение. Однако работы, 
связанные с исследованиями просодии и метрики, составляют в 
этом смысле исключение: генеративистские по своей направлен­
ности исследования захватывают все новые области стихо­
ведения; более того, некоторые лингвистические идеи прошли 
первоначальную апробацию именно в стиховедении (так, метри­
ческая просодика является сейчас одним из ведущих направлений 
в фонологии, а теория оптимальности, предметом которой 
являются общие основы речевого продуцирования, разрабаты­
вается главным образом именно на базе метрических исследо­
ваний)1.
1 О том, что идеи генеративной метрики еще далеко не исчерпаны, сви­
детельствовала, например, международная конференция Formal Approaches to 
Poetry Recent Developments in Generative Metrics, прошедшая в университете 
Торонто 8-10 октября 1999.
Думается, что дело здесь не в моде или престиже генера­
тивной метрики, а, в первую очередь, в самой природе изучаемых 
объектов, соединяющих в себе, с одной стороны, простоту и сим­
метрию общих принципов со сложным многообразием их конк­
ретных проявлений: трансформационные отношения в сфере 
стихосложения имеют гораздо более очевидный и интуитивно 
оправданный характер, нежели в области естественного языка 
(другой областью, где генеративные построения оказались столь 
же продуктивными, является музыковедение).
Не удивительно поэтому, что многие типично генеративист- 
ские построения возникли в стиховедении задолго до “инсти- 
туционализованного” оформления этого подхода. Так, С. И. Гин­
дин убедительно показал, что подход к стиху, содержащийся в 
работах В. Я. Брюсова, во многом предвосхищает методику 
трансформационного анализа (Гиндин 1970); если же говорить не
о методах, а идеях, то здесь в качестве одного из главных пред­
шественников генеративной метрики следует назвать В. М. Жир­
мунского (так, его концепция соотношения метра и ритма естест­
венным образом интерпретируется как соотношение глубинных и 
поверхностных структур; Жирмунский 1925), не случайно, что 
его подход нашел сочувственный отклик у М. Халле —  одного из 
создателей генеративной метрики (Halle 1968). Близок к гене- 
ративизму и подход, продемонстрированный акад. А. Н. Колмо­
горовым и А. В. Прохоровым в их недостаточно, как представ­
ляется, оцененной работе (Колмогоров, Прохоров 1968). На­
против, критики генеративной метрики М. Халле и С. Дж. Кей- 
зера указывают на ее старомодность —  после структуралистских 
разработок их подход показался шагом назад, а не вперед2. После 
того как стало очевидным, что несмотря на ряд важных резуль­
татов и интересных разработок (в первую очередь, в работах
Н. С. Трубецкого и Р. О. Якобсона) структуралистский проект в 
области теоретического стиховедения в целом потерпел неудачу, 
именно различные разветвления генеративизма определяют 
основное направление поисков в современной теории стиха.
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2 Ср. Wimsatt 1971. Можно привести еще одну параллель, на этот раз из 
области естественных наук: физику кристаллов, где уже издавна применяется 
подход, в достаточной мере аналогичный генеративному. Задачи, связанные с 
анализом и описанием кристаллических решеток во многих отношениях при­
ближаются к тем, с которыми приходится иметь дело в стиховедении.
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Тем не менее представляется совершенно очевидным, что 
многие важные проблемы стихосложения в рамках генеративного 
подхода в принципе не находят естественного решения. К таким 
проблемам относятся, например, статистические законы ритма, 
не выводимые из законов метра (“вторичный ритм” по М. JI. Гас- 
парову), ритмическая эволюция того или иного размера, а также 
отмеченность особыми сигналами начальных (resp. конечных) 
позиций текста, строфы или стихотворной строки3. И это не 
следует считать недостатком генеративного подхода, но законо­
мерным свойством любого последовательно проводимого метода: 
он не может дать ответы на все вопросы, но лишь на те, для 
разрешения которых он был создан.
Основные положения
В основании предлагаемого подхода лежат несколько в достаточ­
ной мере элементарных посылок, суммируемых в следующих 
пяти пунктах.
1. В основе явления стихотворности лежит метрическое коди­
рование: отличительным свойством стихотворного текста являет­
ся наличие в нем метра. (Это свойство —  общее для всех разно­
видностей стиха: от самой регулярной силлаботоники до vers 
libre).
2. Стихотворный метр имеет экстралингвистическую природу: 
он не содержится в готовом виде в естественном языке (ЕЯ), 
структура последнего может лишь накладывать ограничения на 
выбор метра (и то лишь в определенной мере, ср. п. 5).
3. Метр представляет собой абстрактную цепочку трансля­
ционной симметрии, элементарный период симметрии назы­
вается стопой. (Следовательно, во-первых, стопы содержатся в 
любых размерах любых систем стихосложения, в том числе и в 
vers libre, а не только в стихах силлабо-тонического или сил- 
лабо-квантитативного стихосложения; во-вторых, стопа не может 
определяться в ЕЯ терминах как, например, последовательность 
ударных и безударных или долгих и кратких слогов).
Разумеется, для соответствующих позиций и в рамках генеративного под­
хода могут быть ad hoc сформулированы те или иные правила (примеры таких 
содержатся и в Лотман 1996), однако в определенной мере они противоречат
самому духу метода.
4. В стихотворном тексте метр всегда опосредован языком: 
метрическая структура не отражается в тексте непосредственно, 
но предварительно кодируется в ЕЯ терминах. Характер этого 
кодирования определяет систему стихосложения. Каждому метру 
соответствует множество систем стихосложения, например, ямб 
может реализовываться в силлабо-квантитативной, силлабо-тони­
ческой и нек. др. системах стихосложения.
5. Стихотворная просодия есть результат воздействия стихо­
творного размера на просодическую систему ЕЯ (ср. тезис 
Р. О. Якобсона о “насилии” стиха над языком). Трансформации 
ЕЯ системы при этом могут колебаться от незначительных (напр., 
ослабление количественной редукции в русской силлаботонике 
или выравнивание силы ударений в акцентном стихе) до очень 
существенных (напр., аруз в тюркских языках, не знающих оппо­
зиции долгих и кратких слогов).
Все дальнейшее изложение представляет собой конкрети­
зацию и комментарий этих пунктов.
Т.о. основными разделами теории стиха является: (1) метрика, 
описывающая метрические структуры на всех уровнях (включая 
строфический и гиперстрофический), метрические правила будут 
обозначаться сокращением MR; (2) системы стихосложения, 
т.е. описание возможных отображений метрических структур в 
естественноязыковые; правила соответствия будут обозначаться 
сокращением CR и (3) просодия и ритмика, т.е. описание транс­
формаций ЕЯ системы под воздействием CR; просодические 
правила будут обозначаться сокращением PR. Порядок этот 
значим: метрические правила являются “старшими” по отноше­
нию к правилам соответствия и просодическим правилам (т.е. 
применяются до них), правила соответствия “старше” просоди­
ческих (ср. п. 5).
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Теория метра
В сфере словесности метричность есть специфическая особен­
ность стихотворной речи4, определяющая, во-первых, ее ритмич­
ность (т.е. периодичность чередования определенных речевых 
сигналов, приводящая к относительной предсказуемости их 
появления) и, во-вторых, наличие в стихотворной речи двойного
4 Подробнее о метрической прозе см. в Лотман 1999.
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членения (в отличие от прозы, стихотворная речь членится не 
только —  в соответствии с принципами ЕЯ —  на слоги, мор­
фемы, слова и т.п., но и на единицы, определяемые метром: 
полустишия, стихи, строфы и т.п.).
Существует несколько основных точек зрения на природу 
стихотворного метра (подробнее об этом см. в Лотман 1996 и 
1999):
1) метр, как закономерность ритма (т.е. метр по отношению к 
ритму вторичен —  Б. В. Томашевский, А. Н. Колмогоров в своих 
ранних стиховедческих работах);
2) метр, как идеальный закон, регулирующий ритмическую 
структуру стиха (В. М. Жирмунский);
3) метр, как структура, лежащая в основе ритма (М. Халле, 
С. Дж. Кейзер и др.).
Предлагаемый нами подход объединяет вторую и третью 
точки зрения. С одной стороны, метр является определенной 
конструкцией, а не просто принципом организации, с другой же 
стороны, метр является структурой, идеальной, с точки зрения 
симметрии. То обстоятельство, что метр является структурой, 
лежащей в основе стихотворной речи, определяет особую значи­
мость —  по сравнению с речью не стихотворной —  языковых 
единиц, несущих метрическую нагрузку (подробнее об этом 
см. Лотман 1996 и 1998); симметрия метрических структур опре­
деляет периодичность стиха, его ритмичность5.
Метр представляет собой абстрактную цепочку трансляцион­
ной симметрии, элементарный период симметрии называется 
стопой6. Т.о. в наиболее обобщенной формулировке стихотвор­
ный метр характеризуется двумя свойствами: периодичностью и 
дискретностью.
Следует подчеркнуть, что дискретность вовсе не является 
обязательным свойством симметрии; дискретность метра отли­
Можно предположить, что В. М. Жирмунский определял метр как закон, а не 
как идеальную структуру из-за опасения возникновения нежелательных ассо­
циаций со “школьной” метрикой и “стопной теорией” В. Брюсова (Брюсов 1919).
Следует отметить два кардинальных отличия предлагаемого подхода от 
"школьной метрики: во-первых, стопа трактуется как элемент глубинной, а не 
поверхностной структуры стиха (т.е. стопа образуется комбинацией абстрактных 
позиций, а не долгих и кратких или ударных и безударных слогов; одна и та же 
стопа может реализовываться в принципиально различных слоговых комп­
лексах); во-вторых, стопа является универсальным конституентом структуры 
стиха, т.е. не может быть “бесстопного” стихосложения.
чает его от трансляционно-симметрических структур конти­
нуального типа. Так, в синусоиде (1) период симметрии может 
быть выделен бесконечным числом способов, ни один из которых 
не может быть предпочтен остальным; транслирование заштрихо­
ванного фрагмента в (1а), в ( lb )  или в (1с) образует одну и ту же 
синусоиду.
(1)
(1а)
(lb )
(1с)
Цепочки трансляционной симметрии называются также раппорт- 
ными композициями, а период симметрии —  раппортом. Т.о. в 
основе стихотворности лежат два в определенном смысле 
противонаправленных механизма: устремленная в бесконечность 
периодичность (любой текст есть выражение бесконечного в 
конечном; в стихотворном тексте обостряется переживание как 
его конечности, так и бесконечности отражаемых в нем за- 
текстовых структур) и разлагающая ее на принципиально огра­
ниченные сегменты дискретность (стихотворный текст обычно 
содержит целое число составляющих его элементов —  стихов, 
строф и т.п.; в случаях, эту закономерность нарушающих, текст 
воспринимается как незавершенный не только в метрическом 
отношении).
Следует подчеркнуть, что дискретность —  столь же значимая 
характеристика метра, как и периодичность: стихотворная речь 
отличается от обиходной не только повышенной ритмичностью, 
но и повышенной расчлененностью; Б. В. Томашевский даже 
считал, что наличие экстралингвистического членения является 
более важным признаком стиха, чем его рекуррентность (Тома­
шевский 1959; подробнее об этом —  в Лотман 1999); 
Б. Я. Бухштаб —  последователь Томашевского —  определял стих 
как речь с двойным членением (Бухштаб 1969, 1973). Поэтому 
при транскрипции метрических структур должны найти экспли­
цитное выражение как периоды симметрии, так и границы между 
ними. Такого рода границы мы будем называть первичными 
делимитаторами (или просто делимитаторами —  в случаях, когда 
не нужно разграничивать первичные и вторичные делимитаторы). 
Будем обозначать периоды симметрии и их составляющие про­
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писными латинскими буквами (А, В и С), а первичные дели- 
митаторы —  значком &.
Роль делимитаторов не ограничивается разграничением эле­
ментов структуры стиха; с точки зрения соблюдения принципа 
симметрии границы метрических сегментов образуют область 
аномальных явлений: различные исключения как из метрических, 
так и ритмических правил встречаются, в первую очередь, в 
начале и окончании текста, строфы, стиха, полустишия. Особое 
значение имеют нарушения метрической структуры, связанные с 
ее наращением или усечением. Классическим примером такого 
рода нарушений может служить каталектика; близким случаем 
является наращение или усечение в предцезурной позиции. По­
скольку все такого рода нарушения симметрии связаны с 
делимитацией, будем называть их вторичными делимитаторами и 
обозначать следующим образом: (А)“ —  если период симметрии 
усечен на А и (А)+ —  если он наращен на А.
Хотя делимитаторы (особенно вторичные) и нарушают перио­
дичность на соответствующем уровне метрической структуры, 
они же способствуют образованию симметрических структур на 
более высоких уровнях. Так, законы альтернации клаузул, нару­
шающие симметрию на границе стиха, могут служить фактором 
строфообразования; аналогичную роль выполняет чередование 
стихов различной стопности в неравностопных урегулированных 
размерах и т.п.
Метр иерархичен. Периоды симметрии могут группироваться 
и образовывать периодические структуры более высокого уровня, 
причем этот процесс ничем не ограничен: периоды симметрии 
сколь угодно высокого уровня могут в свою очередь объеди­
няться в еще большие (подробнее об этом см. в Лотман 1995). 
Т.о. потенциальная бесконечность метра развертывается одно­
временно в двух измерениях: в длину и в глубину.
Важно отметить, что когда мы говорим о таких элементах 
стиховой структуры, как ‘стих’ или ‘строфа’, мы имеем ввиду 
обычно не столько метрическую реальность, сколько исто­
рико-литературную условность, закрепленную, как правило, в 
стихотворной графике. Так, мы называем стихом и строку 
4-стопного, и строку 6-стопного ямба, между тем, стих Я4 с 
точки зрения метрики является цепочкой 2-го ранга: он состоит 
из четырех стоп типа AB, в то время как стих Я6 —  цепочкой 
3-го ранга: он состоит из двух полустиший, каждое из которых
образуется тремя стопами AB. Еще более показательный при­
мер —  балладный септенарий (подробнее о нем см. в Лотман 
1996). Стих этот имеет, скорее всего, индоевропейское проис­
хождение, но особенное распространение получил в германском 
стихе. Хотя исходной, вероятно, следует считать 8-стопную 
форму, самой простой из реально зафиксированных является 
7-стопная следующего вида:
(2) &&АААА&ААА(А)" &&
Дальнейшее развитие шло по двум направлениям, оба они 
касались лишь первого полустишия: оно либо, в свою очередь, 
разделялось пополам, давая структуры типа 2+2+3 (3), либо, 
напротив, удваивалось: 4+4+3 (4):
(3) &&&АА&АА&&ААА(А)" &&&
(4) &&&АААА&&АААА&&ААА(АJ &&&
Далее процесс мог повторяться, давая структуры типа 
4+4+...+4+3 или (2+2)+(2+2)+3 и т.п., а также различные сме­
шанные варианты типа (2+2)+4+3 и т.п. Что здесь считать сти­
хом? Графика предлагает самые различные варианты, начиная от 
семистопной строки и кончая неравностопными чередованиями 
двух двустопных сток с трехстопной (самый распространенный 
вариант —  чередование 4-стопных строк с 3-стопными) . Пример 
балладного септенария демонстрирует одновременно и всю 
условность термина ‘полустишие’: “полустиший” в стихе может 
быть, например, три. Обычная иерархия: стопа —  (полустишие) 
стих — строфа, —  отражает не столько возможности метрики, 
сколько сложившуюся в европейском стихосложении традицию. 
Вероятно, одной из причин, почему различные варианты баллад­
ного септенария обычно не осознаются в качестве единого раз­
мера, является именно то обстоятельство, что он не укладывается 
в привычные классификационные схемы.
В отличие от терминов, обычно употребляемых для обо­
значения различных уровней структуры стиха, используемое 
нами понятие ранга метрической цепочки имеет точное
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7 Мы не касаемся здесь проблемы рифменного членения; первоначально 
септенарий был формой аллитерационного стиха, при переходе к рифменному 
стиху 4-стопные части стали рифмоваться с 4-стопными, а 3-стопные —  с 
3-стопными (т.е. метрической схеме 4343 соответствовала рифменная АВАВ, 
метрической схеме 443443 —  ААВААВ и т.д.), при разделении 4-стопной части 
2-стопные составляющие, в свою очередь, часто рифмуются между собой.
226 Михаил Лотман
содержание, определяемое процессом ее порождения и нахо­
дящее отражение в ее структуре. Ранг метрической структуры 
будем обозначать показателем степени, в случаях, когда 
необходимо указать ее порядковый номер, он будет обозначаться 
индексом: А" -  начальный раппорт (т.е. период симметрии) /7-го
ранга, &1 —  первичный делимитатор z-го ранга.
В зависимости от того, из элементов скольких типов состоят 
раппорты того или иного ранга, мы будем относить их к 
метрическим системам, соответственно, первой (MC ), второй 
(MC2) и третьей (MC'1) степени (теоретически возможны и 
метрические системы более высоких степеней, но в практике по 
крайней мере русского стихосложения они встречаются крайне 
редко). Все раппорты, входящие в M C 1, состоят лишь из одного 
символа (следовательно, все стопы в M C1 —  одноэлементны); 
входящие в MC2 —  из двух и в M C 1 —  из трех символов (рап­
порты в MC2 и MC3 должны состоять не менее, чем, соответст­
венно, из двух и из трех символов, что же касается их макси­
мальной длины, то она в принципе является неограниченной). 
Например, метрические структуры (5) и (6) относится к M C1, (7) 
и (8) —  к MC2, а (9) и (10) —  к MC3:
(5) &&ААА&ААА&ААА&&
(6) &&&АААА&АААА&&АААА&АААА&&
(7) &АВАВАВАВ&
(8) &АВААВААВА&
(9) &АВСАВСАВС&
(10) &АВАСАВАСАВАС&
Важно отметить, что цепочки типа (5) —  (10) возможны на всех 
уровнях структуры стиха, начиная со стопного и кончая гипер­
трофическими уровнями (см. Лотман 1995). Тем не менее, по 
понятным причинам для метрического описания наибольшее 
значение имеют раппорты терминального уровня —  стопы8. Для 
простоты описания первичные делимитаторы раппортов нижнего 
ранга опускаются (в противном случае вместо (5) следовало бы 
обозначать цепочку, представленную в (5) как
Терминальной называется структура, поступающая на вход трансформацион­
ного компонента модели, т.е. интерпретируемая при помощи правил соответст­
вия.
&&&А&А&А&&А&А&А&&А&А&А&&&, а (8) —  выглядела 
бы следующим образом: &&АВА&АВА&АВА&&)9.
В отличие от (5) и (6), минимальные периоды симметрии 
в (7) —  (10) не элементарны и состоят из составляющих, которые 
сами не являются периодами симметрии; с другой стороны, все 
метрические единицы могут рассматриваться в качестве единого 
целого, т.е. все метрические структуры могут быть в конечном 
счете сведены к цепочке типа ААААА... Таким образом, M C1, 
является не просто одним из семейств метрических систем, но и 
основой всех образований, характеризующихся более сложной 
структурой.
Если рассматривать все наследие мировой поэзии в качестве 
единого целого, то преобладающее положение в нем занимают 
размеры, выводимые из M C1 (различные формы силлабического, 
тонического и свободного стиха), затем следуют размеры, вхо­
дящие в MC" (в русской литературной поэзии именно они 
являются основными), наконец, размеры, входящие в МСЗ, 
представляют собой большую редкость и возникают только в 
контексте развитой поэтической культуры (отдельные примеры 
см. в Лотман 1996).
Среди метрических правил будем различать правила образо­
вания метрических структур и правила трансляции; первые 
определяют структуру метра, вторые —  ее “перевод” в терминах 
данного ранга. На терминальном уровне запись максимально 
упрощается: производится раскрытие скобок, сокращение избы­
точных первичных делимитаторов, опускаются индексы и 
показатели ранга10.
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В отличие от терминального, в качестве “нижнего” может выступать любой 
уровень стиховой структуры: на уровне стиха это, как правило, стопа —  тогда (8) 
может быть интерпретирована как 3-стопный амфибрахий, на уровне строфы это 
может быть стих, тогда (8) интерпретируется как три 3-стишия.
Все эти операции не могут считаться трансформациями метрических струк­
тур, поскольку касаются не ее сегментов, но лишь метаязыковых символов.
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I. Правила образования:
(MR1) А" —> &ПАП&П
(M R2) А" —» (A n_k)±A n(A n_J)± , где п > к и п  >j.
(MR3) А п -»
П-1 А п-1 о П-1< 1 >  Г ' А П"&
< 2 > &J1*'1 А^'&г"’1 & 3 " - 1 А 2П' 1 & 4 П' 1
п  П-1 д  П -1 р  П-1 р  П -1 д  П-1 р  П-1< q > &1 Aj &2 &з А2 &4 &П-1 Л п-1 п  п-1 2q-l & 2q
(MR4) (i) An -4  A
(ii) An AB
(iii) An -> ABB
(iv) An ABC 
и т.п.
Смысл MR1 заключается в том, что каждый период симметрии 
/-го ранга отграничен делимитаторами того же ранга; MR2 
определяет действие вторичных делимитаторов (вторичным 
делимитатором элемента «-го ранга может быть элемент любого 
из меньших рангов); MR3 определяют внутреннюю структуру 
периода (Ап): она может быть как элементарной, так и состоять из 
q периодов п-1-го ранга:
Набор правил MR4 определяет степень метрической системы 
данной структуры: правила типа (MR4) (i) —  M C1, (MR4) (ii) и
(iii) —  MC2 и (MR4) (iv) —  MC3.
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II. Правила трансляции:
(MR5) &nA n&n—> &n&n_1A in_1&n_1 ... &n-1AqD~1&n_1&n 
(MR6) A n(An‘m) -> & ;•' А,"'1 &2пА A ,"'1 &2k(An’m) ->
4--------------- V -------'к раз
—>... —> & А &  А... А&
к+1 раз
(где к и к+1 обозначают число вхождений символа А).
MR5 определяет порядок “наследования” первичных делимитато- 
ров: они просто транслируются с более высокого уровня. Т.о., на­
пример, строфораздел остается строфоразделом и на уровне сти­
ха: он не отменяется стихоразделом, но и не заменяяет его. MR6 
определяет порядок “наследования” вторичных дел имитаторов.
Приведенные правила определяют вывод метрических струк­
тур произвольной сложности. В заключение следует отметить два 
обстоятельства, самих по себе не очень принципиальных, но 
отличающих предлагаемый подход от большинства работ по 
генеративной метрике. Во-первых, для представления метриче­
ских структур мы используем символы А и В, а не W и S 
(сокращенно от strong и weak position). Делаем это по двум 
взаимосвязанным причинам: а) метрические элементы вообще не 
характеризуются силой: важно лишь то, что А = А и А Ф В 11; 
б) Символы S и W могут быть использованы лишь при описании
11 “Слабые” и “сильные” позиции —  рецидив структуралистского мышления. 
“Сила” и “слабость” позиции не есть непосредственная данность, но лишь услов­
ность ее восприятия. Уже в трактовках античного стихосложения возникли 
споры о том, что есть сильная позиция: тезис или арсис; дискуссия о природе 
русского силлаботонического стиха со всей недвусмысленностью свидетельст­
вуют о том, как непросто решить, какая же из позиций является “сильной”. В 
противоположность традиционной точке зрения, согласно которой в русском 
ямбе сильными позициями должны считаться позиции четные, для Н. С. Тру­
бецкого и Р. О. Якобсона в нем отмеченными, т.е. фонологически сильными 
позициями являются нечетные; если отвлечься от вносящего еще большую 
путаницу первого слога, схема ямба у них принимает следующий вид 
u X u X u X . . . ,  а не u - u - u - . . .  (где X —  позиция, занимаемая произвольным 
слогом). Еще интереснее по Якобсону обстоит дело в русских трехсложниках, 
где обе позиции (и и ,  и - )  должны считаться сильными.
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метров, входящих в MC2, они в принципе не годятся для M C1 
(т.е. они были введены лишь для описания метрических структур 
специфического типа). Во-вторых, мы не сводим трехсложные 
размеры к бинарным структурам (т.е., например, дактиль у нас 
имеет вид А В В А В В ..., а не АВАВ...12).
Правила соответствия
В русском стихосложении преобладают формы, основанные на 
одновременном использовании силлабического и акцентного 
принципов. Это или силлаботоника (хорей, ямб, дактиль, амфи­
брахий и анапест), или акцентно-силлабический стих (дольник и 
обе разновидности тактовика); чистая силлабика, чистая тоника и 
свободный стих занимают периферийное положение; их опи­
сание подчиняется сравнительно простым правилам (см. Лотман 
1996 и 1998).
Ниже приводится описание основных форм русского лите­
ратурного стиха. Анализ его различных форм, а также исследо­
вания в области компаративной метрики позволяют обобщить и в 
определенной мере упростить систему правил соответствия, 
предложенную в Лотман 1996.
А. Д вуслож ны е м етры
Двусложными метрами называются ямб и хорей, в основе 
которых лежат, соответственно, метрические схемы (11) и (12) 
(делимираторы для наглядности опущены).
(11) АВАВАВ...
(12) ВАВАВА...
Из этих схем двусложные размеры выводятся при помощи 
следующих правил соответствия:
Фетишизация принципа бинарности —  также является данью структура­
лизму, в данном случае особенно неуместной, поскольку без всякой к тому 
необходимости вводит лишний промежуточный уровень описания.
(CR1) Каждой позиции (А и В) соответствует один и только 
один слог13.
(CR2) Односложное слово может занимать в стихе любую 
позицию.
Исключение из этого правила составляют случаи, когда одно­
сложное слово несет синтагматическое ударение (ср. PR8); в 
таком случае действует CR3. Важным следствием CR2 является 
то обстоятельство, что в русских двусложниках (и вообще в 
русском стихе) словораздел возможен после любого слога, т.е. 
русский стих не знает зевгмы.
(CR3) Слог, несущий синтагматическое ударение, может при­
ходиться только на позицию В.
(CR4) Ударение неодносложного слова может приходиться 
только на позицию В.
CR4 не означает, что позициям В могут соответствовать лишь 
ударные слоги: позиции В может соответствовать безударный 
слог многосложного слова, но только в том случае, если ударный 
слог этого слова приходится на другую позицию В; что касается 
позиции А, то ей может соответствовать лишь либо безударный 
слог, либо ударение односложного слова (ср. CR2). CR4 является 
основным правилом русской силлаботоники.
Особенностью русской силлаботоники является наличие так 
наз. ударной константы:
(CR5) В, в позиции непосредственно предшествующей (А)&, 
может соответствовать только ударный слог.
Помимо своего прямого назначения, связанного с описанием 
вывода ритмических структур из метрических, приведенная сис­
тема правил позволяет решить и ряд других проблем. В част­
ности, она кладет конец спорам о природе русского “классиче­
ского” стихосложения14: оно является именно силлаботониче- 
ским, причем силлабический принцип в нем превалирует над
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13 CR3 не обязательно для всякого силлабо-тонического стиха; например, в 
английском ямбе позиции А могут соответствовать два слога; по мнению 
М. Халле и С. Дж. Кейзера, в определенных условиях два слога могут 
соответствовать и позиции В (Halle, Keyser 1971), хотя все приводимые ими 
примеры носят искусственный характер; при анализе реального материала нам 
не удалось обнаружить ни одного такого случая.
14 Так, В. К. Тредиаковский и Б. В. Томашевский считали его тоническими, 
Н. В. Недоброво —  силлабо-тоническим и даже чисто силлабическим, Е. Д. По­
ливанов —  тонико-силлабическим, Б. Я. Бухштаб выделял в нем две разно­
видности: силлабо-тоническую и акцентно-силлабо-тоническую и т.п.
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тоническим (с точки зрения эстетики стиха можно было бы 
сказать, что силлабический принцип определяет константность 
ритмики, в то время как тонический —  богатство ее вариатив­
ности).
Правила CR1-CR5 позволяют описать более 99.5% стихового 
материала. Нарушения этих правил должны рассматриваться в 
качестве исключений. Впрочем, у исключений обнаруживается 
также своя логика, позволяющая сформулировать дополнитель­
ные правила. Первое из них касается ударной константы:
(CR6) Пропуск ударения в позиции S, непосредственно 
предшествующей &, допускается в порядке исключения .
Обычно применение CR6 связано с ориентацией на герман­
скую традицию16.
Инверсия запрещается основным правилом силлаботоники 
(CR4); в порядке исключения она допускается при условиях: 
а) она приходится на начальную позицию стиха и б) она осущест­
вляется двусложным словом. Здесь следует различать два случая 
(принципы транскрипции просодических структур объясняются 
ниже):
(CR7) &А,В, =* [[Хх]]#]#
(CR8) &А,В, => [[Хх]]#
CR7 допускает инверсию только в том случае, когда осущест­
вляющее ее двусложное слово образует самостоятельную синтаг­
му или фразу (обычно —  интонационно выделенную); такого 
рода инверсии особенно распространены в белом драматическом 
Я5 и маркируют ориентацию на английскую традицию. CR8 
встречается реже и ощущается как более сильное нарушение 
CR4.
Стихи, не укладывающиеся в рамки, допускаемые CR1-CR8, 
не воспринимаются в качестве силлаботонических двусложников.
1 "В порядке исключения” означает, что в тексте допускается либо лишь один 
стих такой структуры, либо, если это текст значительной длины, стихи такой 
структуры должны быть в подавляющем меньшинстве и отстоять на таком 
расстоянии друг от друга, чтобы исключалась возможность возникновения 
ритмического ожидания (ср. Испанцы М. Ю. Лермонтова, где таких стихов три).
С точки зрения логики модели CR6 кажется избыточным: аномальным 
является CR5, отклоняющееся от CR4. Однако в контексте истории русского 
стиха "‘событием'’ является именно отсутствие ударения на клаузуле, а не 
постоянное его появление там.
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В. Трехсложные метры
Трехсложными метрами называются анапест, амфибрахий и 
дактиль; в основе их лежат, соответственно, схемы (13), (14) и 
(15).
(13) ААВААВААВ...
(14) АВААВААВА...
(15) ВААВААВАА...
Ритмическая структура трехсложных метров обычно считается 
более простой по сравнению с метрами двусложными. Действи­
тельно, основная масса стихов, написанных трехсложниками, 
описывается одним простым правилом:
(CR9) Позиции В может соответствовать только ударный слог. 
Т.о., в отличие от двусложных метров, в трехсложниках 1) все 
позиции одного типа (в данном случае -  В) выступают в функции 
ударной константы; 2) ударные слоги двусложных слов допу­
скаются в позиции А, но только при условии, что при этом не 
нарушается CR9 (т.е. безударный слог этого слова не может 
приходиться на позицию В, но обязательно на соседнюю 
позицию А).
Исключение из CR9 составляет начальная позиция В в дак­
тиле: ей может соответствовать и безударный слог (как уже 
указывалось, начальный слог в русском стихе является по сути 
дела произвольно ударным во всех размерах), т. е. действует 
правило: &В... => [х ....
В XX в. действие CR9 ослабевает и оно трансформируется в 
сторону CR4 (правда, в отличие от двусложников, показатель 
ударности никогда не опускается ниже 90%). Пропуски схемных 
ударений в сочетании с двусложными словами в межиктной 
позиции может приводить к ритмическим структурам, 
значительно более сложным для восприятия, нежели это бывает в 
двусложниках (ср. примеры в Лотман 1996).
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С. Дольник и тактовик первого типа (Т,)
Дольники выводятся из тех же метрических структур, что и 
трехсложники с тем лишь отличием, что в дополнение к CR9 
действует также правило, допускающее пропуск слога в позиции 
А, предшествующей В (тем самым частично отменяется CR1):
(CR10) А/__В => 0 ,  где 0  —  пустой символ.
Т.о. ритмика дольника сводится к следующей схеме:
(16) ... (х)Хх(х)Хх(х)Хх(х)Х...
Поскольку пропуски метрического ударения в дольниках встре­
чаются несколько чаще, чем в соответствующих трехсложниках, 
то дольниковые структуры возможно выводить не при помощи 
CR9, a CR4.
Тактовик первого типа образовался из дольника путем даль­
нейшего сокращения межиктного интервала (колеблется в диа­
пазоне 0-2  слога), т.е. вместо CR10 действует более общее 
правило C R 11:
(CR11) А=>0  
Ритмическая схема Tj:
(17) .. - (х)Х (х)(х)Х (х)(х)Х...
Дольник и Tj образуют переходную область между силлаботони- 
кой и чистой тоникой, в отличие от дву- и трехсложников их 
следует отнести к акцентно-силлабической системе стихосложе­
ния.
D. Пеоны и тактовик второго типа (Т^)
В Лотман 1996 было предложено новое понимание проблемы 
пеонов, согласно которому в основе их лежат метрические 
структуры типа (18), относящиеся к MC3, а что касается Т^, то он 
выводится из структуры пеонического типа (такая трактовка 
проблемы Tjj в качестве одной из возможных упоминается и 
М. Л. Гаспаровым (Гаспаров 1974)):
(18) ...ВАСВАСВАС...
В пеонах эта схема реализуется следующим образом: символы А 
и В подчинены тем же правилам, что и в двусложниках (в CR4 
для пеонов должна быть внесена незначительная корректива: 
“Ударение неодносложного слова может приходиться только на 
позиции В или С”), в то время как символы С образуют ударные 
константы.
(CR12) Позиции С всегда соответствует ударный слог.
Что касается Tjj, то для его вывода дополнительно исполь­
зуется CR11 (т.е. Tü выводится из пеонов таким же образом, как 
дольник и Т, из трехсложников). Ритмическая схема Тц:
(19) .. .(х)Х(х)х(х)Х(х)х(х)Х...
Просодическая структура силлаботонического стиха
А. П росодические единицы  язы ка 
(обозначения и принципы  классиф икации)
С точки зрения силлаботонического стихосложения просодиче­
ские единицы (ПЕ) языка определяются словоразделами и кон­
фигурацией ударных и безударных слогов; при описании ПЕ 
будем различать уровни слога, слова и синтагмы. Будем обозна­
чать ударные и безударные слоги символами X и х соответст­
венно, а границы между ПЕ —  скобочной записью: ]]# —  конеч­
ная граница просодического слова, ]]#]# —  конец синтагмы (про­
содической фразы), в то время как проклитики и энклитики отде­
ляются одинарной скобкой. Например: лес [[X]]#, море [[Хх]]#, 
велосипед [[хххХ]]#, параллелепипед [[ххххХх]]# и т.п.; под стол 
[[х[Х]]#, Ни за что! [[х[х[Х]]#, за город [[Х]хх]]#, под узды 
[[х[хХ]]#, А вам-mo что? [[х[Хх]х]]#, Пошел вон! [[[хХ]]#[Х]]#]#, 
каждый день [[[Хх]]#[Х]]#]#, день за днем [[[Х]]#[х[Х]]#]# и т.п..
На уровне просодического слова будем различать простые и 
составные ПЕ. Простые ПЕ образуются одной лексической еди­
ницей, составные включают также проклитики или энклитики; 
обозначив первой цифрой число слогов в ПЕ, а второй —  пози­
цию ударного слога, получим следующую типологию просоди­
ческих слов:
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Простые (а) Составные ( ß, у и õ)
а ß У Õ
1.1. [[X]]#
2.1. [[Хх]]# [[X]x]]#
2.2. [[xXJJ# [[x[X]]#
3.1. [[Xxx]]# [[X]xx]]#5 [[Хх]х]#
3.2. [[xXx]]# [[xX]x]]# [х[Хх]]# [[х[Х]х]]#
3.3. [[xxX]]# [[x[xX]]# [[хх[Х]]# [[х[х[Х]]#
и т.п.
Обычно распределение “однономерных” простых и составных 
просодических слов в силлаботоническом стихе подчиняется 
одним и тем же закономерностям (основное отличие заключается 
в том, что составные чаще разрываются переносами, чем прос­
тые; впрочем, поэты, регулярно отделяющие стихоразделами 
про- и энклитики, обычно разделяют переносами и простые ПЕ). 
Тем не менее, в русской силлаботонике простые ПЕ играют 
значительно более важную роль, нежели составные (ср. PR7).
В. Просодические правила в русской силлаботонике
Просодическая структура стиха определяется просодическими 
правилами. С точки зрения силлаботоники наибольшее значение 
имеют правила слогообразования (PR1-PR4) и правила ударения 
(PR5-PR8).
(PR1) Слог образуется каждой гласной фонемой.
(PR2) Последовательность двух гласных считается одним сло­
гом, если она соответствует одной метрической позиции.
(PR3) Последовательность согласных типа ‘шумный+сонант’ 
на конце слова образует слог, если она соответствует метри­
ческой позиции.
(PR4) Любая последовательность согласных, отделенных 
словоразделами, образует слог, если она соответствует метри­
ческой позиции.
Важно отметить, что PR1, как и прочие приведенные правила, 
не является автоматическим следствием просодически системы 
русского языка, где из-за сильной количественной редукции с 
уверенностью можно утверждать лишь то, что слог образуется 
каждым ударным гласным. То, что в русской силлаботонике
количественная редукция практически отсутствует, является 
прямым следствием CR1. Тем не менее, PR1 обычно не вос­
принимается в качестве поэтической вольности, “насилия” над 
русским языком, оно скорее “проясняет” языковую просодику17.
О PR2, PR3 и PR4 этого сказать уже никак нельзя, они и 
рассчитаны на то, чтобы быть заметными, внося либо элемент 
“иностранности” (PR2, т.к. русский язык дифтонгов не знает), 
либо, напротив, просторечия (PR3, PR4) в русский литературный 
стих. Впрочем, у некоторых поэтов конца XX века (например, у 
Бродского) PR3 теряет свою отмеченность, становится стилис­
тически нейтральным.
Порядок следования просодических правил значим; PR2 и PR3 
являются “отступлениями” от PR l, PR4 —  от PR3:
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Акцентная структура регулируется следующими правилами.
(PR5) Во всех случаях, когда позиция ударения в неодно­
сложном слове строго определена общеязыковой нормой (а это 
справедливо для значительного большинства случаев), силлабо- 
тонический стих следует общеязыковому употреблению (т.е. 
переакцентуация не допускается)18.
17 PR1 может быть истолковано и иначе —  в духе Б. В. Томашевского. В 
русском языке слог образуется каждым гласным, что же касается русской речи, 
то здесь все зависит от целого ряда факторов: темпа речи, стиля произношения и 
т.п. Правда, отсюда Томашевский делает фантастический вывод о том, что стили 
произношения и определяют различные типы стиха (между тем, как прямо 
противоположный вывод, согласно которому произношение стиха зависит от 
системы стихосложения, страдал бы лишь известной упрощенностью). Хотя 
природа редукции и не вполне ясна, думается, все же нет оснований считать ее 
лишь речевым явлением, не вытекающим из свойств языка.
|н При всей кажущейся тривиальности PR5 вовсе не обязательно для любого 
стихосложения, основывающегося на тоническом принципе. Например, оно не 
действует в русском народном стихе, где переакцентуация может являться 
эстетическим фактором. Чтобы убедиться, сколь значимым является PR5, полезно 
привести пример, решительно его нарушающий. Венгерский эстрадный певец 
Янош Кош в переводе (вероятно, собственного сочинения) венгерской песни 
переакцентуировал едва ли не все слова, так что, например, стих “Но не изменяется 
песня” предстает 3-стопным анапестом со сплошными мужскими словоразделами:
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(PR6) В тех случаях, когда возможны различные варианты 
акцентуации неодносложного слова, позиция ударения опреде­
ляется правилами соответствия (т.е. ударение приходится на 
позицию, предусмотренную метрической схемой).
(PR7) Правила соответствия имеют ввиду только простые ПЕ; 
составные ПЕ нарушают правила соответствия только тогда, если 
их нарушают их минимальные составляющие.
Так, ПЕ типа 2.1. ß  ведут себя, скорее, как 1.1., чем как 2.1. а 
(эту закономерность впервые отметил Р. О. Якобсон, хотя и 
сформулировал ее в принципиально иных —  фонологических —  
терминах; Якобсон 1923, 1973). Между тем, в речи нестихо­
творной простые и составные ПЕ подчиняются тем же законо­
мерностям (заметим, что, согласно существующим описаниям, 
таким же образом обстоит дело и в английском 5-стопном ямбе, 
на этом отождествлении основывается, в частности, правило 
“ударной максимы” Халле-Кейзера; Halle and Keyser, 1971).
Что касается остальных ПЕ, то их употребление подчиняется, 
скорее, статистическим закономерностям, нежели строгой регла­
ментации при помощи правил. Исключение составляет CR3. 
Градация силы словесных ударений на уровне синтагм зависит от 
многих факторов акцентологического, синтаксического и семан­
тического порядка. Так, ударения на полнозначных словах заве­
домо сильнее, чем на неполнозначных, ударение на существи­
тельном обычно сильнее, чем на глаголе или прилагательном; 
вместе с тем, действует и чисто ритмическое правило, согласно 
которому в повествовательной фразе наиболее сильное ударение 
приходится на конец синтагмы. В наиболее общем виде правило 
синтагматического ударения может быть сформулировано сле­
дующим образом:
(PR8) Синтагматическое ударение приходится на последний 
полнозначный член синтагмы.
Синтагматическое ударение сдвигается с этой позиции в 
результате разного рода обстоятельств, связанных с актуальным 
членением и коммуникативной ориентацией фразы. Тем не 
менее, в отличие от PR8, такие синтагматические ударения с 
точки зрения CR3 иррелевантны.
" но-не-Из ме-ня-Ет ся-пес-нЯ” (следует отметить, что в венгерском ямбе —  но не 
трехсложниках! —  такого типа ритмические ходы допустимы).
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Заключительные замечания
Изложенное выше представляется одновременно и наиболее 
обобщенным, и наиболее точным описанием условий функцио­
нирования метрических форм в русском стихосложении X V III- 
XX вв. Разумеется, дальнейшее уточнение предложенных правил 
(в первую очередь CR и PR), не только возможно, но и необхо­
димо. Так, за рамками настоящего обзора остались все просоди­
ческие правила, определяющие характер фразировки стиха.
Кроме того, за рамками обзора остались акцентный стих и vers 
libre, но уже по другой причине: в отношении этих форм в 
настоящий момент автору нечего прибавить к сказанному в 
Лотман 1996, 1998 и 1999.
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Vene värss: 
meetrika, värsisüsteemid ja prosoodika 
(generatiivne ülevaade)
Artiklis käsitletakse üldist värsimõõduteooriat ning selle rakendamist 
vene värsile, kusjuures kõne alla ei tule üksikud detailid, vaid üksnes 
värsi kõige üldisemad omadused. Käsitluse võib kokku võtta järgmise 
viie teesiga:
1) värsilisuse aluseks on meetriline kood: värssteksti eritunnuseks on 
selle meetrumi olemasolu (see omadus on ühine kõigile värsitüüpidele 
alates kõige regulaarsemast värsist kuni vabavärsini);
2) värsimõõdu loomus on keeleväline, keeles meetrumit pole, viimane 
võib esitada üksnes teatud piiranguid meetrumi valikul;
3) meetrum on translatsioonilise sümmeetria abstraktne ahel, mille 
elementaarset sümmeetrilist perioodi nimetatakse värsijalaks (st esiteks 
on värsijalad kõikides värsisüsteemides, sh silbilises ja vabavärsis, aga 
mitte üksnes silbilis-rõhulises ja silbilis-vältelises; teiseks, värsijalga ei 
saa defineerida loomuliku keele terminites, nt lühikeste ja pikkade või 
rõhuliste ja rõhutute silpide kombinatsioonina);
4) värsstekstis esineb meetrum loomuliku keele vahendusel: värsimõõt 
kodeeritakse loomuliku keele terminites. Selle kodeerimise iseloomu 
määrab värsisüsteem. Seega võib iga värsimõõt realiseeruda erinevates 
värsisüsteemides, nt jamb võib esineda silbilis-rõhulises, silbilis-vältelises 
ja veel mõningates värsisüsteemides;
5) värsi prosoodia on värsimõõdu mõju tagajärg keele prosoodikale; 
meetrumi mõjul keelesüsteemi transformeerumise diapasoon ulatub alates 
värsirõhkude tugevuse ühtlustamisest rõhulises värsis ja lõpetades selliste 
kunstlike moodustustega nagu pikkade silpide tekkimine keeltes, kus pole 
fonoloogilist kvantiteeti.
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Abstract. The paper examines V. Nabokov’s “strange” novel “Bend Sin­
ister”. The fictional space of the novel is regarded as a process of interac­
tion of different languages or different versions of reality. The philoso­
pher Krug’s story unrolls in the imaginary totalitarian state whose ideol­
ogy combines the elements of fascism, communism and the language of 
mass psychology. At this level the text is identical with a “social mes­
sage”. The protagonist has to choose between a “private autonomy” and a 
“bad solidarity”. The paper offers the new facts and documents referring 
to the key symbols of the novel. The language of “reality” is decon­
structed in the protagonist’s idiosyncratical language, the language of his 
thoughts, recollections and dreams. Scientific metaphors are crucial in the 
deconstruction and help to reveal metafictional nature of the text. The 
analogies with painting, relativist physics, logical paradoxes (Russell’s 
and Gödel’s theories) permit^, to investigate the status of the fictional 
space, its development in time and the fiction of the Author.
Or is “outer” and “inner” an illusion too, so that 
a great mountain may be said to stand a thou­
sand dreams high and hope and terror can be as 
easily charted as the capes and bays they helped 
to name ?
(Nabokov 1974: 146)
Nabokov’s “Bend Sinister” has been repeatedly evaluated as a strange 
or not quite successful text. There were few critical responses to it in 
1947 when it was published and it is still surrounded by certain critical
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perplexity, although a number of scholars have paid close attention to 
it. D. Barton Johnson’s thematic analysis (Johnson 1985: 185-223) 
and P. Tammi’s narratological analysis in terms of the auctorial “in­
complete control” over the text (Tammi 1985: 115-125) is especially 
revealing. Basing ourselves on these investigations, we will attempt to 
place the text into the context of culture and to examine it as a process 
of interaction of different languages.
The perplexity is probably caused by Nabokov’s flat rejection of 
any general ideas and social comments applicable to “Bend Sinister” 
and by his delineation of the novel as an author’s fantasy (Nabokov 
1974: 6-7). Despite the author’s will to prevent a “social intent” in the 
critical appraisal of the novel, the latter has been accepted as a parallel 
to other anti-totalitarian texts containing a “social message” (“Invita­
tion to a Beheading”, “Tyrants Destroyed”, etc.). In the Introduction 
of 1963, Nabokov denied any didactic or allegorical goal, any “seri­
ous” idea, but admitted that “certain reflections in the glass directly 
caused by the idiotic and despicable regimes” can be distinguished in 
the book: “worlds of tyranny and torture, of Fascists and Bolshevists, 
of Philistine thinkers and jack-booted baboons” (Nabokov 1974: 6). 
The text might be understood more precisely as a system of contra­
dictory elements both maintaining and undermining the “social mes­
sage”. The language of ideology is juxtaposed to the protagonist’s 
idiosyncratical language. The philosopher Adam Krug refuses to ac­
cept the language of the social “conspiracy” since the people involved 
(classmates, colleagues, acquaintances) belong to his personal world: 
he is “re-writing” the totalitarian idiom and decomposing it into pri­
vate human meanings. His philosophical method is defined as “crea­
tive destruction” of any closed, finite and therefore mythological sys­
tem (Nabokov 1974: 145-146). The tension between the languages 
reaches its top point in the episode of protagonist’s death while he 
attempts to re-tum the situation into the idiosyncratical recollection of 
a schoolgame or fight to subdue the dictator. The narration simultane­
ously opens at the level of the author-narrator whose presence perme­
ates protagonist’s idiosyncratical language as its “inner form”.
1. The social message
According to the Introduction, “the greater part of the book was com­
posed in the winter and spring of 1945^46” (Nabokov 1974: 5), but
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the work started already in 1942. Certain published and unpublished 
documents of the time should be appropriately related to the novel 
since they point at its key symbols and motives. On February 4, 1944, 
New York Browning Society invited Nabokov to give a talk and sent 
him a leaflet containing the schedule of meetings and description of 
lectures. The Society was founded to study and popularize Robert 
Browning’s life and works, but it was engaged in other educational 
activities as well. As one can learn from the leaflet, German culture 
was a focus of the Society’s interests in 1944. The description in­
cludes a report on Prof. Schneider’s lecture on German philosophy 
accompanied by some observations on totalitarian elements in the 
German philosophical thought from Hegel to Nietzsche. The editor of 
the leaflet remarks:
... though it is a strange indictment to bring against philosophers, of all 
people, very humbly I would suggest that the German people are less to 
blame for misapplication of their ideas than are philosophers to blame for 
failing to see the logical and natural outcome of those ideas, when trans­
lated into action.
So philosophy is interpreted as a practical activity or spiritual leader­
ship. The philosophical image of Adam Krug, a solitary, free “hunter” 
in the kingdom of thought, might have been consciously opposed to 
this “applied” philosophy. The leaflet ends with the following state­
ment:
The German people must save themselves. The final picture cannot be 
that of a fully armed, powerful world force holding Germany in subjec­
tion —  the final picture must be that of an aroused higher Germany, 
armed with the might of truth and right, standing, as does the higher na­
ture of man in George Gray Barnard’s famous statue, upon the vanquished 
form of her own cruel, bestial, depraved nature.
Miss Henrietta Green closed our December meeting with the singing 
of Schubert’s “Gretchen am Spinnrode”. In the last plaintive notes of that 
fresh, youthful voice, in the words “Mein hertz is sehr”, one could fancy 
that one heard the pathetic cry of the submerged, tortured Germany, the 
gentle, kindly, friendly Germany, pleading for a chance to survive. That it 
be given a chance, is as important for the rest of the world as it is for 
Germany (Letters, folder 118).
The outlook for the future rebirth overshadows the ominous historical 
events, the actual historical tragedy of Germany related to similar 
ideas of national rebirth and might. Nabokov’s fierce anti-German 
letter in reply where he turns to the literal, biological meaning of “na­
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ture” is an obvious reaction to the “metaphysical” phraseology and 
presumed political innocence of the leaflet:
I have lived in Germany for 17 years and am quite sure Gretchen has been 
thoroughly consoled by the secondhand, somewhat bloodstained, but still 
quite wearable frocks that her soldier friend sent her from the Polish 
ghettos. No, I am afraid we shall never see the Barnard statue in a German 
impersonation. It is useless looking at a hyena and hoping that one day 
domestication or a benevolent gene will turn the creature into a great soft 
purring tortoiseshell cat. Gelding and Mendelism, alas, have their limits. 
Let us chloroform it — and forget. (Nabokov 1991: 47-48).
The letter is directed against a straightforward interpretation of the Euro­
pean situation through democratic ideas. George Gray Barnard’s name is 
not casual: the artist was famous for his sculptural illustrations of the 
American democracy (“Struggle of the Two Natures in Man”, 31 alle­
gorical figures “Broken Laws” and “Laws We Keep”, the statue of Lin­
coln). “A tortoiseshell cat” as a symbol of a “domestic” and “gentle” 
Germany appears in the episode of an emergency session at University 
President Azureus’ place in “Bend Sinister” (Nabokov 1974: 43-44). It is 
probably worth to note that in the Soviet tradition the sentimental dictator 
and a cat are the usual pair in children’s literature on Lenin. Nabokov 
made use also of the “Gretchen” metaphor. In the novel, the Bachofen 
sisters, outwardly erotic and submissive, actually cruel, practical and de­
ceitful represent Germany-Gretchen. Mariette Bachofen exposed to the 
violence of soldiers embodies “the gentle, kindly, friendly Germany, 
pleading for a chance to survive”. The theme of Nazism as a violence 
inflicted “on the gentle, cultured German people” (Boyd 1992: 86) 
emerges also in “Double Talk” and “Pnin”. The following passage evokes 
the style of the leaflet and discredits the apprehension of culture as an 
autonomous, safe and “innocent” entity:
...sh e  was selected to die and was cremated only a few days after her ar­
rival in Buchenwald, in the beautifully wooded Grosser Ettersberg, as 
the region is resoundingly called. It is an hour’s stroll from Weimar, 
where walked Goethe, Herder, Schiller, Wieland, the inimitable Kotze­
bue and others, “Aber warum -  but why -  “ Dr Hagen, the gentlest o f  
souls alive, would wail, “why had one to put that horrid camp so near!” 
for indeed, it was near -  only five m iles from the cultural heart o f  Ger­
many -  “that nation o f  the universities”, as the President o f  Waindell 
College, renowned for his use o f  the mot juste, had so elegantly phrased 
it when reviewing the European situation in a recent Commencement 
speech, along with the compliment he paid another torture house, “R u s­
sia -  the country o f  Tolstoy, Stanislavski, Raskolnikov, and other great 
and good men” (Nabokov 1997: 113).
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Nabokov notes approvingly the following idea of the leaflet: “In 
Goethe, it is true, were found what seemed to be fundamental flaws in 
character, flaws which seem also to be inherent in the type of German 
now in power” (Letters, folder 118). “Bend Sinister” is permeated 
with polemical allusions and references to Goethe. For example, a 
paraphrasis of the famous Goethe’s statement: “I am bom to lead as 
naturally as a bird flies” (Nabokov 1974: 27). The story of the pro­
duction of “Hamlet” in the State Theatre where “Osric and Fortinbras 
have acquired a tremendous ascendancy over the rest of the cast” 
(Nabokov 1974: 96) contains a reference to the staging in “Wilhelm 
M eister’s Apprenticeship” : the actress and the producer, “like Goethe, 
imagine Ophelia in the guise of a canned peach: ‘her whole being 
floats in sweet ripe passion,’ says Johann Wolfgang, Ger. poet, nov., 
dram. & phil. Oh, horrible” (Nabokov 1974: 104). Therefore the inter­
pretation of “Hamlet” as “a play founded upon young Fortinbras’ at­
tempt to recover the lands lost by his father” with clear racist and anti- 
Semitic connotations (Nabokov 1974: 97) presents evidently reductio 
ad absurdum of Wilhelm M eister’s version of Shakespeare where an 
essential part of action is transferred to Norway and Hamlet is a blond 
and blue-eyed Nordic hero.
All these allusions and explicit statements by Nabokov are, of 
course, clear “social comments” . But, in Nabokov’s own words, 
“Bend Sinister” is first of all a story of the protagonist and his creator. 
Nabokov’s letter to his fellow-emigre Zenzinov (March 17, 1945) in­
dicates a contradiction underlying the plot of “Bend Sinister” : it is, in 
R. Rorty’s terms, the theoretical incompatibility of “private auton­
omy” and “solidarity” (Rorty 1989). Nabokov’s indignant remark was 
caused by V. M aklakov’s, the official representative’s of the Russian 
emigres in France visit to the Soviet embassy:
I can understand denying o n e ’s princip les in one exceptional case: if  they 
told m e that those c lo sest to m e w ould  be tortured [to death —  M . G.] or 
spared according to m y reply, I w ou ld  im m ediately  consent to anything, 
id eo log ica l treachery [betrayal o f  princip les —  M. G.] or foul deeds and 
w ould even  apply m y se lf lo v in g ly  to the parting on S talin ’s backside  
(B oyd  1992: 84).
As it seems, the idea of the letter is reflected in the significant symbols 
of “mug” (Krug, not a perfect “circle”, but a “mug” in German or 
“kruzhka” in Russian: the latter might be interpreted as a diminutive 
of “krug” in Nabokov’s playful language) and “handle” (a vulnerable 
point, a lever to handle, to manipulate a man) in “Bend Sinister”. It is
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a polemical idea: personal attachments and fears are stronger than so­
cial rules. What is called a “historical necessity” consists of personal 
feelings and inclinations. One should not be misled by “common 
goals” . The “social” and “personal” meanings are often polemically 
juxtaposed in Nabokovian metaphors. For example, the episode of 
Krug’s death that could be regarded as a heroic suffering in another, 
non-Nabokovian system of thinking, turns out to be a schoolboys’ 
game or fight. At the same time it might reflect a real mutilation of a 
Tenishev school student during a football game or Nabokov’s own 
football trauma in Berlin in 1932 (Leving 1999: 131). The moment of 
death is especially significant as a realization of the major Nabokovian 
theme of crossing a border (Levin 1998): a process of passage resists 
any “general” interpretations and the very idea of passage is usually 
eclipsed by sharp sensory, especially yisual impressions. For example, 
Nabokov’s poem “The Execution” (1928) equalizes shooting (execu­
tion) with a photographic flash. The wordplay is apparently based 
upon the two meanings of the English verb “shoot” : “to hit or kill with 
firearms” and “to take shots/ pictures” (see Emerson 1912, Barthes 
1981 on photography as death; cf. also the simultaneity of the photo­
graphic flash with death in “Transparent Things”). In “Bend Sinister” 
the writer resorts to the verb’s third meaning: “to send a ball (in 
sports)” .
Certain letters of 1944 support the interpretation. It is clear, for 
example, from the letters of Dr. Leon Dinkin (Letters, folder 42) that 
the Nabokovs consulted him about their son’s health in 1944 (a stom­
achache of uncertain origin). The “exploratory laparotomy” (incision 
into the abdomen) was proposed by doctors, but Dinkin was resolutely 
against it and offered to bring Dmitrii to New York for further obser­
vation under his control. Dmitrii might even enter some New York 
school: “It may sound monstrous to you, but it is still better than gut 
[eviscerate] him, excuse me for such a word. I am definitely against 
the operation” [the translation is mine. —  M. G.]. It is noteworthy that 
Nabokov sent a copy of “Bend Sinister” to Dinkin. The doctor thanks 
him for it in his letter of August 20, 1947, and reports: “I read it 
through one evening and half of the night and did not sleep the rest of 
the night. It is really sinister”. Evidently “horrors” of the radical West­
ern medicine may have no less impact on an individual sensibility 
than the violence of totalitarian rule which uses “the diabolical method 
[...] of tying a rebel to his wretched country by his own twisted heart­
strings” (Nabokov 1974: 7).
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A “release game”, one of the most unpleasant episodes of “Bend 
Sinister”, combines the aforementioned meanings (the cruelty of 
schoolgames, medical horrors) with the rudeness and falsity of imagi­
nary psychoanalytical manipulations aimed at the release of the “col­
lective unconscious”. “Personal” (autobiographical) and “social” 
(historical, cultural, philosophical) subtexts are systematically brought 
together in Nabokov’s work into singular polygenetic textual con­
structions (see Tammi 1999 : 34-64 on Nabokov’s polygenetism).
In April of 1946, Nabokov received the letter of M. Kaminka. 
From this and following letters (Letters, folder 83) he found out the 
destiny of his Berlin friends and acquaintances. Mikhail Kaminka was 
a former Tenishev student like Nabokov. His father, August Kaminka, 
a prominent Russian lawyer, scholar and political figure, fled to Berlin 
from the Bolshevist regime. M. Kaminka describes the death of his 
father in a German camp in Latvia or Lithuania: it is evident from the 
letter that he had stayed in the camp voluntarily, despite the permis­
sion of the German authorities to go free obtained by his wife. Mikhail 
expresses the hope that his father could have used the poison he had 
prepared in case of Bolshevik arrest. But the Bolsheviks turned out to 
be tolerant to both A. Kaminka and Nikolai Vasilievich (Yakovlev?). 
These men took refuge in the Baltics after they left Berlin and soon 
found themselves between the two dangerous regimes: the condition 
probably symbolized by Adam Krug’s “intermediary” position on the 
bridge in Nabokov’s novel. Their fate was different. M. Kaminka de­
scribes also his mother’s painful diseases after her husband’s death.
Another man very significant for Nabokov and mentioned in 
M. Kaminka’s letter was the philosopher Grigorii Landau. On my 
opinion, he might have been one of the possible prototypes for Adam 
Krug (a philosopher who started from the philosophy of history and 
ended as an aphorist —  cf. Landau’s “The Twilight of Europe” and 
“Epigraphs”). The Bolsheviks offered him a return to Russia and col­
laboration. M. Kaminka assumes that he might have been then sub­
jected to “Gletkin” tortures (see A. Koestler’s “Darkness at Noon”) or, 
to the contrary, might have been one of the very few Jews who sur­
vived in Latvia. Now it is known that Landau died in the Soviet camp 
in Siberia (Ravdin 1994).
“The Twilight of Europe” examines the inner tensions of the Euro­
pean space between the two world wars and to a certain degree antici­
pates the social criticism by European and American intellectuals after 
World War II. The book brings us closer to the reasons of Nabokov’s
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distrust of democratic slogans which sometimes disguise totalitarian­
ism. According to Landau, in World War I the allies destroyed Ger­
many in the name of an ideal, unhistorical aim of “absolute peace” . 
They proclaimed this sacred idea, and not their own profit or benefit, 
to be the genuine goal of the war. It was not a war against Germany 
but the War against premises of any future war and injustice nesting in 
Germany. Pacifism itself becomes a tool of the war to compel all 
dreamers and compassionate people not indifferent to the suffering of 
other human beings to take the side of enemies of Germany. We 
would call such an ideological challenge the “abuse of solidarity” 
following R. Rorty’s understanding of “solidarity” as a capacity to 
sense cruelty and other people’s humiliation (Rorty 1989).
Landau supposes that the easy birth and spreading of “absolute” 
ideas are maintained by the common history of modem Europe. The 
common space of European culture has produced extremely close and 
intense communications and the feeling of accessibility of any goals. 
Idealistic maximalism is inherent in the proud and conceited European 
culture. In creative work, this pride is justified: being ineffective with­
out competence and beneficial in “experts” or “professionals”, it be­
comes dangerous while descending from “heroes” and “creators” to 
the ignorant “public”. The pride spreads with consummate ease in the 
social and political sphere where everyone participates in action and 
shares self-confidence with others. Mass culture is governed by ap­
proximateness: it lacks the exact notions and weighted promises of 
experts. It is clear, says Landau, where this slope leads us when a 
crowd of professional leaders of society (politicians, journalists, 
preachers, ignorant writers and teachers) steps on it: shepherds them­
selves belong to the herd. The common ground of contemporary 
communications produces the effect of “flatness” : the society over­
grows old systems of thought developed by humankind by means of 
hard work and inherits only naivety instead of spontaneity and ration­
alism instead of wisdom. The masses imagine that it is easy to arrange 
the world according to their reasonable wishes.
According to Landau, Germany had accumulated a considerable 
creative potential by the early 20th century. The defeat of Germany in 
the First World W ar was the defeat of Europe. The triumph of masses 
started. It seems that Landau’s diagnosis has had an impact on 
Nabokov’s ideas of “Ekwilism”, “the Party of an Average Man” and 
all symptoms of oblivion of history and mental degeneration in the 
Padukgrad inhabitants. A. Dolinin wrote that Landau’s pathos of
European energies and creativity had probably influenced the concep­
tion of “Glory” (Dolinin 1999, 206). In “Bend Sinister” other, anxious 
thoughts about European history break out. They are close to Lan­
dau’s reflections on the unstable balance of democracy and totalitari­
anism.
Landau’s thesis on the easy accessibility of an “extreme” idea 
could also attract Nabokov’s attention: the real growth of knowledge 
consists in the accumulation of axiomata media, intermediate steps. 
The irrealism of “ideal aims” destroys the living reality. Reality de­
scends to an inferior level or falls into an abyss. The idea of the de­
structiveness of “idealistic maximalism” is also prominent in “Lolita”, 
where it assumes a form of the Romantic-decadent solipsistic quest for 
the lost or imaginary beloved and entails Humbert’s obsessive actions.
Landau’s book contains the polemics with Spengler, his notions of 
organic growth and decline of cultures (cf. polemics with Spengler in 
“Glory” and “The Gift” —  A. Dolinin 1999, 204—206). Landau asserts 
that the highest functions of culture contradict its “organic”. The super­
development or supertension of an isolated function in an organism 
contradicts its organic wholeness and causes its destruction. The exis­
tence of the highest functions of culture (such as, for example, philo­
sophical thinking) is possible only if there are forces and materials free 
from organic development. Contradiction is an essential form of life and 
dissatisfaction is a basic law of it. The more developed a culture, the 
sharper this tragic contradiction. Nabokov’s permanent opposition to the 
systems which pretend, like Marxism or psychoanalysis, to be able to 
resolve contradictions and to fulfill wishes, is well-known. A contradic­
tion underlies “Bend Sinister”: Adam Krug’s heavy body belongs to the 
restricted physical reality, his consciousness strives for infinite freedom. 
The contradiction is not an expression of the traditional Romantic- 
Symbolist dualism of nature (of the “inward” and “outward” reality): it 
is inscribed into scientific metaphors.
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2. The philosophy of time: Nabokov and Dunne
In the unpublished chapter of “Conclusive Evidence” Nabokov, who 
refers to himself in the third person, mentions “Mr. Nabokov’s method 
of referring to himself in the third person as “Sirin”:
One is rem inded o f  those problem s o f  “ob jectiv ity” that the ph ilosophy o f  
sc ien ce  brings up. An observer m akes a detailed picture o f  the w h ole  un i­
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verse, but w hen he has finished he realizes that it still lacks som ething: his 
ow n self. So  he puts h im self in it too. But again a “s e l f ’ rem ains outside  
and so forth, in an endless sequence o f  projections, like those advertise­
m ents that depict a girl holding a picture o f  herself hold ing a picture o f  
herself hold ing a picture that only coarse printing prevents o n e ’s eye  from  
m aking out (N ab okov 1999: 128; the chapter was written in 1950)
The outlined problem arises together with the discovery by relativist 
physics of the impossibility to describe the world without including a 
human “observer” . Some relativist allusions in Nabokov’s work have 
been pointed out already (Grishakova 1999; Grossmith 1991). The 
Einsteinian system is based on the observation of two (or more) ob­
servers, but ignores the existence of the “last” observer: there must be 
the third observer (the fourth, the fifth, etc.) observing the previous 
observers. That was the point of the critique directed against the the­
ory of relativity by John William Dunne, a British philosopher of sci­
ence. Modern physics actually refers to the Pascalean philosophy of 
the “Hidden God” and the “truth” as a matter of point of view or per­
spective (Grishakova 1999). Blaise Pascal “aura ete le premier ä jouer 
systematiquement du paradigme ä des fins philosophiques et/ou 
apologetiques, et ä en jouer en pleine conscience de ses implications 
theoriques” (Damish 1987: 63).
The Pascalean subtext and the fiction of the “invisible observer” as 
the Author of the World vs. the author of the text appears already in 
Nabokov’s Russian novels. Vera Nabokov’s letter of June 15, 1961, 
on behalf of her husband, to the American publisher of “Lolita” W al­
ter Minton contains a significant indication: “PA R  consists of five 
chapters, four of these are written by the author (as invisible observer), 
the fifth (No. 4 in the sequence) purports to be the work of the main 
protagonist” (Letters to G. P. Putnam’s sons). Another important 
author’s remark accompanies M. ScammeH’s typescript translation of 
“The Gift” (the end of chapter 4, Busch’s speech on the atom- 
universe): “Busch in his grotesque way expresses a deep and impor­
tant theory, and its meaning should be brought out clearly, despite the 
ranting” (Dar: 249). Busch’s ranting and grotesque speech refers to 
Fragment 72 (Brunschwicg’s numeration) of Pascal’s “Thoughts” 
which develops an idea of the immensity of the universe: “The whole 
visible world is only an imperceptible atom in the ample bosom of 
nature. No idea approaches it. We may enlarge our conceptions be­
yond all imaginable space; we only produce atoms in comparison with 
the reality of things. It is an infinite sphere, the centre of which is eve­
rywhere, the circumference nowhere”. Each smallest part of nature is 
an “abridged atom” of its immensity: there is “an infinity of universes, 
each of which has its firmament, its planets, its earth, in the same pro­
portion as in the visible world” . Man is “a mean between nothing and 
everything”:
W hat w ill w e  do then, but perceive the appearance o f  the m iddle o f  
things, in an eternal despair o f  k n ow ing  either their beginning or their end. 
A ll things proceed from  the N oth ing, and are borne towards the Infinite. 
W ho w ill fo llo w  these m arvelous processes?  T he A uthor o f  these w onders 
understands them . N on e other can do so  (Pascal: 1958: 1 6 -1 8 ).
Pascalean allusions are related to Nabokov’s implicit polemics with 
the theory of relativity. The distinction between the “inward” and 
“outward” space is illusory: it is just a habit of our thinking since the 
world contains immeasurable worlds enclosed one within the other. 
Human knowledge is inevitably partial, only the Author of the Uni­
verse can play the role of the privileged “objective” observer. The 
polemics is taken up again in Ada’s letter on “physics fiction” in 
“Ada” : “Elaborating anew, in irrational fabrications, all that Cyraniana 
and ‘physics fiction’ would have been not only a bore but an absurd­
ity, for nobody knew how far Terra, or other innumerable planets with 
cottages and cows, might be situated in outer or inner space: ‘inner’, 
because why not assume their microcosmic presence in the golden 
globules ascending quick-quick in this flute of Moet or in the corpus­
cles of my, Van Veen’s —  (or my, Ada Veen’s) —  bloodstream” 
(Nabokov 1970: 258-259).
J. W. Dunne proposed the theory of serialism to resolve the prob­
lem of the “last” observer. In Chapter 2 of “The Serial Universe” he 
uses the following example to illustrate his ideas. A painter who es­
caped from the lunatic asylum began to draw a picture of the universe. 
He painted the landscape as he saw it, but noticed that something was 
missing and soon understood that he himself was missing as a part of 
the universe. “With the remorseless logic of the lunatic” (Dunne 1934: 
30) the insane artist proceeds to expand his picture, portraying himself 
as a part of the universe, then adding again himself who is aware of 
his own existence, etc. etc. —  the multiple picture with an increasing 
number of artists of increasing capacity.
The artist is trying to describe in his picture a creature equipped with all the 
kn ow ledge which he h im self p ossesses, sym b oliz in g  that know ledge by the 
picture which the pictured creature w ould draw. And it becom es abundantly 
evident that the know ledge thus pictured m ust alw ays be less than the
V. Nabokov’s “BendSinister” 253
know ledge em ployed in m aking the picture. In other words, the mind which 
any human science can describe can never be an adequate representation of 
the mind which can make that science (Dunne 1934: 32).
As Dunne infers, one can systematically (rationally) treat the condi­
tion that we are self-conscious creatures aware of something other 
than ourselves, only exhibiting it in the form of an infinite regress and 
viewing all experience in terms of time: “The notion of absolute time 
is a pure regress. Its employment results in exhibiting us as self- 
conscious observers” (Dunne 1934: 34). In the above-cited passage 
from the unpublished chapter of “Conclusive Evidence” Nabokov ap­
parently borrowed the argument from Dunne. But was not the parable 
of the insane artist the conceptual kernel of “Pale Fire” : mad Kinbote 
imposing himself on Shade’s life and poetry by means of his obses­
sive commentary, but also the author who endeavours to express him­
self through a series of imaginary literary substitutes? A similar par­
allel between the “self-conscious” novel technique and the “self- 
conscious” landscape painting appears already in “The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight” (1941):
...T h e  Prizmatic Bezel can be thoroughly enjoyed on ce  it is understood  
that the heroes o f  the book are what can be lo o se ly  called  “m ethods o f  
com position” . It is as i f  a painter said: look, here I ’m go ing  to sh ow  you  
not the painting o f  a landscape, but the painting o f  different w ays o f  
painting a certain landscape, and I trust their harm onious fusion  w ill d is­
c lo se  the landscape as I intend you to see  it (N ab okov 1995: 79).
In “An Experiment with Time” Dunne emphasizes that the things 
which belong to the core of human experience (sensations of colour, 
sound, etc.) are not explainable in the frame of objectivist science: 
“Physics is, thus, a science which has been expressly designed to 
study, not the universe, but the things which would supposedly remain 
in that universe if we were to abstract there from every effect of a 
purely sensory character” (Dunne 1973: 18). The scientific procedure 
consists in pushing the observer as far back as possible,
reducing him to the level o f  a help less on looker w ith no more capacity for 
interference than has a m em ber o f  a c inem a audience the ability to alter 
the course o f  the story develop in g  before him  on the screen. < . . .>  It is a 
perm anent obstacle  in the path o f  our search for external reality that w e  
can never entirely get rid o f  this individual. Picture the universe how  w e  
may, the picture rem ains o f  our m aking (D unne 1973: 21).
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According to J. W. Dunne, this obstacle cannot be removed, but can 
be acknowledged and used in experimental knowledge based upon the 
notions of time and the moving observer. It is not Time, but the ob­
server who moves. He observes, i.e. his field of presentation (a brief 
span of attention, the “now”) moves within Time. The Time substra­
tum exists constantly: the past, the present and the future are simulta­
neous. But the observation itself (the movement within the Time di­
mension) takes time. It is another time, the time of the higher order: it 
transpierces the primary time in its past, present and future. So the 
distinction is drawn between events observed and observational 
events. Time is serial and there is the serial observer. The first ob­
server exists in the usual three-dimensional space where the fourth 
dimension is time. The primary time is the fourth spatial dimension 
for the four-dimensional second observer whose time is the fifth di­
mension, etc., etc. The field of the primary observer is absent in 
dreams, therefore observation is wandering hither and thither (in the 
past and future) by flashes. That is why the “anticipation” of the future 
events happens in dreams. A mental barrier between the past and the 
future exists only when we are awake: “In reality, the associational 
network stretched, not merely this way and that way in Space, but also 
backwards and forwards in Time” (Dunne, 60). On waking, the usual 
three-dimensional interpretations are applied to the dream logic. The 
dream results from the process of observation of the higher-order ob­
server whom man has hypostatized into the figure of “animus”, the 
mysterious soul that is actually equal to his own mental states: “Al­
though the “higher-order observer” is nothing more magnificent or 
more transcendental than one’s own highly ignorant self, he is begin­
ning to look perilously like a full-fledged “animus”” (Dunne 1973: 
167). One may suppose that death is a phenomenon of three- 
dimensional continuum, a break similar to sleeping and other alterna­
tive states of consciousness.
A ny world w h ich  is described from  observation  m ust be, as thus de­
scribed, relative to the describ ing observer. It m ust, therefore, fall short o f  
accordance w ith reality in so  far as it cannot be thought of, by anyone  
w ho accepts the said observer’s description , as capable o f  contain ing that 
observer. C onsequently , you, the ultim ate, observ ing  you, are a lw ays out­
side any world o f  w hich you can m ake a coherent m ental picture. If you  
postulate the ex isten ce  o f  other observers m aking different descriptions, 
then it turns out that you and these observers must together form a com­
posite observer who is not includible in the world as thus conjointly de-
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scribed. Y ou , as part o f  that com posite  observer, retain your ind ividual­
ity [ . . . ]
The picture you draw sh ow s the real world in its relation to your­
se lf  —  sh ow s, that is to say, how  that world is capable o f  affecting you. If  
drawn as the com posite  effort o f  m any observers, it sh ow s how  the ph ysi­
cal world is capable o f  affecting M ind in general. T he m ost important fact 
w hich  em erges is that you prove to be the im m ortal part o f  an im m ortal 
com p osite  o b server... (D unne 1973: 190).
Nabokov tried Dunne’s method examining his own dreams. As it 
seems, the idea of the “serial observer” emerges also in his literary 
texts: the writer has transformed Dunne’s philosophical metaphors 
into a literary technique. Nabokov used the edition of 1945 of “The 
Serial Universe” for his manuscript “Notes for Texture of Time” 
(1957-1961) and the third edition of “An Experiment with Time” 
(1934, first published in 1927) for his own experiments.
The device of the “serial observer” is at its most obvious in “Bend 
Sinister”, “Pale Fire” and “Transparent Things”. “Bend Sinister”, 
permeated with critical references to the relativity (Grishakova 1999), 
may be understood as a composite dream: a preliminary title “A Per­
son from Porlock” refers to Coleridge’s famous vision. The 
author/narrator is “dreaming” of Krug’s life. Both dream and narration 
are the forms of absence in three-dimensional space accompanied by 
the “transparence” of the latter acquired due to the higher level of ob­
servation and by the spatialization of the lower-order time. Thus the 
metaphor of “observation” is metafictional: it signifies a process of 
writing (cf. Iser 1993: 16: an act of fictionalizing turns elements of the 
given world into objects for observation; the fictive “implies creating 
a position from which the represented world becomes observable”). 
The time of the observation intersects the space-time where Krug 
lives, acts and dies. Krug is also dreaming of himself. It is a multi­
level dream (cf. “I want to wake up. Where is he? I shall die if I do not 
wake up”: Nabokov 1974: 186). His dreams are pierced by the pres­
ence of a “mysterious intruder” or “genius” (Dunne’s animus), the 
“higher-order observer” whose associational network stretches back­
wards and forwards in time (Dunne 1973: 60) and who is apparently 
common to both the hero and author. In the state of madness, which is 
another form of absence in three-dimensionality, Krug “suddenly per­
ceives the simple reality of things and knows but cannot express in the 
words of his world that he and his son and wife and everybody else 
are merely my whims and megrims” (Nabokov 1974: 7). The border 
between the two worlds has became transparent: “Krug’s conscious­
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ness has at least partly merged with that of his creator, for he is now 
aware of events in both worlds” and hears “the cautious crackling of a 
page” thrown into the author’s wastebasket (Johnson 1985: 192). In 
the end, an author’s sudden breaking through of the “imaginary” space 
of the text is introduced. It is a new level of serial time where Krug’s 
schoolgame, death and return to his higher “se lf’ are simultaneous, — 
but not the last level since the “real” Author of the text stands behind 
the author/narrator. As it is known from Nabokov’s letter to Edmund 
Wilson (cit. in Johnson 1985: 193), his initial intention was the “con­
frontation” of the protagonist and the author, which would apparently 
mean the inclusion of auctorial “unlimited freedom” into the finite 
mode of the “real” being.
The dream is nevertheless an unclear, imperfect form of observa­
tion, a “bad staging” with numerous unnecessary details. The similar 
idea is conveyed in “Transparent Things”: “Dream-man is an idiot not 
wholly devoid of animal cunning” (Nabokov 1972, 60). Dunne also 
remarks that “the dreaming mind is a master-hand at tacking false in­
terpretations on to everything it perceives” (Dunne 1973, 67).
As it often happens in Nabokov, “Transparent Things” seems to be 
a twin-text for “Bend Sinister” and “Pale Fire”, the text parodying the 
same device of the serial observer. The “dead author”, the floating 
(wandering) identity of characters (a “person”, a “pilgrim”; “a person 
dancing in a variety of forms around his own se lf’ —  Nabokov 1972: 
92), the dreamlike reality, anticipations —  all these features have been 
already noticed.
Nabokov creates the illusion of an exact chronology based mainly 
on number 8, the reversed symbol of infinity. Person comes to Swit­
zerland at the age of 22 (his father’s death follows); during the next 
visit he is 32, he meets and marries Armande; during the last, fatal 
visit he is 40 and exactly 8 years have passed (it was August when he 
met Armande 8 years ago, he is apparently back again in August: 
“there was to be, or would have been (the folds of tenses are badly 
disarranged in regard to the building under examination) quite a nice 
little stream of Germans in the second, and cheaper, half of 
August” —  Nabokov 1972: 100). 8 months (from August to March) 
spent with Armande are mysteriously absent in this chronology: the 
first appointment, honeymoon in Stresa, Person’s third visit to Europe, 
the hypothetical murder —  all happened 8 years ago. One may sup­
pose that Armande might have been only an imaginary point in multi­
ple networks of time.
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The very notion of “transparence” has the special, Dunnian mean­
ing in “Transparent Things”, and the last letter of R. contains an ironi­
cal hint at both the “composite observer”, whose shape he is assuming 
before the death, and its creator Dunne:
I believed  that treasured m em ories in a dying m an’s m ind dw indled  to 
rainbow w isps; but now  I feel just the contrary: m y m ost trivial sentim ents  
and those o f  all m en have acquired gigantic proportions. T he entire solar  
system  is but a reflection  in the crystal o f  m y (or your) w rist watch. T he  
m ore I shrivel the bigger I grow. I suppose this is an un com m on p h e­
nom enon. Total rejection o f  all religions ever dreamt up by man and total 
com posure in the face o f  total death! If I cou ld  exp lain  this triple totality  
in one big book, that book  w ould becom e no doubt a new  b ib le  and its 
author the founder o f  a new  creed. Fortunately for m y se lf-esteem  that 
book will not be written —  not m erely because a dying man cannot write 
books but because that particular one w ould never express in one flash  
what can on ly  be understood im mediately  (N abokov 1972: 84).
There is another important point which Nabokov could have made use 
of turning Dunne’s philosophical construction into a literary tech­
nique: it is his favourite theme and device of pattern. Travelling in 
Time inevitably meets irregularities which are the movements of ob­
jects in the three-dimensional world. But a considerable amount of 
these irregularities might present a pattern for the observer. Thus, the 
“pattern” results from the interaction of the individual observer’s at­
tention and movement in time: it acquires its meaning only through 
recurrence and not through the unfolding a priori sense.
The early 20th century literature and philosophy had discovered 
the individual perceptual time. Nabokov’s intention was probably the 
introduction of several individual time-orders, their “objective” expo­
sition as different perceptual fields within the single, “subjective” field 
of perception, i.e. the qualitative alteration as well as expansion of the 
latter. The device of the “serial” observer reveals a certain affinity 
between the meta-fictional and meta-physical problems: the status of 
the textual world, its development in time, the fiction of the creator. It 
apparently had a personal significance for Nabokov who experienced 
multiple shifts in space and time before he escaped the awful “dream” 
of pre-war Europe.
The theme of “Hamlet” provides probably the most important key 
to the novel. Both the Shakespearean and Nabokovian hero need to 
“re-play” or “re-write” the reality in their own idiosyncratical lan­
guage to handle it. Appealing again to Rorty’s analysis, we agree that
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Nabokov’s ability to sense cruelty (“solidarity”) was very high and his 
faith in a possibility to rationalize social life and make it free of cru­
elty was very weak. But the conflict of “Tyrants Destroyed” and 
“Bend Sinister” does not rest in the incompatibility of “private auton­
omy” and “solidarity”: it is rather a matter of choice between a “pri­
vate autonomy” and a “bad solidarity” . The latter means an abuse of 
the human capacity for “solidarity” (i.e. the capacity to share other 
people’s feelings) based on some false idea assuming a form of com­
mon emotion or conviction. As it becomes evident in the novel, there 
is no principal theoretical difference between the psychology of ad­
vertising and the psychology of totalitarianism. Both use the vocabu­
lary of “solidarity” and different modes of hypnotic suggestion or 
“collective mysticism” to achieve their goals. The choice is difficult 
since the protagonist (in both Shakespeare and Nabokov) is linked to 
the “bad” solidarity by personal ties and memories forming a part of 
his private idiosyncrasy and making him especially vulnerable. He can 
only view the reality through the language of his “private autonomy” 
since the language of “solidarity” is misused and compromised. It is 
not his “solipsism” or indifference to the outward world, but the his­
torical paradigm, which does not leave him any choice.
The impossibility of choice complicates also the metafictional task 
of “creating a position from which the represented world becomes ob­
servable” (Iser 1993: 16). The text develops as a “serial dream” of mul­
tiple observers or the different independent modes of auctorial vision. 
On the one side, the author is an anonymous space of the intersection of 
different languages. On the other side, the narrative “is evolving by de­
grees towards an ever greater individuation” of the author-narrator 
whose personal presence might be traced throughout the whole text, but 
whose control over the fictional worlds is “only a comparative matter” 
(Tammi 1985: 115). It seems that the text construction is determined not 
so much by the optimistic evolvement of the Infinite Consciousness of 
Gnosticism, but rather by the paradoxality of all attempts to imagine or 
to depict infinity. The final coincidence of finity and infinity in the 
author-persona reminds of those riddles which agitated European sci­
ence in the 1920-50s: the “last” observer in relativist physics, logical 
paradoxes, Gödel incompleteness theorem in response to Russell’s hier­
archy of restrictive “types”. Escher’s strange pictures of the 1930-50s 
(Fig. 1) presented the visual analogies for logical paradoxes:
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Figure I. R eptiles. 1943.
.. .o n e  sin g le  them e can appear on different lev e ls  o f  reality. For instance, 
one leve l in a drawing m ight clearly be recognizable as representing fan­
tasy or im agination , another leve l w ould  be recognizab le as reality. T hese  
tw o leve ls m ight be the only exp lic itly  portrayed levels. B ut the mere 
presence o f  these tw o leve ls invites the v iew er to look upon h im se lf as 
part o f  yet another level; and by taking that step, the v iew er cannot help  
getting caught up in E scher’s im plied chain o f  leve ls, in w hich, for any 
level, there is a lw ays a level below , “m ore”im aginary” than it is (H of- 
stadter 1980: 15).
The Russellian-Gödelian analogy was applied to Nabokov’s prose for 
the first time b y  Dr. Dinkin in his comments to “Ultima Thule” (Janu­
ary 19, 1949), a proto-text of “Bend Sinister”, a fragment of the un­
finished novel “Solus Rex”, where the knowledge of death and after­
life is considered as a logical paradox: “Not long ago I read a similar 
thought in Bertrand Russell (History of Western Philosophy): if a 
philosophical system is perfectly logical, without any errors or contra­
260 Marina Grishakova
dictions, and thus well-balanced and absolutely closed in itself, it in­
evitably comes to incongruous results, is monstrous and loses any 
contact with “reality” “ (Letters, folder 42; the translation is mine. — 
M. G.). “Ultima Thule” is a poem in a language unknown to the nar­
rator. The narrator, a painter Sineusov, sets to illustrate the poem: the 
illustration is a parallel to his “narratological” task, an attempt to un­
derstand the mad Falter’s “unspeakable” message. The latter, as a re­
sult of a certain “playful” combination of thoughts, is self-evident, 
logically inexplicable and unprovable. All endeavours to prove the 
existence of afterlife or to answer the question whether the word “het- 
erological” is itself heterological (Nabokov 1990: 461) would end in a 
vicious circle. There is nevertheless a mysterious correlation between 
the world and the otherworld, a kind of cross-reference. D. B. Johnson 
has noticed the reverberation of the words of the narrator’s dying wife 
in the madman’s speech (Johnson 1985: 208), which is apparently to 
confirm the mysterious interdependence of the worlds. The auctorial 
point of view could be reconstructed as the result of the interdepend­
ence and located at the metametalevel where “the riddle of the uni­
verse” is to be solved.
In “Bend Sinister” the story is also conveyed in different languages 
or different versions of reality (the finite, closed and therefore “mon­
strous” totalitarian language; science languages; the idiosyncratical 
language of protagonist’s thoughts and recollections; more and more 
incomplete and indefinite dream languages, etc.). Put through the 
various realities and evolving towards infinity, the story finally with­
draws back into the author-persona. The author is the “otherworld” 
observer of the textual imaginary physical space: he is identical with 
the “consciousness” of the text. But, being also involved into the text 
from the inside and “embodied” in it, he becomes together with it a 
part of the outside physical reality. So the quest for infinity ends in a 
“strange loop”, a finite representation of infinity: it “occurs whenever, 
by moving upwards (or downwards) through the levels of some hier­
archical system, we unexpectedly find ourselves right back where we 
started” (Hofstadter 1980: 10, 15). The fictional space of “Bend Sin­
ister” is unfolding as a chain of levels to be finally reversed into the 
paradoxical self-reference.
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Mikhail Iampolskii and Richard Sieburth for the professional support, 
to Irina Shevelenko and Olga Skonechnaya for their assistance. I want 
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“Bend Sinister” Владимира Набокова: 
социальное сообщение или эксперимент со временем?
В статье анализируется “странный” роман В. Набокова “Bend Sinis­
ter”. Х удожественное пространство романа рассматривается как 
процесс взаимодействия разных языков или разных версий реаль­
ности. История философа Круга развертывается в воображаемом  
тоталитарном государстве, идеология которого сочетает в себе эле­
менты фашизма, коммунизма и языка массовой психологии. На этом 
уровне текст представляет собой “социальное сообщ ение”. Герой 
стоит перед необходимостью выбора между личной автономией и 
“плохой солидарностью”. Статья вводит новые факты и документы, 
образующие социальный подтекст романа. Язык “реальности” 
деконструируется в идиосинкразическом языке героя, языке его 
мыслей, воспоминаний и снов. Большую роль в этой деконструкции 
играет научная метафора, которая выявляет метахудожественную  
природу текста: аналогии с живописью, релятивистской физикой, 
парадоксами логики (теории Рассела и Геделя) являются способами  
исследования статуса художественного пространства, развертывания 
текста во времени, фикции Автора.
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V. Nabokovi “Bend Sinister”: 
sotsiaalne teade või eksperiment ajaga?
Arrtiklis analüüsitakse Vladimir Nabokovi “kummalist” romaani “Bend 
Sinister”. Romaani kunstilist ruumi vaadeldakse kui erinevate keelte (või 
erinevate reaalsuse versioonide) vastastikuste mõjutuste protsessi. Filo­
soof Krugi lugu hargneb kujuteldavas totalitaarriigis, mille ideoloogia 
ühendab endas kommunismi, fašismi ja massipsühholoogia keele ele­
mente. Sellel tasandil kujutab tekst endast “sotsiaalset teadet”. Kangelane 
seisab valiku ees — kas isiklik autonoomia või “halb solidaarsus”. Kirjel­
datakse uusi fakte ja dokumente, mis moodustavad romaani sotsiaalse 
allteksti. “Reaalsuse” keel dekonstrueeritakse peategelase mõtete, mäles­
tuste ja unenägude idiosünkraatilises keeles. Olulist osa mängib selles 
dekonstruktsiooniprotsessis teaduslik metafoor, mis toob välja antud tek­
sti metakunstilise olemuse: analoogiad maalikunstiga, relatiivse füüsi­
kaga, loogika paradoksidega (Russelli ja Gödeli teooriad) on kunstilise 
ruumi staatuse, teksti ajas kulgemise ja Autori fiktsiooni uurimise 
moodusteks.
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The book at the outskirts of culture: 
Cortäzar’s first almanac
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Abstract T he notion  o f  intersemiosis su ggests the game relationships 
betw een  the m ultip le interacting s ig n ify in g  spheres o f  culture, but the 
term can a lso  be fitly  applied to the study o f  certain extraordinary artistic 
texts. T his study m akes use  o f  one such book , Julio Cortazar’s Around the 
Day in Eighty Worlds, to sh ow  h ow  the sui generis interplay o f  the b ook ’s 
sem antic  spheres sim ultaneously  m o d els and renew s the com p lex  cultural 
p rocesses o f  the production o f  m eaning. T his o ften  reprinted and hard-to- 
categorize  b ook  that for years has rem ained at the outskirts o f  Latin 
A m erican  culture is a lso  an ideal exam ple  to exp lore the dynam ics be­
tw een  the center and periphery o f  culture as w e ll as the w riter’s role in the 
creative renew al o f  cultural repertoires. B y  draw ing a bridge over the ap­
parent gap betw een  the sem io tics o f  culture and the sem iotics o f  the artis­
tic  text, the present study attem pts to  approxim ate the critical-creative  
spirit o f  the late great theoretician  Yurij Lotm an.
to Glenda
The term intersemiosis evokes a zone of encounter and play between 
diverse semiotic systems, and it also elicits the frontiers between these 
systems. At first, the term brings to mind the semiotic structure of 
culture because culture is composed of a multiplicity of heterogeneous 
systems that are at constant interplay. Moreover, a culture is never 
found by itself; a culture is defined by contrast to other cultures (thus 
the common distinction of we vs. they), and a culture is renewed by its 
interaction with other cultures (some of the most exciting “hot spots”
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of semiotic dynamism are the result of the clash and mix of two or 
more opposing cultural repertoires'). Intersemiosis also brings to 
mind art forms composed of more than one semiotic language such as 
cinema, audio-visual performances, or books containing both verbal 
and visual signs.2
Upon further consideration, however, one can see that the concept 
of intersemiosis can also be fitly applied to the description of any 
complex system in which semantic units enter into a play of contrasts 
and correspondences. The iconic principle of verbal art, natural lan­
guage’s capacity to generate images in the reader’s mind, for instance, 
makes of literature a space of intersemiosis in which the narrative and 
iconic aspects of language are in constant interaction and tension. 
These two aspects, the capacity to tell and to show, are perhaps the 
most obvious, but by no means the only, forms of intersemiosis in the 
literary text. Let us take one more example. The old practice of rheto­
ric, as the late French theorist Roland Barthes pointed out in 
L ’ancienne rhetorique, conceived language as being composed of two 
distinct states of semiosis: “there is a naked, pure level of communi­
cation, a base from which one can construct a more complicated ex­
pression, adorned, gifted with a larger or smaller distance with respect 
to the original base” (Barthes 1974: 72-73). The interaction in a given 
text between these two elementary rhetorical states can also be under­
stood as a form of intersemiosis.
It should be noted here that the amount of information generated 
by the process of intersemiosis —  what we may call the semiotic rich­
ness of a complex system —  may depend more on the semantic dis­
tance between different forms of semiosis in a single medium than on 
the congruence of signs produced in different media: a traditional il­
lustrated book in which the visual art strives to correctly translate the 
verbal images, or a situation comedy in which canned laughter inter­
prets for the viewer the humor of a scene, for instance, can say less 
than the unexpected juxtaposition of seemingly incompatible verbal 
images in a poetic text.3 The coexistence and tension between distant
1 I use the term repertoire here in the sense given to it by Israeli semiotician Itamar 
Even-Zohar (1999: 7), that is, the invented set o f  cultural options by means o f which 
we conduct our lives.
The notion o f illustrated book, as I have argued before (1993), inadequately de­
scribes the complex semiotic interactions between verbal and visual signs in the art 
form o f  the book.
The principle o f  the production o f  meaning by means o f the encounter o f distant 
semantic realms is not only central to the poetics o f  western artistic manifestations
semiotic systems is also one of the defining characteristics of culture. I 
am referring here to culture as seen from a critical, external perspec­
tive, that is, from a metasystemic point of view, and not to the usual 
conception of culture as seen from the inside which validates and ac­
cepts some cultural manifestations and excludes others.
As Yuri Lotman described in The Universe o f the Mind (1990), 
customary semiotic systems at the core of a given culture are in con­
stant dialectical tension with divergent and unconventional systems at 
the periphery. Lotman was drawing from the relatively young tradition 
of cultural semiotics. The idea that, seen from the outside, “the 
mechanism of culture is a system which transforms the outer sphere 
into the inner one: disorganization into organization, ignoramuses into 
initiates, sinners into holy men, entropy into information” (Uspenski 
1998: 34), was first proposed in 1973 by B. A. Uspenski, V. V. Iva­
nov, V. N. Toporov, A. M. Pjatigorski, and Lotman himself in the 
seminal “Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures.” The “game rela­
tionship” (36) between the outer and inner spheres of culture that these 
authors identified must be understood in the context of the complex 
interplay of semiosis between the myriad of competing codes and 
structural levels in a given culture.
It is in this context that I would like to discuss here an extraordi­
nary book that seems to me not only to model the processes of cultural 
intersemiosis, but that also seeks to redefine and renew them, a book 
informed by the “classics”4 yet unusually receptive to the undervalued 
worlds of semiosis at the edge of culture, a revolutionary text open to 
anything that might happily deautomatize our expectations of art, 
culture, and life. I am referring to La vuelta al dia en ochenta mundos 
(Around the Day in Eighty Worlds) written by the late Franco- 
Argentine writer Julio Cortäzar (1914-1984). This is a book that of­
fers us a new repertoire of ways to see the world, a deck of surprises, 
an unaccustomed interplay of signifying systems at play in a zone 
between the accepted and peripheral spheres of culture.
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such as romanticism and surrealism but also to that o f  many oriental and pre- 
Columbian cultures.
4 Roland Barthes (1974: 24) reminds us that "the expression 'classic’ ( ‘classicism’) 
originated in the opposition proposed by Aulo Gelio (second century) between the 
classicus and the proletarius author: an allusion to Servio Tulio’s constitution which 
divided citizens according to their fortune in five classes, the first o f which was the 
classici (the proletarii were outside the classes); classical, therefore, etymologically 
means one who belongs to the cream of society (richness and power).'" (My transla­
tion.)
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When it was first published simultaneously in Mexico and Buenos 
Aires in 1967 by Siglo XXI Editores, Around the Day had an immedi­
ate impact on Latin American readers. Since then it has been reprinted 
close to thirty times; yet, it has never stopped being an exemplary pe­
ripheral book, and this is true both in the context of Latin American 
culture as it is in the context of Cortäzar’s corpus. Around the Day 
seems to belong today at once both to the “canon” and to the “avant- 
garde” of Latin American literature, it is one of those well-read books 
that has paradoxically received little critical recognition. Elusive to 
classification, the book is often described by critics in brief, cursory 
terms, as if it were too difficult to situate critically. This, of course, 
does not imply that a text can place itself outside a metasystemic cul­
tural perspective: any text that participates in the flux and reflux of 
culture must be a part of it. The work of a “minor poet” or an “avant- 
garde artist” that may be marginal today and key tomorrow is by no 
means less an integral part of culture than the work of a so-called 
“classic” author that has managed to retain its semiotic vitality beyond 
the passage of time.
It has been over thirty years since the first edition of Around the 
Day in Eighty Worlds, and the book remains daring and modem. It is 
an extrageneric text, neither a collection of essays nor a novel, at times 
poetic and fictional and at others factual and journalistic, falling 
somewhere between the metasystemic description of cultural mani­
festations and the creative impulses of imagination that have the 
power not only to expand a cultural tradition, but also to transform 
and renew it. The enchanting first edition, as well as the many that 
would follow, is composed of both verbal and visual art and was de­
signed in collaboration with Argentine artist Julio Silva. The numer­
ous pocketbook editions that date to 1970 transposed most of the ver­
bal and visual art into two slim volumes of less than 200 pages each 
that are meant to fit in a small pocket and travel well. I say that most 
of the art was transposed because Cortäzar feels free to change the 
order of the texts, to elide and replace some of the visual art and, no­
tably, to hold back on a series of four personal poems dating back to 
1950 (“Razones de la colera”) which, as he confesses in the first edi­
tion, he had not published until then due in part, and I translate, to a 
“perverse pleasure of keeping mine what is most mine” (Cortäzar 
1967: 195). In doing so, Cortäzar is consequent to his desire to write 
“nothing but takes” (Cortäzar 1967: 172), in the sense given to this 
term in jazz to the successive recordings of the same theme.
Around the Day in Eighty Worlds is first and foremost a text in­
tended to motivate writing and incite creativity; like a succession of 
jazz takes, each piece of the book calls for other takes and recreations. 
Consequently, the book has had its share of epigones, quite a few of 
them no doubt prompted by its playful and translatable title, a transpo­
sition of Jules Verne’s imaginary voyage around the globe in, as I re­
member it from childhood readings, a rather flimsy balloon. The in­
genious transposition of Around the World in Eighty Days to Around 
the Day in Eight Worlds signals play, and it also marks a passage from 
diachrony to synchrony, from a journey in which a series of concate­
nated adventurous events take place in a relatively lengthy period of 
time, to one in which a different series of no less adventurous imagi­
nary worlds coexist simultaneously in a rather short span of time: in a 
single day, in the orb of a book. As the visual art in the black and 
white cover of both thin volumes of the portable editions prefigure, 
countless semantic worlds of imagination are indeed at play in Around 
the Day,5 In the now well-known illustration by Grandville, a musta­
chioed man playfully juggles countless worlds to the bewilderment of 
a little nineteenth century spectator who can see that one of the worlds 
has fallen in the juggler’s pants and that another has turned into a 
Croix d ’honneur which is about to crash over his head.6
The high degree of narrative content in the book’s cover is signifi­
cant — throughout the book Cortäzar uses images not only that show 
but also that tell. Cortäzar liked to swim against the current, and so he 
made his way Around the Day telling with images and showing with 
words, that is to say, going against the primary semiotic properties of 
verbal and visual signs. In Around the Day verbal and visual art strive 
to show and tell in unison;7 the content of both of verbal and visual 
modalities is polymorphous and eludes conventional expectations, and 
so does the book’s organizing principle. Around the Day is at once 
both an aesthetically integrated and decentered constellation of semi­
in an article on the visual world o f  Around the Day (“El mundo visual en La vuelta
al dia en ochenta mundos"), Andrea Varricchio discusses the different drawing that 
features on the cover o f one o f the first hard cover editions o f  the book.
7 The illustration is by Jean Ignace Gerard, a.k.a. Grandville (1803-1847).
This is a semiotic gesture that Cortäzar and Silva would take one step further in the 
first edition Ultimo round (1969). Behind its cover, the book is split into two inde­
pendent sets ot pages, a larger set above and a slimmer one below, so that the pages of 
each set can be turned separately from each other. Thus, the reader/viewer may read a 
text in the upper section while viewing the visual art in the lower one or vice versa; or 
the he/she may choose to counterpose the pages o f  two sets o f  verbal art with two sets 
o! visual art, or the pages o f two mixed sets o f  verbal and visual art against each other.
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otic systems, a space of intersemiosis open as much to references of 
what Cuban writer Jose Lezama Lima aptly called “the memorable, 
monumental culture” 8 as it is to the discourses of the periphery.
Around the Day is indeed a hard-to-categorize book. In it we find 
in fraternal tension and coexistence references to jazz, Shakespeare, 
happenings, madness, esoteric knowledge, cats, Jack and other famous 
rippers, colloquialisms, a praise of idiocy, advertising, oriental man- 
dalas, permutable poems and poems to be completed by the reader, 
tricks of memory, the melancholy of suitcases, boxing, hints to 
deautomatize daily experience, the horror of war, kitsch, surrealism, 
and always humor and many other unexpected interventions of the 
extraliterary and miraculously mundane. All this and much more in a 
rich semantic play with the distances and vicinities of a deck of visual 
reproductions that resemble more a tarot of the uncharted than an il­
lustrated tour.
In his introduction to The Universe o f the Mind, Umberto Eco 
wishes to “draw attention to a crucial definition” (xii) in which Lot­
man describes the semiosphere, i.e., the space of intersemiosis in 
which the many codes of a given culture come into play with each 
other:
[ . . . ]  im agine a m useum  hall w here exhib its from  different periods are on  
display, a long w ith inscriptions in know n and unknow n languages, and in­
structions for decod ing  them; then there are also the exp lanations co m ­
posed by the m useum  staff, plans for tours and rules o f  behaviour o f  the 
visitors. Im agine also  in this hall tour-leaders and visitors and im agin e all 
this as a single m echanism  (w h ich  in a certain  sense it is). T his is an im ­
age o f  the sem iosphere. (x ii)
The dynamic complexity of Lotm an’s notion of the semiosphere can­
not of course be captured in a brief single quote. But the image of the 
semiosphere, and by extension of culture, as a museum is nonetheless 
significant.
I have suggested that Around the Day in Eighty Worlds is a book 
that models and recreates the processes of cultural intersemiosis. In­
deed, many of Lotman’s descriptions of the semiosphere can be aptly 
applied to the description of this book. Like culture, Around the Day 
in Eighty Worlds, is a complex message composed of an array of in­
“Cortäzar and the Beginning o f  the Other N ovel” (1972: 18). As Lezama Lima 
suggests in the same page o f this essay, Cortäzar is certainly one o f  the best read writ­
ers o f the twentieth century: Cortäzar, Lezama Lima writes, “ostentatiously displayed a 
fan o f artistic and literary references o f  insuperable extension”. (My translations.)
tercommunicating vessels, and like culture, too, these meaningful 
channels support one another and are unified in ways that uphold their 
independence as immanently organized systems. The initial premise 
of the “Thesis on the Semiotic Study of Cultures” states that “all hu­
man activity concerned with the processing, exchange, and storage of 
information possesses a certain unity” (Uspenski 1998: 33); this is true 
for a culture as a whole as much as for the individual signifying sys­
tems that comprise it.
Little if any, however, has been said about the features that distin­
guish the unifying principles of the work of art from those of culture. 
Most of the prevalent expressions of verbal art, such as the novel, the 
essay, the short story, and poetry,9 end up submitting to the impulse of 
logical or aesthetic coherence which at once distinguishes them from 
other works and secures them an inner place in the gallery of culture. 
In Around the Day, Cortäzar abstains from this tendency; instead, he 
allows for a sort of sympathetic magic that coalesces various pieces of 
the book and resembles the secret affinities that bring together the dis­
parate strands that intervene in a given culture.
But this is not the single unifying principle of the book. The high­
est form of a semiotic system is when it describes itself; this is as true 
in literature as it is in culture. In some of its first pieces Around the 
Day talks about itself, but it does so in such a way as to leave the door 
ajar for the free interplay of chance associations and unexpected en­
counters. It is clear that this is a text permeable to the partial and oft 
ignored languages at the periphery of culture, and it is clear too that it 
is aware of bringing them into its orb. A few pages into the book we 
are invited to the Cortazars’ summer home in the southern French 
town of Saignon, where we meet for the first time their cat Teodoro 
W. Adorno; and in one of the last texts, at the end of Around the Day, 
Cortäzar returns us to the place where the journey began: the summer 
has ended, the book is over, it rains; Teodoro senses the imminent 
departure of the couple, and the kitty is “full of whims and sprints in 
all directions” (Cortäzar 1980: 167).
I suggested that Around the Day seeks to transform and renew the 
processes of cultural intersemiosis. This is a book that presents itself 
as a permeable territory open to the diverging sways of culture, a hot
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Something similar can be said o f most expressions o f  semiosis made up o f non­
discrete, continuous sign systems such as painting, music, and sculpture, as well as of 
other complex forms o f intersemiosis such as dance, theater, television productions, 
and film.
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zone for unexpected encounters, a model for creative acts capable of 
expanding the horizons of what we understand as culture. Keeping in 
mind and as a contrast the image of a museum, I would like to draw 
attention to the first piece of visual art in the book, a drawing which I 
will call here a permeable aquarium that may very well serve as an 
emblem for the whole book. In it, a set of fantastic critters either float 
or rest still in the confines of a transparent rectangular object which 
may be filled with air or water: among them are a horse, a cat, a bird, a 
wild boar, and a dog —  and all of them are depicted with fish tails. 
These unpretentious mythical critters commingle with a little star, a 
clove playing card, a treasure chest, a capital letter D or A, depending 
on the angle of vision, a horseshoe, a lance, a wolf, a banana, a few 
scattered plants, and an air balloon reminiscent of the one in V erne’s 
Around the World in Eighty Days. I have called this transparent rec­
tangle a permeable aquarium because there are in it some partial fig­
ures — the head of a sheep, the tail of squirrel or a bunny —  that seem 
to infuse the aquarium’s margins. I also called it permeable because 
the book itself is organized around what we may call the poetics o f the 
sponge, a semiotic territory where the real commingles with the 
imaginary, where jazzman Clifford Brown can freely swing in and out 
of the confines of classification with a caged pet mandrake. Cortäzar 
invites us to presuppose that semiosis may by found where we least 
expect it: why should we reserve our enthusiasm for the night in 
which King Lear is shown when before us we see a dew laced spider 
web shining bright against the sun?10
A museum, it seems to me, is the sanctioned zone where the rep­
ertoire of (most often visual) cultural productions is admitted into the 
mainstream of culture —  the extreme example, of course, was set by 
Marcel Duchamp, who dared to sign his pseudonym on an urinal, 
which he titled Fountain, and send it to an exhibition.11 For Cortäzar, 
who thought Duchamp’s life was itself an act of imagination, the idea 
of culture includes not only past and present works that have become 
acceptable and remarkable, but also the many inadvertent surprises of
10 Cf. “Hay que ser realmente idiota para...” (Cortäzar 1980: 161-167). In another 
ironic and confessional piece titled “The Pigeonhole o f  the Chameleon”, Cortäzar 
reminds us that “Nietzche, who was a cronopio as few others [I will return to this term 
later], said that only idiots don’t contradict themselves three times a day” (Cortäzar 
1980: 186).
11 Although first rejected, this famous readymade would eventually find its way to 
the museum and to many a respected art history book.
life that would never make it to most museums, as well as all that 
could be added to the world with just a little humor and imagination.
Elusive as few others, Around the Day in Eighty Worlds, and the 
1969 book that is routinely considered to be its homologue and se­
quence, Ultimo round (Last Round), have been referred to in many 
ways and described with at best partial critical grammars. Peruvian- 
born writer Mario Vargas Llosa, in an essay latter to be used as the 
preface to Cortäzar’s Complete Stories, for instance, called these books 
“miscellanies” (Vargas Llosa 1997: 32), a term that suggests at best a 
random gathering of texts; and critic Dan Stavans —  who no doubt had 
in mind Vargas Llosa’s appraisal of Cortäzar’s literary legacy —  dis­
missed them, with all the moral implications of the phrase, as “the art of 
literary promiscuity” (Stavans 1996: 306).13 A more sympathetic critic, 
Monique J. Lemaitre, who identified in these two books many a practi­
cal example of the theories exposed by Jacques Derrida, referred to 
them as “unwritten novels.” 14 Around the Day, however, is not an “un­
written novel” ; to call it so presumes that it is a text that fell short of a 
desired standard, that Cortäzar abstained from turning the text into a 
novel and, consequently, that a written novel is the measure of what a 
text could or should be —  that a written novel is an accomplished novel. 
Another critic, Ana Maria Hernandez de Lopez, more fitly called them 
“kaleidoscopic books” (Hernandez 1987: 194), a term that captures the 
playful sense of shifting coalescence of heterogeneous elements akin to 
the organizing principles of culture.
We have some idea of how Cortäzar himself liked to think of these 
books. I mentioned above that some of the blurbs refer to them as
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12 Although Around the Day and Last Round are similar and sequential in many ways 
(there are, for example, hidden references in the latter to the former), they are dissimi­
lar in other ways that lie outside the scope o f  this study. Therefore, and as far as possi­
ble, 1 have avoided clumping them together here, although in a certain sense they do 
belong in the same aesthetic and ideological category. I hope that this study will moti­
vate further research on the links and differences between Cortäzar’s two almanacs.
One ot the main arguments o f  Vargas Llosa’s article is that, in the context of 
Cortäzar s life, promiscuity, along with social concern and political commitment, sig­
n e d  a tum for the worse.
Lemaitre quotes from Stephen Kock’s “Flights o f  Polymath’s Fancy”: “The 20th 
pvTnUry writes ^ock has witnessed the emergence o f  a potent —  and I think possibly 
nnu/rUt^ ||егагУ form, which we might dub, informally, the unwritten novel. The 
tY D ical cxam lb  Г bowever P u sh ed  that seems a compilation o f  fragments. A
fessions ппкр^ 00 S * 6 3 Sa*ac* aut°biography, notebook ecstasies, diaristic con- 
scattered works are not ®p,grams’. ^ edltatlons, shafts o f  critical discourse. Yet these 
o f  a unifying refusal an en"^ d°  haVC unity; but theirs is the coherence
L tusal> ar> energized demaL (Lemaitre 1988: 186).
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collages, a term close to the cinematic montage and one that captures 
the idea of a seemingly random yet nonetheless calculated gathering 
of semantically distant and disparate parts. In interviews, Cortäzar 
liked to refer to them as “almanacs”,15 a word derived from the Arabic 
that implies organization and system: each entry corresponding to a 
day, week, or month of the year. It is a rather ironic term because in 
most of the almanacs of the Hispanic world each saint is placed in its 
proper pigeonhole where it quietly stays until its next turn the year 
after —  which is precisely the opposite of what Cortäzar does in these 
books. Somewhere between these two terms, between the apparently 
casual yet nonetheless calculated juxtaposition of distant signifying 
worlds suggested by the notion of collage, and the ironic use of the 
word almanac to comment, with humor, on the accepted order of cul­
tural entries, Cortäzar sets forth a sui generis conception of the book.
Sui generis, because in contrast to most novels, essays, and stories, 
Around the Day does not follow a preconceived plan nor does it strive 
to achieve a compositional finality.16 Around the Day is not meant to be 
“definitive”. I mentioned that in subsequent editions, Cortäzar feels free 
to alter both the graphic dispositio and the content of the first edition. 
Indeed, Cortäzar’s first almanac comes close to his aspired aesthetic 
standard of the jazz take: the book is conceived as a kaleidoscopic series 
of pieces that are free to shift with each reading and to offer themselves 
at once as what they are and as what they can be as they interplay with 
other elements of the text. One of the most ostensible examples of this is 
“La hoguera donde arde una” (“The Fire That Bums A”). It is a “half- 
baked” poem composed of 51 “incomplete” lines, each of which is an 
instigation for the reader to complete it. Here are a few examples:
To bite in the act of love is not strange when you have
I had moaned, yes, and at some point I was able to 
We didn’t speak about it after, he seemed proud of
(Cortäzar 1980: 83)17
13 Cf. Cortäzar and Prego, 185.
I suspect Cortäzar would not have wished his work to be encapsulated by this asser­
tion. He would have argued, for instance, that his novel Rayuela (Hopscotch) was “not in 
any way a book o f a writer who plans a novel, not even vaguely” (Prego, 108); but then
again, we should keep in mind that he also claimed that his stories —  some o f which are
among the most highly structured stories in Latin American literature —  unfastened 
themselves like monkeys from trees or unexpectedly fell on his head like coconuts.
17 There is a similar poem in Ultimo round.
This is an open-ended and participatory conception of literature that 
models an often-overlooked aspect of culture. Culture, too, is con­
formed not of final discourses but rather of a series of signifying pro­
posals that much like jazz takes either prolong or renew, or both pro­
long and renew, existing cultural codes. The pieces in Around the Day 
come together in a communal space that is open to the polyphonic 
voices of culture, a crossroads of mobile semiotic possibilities that 
ends up drawing a complex picture that is both uncertain and desir­
able, uncertain because at any given point it is partial and in flux, and 
desirable because at any given point it is an offer and proposal which 
we may take or leave. Culture, Cortäzar reminds us, is not only the 
vehicle in which we ride but also the one we drive.
With the steering wheel in our hands, we may choose to repeat old 
trodden paths, but then the book does not allow us to forget the conse­
quences of individual actions that have led to the ill fated history of 
the twentieth century and to so many posthumous lives of acquies­
cence (there to remind us, for example, are the chronicles and images 
of the atrocities of Viet Nam and of the abduction, maiming and en­
slavement, of children in Venezuela). Or, with vertigo, anticipation, 
and some imagination we may take the wheel in our hands and turn 
into the lane of Journeys and Surprises as naturally as one may turn 
the door knob and walk into that Kibbutz of Desire that Horacio 
Oliveira so longed for in Rayuela {Hopscotch), Cortäzar’s acclaimed 
1963 novel. We may also take flight and visit the island of the crono- 
pios; Around the Day, after all, is also the book where a highly grate­
ful and expectant cronopio travels —  by plane of course —  to “a 
country of cronopios” (Cortäzar 1967: 203).
The cronopiosl They are these half-real, half-imaginary creatures, 
at once ideal and goofy, joyful and hapless, and probably the most 
internationally popular characters among the many that Cortäzar con­
ceived. Most importantly, they are arguably the single most significant 
cultural contribution of the many he made and one by which Cortäzar 
would have liked to be remembered. In what follows I would like to 
make avail of these slippery critters to advance in a rather Cortazarian 
fashion the thesis that Around the Day is a book that, like one of those 
partial beings in the permeable aquarium that has paused in the fron­
tier that separates what is from what is not and what could be, has re­
mained at the outskirts of culture, that this is a book where the most 
welcome and unheard of could be born.
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Around the Day, for all practical purposes, is where the first crono- 
pio was bom —  anachronistically, of course, as any self-respecting cro- 
nopio would care to be bom. Which is to say that this is the book that, 
quite some years later, would give popular diffusion to the text where 
the first cronopio was in fact bom. And the first cronopio was Satchmo, 
Louis Armstrong, bom as a cronopio in 1952 (incidentally, the year in 
which Cortäzar arrived in Paris for a long and fruitful exile), properly 
bom as a cronopio in a text titled “Louis enormisimo cronopio” (“Louis 
the Hugest of Cronopios”) first published in Buenos Aires literaria, a 
journal of limited diffusion. This is the text reprinted in the pages of 
Around the Day beside a photographic reproduction of old Satchmo 
sharing with us the enormous smile of the incessantly bom anew. Be­
fore the republication of this text in Around the Day, many readers in 
the Spanish speaking world had not only already heard of the cronopios 
but had incorporated them into their daily vocabulary; few, however, 
knew that there was a first cronopio and that this first cronopio was a 
being as human as human beings can get.
The cronopios, those elusive and likeable beings, had made their 
multitudinous entrance and became cultural icons in 1962 after the 
publication o f what Vargas Llosa, likely thinking of the Spanish ad­
jective travieso, called “the most mischievous” of Cortäzar’s books: 
Historias de Cronopios у  de Famas,18 translated into English in 1969 
as Cronopios and Famas by Cortäzar’s friend, the poet Paul Black- 
bum .19 The cronopios did not come alone; Cronopios and Famas in­
troduced two other character types, the famas and the esperanzas, the 
complements and counterparts of the cronopios. Cortäzar was and 
remains a well-read author;20 Cronopios and Famas has been re­
printed in Spanish over thirty times, and Around the Day does not trail 
far behind. Many readers today, as they did in the sixties and seventies 
when they first encountered these indelible beings, will refer to some­
one they know, or even someone they see walking in the street as a
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111 Cortäzar wrote the text after attending a Louis Armstrong concert in the Champs 
Elysees on November 9, 1952. In the tradition o f Macedonio Femändez, Cortäzar dis­
tributed among his friends an early mimeographed version o f  his Cronopios and 
Famas before it was published as a book.
14 In one o f  the first pieces o f  Last Round (“Uno de tantos di'as en Saignon”) Black­
burn arrives to Cortäzar’s place in Saignon “with the tremendous decision” to stay ten 
days so that he may be able finish with Cortäzar’s help the Anglo-American translation 
o f Cronopios and Famas.
This is true specially among European and Latin American readers but also in the 
US and many other cultures o f the world into whose languages Cortäzar’s work has 
also been translated.
cronopio, or a fama. or a esperanza, as the case may be. But who are 
these elusive critters that have managed to become part of the reper­
toire of Latin American culture?
I will try to describe them here in the double context of the dialec­
tics between the center and periphery of culture and of the renewal 
and persistence of cultural repertoires. Let us begin with the famas. 
Their name is derived from the Spanish word for fame. The famas are 
subjected to the center of culture; they feel at home in the agreed and 
prevailing repertoires and stick to the most structured languages and 
the correct practices of culture. They are also the easiest to define 
characters of the triad: their image of the world is made according to 
the norms of the “correct”, the rest does not exist. They are the dili­
gent bearers of the sanctioned semiosis of culture.
The esperanzas are the indecisive beings; they mediate between 
the cronopios and the famas. Their name in Spanish indicates that they 
are hopes, perhaps a hope to achieve the status of a cronopio, but not 
quite. In the country of the cronopios, “the cronopios have pulled out 
the color chalks that they always take with them and have drawn and 
enormous, THAT’S IT, in the walls of the famas, and with smaller 
and more compassionate writing, MAKE UP YOUR MIND, in the 
walls of the esperanzas” (Cortäzar 1980: 173). They are the undeter­
mined and for the most part inconsequential beings of the triad.
The cronopios, on the other hand, are indeterminate but plausible 
and even necessary beings that effortlessly slip away from every pi­
geonhole that society and language tends to put them in. They are by 
nature peripheral beings; there is something childlike about them, an 
often impractical but delightful eccentricity that goes against the grain 
of our accepted ways of knowing and perceiving —  they are the ten­
der caricatures of the humans we could be if someone rescued us from 
all the seriousness and solemnity that characterizes a great deal of our 
waking lives. Like Louis Armstrong —  and I am grateful for the luck 
to write about him in the year of his centenary —  the cronopios cor­
rode, without wishing, or even knowing it, the established norms of 
culture; but like Louis, they too frequently end up being tenderly ac­
cepted (although the famas will do so with a delicate frown). They are 
the bearers ol things that they ignore; their main contribution, for in­
stance, has been, as I said, to expand the repertoire of Latin American 
culture, a feat which the cronopios would never think of, much less 
take credit lor. I said that many of us today can spot a cronopio in our 
mist; many also secretly aspire to see the world like one. This is a
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playful aspiration that rejects both the rigor mortis of intellectual 
stiffness and the snobbish hope to belong to the top echelons of cul­
ture, to be part of the fashionable elite or the noble intelligentsia.
In Cronopios and Famas, Cortäzar made it simultaneously intui­
tively easy and rationally difficult to understand the cronopios (it 
seems that much more is said there about the famas and the esperan- 
zas). It is in one of the last pieces of Around the Day, that Cortäzar 
draws a fuller picture of these critters. In “Viaje a un pais de crono­
pios” (“Journey to a Country of Cronopios”) we have the exceptional 
fortune to witness what could happen in a planefull of cronopios. 
A cronopio, in my place, would now proceed to translate at least two 
full pages of that text and as a consequence would inevitably be 
flooded with letters from publishers notifying him in enigmatic lin­
goes of copyright infringements. I will limit myself to paraphrase. As 
soon as the cronopios are seated in the plane that is to take them to the 
desired island of the cronopios, they are notified by the company that 
they have to go back down to the airport because there is a lay over of 
more than two hours. It is to be expected that the cronopios will run 
into a web of obstacles when they travel (cf. “Viajes” in Historias 
(Cortäzar 1989: 123), and it is also “a well-known fact,” and now I do 
allow myself to translate and quote at length,
that the cronopios don’t worry about such things, because immediately 
they think that the company is going to serve them big-tall glasses of 
juices of different colors in the airport’s bar, not to say that they will be 
able to keep on buying postcards and sending them to other cronopios, 
and not only does this happen but on top of it the company has them 
served a succulent dinner at eleven p.m. and the cronopios can thus ac­
complish one of the dreams of their life, which is to eat with one hand and 
write postcards with the other (Cortäzar 1980: 177).
I will say no more about the cronopios, except to mention that they are 
not afraid of tigers (especially of those that threaten our enjoyment of 
life), and that they always surf, with a sense of wonder and great en­
thusiasm, outside the accepted norms of culture.
What is interesting in the context of our discussion is that much 
like the cronopios, Around the Day, the book that told us about their 
progenitor and their country, has also managed to surf for years 
somewhere between the center and the periphery of culture. Compared 
with Cronopios and Famas, a book commonly acknowledged to be at 
the heart of the canon of Cortäzar’s opus, or to Hopscotch, a book 
widely recognized as one of the two “classic” novels of 20th Century
Latin American literature (the other is A Hundred Years o f Solitude by 
Colombian writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez), critics do not quite know 
what to do with Around the Day. The rich and variegated corpus of 
Cortäzar’s stories and even 62 modelo para armar (1968) {62 Model­
ing Kit), which is an extremely difficult to categorize narrative, have 
settled in considerably firmer critical ground. Around the Day in 
Eighty Worlds, however, remains a satellite whose orbit, both in the 
context of Cortäzar’s work and in that of Latin American literature 
and culture, critics have largely been unable to adequately chart.
How can this phenomenon be explained? I think one way to ex­
plain the elusiveness of this book is by observing its affinity with the 
operations of cultural intersemiosis. It is a rather paradoxical affinity. 
Around the Day models the operations of culture as seen from the out­
side, while at the same time it assiduously goes against the grain of 
accepted norms of culture as seen from the inside. Cortäzar’s first al­
manac situates itself at a metasystemic perspective that is both critical 
and creative. Much like culture, the book’s rhetorical dispositio fol­
lows a principle whereby an array of semiotic spheres gather together 
around an aleatory riff of surprising and meaningful encounters. And 
much like those “hot spots” where cultural repertoires clash, interact, 
and find renewal, each reshuffling of the book’s takes generates ex­
traordinary codes that heighten the level of information of the system. 
Around the Day in Eight Worlds is a rare book that manages to si­
multaneously take a part in, reflect, and recreate the game relation­
ships of cultural interplay.
One final analogy: like the cronopios, those slippery beings who 
know so much about the power of the merry and the unexpected and 
so very little about the seriousness of our endeavors, Around the Day 
is an exceptional kaleidoscopic book that I suspect will remain for 
long at play at the outskirts of culture.
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Книга на периферии культуры: 
первый альманах Кортасара
Понятие интерсемиозиса предполагает игровые соотношения между 
многими взаимодействующими знаковыми сферами культуры, но 
сам термин вполне может применяться и в изучении некоторых 
особых художественных текстов. Данное исследование имеет целью 
показать на примере одного из них, “Вокруг дня в восьмидесяти
мирах” Хулио Кортасара, как своеобразное взаимодействие семан­
тических сфер текста одновременно моделирует и обновляет слож­
ные культурные процессы производства значений. Эта часто пере­
издаваемая и трудноопределимая книга, долгое время остававшаяся 
на периферии латиноамериканской культуры, — идеальный пример 
для изучения динамической связи культурного центра и периферии, 
а также роли писателя в творческом обновлении репертуаров куль­
туры. Перекидывая мост через промежуток, отделяющий семиотику 
культуры от семиотики художественного текста, данное исследо­
вание по своему духу является попыткой приблизиться к критиче­
скому творчеству выдающегося покойного теоретика Юрия Лот- 
мана.
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Raamatud kultuuri perifeerias: 
esimene Cortäzari almanahh
Intersemioosise mõiste eeldab mängulisi seoseid paljude teineteist mõju­
tavate märgiliste kultuurisfääride vahel, kuid terminit ennast võib kasu­
tada ka mõningate eripäraste kunstitekstide uurimisel. Antud uurimuse 
eesmärgiks on näidata ühe taolise teksti, Julio Cortäzari “Ümber päeva 
kaheksakümnes maailmas” näitel kuidas teksti semantiliste sfääride oma­
pärane koosmõju üheaegselt nii modelleerib kui ka uuendab tähendus- 
loome keerulisi kultuurilisi protsesse. See mitmes trükis ilmunud raskesti- 
lahterdatav raamat jäi tükiks ajaks ladinaameerika kultuuri perifeeriasse ja 
on ideaalseks näiteks kultuurilise keskme ja  perifeeria dünaamilise seose 
uurimisel, aga samuti kirjaniku rolli määratlemisel kultuuri repertuaaride 
loomingulises uuendamises. Olles sillaks kultuurisemiootika ja taideteksti 
semiootika vahel, püüab antud uurimus läheneda silmapaistva teoreetiku 
Juri Lotmani kriitiliste tööde vaimule.
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On the concept of humanistic base texts
Linnart Mäll
P.O. Box 414, 50002 Tartu, Estonia 
e-mail: ero@hot.ee
Abstract. I elaborated the concept o f humanistic base texts when I was 
translating Indian and Chinese classical texts into Estonian. At present, I 
would classify as such the following works: “BhagavadgTtä”, a part o f 
Buddhist texts, “Lunyu” by Confucius and the Gospels according to Luke, 
Matthew and Mark, to mention only a few. This article gives a general 
survey o f the concept, to be specified in the papers to follow.
The shifts in social life that occur with the passing o f time, or history, 
can be described and explicated from various angles. First and fore­
most, the choice o f the latter depends on which phenomena and ten­
dencies the describer or explicator considers as decisive or, even, mo­
tive powers. Thus, for example, changes in production and exchange 
or, in other words, in economic life, have been regarded as such, or 
else the events within or between countries (for instance, in diplomacy 
or battlefields), which is to say, in politics. Likewise, the alterations, 
renewals and decay o f mythological, religious, philosophical, artistic 
and ideological ideas, or changes in the spiritual world, have also been 
held responsible, as have, indeed, many other things. The present 
author regards humanistic base texts as the greatest influencing factor 
in the history o f the last couple o f millennia.
Despite their major impact, the number o f humanistic base texts is 
not really large. They were created, or they appeared or took shape 
(the use o f several words above refers to the complex nature o f the 
formation process o f the texts; from now on, only one o f those will be 
used, ‘to take shape’) in various parts o f the Old World in a definite 
period o f time. This is characterized by the distinct formation o f the
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new social dimension which had started to evolve much earlier, but 
was left unrecognized for a long time, denoted by different words in 
different places back then, but which can at present be termed, in the 
most general sense, as culture.
It must have become obvious at that period that mankind was more 
than just a part o f the surrounding nature, and that the human being 
more than merely a member o f the tribe or people or polis or state, and 
the transmitter o f its traditions and mythological and religious beliefs. 
The burden o f the personal existence must have struck one for the first 
time at approximately the same time, which found expression in the 
questions addressed to oneself and other people: “How to be?”, “Why 
to be?”, “What to do?”, “How to improve or change myself or, how to 
become different or new?” All these questions presuppose an aware­
ness o f the sense o f duty and responsibility, and I would like to add at 
this point that the so-called existential questions in the manner o f “To 
be or not to be?” were probably not popular back then.
Although in the absolute time scale this period and, as a result, the 
formation o f humanistic texts do not exactly coincide by regions, one 
could still maintain as a generalization that it took place between the 
6th century BC and the 2nd century AD, while some of the texts have 
taken their final shape even later.
We shall now attempt to sum up the meaning o f this notion. The 
word ‘base text’ refers, logically enough, to the text that has been a 
basis for other texts; thus we have a text here that over the ages has 
functioned as a text generator. A genuine base text has the ability to 
give rise to an indefinite number o f new texts in an indefinite period 
o f time which do not have to be put down in writing but may, as in­
deed they mostly do, exist either in the form o f oral speech or discus­
sion or even as a speculative act (deliberation, reflection, contempla­
tion, meditation).
A humanistic base text has a specific tendency, expressed by the 
word ‘humanistic’. In English, the semantic range o f this word has 
been conveyed by mainly two equivalents: ‘humane’ and ‘human’, in 
the sense o f being ‘characteristic o f man’. The semantic range o f these 
both, as is generally known, is rather vague. Thus, to be more specific, 
a ‘humanistic base text’ is a base text that on the one hand is charac­
terized by elevating man as such (in other words, as a species and an 
individual) to the central and determining phenomenon o f existence, 
on the other hand, by an emphasis on such ‘humane’ qualities as dig­
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nity, philanthropy, compassion, non-violence, responsibility, sense of 
duty, respect, etc. in human relations.
Although each humanistic base text has evolved within the context 
of a definite culture, reflecting the latter’s influence both in its form 
and content to such an extent that at first glance it may seem difficult, 
if not entirely impossible, to find a common denominator for them, 
there are still enough similarities and common features that allow us 
to do so, relating to both the formation process and structure o f the 
texts (A) and the doctrines they contain (B), as well as the direct and 
indirect impact they make (C). We shall now present the most essen­
tial ones:
A l. Humanistic base texts evolved in a relatively developed cul­
tural environment, characterized by the existence o f the art o f writing 
and a generally accepted and, in some cases, the sole religious and 
mythological thought system, as well as by an aspiration to establish, 
in one form or the other, a social hierarchy. At the same time, we can 
detect a tendency to reinterpret the existing and to present new ideas 
and doctrines.
A2. These texts have nominal authors, referred to by the same texts 
and the tradition based on them.
A3. These texts present a definite Teaching. This Teaching has 
been given through the mouth o f a definite Teacher, who has a definite 
mission to preach it. The texts describe, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the life story o f the Teacher.
A4. Although the Teachers must have certainly been literate, due 
to their origin and education, they preached their Teachings by word 
of mouth, so that those became fixed in writing only later by their 
immediate disciples or the inheritors o f the teaching tradition. Because 
the editing process o f the texts continued also after that, they acquired 
their final finished (canonical) form later still.
A5. Despite all this, a certain authorial idiosyncrasy can be de­
tected in all humanistic texts, embracing both descriptions and the 
way the Teaching is presented. This and other characteristic features 
o f the humanistic base texts have now and again given rise to opinions 
that the actual proponents o f the Teaching are the nominal authors, or 
the latter are entirely unknown, and that the Teacher is altogether a 
fiction or a generalized literary figure.
A6. The Teacher is depicted as an unusual person in some way, to 
whom extraordinary, supernatural and downright divine qualities are 
ascribed.
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A7. Yet also the human features and even weaknesses o f the 
Teachers have been emphasized in the humanistic base texts. They all 
feel sad at times when they are not understood and they often doubt 
the expediency o f their mission. They do not consider themselves to 
be unique and superior to other people. Instead, they think and expect 
that the others should follow them and become like them. This is par­
ticularly true o f their relations with their disciples, among whom there 
are always some that are convinced that they surpass the Teacher so 
much that it gives them even the right to betray.
B l. The Teaching presented by any humanistic base text is formally, 
content-wise and also terminologically related to a certain cultural 
environment, within which it evolved. According to the Teachers 
themselves, their doctrines are not entirely original, having been 
preached in one form or other earlier as well.
B2. Yet the novelty o f the message o f all humanistic texts was 
quite literally revolutionary, and not just because the Teachings that 
were proclaimed differed radically from the existing ones, but also 
partly due to the fact that the situation was right for their emergence.
B3. As pointed out earlier on, the most significant aspect of these 
Teachings is their humanism —  their humanity and humanness. The 
main objective o f humanistic teachings is to show to man the sense of 
his existence and what his possibilities and duties are, not only in the 
physical world, but also in the social and cultural situation at the given 
moment at the given place; to make the man understand that he as a 
member o f mankind and as a definite personality (but not as ego) is 
something unique in the world, which is why he can and even must, 
bearing full responsibility, act in a novel way.
B4. The uniqueness o f man as a member o f mankind is manifested 
in that gods and other supernatural creatures and phenomena are no 
longer unequivocally placed above man, but that they are considered 
equal to him in many ways and sometimes even lower. A god may 
acquire human shape, appear as a human being, and man may become 
a god.
B5. The uniqueness o f man as a personality is manifested above all 
in the emphasis o f the fact that it is him as a definite person that has 
been chosen to carry out the Teaching.
B6. This also means that man as an individual has an opportunity 
to improve himself, to change himself, to become new. Man is not 
destined to remain the same or to retain his former self. Instead, he has
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the freedom to choose between remaining the same and becoming 
new, as well as the freedom of choosing between the various possi­
bilities and means or ways o f becoming new.
B7. In all humanistic base texts, the emphasis has been laid on de­
scribing the path or the process of man’s renewal. The explication o f 
the path has been preceded by the analysis o f the initial situation, that 
the man inevitably has to proceed from, as well as the more or less 
exact formulation o f where the man will end up.
B8. Principally everybody can renew himself, and it does not de­
pend on one’s origin or status in the social hierarchy, but above all on 
how the Teaching or, to put it differently —  a new cultural para­
digm —  has been adopted.
B9. This means that man is culture-centered from the point o f view 
o f humanistic base texts: not only does he depend on the current state 
o f culture and recreate the culture, but he also possesses an ability to 
create and bring to culture utterly new phenomena, and even a com­
pletely new cultural whole, something that the Teachers themselves 
have quite unequivocally accomplished.
BIO. At the same time man has to understand that he himself is not 
the creator o f culture, for the process o f creation only takes place 
through him, that is, it is the culture that functions through him. The 
man must understand that the ego that thinks that it has its own 
thoughts and performs its own acts does not, in fact, exist, so that it 
has either to be done away with or at least subjected to something that 
in the given culture is regarded as greater or higher.
В 11. The reason for the emergence o f ego is the self-protective 
endeavour o f the individual, caused by the fact that man originates 
from nature, or, in other words, from the animal world. The humanis­
tic base texts accept this fact to a greater or lesser extent, while im­
plying at the same time that the focus o f human existence should be 
located somewhere else, on a cultural level, which also means that the 
natural nature should be replaced by the cultural one.
В 12. It follows from the above that the relations based on physical 
descent ( i.e. genetic information) should not be as important as the 
culturally determined relations (i.e. cultural information).
В 13. This in turn allows us to say that the transmission o f cultural 
information is more important than that o f the genetic information. All 
humanistic base texts view the Teacher-disciple relationship as more 
significant than the parent-child or kinship relations. Studying and
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passing on the teaching are considered more valuable than procreation 
and taking care o f physical children.
В 14. At the same time, the humanistic base texts stress the need for 
the man to remain humane, meaning that he must treat if not every­
thing that is alive, then at least human beings, with compassion and 
love.
В 15. Compassion and love are notions that have many meanings 
and that can and may be interpreted rather deliberately. One needs 
sense to grasp their truly humane significance and to know and em­
ploy them as such. Common sense, consciousness, comprehension, 
understanding (i.e. intellectuality) —  these are among the most essen­
tial concepts in humanistic base texts, the development o f intellectual 
capacities being one o f the principal means, as well as objectives, in 
the process o f human renewal (or attaining the higher state of con­
sciousness or repentance).
В 16. To sum it all up —  the process o f becoming a new man or 
humanization actually means becoming a cultural man. The ideal, 
however, is not one-sided (specialized) culturalization but a total cul­
tural immersion or absolute culturalization that from the point o f view 
o f humanistic base texts means that the natural animalistic or brutal 
human being has become a superman, saint, blessed, elevated, perfect, 
Buddha, bodhisattva, son o f God, god etc. —  the name depends on the 
specific character o f the vocabulary o f a definite cultural tradition.
С 1. The dialogue between the base texts and background cultural en­
vironment began already at the first stage o f their formation, at the 
time when the Teacher him self pronounced his Teachings either as 
sermons or instructions meant for one or another concrete person. 
Their impact was quite slight at first, becoming manifest mainly in the 
relatively limited circle o f disciples. But their radical difference from 
the dominant or generally accepted ideology inevitably led to con­
flicts, which were often accompanied with severe repressions.
C2. As time passed, their impact gradually increased, reaching a 
truly explosive effect after the formation o f canonical texts.
C3. Although one cannot detect the direct tendency in the human­
istic base texts themselves, several religious, philosophical and other 
doctrines were formed on the basis o f those, as well as certain institu­
tions that often claimed the exclusive rights o f interpreting these texts. 
In case such institutions managed to attain the dominating position in 
the society, the humanistic essence o f the Teachings has been consid­
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erably reduced in the accepted interpretations at the expense o f the 
dominant background system either in the period o f the formation of 
the text or the emergence o f the given interpretation.
C4. At the same time we should not underestimate the role o f these 
institutions in spreading both the humanistic base texts, as well as the 
humanistic ideas, due to which their impact has reached global dimen­
sions by today.
C5. By way o f conclusion, let us maintain that even though in the 
course o f history downright human-hating and ego-cult based teach­
ings have been preached under the name of humanism, the direct and 
indirect impact o f humanistic base texts has still been o f cardinal im­
portance in the ever-growing influence of humanistic ideas on the de­
velopment of human society.
О концепции базовых гуманистических текстов
С точки зрения данной концепции, базовые гуманистические тексты 
оказали определяющее влияние на ход истории последних двух 
тысячелетий. Эти не столь многочисленные тексты сложились в раз­
ных регионах Древнего мира (в Китае, Индии, на Ближнем Востоке) 
в определенный исторический период, который можно, несколько 
обобщая, ограничить промежутком от -IV  до +11 вв.
Понятие “базовый текст” означает текст-генератор, который спо­
собен служить основой все новых текстов. У гуманистических базо­
вых текстов особая направленность, выраженная словом “гуманис­
тический”. Их характеризует, с одной стороны, возвышение чело­
века как такового (вида и отдельной личности) в качестве главного и 
определяющего явления бытия, с другой стороны, подчеркивание 
таких “человеческих” качеств как достоинство, любовь к человеку, 
сострадание, отказ от насилия, чувство ответственности и долга, 
почтительность и т.д.
Хотя любой гуманистический текст сформировался в контексте 
своей культуры, влияние которой отразилось в особенностях его 
содержания и формы, эти тексты достаточно сходны и имеют много 
общих черт. Эти сходства затрагивают в основном три аспекта: (А) 
процесс формирования и строение текстов, (Б) изложенные в них 
учения, (В) их непосредственное и опосредованное влияние.
(А) Все эти тексты излагают определенное Учение и исходят от 
определенного Учителя. Учителя проповедовали свое учение устно, 
оно было записано учениками и последователями и, наконец, в
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длительном процессе редактирования приобрело каноническую 
форму.
(Б) Учение каждого гуманистического базового текста связано по 
форме, содержанию и терминологии с определенной культурной 
средой, в которой он сложился. В то же время человек, с точки зре­
ния базовых гуманистических текстов не только зависит от 
состояния культуры в данный момент и не является лишь воспроиз­
водителем культуры, а прежде всего ее создателем. Цель базовых 
гуманистических текстов —  показать человеку смысл его сущест­
вования и его возможности и задачи не только в физическом мире, 
но и в сложившейся в данное время и в данном месте общественной 
и культурной ситуации; объяснить человеку, что он, как предста­
витель человеческого рода и конкретная личность (но не эго), непов­
торим и поэтому может и должен действовать с полной ответст­
венностью.
(В) В диалоге базовых гуманистических текстов с фоновым 
культурным окружением их влияние в обществе начало расти, осо­
бенно после того, как сформировались канонические тексты. На их 
основе возникли религиозные, философские и другие учения, но и 
институции, которые часто пытались присвоить себе монопольное 
право интерпретации этих текстов. Эти институции, тем не менее, 
способствовали распространению самих текстов и гуманистических 
идей, благодаря чему влияние этих текстов теперь стало глобаль­
ным.
Humanistlike baastekstide kontseptsioonist
Selle kontseptsiooni kohaselt on humanistlikud baastekstid olnud viimase 
paari aastatuhande jooksul ajalookulu suurimateks mõjutajateks. Need 
tekstid, mida ei ole kuigi palju, kujunesid Vana Maailma mitmes piirkon­
nas (Hiinas, Indias, Lähis-Idas) kindlal ajalooperioodil, mida võib mõnin­
gase üldistusena piiritleda -IV  ja +11 sajandiga.
Mõiste ‘baastekst’ tähendab teksti, mis tekstigeneraatorina on olnud 
aluseks üha uutele tekstidele. Humanistlikel baastekstidel on eriline suu­
nitlus, mida väljendab sõna ‘humanistlik’. Neid iseloomustab ühelt poolt 
inimese kui niisuguse (liigi ja üksikisiku) ülendamine olemasolu keskseks 
ja määravaks nähtuseks, teiselt poolt aga niisuguste “inim like” omaduste 
rõhutamine, nagu väärikus, inimarmastus, kaastunne, vägivallatus, vastu­
tustunne, kohusetunne, aupaklikkus jne.
On the concept o f humanistic base texts 289
Kuigi iga humanistlik baastekst on kujunenud oma kultuuri kontekstis, 
mille mõju on avaldunud nii sisu kui ka vormi eripäradena, on kõigis neis 
sarnasusi ja  ühiseid jooni piisavalt palju. Need puudutavad peamiselt 
kolme valdkonda: (A) tekstide kujunemisprotsessi ja  ülesehitust, (B) nen­
des esitatud õpetusi ning (C) nende vahetut ja kaudset mõju.
(A) Kõik need tekstid esitavad kindlat Õpetust ja  lähtuvad kindlalt 
Õpetajalt. Õpetajad kuulutasid oma õpetust suuliselt, see pandi kirja tema 
õpilaste ja järeltulijate poolt ning võttis pikas redigeerimisprotsessis lõ­
puks kanoonilise kuju.
(B) Iga humanistliku baasteksti õpetus on vormilt, sisult ja  ka termi­
noloogiliselt seotud kindla kultuurikeskkonnaga, mille raames see kuju­
nes. Samas on inimene humanistlike baastekstide seisukohalt kultuuri- 
keskne olend, kes mitte ainult ei sõltu kultuuri hetkeseisust ega ole kul­
tuuri taastootja, vaid ka kultuuri looja. Humanistlike baastekstide eesmär­
giks on näidata inimesele tema olemasolu mõtet ja  seda, mis on tema 
võimalused ja ülesanded mitte üksnes füüsilises maailmas, vaid ka antud 
hetkel antud kohas valitsevas ühiskonna- ja kultuurisituatsioonis; teha 
inimesele selgeks, et tema kui inimsoo liige ja konkreetne isiksus (kuid 
mitte ego) on maailmas midagi erakordset, mille tõttu ta saab ja peab täie 
vastutustundega toimima.
(C) Humanistlike baastekstide dialoogis taustkultuurikeskkonnaga 
hakkas nende mõju ühiskonnas pikkamööda suurenema, eriti peale ka­
nooniliste tekstide väljakujunemist. Nende põhjal tekkis religioosseid, 
filosoofilisi ja muid õpetusi, aga ka institutsioone, mis sageli püüdsid en­
dale omistada tekstide interpreteerimise ainuõigust. Eeskätt just need ins­
titutsioonid on aga aidanud kaasa tekstide endi ja humanistlike ideede 
levikule, tänu millele nende mõju on nüüdseks saavutanud globaalse ula­
tuse.
Sign Systems Studies 28, 2000
Semiotic pollution: 
Deliberations towards an ecology of signs
Roland Posner
Technical University Berlin,
Emst-Reuter-Platz 7, D -10587 Berlin, Germany 
e-mail: posn0135@mailszrz.zrz.tu-berlin.de
Abstract. This article compares the material pollution o f life’s elementary 
resources, i.e., water, soil, and air, with the semiotic pollution o f the ele­
mentary resources o f sign-processes, i.e., channel, sign-matter, and mes­
sage; code, signifier, and signified; as well as context, sender, and recipi­
ent. It is claimed that semiotic pollution interferes with sign-processes as 
much as material pollution interferes with the fundamental processes of 
life; both types o f pollution are similar in that they produce stress for hu­
man beings in current societies. It is argued that semiotics is able to pro­
vide the conceptual tools necessary to develop policies that can reduce 
semiotic pollution. As is shown, however, additional research is required 
to operationalize and metricize generalized concepts o f semiotic pollution 
such as “channel-related”, “semiosis-related”, and “situation-related 
noise”.
Since the 1960s, there has been much talk about the ever increasing 
constraints that environmental pollution places on our quality o f life. 
In recent decades, ecology has worked hard to explicate the notion of 
pollution scientifically and to render objectively measurable the de­
gree to which a biotope is polluted (W eizsäcker 1989). This article 
attempts to show that this concept o f pollution is insufficient to ex­
plain important causes o f the constraints placed on our quality o f life.
I he common idea of material pollution, therefore, is to be augmented 
by the concept of semiotic pollution. In this article, a suggestion for 
the explication o f this concept is developed and possible means of
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objectively measuring the degree o f semiotic pollution are considered. 
Given the current status o f research, the goal o f this paper is not to 
present a fully elaborated theory o f semiotic pollution, but rather to 
open the discussion o f the possibilities and limits o f such a theory. In 
providing this discussion with the necessary concepts, semiotics ac­
cepts social responsibility for its objects o f research.
1. Material pollution
Today, those who speak of pollution mean
• the poisoning o f rivers, lakes, and seas with industrial waste and 
fertilizers (Dorst 1998),
• the contamination of the soil with heavy metals and pesticides (La- 
gadec 1987; Reiser and Martzloff 1988), and
• the smogging o f the air with industrial and automotive emissions 
(Koch 1983; W olf 1988).
Citizens o f industrialized countries are subject to a considerable 
amount o f stress due to these developments since they place con­
straints on their activities (Selye 1976; Jerusalem 1990). One person­
ally experiences the reduction o f the quality o f life, when one can no 
longer
• drink tap water for fear o f stomach problems,
• swim in a river, lake, or sea for fear o f exposure to contagious dis­
eases,
• eat the fruit and vegetables from one’s own garden for fear o f in­
gesting high doses o f heavy metals,
• stay out in the sun for extended periods o f time for fear o f getting 
skin cancer due to overly powerful ultraviolet rays,
• breathe fresh air for fear o f heart problems due to the high ozone 
content.
Stress, however, is also caused when one leaves the house and cannot
• go anywhere without running into fences and traffic signs,
• avoid seeing billboards and signs wherever one looks,
• read the advertisement texts because there are too many o f them,
• recognize the faces o f people in traffic because their eyes are hid­
den behind helmets and sunglasses,
• understand what someone is saying because the traffic noise 
drowns them out,
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• smell the rejuvenating aroma of the trees lining the streets because 
it is masked by the exhaust from the air conditioners;
• taste the natural aroma o f a meal because the ingredients are grown 
in a greenhouse, neutralized with conservatives, and treated with 
aroma enhancers (Posner 1998).
For the past generation, environmentalists have called attention to the 
worldwide deterioration o f living conditions. Their campaign has 
made clear that this development was caused by exactly those meas­
ures which were originally taken to improve the standard o f living in 
industrialized countries (Carson 1962, and others).
Environmentalists consider the worst sort o f pollution to be the 
contamination o f life’s fundamental resources: water, soil, and air 
(Reiser, M artzlof 1988). This pollution becomes threatening when it 
disturbs basic life-sustaining processes such as eating, drinking, and 
breathing.
In general, pollution does not become evident until it is almost too 
late to repair the damage: it is too late when people taste it in the wa­
ter, when they see the withered plants in the field, when they have to 
hold a cloth to their nose because o f the stench in the air (Kur 1986). 
Even if possible, it could take decades or centuries to rid the ground 
water o f chemical substances, to clean the salty, pesticide-contami- 
nated, acidic, or over-radiated soil, and to remove poisonous gases 
from the air.
The contamination o f these resources has occurred insidiously 
(Bohret 1990). People initially react to the gradual deterioration of 
their living conditions with subconscious adaptation. When the situa­
tion eventually becomes unbearable, they are forced to evacuate the 
region with poisoned ground water, contaminated soil, and smoggy 
air.
In the conventional sense, therefore, pollution is a physical deterio­
ration o f life’s elementary resources through contamination. Pollution 
is considered a threat because
• it endangers the basic life-sustaining processes o f human beings 
and other higher life-forms,
• it occurs insidiously and is not detected until it is nearly too late to 
repair the damage,
• exactly those production and consumption processes originally 
intended to make life easier, paradoxically, wind up making peo­
ple’s lives more difficult.
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The explosive combination o f the threatening factors presented above 
no longer affects only the basic life-sustaining processes such as eat­
ing, drinking, and breathing. Today, it also affects the more advanced 
needs which people satisfy in interaction with each other. Citizens o f 
highly developed countries become frustrated when
• they look in their mailbox in the morning and find that their im­
portant mail gets lost in a flood o f advertisements,
• sitting down at their computer, they find hundreds o f unsolicited 
e-mails waiting to be answered before they can begin their work,
• they are forced to call an agency or administrative office and the 
phone is continuously either busy or unattended or the answering 
machine is turned on,
• they want to take action and constantly have to consult a lawyer 
about legal obstructions and risks,
• they want to apply for a job and are obligated to fill out a question­
naire with dozens o f irrelevant questions,
• they are forced to sign a contract o f purchase and have to read 
many pages o f small print referring to situations which do not ap­
ply to themselves,
• they are prescribed medication and the information in the package 
is not only difficult to understand but also makes note o f innumer­
able non-applicable uses, risks, and side-effects.
In our society, almost all innovations introduced to make life easier 
end up achieving exactly the opposite; they make our lives more com­
plicated and more difficult. Just as disturbing as the hindrance o f fun­
damental life-processes caused by material pollution is the hindrance 
of the fundamental sign-processes caused by the pollution o f our se­
miotic resources. It seems justifiable, therefore, to speak o f semiotic 
pollution as being analogous to the material environmental pollution.
Similar to material pollution, semiotic pollution is considered 
threatening because
• it endangers the fundamentals o f human interaction in industrial­
ized countries,
• it occurs insidiously and is not detected until it is nearly too late to 
repair the damage, and
• exactly those semiotic processes originally intended to facilitate 
human interaction, paradoxically, wind up hindering it.
2. Semiotic pollution
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These are far-reaching claims. In the following sections, these claims 
are first systematized to render them debatable and then are substanti­
ated with reference to examples. The structure o f sign-processes and 
their associated cultural techniques serve here as a guide. The consid­
erations lead to conclusions for the theoretical and empirical research 
that is necessary for an ecology o f signs (Nöth 1996). This, in turn, 
will make a well-focused semiotic environmental protection policy 
possible.
3. Factors of semiosis as semiotic resources and 
the pollution of these resources
A complex interpersonal sign-process (semiosis) begins with a sender 
who, in a given context, communicates a message to an addressee. 
This is done by using an appropriate channel and by selecting from a 
common code a signified befitting the message. The signified is con­
nected by means o f the code to a signifier that is realized by producing 
appropriately formed sign-matter. If all o f this occurs as the sender 
intended, the addressee perceives the sign-matter through the channel 
and recognizes it as a signifier which, due to the code, refers to a sig­
nified. Given the signified and the context o f transmission, the ad­
dressee then reconstructs the message (Posner 1989: 245). In general, 
the processes involved take place sequentially or, to some extent, si­
multaneously: the message to be sent must be known in order to select 
an appropriate signified; the signified must be known in order to iden­
tify a signifier; the signifier must be known in order to produce the 
sign-matter. Thus, the formulation process requires the transformation 
o f a message into a signified, a signified into a signifier, and a signi­
fier into sign-matter. The reception process occurs in the opposite or­
der. It requires the transformation o f sign-matter into a signifier, a sig­
nifier into a signified, and a signified into the message, which, if there 
were no disturbances, is the same as the message intended by the 
sender. The transformations are o f quite different types. The sender’s 
transforming the message into a signified and the recipient’s trans­
forming the signified into the message are both context-dependent 
pragmatic processes o f abduction (Wirth 1995). The same holds true 
for the sender ‘s production o f sign-matter when realizing the signifier 
as well as the recipient’s reconstruction o f the signified from this sign- 
matter. In contrast, relating the signifier to the signified, as the sender
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does (encoding), and relating the signified to the signifier, as the re­
cipient does (decoding), are semantic processes o f deduction (Prieto 
1972:23).
As this outline shows, each sign-process can be described by char­
acterizing the factors involved: sender, recipient, context, channel, 
sign-matter, message, and code with its signifiers and signifieds. In 
comparing material and semiotic pollution, it makes sense to regard 
these factors as resources o f the sign-process.
Each o f these resources can be polluted (cf. Prieto 1972: 50-58 and 
1975: 49-60 on success and failure o f communication acts):
• Excessive noise-levels (see section 5 below) in the channel pre­
vent the recipient from recognizing the sign-matter produced by 
the chosen sender. This obviates all further sub-processes.
• Even if the noise does not reach this point, it can pollute the sign- 
matter to the extent that it loses its conciseness. In the case of 
codeless semiosis (Posner 1997: 234), this hinders the recipient in 
ascertaining the message. In the case o f coded semiosis, the recog­
nition o f the signifier is hampered and with this, all further sub­
processes up to the ascertaining o f the message must fail.
• The signifier can also become polluted. In such a case, its form 
cannot be distinguished from other signifiers o f the same or o f a 
different code.
• A polluted signified has no clearly defined relationship to the other 
signifieds o f the code and is, therefore, poorly suited for the recon­
struction o f meaningful messages.
• A message is polluted, when it does not easily correspond to signi­
fieds or apply to the semiosis-partner’s context.
• The code is polluted either when its signifiers (syntactic space) or 
its signifieds (semantic space) are polluted or when the correlation 
between the syntactic and semantic spaces is muddled (Prieto 
1972: 45 and 1975: 27 speaks o f “sematic” and “noetic fields”). 
The latter case exists when there are too many signifiers with more 
than one signified (homonyms) in the code.
• The context is polluted, when the semiosis-partners either take 
very different situations into consideration or structure their shared 
situation differently in translating between the message and the 
signified (or between the message and the sign-matter in the case 
of codeless semiosis). It is often unclear to the semiosis-partners 
which circumstances should be considered as part o f the formula­
tion and reception contexts. As a result, the sender does not know
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which signified s/he should select for the message and the recipient 
does not know which message s/he should derive from the signi­
fied.
• Even the sender and the recipient can be polluted. This is the case 
when they are unable to use the necessary channel or code or to as­
sume the correct context.
As with material resources, the pollution o f semiotic resources can, to
a certain degree, be compensated by switching over to other resources
o f the same or different type:
• Surrounded by a din, one switches from the auditory channel to the 
visual channel to produce gestures rather than to speak.
• When there is a high level o f noise, one articulates the sign-matter 
very carefully so that the signifiers are recognized despite the 
noise.
• When a signifier is easily misunderstood, one increases the number 
o f signifiers so that they provide additional clues for the decoding 
process.
• When the signified is unclear, one draws the recipient’s attention 
to a clarifying context.
• When the usual code is muddled in the intended semantic field, 
e.g., because the usual code was never used in handling the given 
topic, one switches to a different code.
• When it is probable that the sender and the recipient assess the 
context o f the sign-process differently, then one chooses expres­
sions that can be interpreted independent o f the context, i.e., one 
formulates more explicitly and thereby increases the number of 
communicated signifieds.
• When one considers the semiosis-partner to be less capable of 
semiosis, then one lets the situation speak for itself.
4. Two examples of channel pollution: light and sound
The analogy between material and semiotic pollution can easily be 
elaborated in detail for the sign-channels. This is facilitated by the fact 
that material resources such as air and water are often used as sign- 
channels themselves.
A channel serves to transmit the sign-matter; were the channel it­
self to become sign-matter, the sign-process would fail. The same
holds true for material resources; they usually go unnoticed as long as 
they allow life-processes to take place without a problem. In general, 
air is odourless, water is tasteless, and both are colourless; that is, un­
less they contain foreign particles. It is not until the contamination 
reaches a certain level that the air “smells”, the water “tastes of 
something”, and both look “dirty”. The air and water pollution can 
increase to the extent that it disrupts the visual, olfactory, and gusta­
tory perception o f other objects. This is the case with smog and auto­
exhaust in the air and with oil and chemicals in the water. The strain 
on the material resources, therefore, has a negative effect on those 
sign-processes that use these resources as channels. Not only a few but 
rather all sign-processes which depend on the polluted channel are 
disturbed.
In modern industrial societies, smog disturbs the visual channel, 
industrial noise disturbs the auditory channel, and auto-emissions 
disturb the olfactory channel. The smog, noise, and stench are caused, 
respectively, by the carbon-dioxide emission o f heating systems, the 
sounds o f mechanical production processes, and the exhaust systems 
of automobiles. All three are examples o f materially induced (material 
and) semiotic pollution. However, the opposite case is also possible: a 
channel can become semiotically strained resulting in material pollu­
tion. Examples o f semiotically induced material (and semiotic) pollu­
tion are certain types o f pollution through light (Schmauks 1997) and 
through sound (Honkasalo 1996).
The history o f natural and artificial light is proof o f how technol­
ogy, in attempting to get rid o f a deficiency, winds up helping to pro­
duce an overabundance that reaches damaging proportions. For a long 
time, people’s spatial and temporal range o f activity was limited be­
cause most o f their actions could only be carried out in daylight. The 
art o f making and maintaining fire then made nighttime and closed 
spaces as accessible to sign-processes as was daytime. For thousands 
of years, however, fire-based light sources, such as wood chips, can­
dles, and oil-lamps, remained so expensive that the majority o f people 
continued going to bed as soon as it got dark. It was not until the end 
of the nineteenth century that relatively inexpensive electricity made it 
possible in much o f the world to disengage every-day activities from 
daylight. In all industrial countries today, the cities are lit all night and 
the basements are supplied with electrical light; visual sign-processes 
no longer have spatial and temporal constraints. These have been re­
placed, however, by semiotic constraints.
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The introduction o f electric light to enhance visual perception in­
creased the energy consumption. This necessitated the construction o f 
coal and oil power plants, and they, in turn, polluted the air, thus af­
fecting the visual channel. More important, however, the excessive 
use o f light itself has become a problem. Light, which is otherwise 
needed to see particular objects, becomes visible as such at night and 
is then often considered a disturbance. Dispersed light disturbs as­
tronomers in their work since almost no stars are visible near large 
cities. Flocks o f migrant birds lose their orientation when in the vicin­
ity o f a lit up city. Insects are attracted to luminous sources; if they are 
not singed by the heat o f the lights, they are at least distracted from 
searching for food and partners. The price o f people’s increased free­
dom of motion due to light is, paradoxically, an impoverishment of 
their visual perception. In the cities, many children grow up without 
having ever seen a clear starlit sky and the only time many adults have 
seen the Milky Way is in a planetarium.
The excessive use o f electric light not only makes visual sign- 
processes possible but it also hinders them (light pollution). In the 
same way, a high concentration o f auditory sign-processes can pro­
duce the opposite o f the intended effect (sound pollution). When 
walking through a Tunisian village at night, one is annoyed by the 
incessant barking o f dogs. Many people own dogs to warn them of 
burglars; the dogs are intended to increase security. This, however, 
becomes impossible as the number o f dogs grows larger; there is al­
ways a dog barking somewhere and the reason cannot be that burglars 
are constantly appearing. The continuous barking not only disrupts 
other auditory sign-processes but also interferes with its own purpose: 
a constant warning signal is not taken seriously as such.
In this case, one can speak o f semiotically induced sound pollution. 
Based on the sign-behaviour o f the dogs, it not only causes a locally 
restricted disruption o f individual sign-processes but produces a con­
stant disturbance o f the auditory channel. One cannot escape this dis­
turbance without leaving the country (or at least the affected neigh­
bourhood). This disturbance developed progressively as the canine 
population grew. Having reached the present level, it can hardly be 
reduced without really giving burglars the feeling that they can be­
come more active.
The same holds true for traffic noise in Indian metropolitan areas. 
There are many types o f signals to help people orient themselves in 
traffic: the pedestrian’s whistle, the bicycle’s bell, the moped’s and
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motorcycle’s hand-operated horn, the car’s and truck’s far reaching 
electric horns, and sometimes even the locomotive’s steam whistle. 
These signals may be distinguishable to the motorists, but to the resi­
dents they contribute to a constant din that prevents them from hearing 
themselves speak. As with the barking dogs in the Tunisian village, 
this initially successful form of semiosis has become impossible due 
to its constant rather than intermittent occurrence. Individually, each 
of these signals can function as a warning signal. When produced si­
multaneously, however, their mutual disruption causes them to fail as 
warning signals; and this in turn, produces a great amount o f stress. 
Here too, the current situation developed gradually and is apparently 
difficult to change without causing the traffic system to collapse. The 
only way to escape the noise permanently is to leave the city.
The traffic noise caused by the many warning signals is also semi- 
otically induced pollution. This assessment is supported by the noted 
effect that the traffic noise has on municipal property value. The real 
estate market reacts to the reduced quality o f living by decreasing the 
property value. Its reactions to material pollution (e.g., oil in the 
ground water) and to semiotic pollution (e.g., warning signals in traf­
fic) are the same. As with material pollution, semiotic pollution is the 
worst in the areas where the poorest people live.
The same situation exists in large European cities. Here, however, 
remedial measures have been taken. Since the 1970s, if the laws en­
acted to limit acoustic signals are insufficient to reduce the level of 
traffic noise, then noise barriers are built. While solving one problem, 
however, this measure produces another: noise barriers are also visual 
barriers (Rohrmann 1984: 198). In addition to having been robbed of 
their former peace and quiet, the affected residents are also robbed of 
their former view o f the surrounding area. The relief o f the auditory 
channel results in a disruption in the visual channel. Those who seek 
visual diversity in spite o f this are forced to turn to the “new media” in 
their own homes: television and video. In this manner, one environ­
mentally disruptive measure leads to another and there is no end in 
sight to the medial arms race (Bouissac 1993).
Environmental protection measures o f this type are also to be 
found in the other channels. The initially hailed shift in suburban traf­
fic from air-polluting buses to streetcars or trolley busses necessitated 
the construction o f overhead contact lines. The tourists who use the 
traffic system to see historical buildings and monuments, however, 
feel cheated because the chaos o f the overhead contact lines impairs
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the view of the monuments and destroys their historical context. In 
this case, the shift is from olfactory channel pollution to visual chan­
nel pollution with additional destruction o f the sign context. Remedial 
measures, such as installing mirrors to defer the view from the chaos 
o f wires, are no solution since these only help photographers and sim­
ply increase the number o f disruptive artifacts.
Such practices are ridiculous. They make about as much sense as 
installing a refrigerator in an Eskimo’s home in order to neutralize the 
negative effect that the recently introduced central heating system had 
on food preservation.
These examples show that the visual, auditory, and olfactory (as 
well as the gustatory and tactile) channels are fundamental semiotic 
resources. The pollution o f these resources reduces our quality o f life. 
The same can be proven for the other factors o f semiosis. Space limi­
tation, however, prohibits a continued analysis here.
The semiotic resources o f the sign-processes discussed can be 
compared to the material resources o f life-processes as follows.
(1) Material and semiotic resources are both hardly noticed as long as 
they are not polluted.
(2) The pollution o f a material resource (e.g., smog, industrial noise, 
and auto-emissions) can directly result in the pollution o f the re­
spective semiotic resource and vice versa (as in the cases o f light 
and noise pollution).
(3) A polluted material resource impairs not only certain individual 
life-processes but rather all life-processes o f the same type; in the 
same manner, a polluted semiotic resource impairs not only indi­
vidual sign-processes but rather all sign-processes which use that 
resource.
(4) The negative effects o f material and semiotic pollution can be re­
duced to a certain extent by switching to other resources; in this 
way, however, the pollution frequently spreads from one resource 
to another.
(5) No higher forms o f life can exist if all material resources are com­
pletely polluted; and, similarly, no sign-processes are possible 
where all semiotic resources are totally polluted.
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5. Research requirements: 
The investigation of channel-related, semiosis-related, and 
situation-related noise
The previous section makes clear that the increased levels o f  stress 
which bother people in today’s densely populated regions o f the world 
are due to semiotic pollution as much as to material pollution. To alle­
viate this stress it does not suffice simply to call attention to extreme 
examples o f pollution or to protest only against those instances that 
affect one personally. Comprehensive criteria for action must be de­
veloped if there is to be an end put to the Band-Aid treatment of 
symptoms and the transfer o f pollution from one resource to the next. 
In principle, semiotic pollution as well as material pollution can be 
identified objectively. Important is the development o f a reliable 
means o f measuring the pollution level in each individual resource 
(each semiosis factor) as well as its relative contribution to the overall 
level o f pollution. This groundwork is needed, for example, to decide 
when it makes sense to strain one resource in order to relieve another.
Having to deal with polluted semiotic resources causes stress 
(Mayer 1979: 235). The goal is to reduce this stress. Measures o f pol­
lution must be introduced in such a way that they can be used as a ba­
sis for determining the amount o f pollution-induced stress (cf. Lazarus 
1990 regarding the measurement o f stress), depending on the individ­
ual circumstances o f the people involved (Jerusalem 1990). Regarding 
all these questions, there is a considerable need for research; at pres­
ent, semiotic pollution research lags far behind material pollution re­
search.
Responsible for this is, on the one hand, the wide-spread tendency 
to reduce all problems down to what is physically and chemically 
measurable and, on the other hand, the conceptual isolation o f the sub­
phenomena from one another. Still lacking today are sufficiently de­
tailed models which allow (1) measuring the level o f pollution o f the 
various semiotic resources, (2) comparing these measurements,
(3) determining their relative contribution to the total semiotic pollu­
tion, and (4) identifying threshold values. As Helmar Frank (2001) 
shows, the work o f information theory in the area o f cybernetics in the 
1960s and 1970s laid important groundwork and information psychol­
ogy made a series o f applications possible. Since then, however, the 
remaining gap in the research needed to meet the requirements o f se-
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miotic environmental protection has hardly become smaller. This is 
true not only for determining the pollution level o f semiotic resources 
which are as complex as sender, recipient, sign-matter, and context, 
but also o f resources such as codes and channels, which have been 
relatively well studied in the framework of information theory.
What is needed can be explained with reference to the example of 
the channels. Information theory tries to measure channel pollution 
(see section 3 above) using the concept o f noise. Noise is the contami­
nation o f the channel with sign-matter not stemming from the sender 
that was chosen by the recipient (Cherry 1967: 245). Examples of 
noise taken from the technical media are the cracking sounds in the 
telephone, the atmospheric disturbance in the radio (made noticeable 
by changes in the volume and distortions o f the signifier), and the 
snow on the television screen.
A high level o f noise means that the respective channel is highly 
strained by interfering sign-matter. This, in turn, indicates a large 
contribution to the overall level o f semiotic pollution (see section 4 
above). Aside from light and sound pollution, every-day examples of 
high channel-related noise levels are the aggravation o f the olfactory 
and gustatory senses, and skin irritation (e.g., due to synthetic materi­
als).
It is a common assumption that semiotic strain on the environment 
increases proportionately with the number o f channels and the degree 
to which they are strained (Frank 1969). It should be noted, however, 
that not every increase in a given channel’s noise level and not every 
increase in the number o f highly strained channels increases the over­
all stress experienced by the individual (Lazarus, Folkman 1984):
• Showing a television transmission in a train station definitely in­
creases the strain on the visual channel o f the passengers waiting. 
The transmission o f a soccer game can, however, lead to a reduc­
tion o f their overall stress because it temporarily distracts them 
from the chaotic activities o f other arriving and departing passen­
gers.
• The endless flow o f background music in an office or in a depart­
ment store strains the auditory channel. It can, however, create a 
relaxed atmosphere which helps the people present to better deal 
with other types o f stress.
• Similarly, perfume affects the olfactory channel. But it can be used 
to mask unpleasant body odours.
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• At a restaurant, a special mixture o f seasonings can make some­
what stale ingredients acceptable to the gustatory demands o f the 
dinner guest.
• In a clinic, nurses are used to suddenly apply pressure with their 
hand in order to distract the patient from the prick o f the needle.
When a signal appears in a channel and covers up another signal in the 
same channel, it is said that the first signal masks the second. The list 
above presents examples o f visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and 
tactile masking (Loeb 1986: 48-79). Masking can prevent one from 
perceiving sign-matter that produces stress. Despite the additional 
loading of the channel, masking can reduce overall stress.
The different effects that desirable and disturbing masking can 
have on a person’s level o f stress show that simply analyzing the noise 
level in the channel does not suffice to determine the semiotic strain­
ing caused by unintended sign-matter. In order to determine the level 
of semiotic stress one must take into consideration not only the noise 
level but also the type o f noise.
One must also address the question o f whether the maskings occur 
only in specific instances (such as skilled hospital staff giving a shot) 
or if they occur constantly in order to hinder the perception o f a cer­
tain type of noise. An example o f constant masking is the continuous 
background music in department stores, public transportation systems, 
and open-area offices (Korn 1975, Fehling 1976, Körner 1979). In 
open-area offices, masking may have a positive side-effect on em­
ployees: others cannot hear what is being said in a conversation so 
that, despite the visual transparency o f the situation, the interlocutors 
can enjoy a certain amount o f auditory privacy. However, no back­
ground music is one-hundred percent emotionally neutral; each person 
present is subject to the music, whether s/he wants to be or not. Those 
who do not want to or cannot be soothed, or those who require maxi­
mum auditory differentiation and, therefore, need their own beat must 
be extremely annoyed by all background music (Mayer 1979: 226). 
The unwanted introduction o f foreign signs into a channel that one 
needs completely for the recognition o f intended signs, combined with 
the impossibility o f escaping the situation, turns background music for 
these people into a classic case o f semiotic pollution.
It makes sense to extend the concept o f masking to refer also to the 
interference between signs o f different channels (Loeb 1986: 48). 
T hus, semiotic stress cannot be determined solely on the basis o f noise 
in just one channel. Sign-matter that does not stem from the recipi­
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ent’s chosen sender can also reach the recipient via a channel other 
than the chosen one and, in this manner, affect the reception o f the 
intended signs. A student’s communication with an instructor in a 
seminar can be negatively affected by the noise in the adjacent room 
(same auditory channel), the activities o f people in street traffic that is 
mirrored in the window pane (visual channel), and even his/her own 
seat that is uncomfortable and scrapes the back (tactile channel).
Therefore, it is suggested that the concept o f noise also be ex­
tended. In the broader sense, noise is to be understood as all sign- 
matter that does not come from the intended sender through the cho­
sen channel and which disturbs the reception o f the sender’s sign- 
matter, independent o f the channel through which the disturbance ar­
rives (Fiske 1982: 8). This approach suggests that, in addition to the 
channel-related noise level, a semiosis-related noise level has to be 
assumed which incorporates all channels involved. A determining 
factor for the success o f sign reception is the number o f other signs 
that simultaneously reach the recipient through any channel. The ac­
tivities in the field o f vision are just as important as sounds and smells. 
Semiosis-related noise is the weighted sum o f the various channels’ 
noise levels during a given sign-process. The weighting is necessary 
so that individual circumstances can be taken into account when 
drawing conclusions from semiosis-related noise about the stress for a 
particular person involved in a given sign-process.
Our well-being, however, depends not only on the presence or lack 
o f stress involved in a particular sign-process. Rather, it depends on 
the entire situation and the signs which confront us during this situa­
tion. To identify this situation and determine its semiotic strain, one 
must observe the entire channel constellation for a longer period of 
time and not just for the duration o f one sign-process. For example, a 
man leaves the house, sees a street lamp and the lights o f the passing 
cars, hears the traffic sounds muted by the trees, smells the slightly 
musty aroma o f fallen leaves, and, at the same time, feels the weight 
o f his briefcase in his left hand. The totality o f these relatively con­
stant impressions comprise the backdrop o f more specialized sign- 
processes which might take place between the man and his compan­
ion. Advanced semiotics should be able to determine the average 
overall noise level in all channels that the two persons must overcome 
if they are to conduct a continuous conversation.
Advanced semiotics must also be able to compare the different 
types o f sign-production situations with regard to semiotic stress.
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What people want to say and can say to one another depends a great 
deal on their location: in an office in the centre o f town, on a street in 
a large city, in a car in city traffic or on the highway, in a forest, on a 
beach, or in the mountains. The level o f stress depends not only on the 
people’s individual circumstances but also on the situation-specific 
noise in the channels. A situation-related noise level can be under­
stood as the average overall strain produced by the noise levels in all 
channels during any sign-process that might take place in a given 
situation. Both the situation-related noise level and the individual cir­
cumstances of the persons involved are constitutive o f the stress per­
ceived in a specific situation.
As a result, these considerations charge researchers with the devel­
opment of the necessary tools to operationalize and metricize the con­
cepts of channel-related, semiosis-related, and situation-related noise. 
This groundwork must be laid in order to effectively measure semiotic 
pollution and start counteracting it.
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Семиотическое загрязнение: 
размышления об экологии знаков
В данной статье материальное загрязнение элементарных жизненных 
ресурсов (воды, почвы, и воздуха) сравнивается с семиотическим  
загрязнением элементарных ресурсов знаковых процессов (канал, 
знаковая материя и сообщение; код, означающее и означаемое, а 
также контекст, отправитель и получатель). Утверждается, что 
семиотическое загрязнение сопряжено со знаковыми процессами, 
так же как материальное загрязнение с основными жизненными 
процессами; сходство этих двух типов загрязнения в том, что они 
вызывают стресс у людей в современных обществах. Доказывается, 
что семиотика способна обеспечить концептуальные инструменты  
для выработки мер снижения семиотического загрязнения. Однако, 
как показано, для операционализации и метризации общ их кон­
цептов семиотического загрязнения, таких как “шум в канале связи”, 
“семиозисный1' и “ситуационный шум”, требуется дополнительное 
исследование.
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Semiootiline saastamine: 
mõtisklus märkide ökoloogiast
Antud artiklis võrreldakse elementaarsete eluressursside (vee, mulla ja 
õhu) materiaalset saastamist märgiliste protsesside elementaarsete res­
sursside (kanal, märgimateeria ja teade; kood, tähistaja ja tähistatav, aga 
samuti kontekst, adressaat ja adressant) semiootilise saastamisega. 
Väidetakse, et semiootiline saastamine on seotud märgiliste protsessidega 
samal moel, nagu materiaalne saastamine põhiliste eluprotsessidega — 
nende kahe saastetiiübi sarnasus seisneb selles, et mõlemad kutsuvad 
tänapäeva ühiskonna inimestes esile stressi. Kinnitatakse, et just semioo­
tika on võimeline kindlustama kontseptuaalsed instrumendid, töötamaks 
välja vahendid semiootilise saaste vähendamiseks. Kuid semiootilise 
saaste üldiste kontseptide, selliste nagu “müra sidekanalis”, “semioosne ja 
situatsiooniline müra” operatsionaliseerimiseks ja  mõõdustamiseks on 
vajalikud täiendavad uurimused.
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Abstract. The expression “artificial animal” denotes a range of different 
objects from teddy bears to the results of genetic engineering. As a basis 
for further investigation, this article first of all presents the main interpre­
tations and traces their systematic interconnections. The subsequent sec­
tions concentrate on artificial animals in the context of play. The devel­
opment of material toys is fueled by robotics. It gives toys artificial sense 
organs, limbs, and cognitive abilities, thus enabling them to act in the real 
world. The second line of development, closely related to research into 
Artificial Life, creates virtual beings “living” on computer screens. The 
most essential difference between these variants are the sense modalities 
involved in interaction. Virtual beings can only be seen and heard, 
whereas material toys can be touched as well. Therefore, the simulation of 
haptic qualities plays an important role. In order to complete the proposed 
typology, two further areas are outlined, namely artificial animals outside 
play and “artificial animals in the medium of flesh” which are alive but 
designed and created by man. Research on artificial animals belongs to an 
extended notion of ecosemiotics, as they are part of ecosystems which 
may themselves be virtual such as the Internet.
1. Introduction
The expression “artificial anim al” has several interpretations which  
can be classified  by sem iotic categories. Three sign functions are o f  
special interest for ecosem iotics: artificial anim als m ay represent liv-
ing animals, substitute them in specific contexts, or be intended as an 
improvement o f nature.
In the standard case, “artificial animal” means representations o f 
living animals. Classical toys such as teddy bears are material and 
therefore three-dimensional models which can be perceived by all 
sense modalities. During the last few years, virtual (or digital) animals 
have been created which are two-dimensional representations on a 
computer screen. In contrast to traditional pictures, they can move and 
may have a voice. And in contrast to artificial animals in movies (like 
the Aristocats or Roger Rabbit), the player can interact with them.
The second interpretation suggests that animal representations are 
“artificial” only if they do not have a model in reality. Examples in­
clude the fabulous beasts o f mythology and the monsters from outer 
space in science fiction. Hybrids o f man and animal (e.g., sirens, cen­
taurs, and sphinxes) and later on o f living beings and machines (cy­
borgs) are typical here. They all exist initially only in the fantasy of 
their inventor and are introduced to common imagination by texts, 
pictures, films, or sculptures. The fact which is not investigated here is 
that many artificial animals can be interpreted as caricatures o f human 
beings. Donald Duck and his relatives, for example, are not only 
ducks whose adventures please their readers, but also a model of the 
human condition in which all characters are stereotypes as in the 
commedia dell’arte.
The third interpretation o f “artificial animal” is a living animal 
which has been “artificially” created by man. Under natural circum­
stances, only closely related species cross-breed spontaneously —  for 
example, the mule is a cross-breed o f horse and donkey. Genetic engi­
neering, however, allows for cross-breeding o f more distant species, 
even o f plants and animals, or o f animals and man. The result may be 
creatures which are “mixed” like fabulous beasts. The circle o f devel­
opment closes in the case o f re-breeding which is intended to slow 
down the loss o f biodiversity.
These three readings are systematically interconnected. Dealing 
with living animals encourages fantasies in which animals are “men­
tally divided” into their body parts which are then “freely composed” 
into fabulous beasts. Sometimes nature itself offers such impulses, 
namely by deformed children and animals. Through observation the 
features in question become “parametrized”. If, e.g., calves with two 
heads or six legs are bom, the number o f heads and legs is no longer a 
constant factor. And vice versa: the “invention” o f fabulous beasts
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may be one o f the sources which has established genetic engineering 
as a scientific vision. Furthermore, fabulous beasts can become inter- 
subjectively available as material or virtual toys. And handling them 
may influence behavior towards living animals. “Animal M akers”, for 
example, who produce artificial animals for Hollywood, support or­
ganizations committed to the protection o f animals on film sets.
Models o f animals belong to the earliest remains o f material cul­
ture, but whether they were toys, sacrifices or mere decoration is not 
always easy to decide. In ancient Egypt, for example, models o f live­
stock were placed in tombs in order to guarantee the eternal alimenta­
tion of the deceased. Since then, man has created a variety o f artificial 
animals, often by using the most advanced technology. M ultifunction­
ality is frequent, for example, toys may be amulets at the same time.
The following sections offer a typology o f artificial animals. The 
main emphasis is placed on artificial animals in the context o f play, 
the development o f which is characterized by the simulation o f more 
and more live-functions (section 2). The history o f material toys 
ranges from simple static models and clockwork toys to today’s ro­
botic toys which simulate locomotion, perception, sound utterances, 
and units of behavior (“Fetch the stick!”). The second line o f devel­
opment —  related to research into Artificial Life —  creates virtual 
animals such as Pokemons which “live” on computer screens. Their 
simulation consists o f metabolism, growth, and social behavior (in­
cluding reproduction), and even a quasi-genetic optimization to a spe­
cific environment may take place. Section 3 gives an impression o f the 
manifold simulation o f animals outside play which is another fruitful 
area for semiotic investigation. The same is true for artificial animals 
in the medium of flesh which is outlined in section 4. The presentation 
is closed by a conclusion and an outlook analysis in section 5.
2. Artificial animals in the context of play
In the context of play, more and more live functions are simulated. 
From a semiotic point o f view, the most essential difference between 
material (2.1) and virtual (2.2) toy animals are the sense modalities 
involved in interaction. Virtual animals can only be seen and heard, 
whereas the material ones are often specifically intended to stimulate 
the skin. Therefore, the simulation o f haptic qualities —  such as tem­
perature, softness, elasticity, and texture —  plays an important role.
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The history o f toy animals can be traced from various viewpoints, for 
example, as a part o f cultural history (cf., e.g., Fraser 1966 and Bry- 
ant-Mole 1996) or as a reflection o f didactic concepts. The following 
investigation concentrates on toys which —  at least roughly —  imitate 
animals’ appearance. “Natural toys” such as stones and cones are not 
considered here, although they can adopt the roles o f animals during 
play. This section concentrates on two aspects which are relevant for a 
semiotic analysis, namely the simulation o f live functions (2.1.1) and 
o f haptic features (2.1.2).
Toy animals are frequently designed as the elements o f complex 
scenarios. Paradise and N oah’s ark are famous historic examples mo­
tivated by religious belief. Other scenarios depict the everyday life of 
pre-industrialized farming —  often idealized by nostalgia, as in the 
case o f farms with free-range animals (the fact that no toy sets simu­
lating industrialized livestock breeding exist may be read as an indi­
cation that we feel ashamed in front o f our children). Some further 
scenarios are already second-order models because concepts such as 
“zoo” and “circus” are themselves culture-specific models o f nature 
and its relationship to man.
There are manifold ways in which toys are given a “serious” func­
tion and vice versa, for example, on the one hand, a teddy bear pro­
motes the canned milk brand name “Bärenmarke”, and on the other 
hand, the Berlin bear as a heraldic sign is sold as a soft toy. However, 
this is not treated in more detail here.
2.1 M aterial toy anim als
2.1.1 The simulation o f live functions
In the beginning o f history, all toy animals were static and silent. 
The first simulation o f movement are toys for dragging and those with 
moving parts. Fraser (1966: 26 and 31) shows examples from around 
1100 B.C., namely a lion on wheels and a crocodile with movable 
lower jaws. Also in the case o f rocking horses (cf. Mullins 1992), it is 
the player him self who makes them move. Although singular auto­
mata such as singing birds or picking hens are known to have existed 
since Western and Chinese antiquity (cf. Fraser 1966: 108ff), the 
simulation o f movement and voice remained an exception until the
late 19th century. By means o f clockworks and later on by batteries, 
moving toy animals started to be produced. Phonographs and later on 
acoustic chips gave them voices. In contrast to ancient rattles which 
only make noise (Fraser 1966: 49), modern devices allow for produc­
ing species-specific sound utterances like grunting or barking.
Today, a highly sophisticated simulation o f live functions has be­
come possible. One line o f development is fueled by robotics. It gives 
toy animals (“toybots”) artificial sense organs, artificial limbs, and 
cognitive abilities such as planning and reasoning, thereby enabling 
them to perceive their environment and to act in the real world. One 
long-term objective is the motor-driven robot-cat “Robokoneko” 
whose “brain” is to contain 40 million artificial neurons arranged in 
modules. Each neuronal net can be optimized by quasi-genetic proc­
esses for a specific task such as the recognition o f “prey”. The cat 
“sees“ by video camera, “hears” by stereo microphones, and also the 
tactile hairs contain sensors. A sound generator allows for miaowing, 
purring, and other sound utterances.
Robot-dogs such as “Aibo” and “I-Cybies” are also already avail­
able. I-Cybies was presented in February 2000 at the Nuremberg toy- 
fair in Germany. When activated, his speech recognizer adapts to his 
master’s voice, and afterwards, he obeys only him. I-Cybies can bark, 
howl, roll, and follow simple orders like following his master, stand­
ing on his hind legs, and retrieving. During locomotion, he avoids hit­
ting obstacles. He knows his name, and interaction with his environ­
ment results in specific “moods” which he expresses by “facial ex­
pression”. For example, he droops his ears sadly if not sufficiently 
caressed. Another subsystem o f mood expression, however, has no 
model in reality: if I-Cybies is happy, his otherwise green eyes glow 
red.
Whereas these toybots are intended to appeal to adults, “Furbies” 
are primarily designed for children. They look like normal soft toys, 
but contain enough computer technology to be treated as “partly ani­
mate” (cf. Pesce 2000). They interact with their environment, show 
their mood by facial expression and gaze behavior, and have a “ lan­
guage” evolving from a childlike patois (“Furbish”) to a rudimentary 
English.
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2.1.2 The Simulation of haptic features
The 20th century brought the rise o f soft toys. At first, only furry 
mammals such as bears and cats were simulated (cf. Fraser 1966: 
182f), later on also animals which are phylogenetically more distant 
from man, e.g., marine mammals, reptiles, and even spiders and other 
invertebrates.
From semiotically perspective it is interesting how the naturalness 
o f simulation systematically varies due to the different features. The 
animal’s general shape —  the main criterion for identifying the spe­
cies in question —  is normally simulated to a comparably high degree. 
Some stylization may take place, for example the face may be modi­
fied to look more “human” or more “childlike”. The color, however, is 
frequently changed completely. Pink lions and blue horses occur, 
maybe in order to please small children. If raised in an urban envi­
ronment without contact with real livestock, children may acquire 
wrong beliefs about real animals’ colors. A famous example is a long­
term advertising campaign by Milka (Swiss chocolate) which makes 
children believe that cows are violet.
One special aspect is the simulation o f haptic features. Real speci­
men have stunningly manifold “surfaces” . M ammals’ coats are curly 
or straight, silky or bristly, scanty or straggly. Birds have feathers, 
fishes and reptiles have scales o f different types, turtles have shells, 
and snails have a slimy skin. In toy production, however, this vari­
ability may be reduced to only two extremes, namely the uniform 
fluffiness o f toys for cuddling and the disgusting sliminess o f creepy- 
crawlies. The affective component may play a minor role in the case 
o f toy collectors, but frequently, artificial toys trigger intense feelings. 
The numerous Halloween monsters are intended to provoke a reaction 
o f fear or disgust.
Most toy animals, however, are intended for being loved as indi­
viduals, and a soft toy acquired in childhood may really become a 
“lifetime companion” (there are even guides about how to treat them 
well, cf. Ricketts 1969). Their sign function may change depending on 
their owner’s age. For younger children, toy animals can substitute 
living animals to a high degree —  they lovingly feed, brush and hug 
their toy cat. Older children intentionally switch between treating toy 
animals as living or as mere artifacts. For adults, toy animals may be 
signs o f craftsmanship, o f their donator’s love, or lucky charms.
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With regard to this long-term usage and emotional impact, leading 
toy manufacturers such as “Steiff ’ or “Kösel” aim to produce highly 
naturalistic toy animals which carefully imitate their m odels’ visual 
features —  including color —  and the haptic features o f their skin. 
This may require the use o f costly hand-woven furs the uneven texture 
of which looks and feels realistic.
The interior o f objects, and especially o f living beings, is normally 
not visible in reality. This normal opacity o f flesh contributes to the 
fascination of transparent animals like jellyfishes and some geckos. 
Only in the case o f severe injuries does the interior o f living beings 
become accessible for visual and haptic exploration. But open frac­
tures and the opening o f cavities are traumatic for the affected as well 
as for the observer. Physicians, however, need this kind o f “insight”, 
and also modern diagnosis from X-ray to computer tomography can­
not substitute for the visual-haptic knowledge acquired during 
autopsy.
If the interior o f toy animals is accessible, these animals often have 
an educational objective. Since the 1980’s, soft toys with babies in 
their womb allow for the simulation o f birth. The detailed “anatomy 
teddy” allows children to literally “grasp” the location and shape of 
inner organs. Furthermore, this teddy is aimed at decreasing the fear of 
doctors and surgery due to its ability to completely “recover” (whereas 
unintended examinations o f a normal teddy’s interior tend to cause its 
destruction).
2.2 Virtual toy animals
The second line o f the development o f toy animals is closely related to 
Artificial Life, a branch o f science which is located between biology 
and computer science (cf., e.g., Magnenat-Thalmann and Thalmann 
1994 as well as Hokkanen 1999). Virtual —  or digital —  beings are 
computer-generated animation which are visible on the screen, move, 
and may have a voice.
Virtual fishes living in a virtual marine world are a scientific ex­
ample (cf. Tu 1996). The simulation o f individuals exhibits a complex 
repertoire of behavior, for example, avoiding obstacles, searching for 
food, and fleeing from predators. The underlying “ intention generator” 
is based on a hierarchy o f behavior in which the most basic desires 
have the highest priority. For example, the desire to eat or to mate can
only occur if there is no danger o f hitting an obstacle or being killed. 
If life-cycles are simulated as well, the individuals are bom, grow, and 
die. In order to gain such complexity, the basic physics o f the animals 
and their environment has to be modeled.
With groups o f animals, social behavior including mating and 
breeding may be simulated, and even a quasi-genetic adaptation to a 
specific environment may take place. Research in this area sometimes 
uses a special terminology, calling living beings (including humans) 
“animals” and virtual beings “animats” (cf. Pfeifer 1998, as well as the 
previous Proceedings o f the Conferences on Simulation o f Adaptive 
Behavior). With regard to this typology, virtual animals are a special 
case of animats which also comprise virtual humans (which may be 
“avatars” : virtual counterparts o f Internet users) and all sorts o f hy­
brids and fictional beings. If virtual beings “ live” in the Internet —  as 
a virtual ecosystem —  and come into contact with many users, a vir­
tual coevolution may take place during which each species refines its 
capabilities (cf. Funes et al. 1998).
From the viewpoint o f computer science, creating virtual animals 
can fertilize the evolution of interactive adaptive software. For ethol­
ogy, on the other hand, carefully designed artificial animals are useful 
tools for systematic studies o f animal behavior (cf. Tu 1996). As they 
are structural as well as functional models, all levels from sensomoto- 
rics to cognition can be studied and modified without animal experi­
ments. Furthermore, investigations o f genetic adaptation profit from 
the fact that life-cycles o f virtual animals may be extremely short. 
This research belongs to an extended notion o f ecosemiotics because 
virtual worlds may be counted as ecosystems as well. The Internet, for 
example, can be seen as a virtual ecosystem, namely a community of 
human users and virtual beings where complex interaction is taking 
place (cf. Funes et al. 1998, chapter 1).
Commercially sold virtual animals exploit all these scientific re­
sults. In 1997, the “Tamagotchis” came from Japan to Europe. These 
“virtual chickens” live on the display o f egg-sized “worlds” and need 
to be fed, nursed, and entertained by pressing buttons. They actively 
ask for attention by cheeping, but unnecessary cheeping has to be 
“punished”. Their life span is restricted to 30 days, and neglect makes 
them die much earlier. They can be revived by the RESET-function 
(which raises the existential question o f personal identity...) or be 
buried in specific Internet cemeteries. Furthermore, their producers
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assume that after death they return to their home planet —  a philoso­
phy which intermingles real and virtual world.
Two years later the “Pokemons” succeeded to the throne (and are 
already being replaced by the “Digimons”). Each Pokemon belongs to 
a species with specific powers such as fire, electro, or psycho. M ean­
while, some hundred Pokemons now exist, each o f which has to be 
caught by skill and perseverance. Only by optimal training can a 
Pokemon develop in a species-specific manner. The aim o f the train­
ing is to own a whole army of Pokemons to fight against others. This 
example shows that virtual animals require more and more involve­
ment from the side of the user. A teddy bear may be forgotten for 
weeks without any damage —  the optimal development o f a 
Pokemon, however, requires extensive care over a considerable 
amount o f time.
In contrast to Tamagotchis, Pokemons are part o f a whole (com­
mercial...) universe comprising also films and figures. As soon as vir­
tual animals get material counterparts, the borders between the two 
realms are blurred. Furthermore, such animal figures are frequently 
introduced into new contexts. As a typical example, animals which 
have originally been produced for films may be sold later. Depending 
on the intentions o f its new owner, a sculpture o f Mickey Mouse can 
be used as a toy, exhibited as a piece o f art, or become a coat stand.
In the Internet, catchwords such as “cyberlife”, “virtualkitty”, or 
“swineonline” lead to numerous virtual species which can be acquired. 
Many o f them are only intended for playing and nursing, but virtual 
variants o f hunting also exist. Virtual fishing rods are operated by real 
hand movements and allow for the choice between different bodies of 
water, baits, and times o f the day. But the seamless integration o f real 
and virtual world fails because the rod can’t be exposed to humid­
ity —  the manual explicitly prohibits its use at riversides...
3. Artificial animals outside play
Numerous simulations o f animals also exist outside play. The aim of 
this section is to list some suggestive examples in order to stimulate 
more detailed semiotic analyses.
Many artificial animals outside play have decorative function. One 
has to distinguish between variants which are designed as mere deco­
rations (knick-knacks, jewelry, ...) and those which have a practical
purpose as well (piggy banks, weathercocks, butcher’s figurines o f 
cows and p ig s ,...).
In didactic contexts, there is no clear-cut difference between 
specimen and model —  frequently, a real coat is put on a model made 
o f gypsum (“dermoplastics”). This intermingling o f model and repre­
sentation is quite rare in the case o f toys —  stuffed chickens and 
ducklings which are sold around Easter on Austrian markets are a 
strange exception.
Animal models in bionics is a highly complex simulation by which 
the principles o f living beings are investigated for translation into 
technical devices. The solutions o f evolution —  tested for millions of 
years —  are studied with respect to the question whether they can be 
emulated by using non-organic materials.
Another special case are artificial animals used for camouflage 
such as the Trojan Horse in which a group o f enemy soldiers hid. A 
life-size iron ox for torturing was created by the artist Perillus for 
Phalaris, the ruler o f Agrigent. The convicted were roasted to death in 
the oxen’s hollow body, and specific sound pipes transformed their 
cries so that they resembled the bellowing o f an ox. A Greek legend 
(cf. Ranke-Graves 1960, I: 265f) tells o f a camouflage due to trans­
species love. Minos, the king o f Crete, kept a wonderful bull which 
belonged to Poseidon. Poseidon cursed Pasiphae, M inos’ wife, to fall 
into love with this bull. She requested Daedalus to build a hollow 
wooden cow, covered by cow ’s hide (cf. some murals in Pompeji, 
Reinach 1922: 183). Hidden in the cow, Pasiphae seduced the bull. 
The result o f this mating is the Minotaure (with the head o f a bull on 
the body o f a man) for whom Daedalus later on built the famous laby­
rinth.
As in the case o f toy animals, the simulation may comprise more 
or less features o f the living animal. The high-tech security system 
called “Power Dog”, for example, is a purely acoustic simulation 
which reduces a dog to its voice. The “digital barking” —  which the 
manual describes as “truly natural” —  is triggered by a motion sensor 
and is to make burglars believe that a huge dog is guarding the house.
Much more complex simulations are used in livestock breeding. 
Today, the artificial insemination o f working animals is a standard 
procedure. However, it is only efficient if the sexual behavior o f the 
species in question is taken into account. From foreplay to intercourse, 
it can be reconstructed as a chain o f reflexes which coordinate the be­
havior o f two individuals. If there is no contact between male and fe-
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male, the elements o f the natural situation have to be simulated by 
different means (cf. Busch, Löhle und Peter 1991; semiotic recon­
struction in Schmauks 2000). During semen collection, the female 
animal is normally replaced by a so-called “phantom”, i.e., a dummy. 
It depends on the species in question to which extent phantoms must 
be true to nature. The minimal variant only has the structure o f an 
archway, i.e., resembles a female’s backside. Cow phantoms may be 
much more elaborate, simulating a cow’s body with respect to size, 
volume, and color in order to offer distal visual stimuli. Its covering 
by cow hide additionally renders olfactory and tactile stimuli. The 
most relevant part is the artificial vagina which may be built into the 
phantom or handled separately by the veterinarian. Filling the double­
walled vagina with warm water simulates body temperature, and the 
pressure at the opening can be adapted to the liking o f individual 
bulls. Vaseline simulates the tactile experience o f the mucous mem­
brane which triggers the immissio-penis reflex.
4. Artificial animals in the medium of flesh
Finally, in order to complete the proposed typology o f artificial ani­
mals, it is important to ask to which extent the expressions “artificial” 
and “organic” still denote opposites, or, in other words: to which ex­
tent the artificial already exists in the medium o f flesh.
Since the beginning o f domestication in the Neolithic period, one 
aim of breeding has been the targeted modification o f the animals’ 
features. The selection o f such desirable features always depends on 
circumstances: whereas in war times robust pigs delivering much ba­
con may be desired, in times o f abundance lean pigs with additional 
chops are preferred. This development is “artificial” because it serves 
human goals, and it causes the loss o f the “natural”, namely o f biodi­
versity.
Many cultures have mythical beings which are mixtures o f differ­
ent species. In ancient Greece, “chimaera” was at first the proper name 
of a creature with three heads: that o f a lion, a goat, and a snake. Later 
on, the derived common noun “chimera” denoted all “mixed” beings. 
In some of them, one species dominates, e.g., the horse in the unicorn. 
Other examples —  like sirens, sphinxes, centaurs, basilisks, and har­
pies —  are more balanced mixtures. The transportation o f such mythi-
cal beings into reality has always been a fascinating aim, the achieve­
ment o f which gives their creator a feeling o f god-like power.
A step towards real cross-breeding is the “ incarnation” o f fabulous 
beasts made from dead specimens. One example from Bavaria, called 
“Wolpertinger”, is created in order to deceive tourists. In the standard 
case, it has the body o f a marmot, roebuck’s antlers, and duck’s feet. 
This is a very practical interpretation o f the postmodern term “brico- 
lage” .
Several branches o f today’s biology create living chimeras. Plants 
which are closely related can be “mixed” non-sexually by grafting. 
Useful plants and domestic animals are frequently cross-bred in order 
to ameliorate one species or to combine desirable features o f two spe­
cies (“hybrids”). Hybrids for usage may be sterile like the mule.
Genetic engineering even allows for cross-breeds which are impos­
sible in nature. Genes o f another species are introduced into the DNA 
of such “transgenic” animals in order to reach specific goals, for ex­
ample in human medicine. Transgenic mice are susceptible to human 
diseases such as arteriosclerosis, cancer, or AIDS, thus allowing for 
the testing o f new therapies. A highly controversial subject for discus­
sion is the use o f genetic engineering in art —  such as the albino- 
rabbits o f Eduardo Kac which fluoresce in the dark due to insertion of 
a gene o f the jellyfish (Schmundt 2000).
In Ovid’s Metamorphoses (1992), some humans —  such as Narcis­
sus, Hyacinthus, and Myrrh —  are transformed into plants which then 
carry their names. Even such mixing o f plants and animals has be­
come possible by genetic engineering. A specific gene o f the winter 
flounder prevents the water in the cells from freezing. By introducing 
this gene into tobacco plants, the latter become frost-resistant.
Unicorns and other fabulous beasts o f the Ancient World —  which 
have become a part o f general world knowledge by textual and picto­
rial representations —  surely have inspired cross-breeding as a scien­
tific vision. On the other hand, the confrontation with deformed chil­
dren and animals may have inspired the invention o f fabulous 
beasts —  this was Rudolf Virchow’s basic premise when establishing 
the “Medical Collection” o f the Charite in Berlin. By presenting a 
“second-order chimera” o f four mythical beasts, Petermann and 
Schmauks (1999) aim at breaching the gap between mythology and 
genetic engineering from the other side. The result o f this virtual 
cross-breeding is called “Sphingahornix cyclopica” —  with the body
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of a sphinx and a mermaid’s tail, one-eyed like a cyclops and one- 
horned like a unicorn.
A special case o f “artificial” cross-breeding is re-breeding —  the 
attempt to regain species which are already extinct in reality. Com­
mercially oriented livestock breeding concentrates on desirable fea­
tures, thus always resulting in an irretrievable genetic loss. In inten­
sive livestock breeding, it is irrelevant whether animals are good 
mothers, get by on very little food, or can cope with rough weather. 
The most important aspect is that they are ready for slaughtering as 
soon as possible and render lean meat matching the clients’ liking.
Alarmed by the dramatic shrinking o f biodiversity, appreciation o f 
old species of domestic animals has grown since the 1980’s. Because 
some of them were already extinct, a targeted re-breeding was started. 
But an extinct species can never be regained in a strict sense. It is only 
possible to breed the descendants and wildlife forms for recombining 
remaining genes. The result are animals whose appearance and be­
havior resembles the original species as closely as possible. One ex­
ample is the re-breeding o f pigs: In 1980, Berlin’s Free University 
started the breeding of wild boars, Hungarian Mangalitzas, and other 
land races for re-breeding the robust and undemanding “Diippeler 
Weideschwein” which is especially suited for extensive farming 
(cf. Horning 1997: 56ff).
Saving endangered species can be attempted by genetic engineer­
ing as well. Fertilized eggs o f the species in question can be cloned 
and then carried to term by surrogate mothers o f closely related spe­
cies. The “production” o f embryos by fusing (arbitrary) cells o f the 
endangered species and eggs without nuclei from other species is even 
more costly. Although such re-breeding cannot stop the general loss o f 
genetic variability, it can at least reduce its negative results.
Depending on the advocated world view, all these artificial animals 
(or the intention to create them) are read as signs o f human creativity, 
power, or hybris. For some theistic religions, e.g., the attempt to “be 
like God” is the ultimate sin, leading to eternal damnation.
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5. Conclusions and outlook
The typology proposed here calls for a deepened semiotic investiga­
tion of the variants which have been distinguished. But already this 
sketchy presentation shows the variability o f artificial animals which
can be ordered according to “naturalness” . At one pole, minimal mod­
els are located which only simulate a singular feature —  like “Power 
dog”, reducing a dog to its barking (cf. section 3). At the opposite 
pole, the model’s aim is to simulate more and more features. Here, 
sophisticated animats are located which are not only naturalistic mod­
els o f individuals, but also form virtual societies and live in an envi­
ronment modeling the laws o f physics.
Projecting current trends results in manifold visions, each o f them 
based on different notions o f “reality”, “nature”, and “mankind”. F rcn  
a humanistic viewpoint, intense contact to animals is always suspi 
cious —  as a waste o f time, as a sign o f misanthropy, or as a kind o* 
perversion (“social sodomy”). This objection is intensified with regard 
to artificial animals. Other thought experiments not only welcome 
robot pets as new attractive toys but also enthusiastically introduce 
them to other tasks. Examples include geriatric nursing where they 
will be —  like their living models —  the last social contact o f aged 
people.
Furthermore, artificial animals —  which can be “neglected” or 
even “killed” without irreversible results —  are suspected to cause an 
alineated attitude towards living beings. The essential didactic goal of 
keeping pets, namely the sensibilization for life’s fragility, obviously 
cannot be reached in the realm of the virtual.
As soon as artificial animals become complex enough, we have to 
face the ethical question o f how to treat them correctly. Such discus­
sions will become more important the more we are convinced that 
they have “feelings” and even some “intelligence” (one can also argue 
that artificial beings —  like other cultural assets —  should be pro­
tected, even if their higher mental functions are not proven).
It has to be added that the ethical treatment o f artificial beings 
should be in appropriate relation to our treatment o f living beings. For 
example, it can be interpreted as a clear indication for our alineated 
attitude towards nature, if we have scruples about hitting a Furby, but 
accept the conditions o f industrialized livestock breeding in which 
millions o f animals undoubtedly feel pain and are kept far away from 
natural conditions.1
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Плюшевые медведи, тамагучи, трансгенные мыши: 
семиотическая типология искусственных животных
Выражение “искусственное животное” обозначает очень разные 
объекты от плюшевых медведей до результатов генной инженерии. 
В качестве основы дальнейшего исследования в статье прежде всего 
даются основные интерпретации и прослеживаются их системати­
ческие взаимосвязи. Последующ ие разделы посвящены искусствен­
ным животным в контексте игры. Развитие материальных игрушек 
обеспечивается роботроникой. Она снабжает игрушки искусствен­
ными органами чувств, конечностями и когнитивными способнос­
тями, позволяя им действовать в реальном мире. Другая линия 
развития, тесно связанная с исследованием Искусственной Жизни, 
создает виртуальные существа, “живущ ие” на экране компьютера. 
Эти два варианта различаются прежде всего модальностями 
восприятия, которые включаются во взаимодействие: виртуальные 
существа можно видеть и слышать, тогда как материальные игрушки 
можно и потрогать. Поэтому симуляция чувствительности (haptic 
qualities)  играет важную роль. Для полноты предлагаемой типологии 
дается набросок двух следующ их областей исследования: искусст­
венные животные вне игры и “искусственные животные во плоти”, 
живые, но проектируемые и созданные человеком. Изучение 
искусственных животных принадлежит к экосемиотике в широком 
смысле слова: они являются частями экосистем, которые сами могут 
быть виртуальными, как интернет.
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Plüüškarud, tamagotchi, transgeensed hiired: 
tehisloomade semiootiline tüpoloogia
Väljend “tehisloom” tähistab vägagi erinevaid objekte pliiüškarudest kuni 
geenitehnoloogia saavutusteni. Artiklis esitatakse kõigepealt “tehislooma” 
mõiste peamised tõlgendused, mis on aluseks edasisele arutlusele, ja 
vaadeldakse nende omavahelisi süstemaatilisi seoseid. Seejärel keskendu­
takse tehisloomadele mängu kontekstis. Materiaalsete mänguasjade 
arengu tagab robotroonika, mis varustab mänguasjad kunstlike taju- 
organite, jäsemete ja kognitiivsete võimetega, võimaldades neil tegutseda 
reaalmaailmas. Teine arenguliin, mis on tihedalt seotud tehiselu uuri­
mustega, loob virtuaalseid olendeid, mis “elavad” arvutiekraanil. Need 
kaks varianti erinevad eelkõige vastuvõtu modaalsuste poolest: virtuaal­
seid olendeid võib näha ja kuulda, aga materiaalseid mänguasju võib ka 
puudutada/kõmpida. Seetõttu osutub oluliseks puutetundlikkuse simulat­
sioon. Pakutava tüpoloogia täielikkuse huvides visandatakse kaks järg­
mist uurimisvaldkonda: tehisloomad väljaspool mängu ja “täisverelised 
tehisloomad” — elusad, kuid inimese poolt kujundatud ja loodud. Tehis­
loomade uurimine kuulub ökosemiootika valdkonda selle laias tähen­
duses, kuna nad on osa ökosüsteemidest, mis võivad ise olla ka virtuaal­
sed (nagu internet).
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An introduction to phytosemiotics: 
Semiotic botany and 
vegetative sign systems
Kalevi Kull
Dept, of Semiotics, University of Tartu,
Tiigi St. 78, 50410 Tartu, Estonia1 
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Abstract. Asking, whether plants have semiosis, the article gives a review 
of the works on phytosemiotics, referring to the tradition in botany that 
has seen plants as non-mechanic systems. This approach can use the con­
cept of biological need as the primary holistic process in living systems. 
Demonstrating the similarity between the need and semiosis, it is con­
cluded that sign is a meronomic entity. A distinction between five levels 
of sign systems is proposed: cellular, vegetative, animal, linguistic, and 
cultural. Vegetative sign systems are those which are responsible for the 
morphogenesis and differentiation within an organism, thus belonging to 
all multicellular organisms.
Eine ganz ähnliche Stufenfolge ist in den Pflanzen, nur mit 
dem Unterschiede, daß die hohem Formen fehlen, wo die 
Zeugung unter dem Einflüsse des Willens steht, weil der 
Wille und das gesammte animalische Leben den Pflanzen 
abgeht. Dagegen ist das Sprossen sehr gemein.
Karl Emst von Baer (1864: 45)
Why phytosemiotics? The problem of semiotic threshold
The question —  whether there is semiosis (a sign process) in plants, 
whether plants are ontologically semiotic systems —  is a decisive 
question for biosemiotics. Because, if the answer is negative, there 
will be no reason to progress further from zoosemiotics, there will be
1 Also: Institute o f  Zoology and Botany, Riia St. 181,51014 Tartu, Estonia.
no need to extend the study o f sign systems to the whole living world, 
to all o f biology, as biosemiotics has set out to do.2
In his book A Theory o f Semiotics, U. Eco has formulated the 
problem of semiotic threshold: ‘By natural boundaries I mean princi­
pally those beyond which a semiotic approach cannot go; for there is 
non-semiotic territory since there are phenomena that cannot be taken 
as sign-functions’ (Eco 1979: 6). At that time, Eco was quite certain 
about where this threshold is situated.3 He has stated: ‘One must un­
doubtedly exclude from semiotic consideration neurophysiological 
and genetic phenomena, as well as the circulation o f the blood or the 
activity of the lungs’ (Eco 1979: 21).
However, few years later, a group o f six leading semioticians pub­
lished a collective work in which they argued for the placement o f the 
semiotic threshold at the boundary o f life (Anderson et al. 1984). Ac­
cordingly, the whole o f biology was included into the semiotic realm.
Since then, research on biological sign processes has been growing 
quickly (for a review, see Kull 1999). Within the last two decades o f 
the development o f biosemiotics, it became widely accepted that the 
semiotic approach is an appropriate tool to describe all living systems, 
down to the first cells. There are many works in which the semiotic 
phenomena of the cellular level are analysed (Emmeche 1998, Hoff- 
meyer 2000, Kawade 1996, Pollack 1994). Quite naturally, semiotics 
of plants, or phytosemiotics,4 would be a part o f this enterprise.
In many semiotic reviews, the existence o f phytosemiotics is only 
mentioned, without real attempts to describe the theoretical models it 
can propose. For instance, W. Nöth (1990: 147) has remarked (al­
though, over a decade ago): ‘Whereas there has hardly ever been any 
doubt about the existence o f signs in the animal kingdom, the assump­
tion of semiosis in the sphere o f plants, defended by the proponents o f a 
new branch of semiotics called phytosemiotics, is still controversial’.
If, in the first edition o f his Handbook, W. Nöth still hesitates to 
speak about phytosemiotics, then, in the second edition, he has already 
included a paragraph ‘Exkurs zur Phytosemiotik’ (Nöth 2000: 258- 
259), to reflect the recent developments in biosemiotics. Also, when 
writing about ecosemiotics, he states that ‘dieses Gebiet der Semiotik
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See also the paper by W. Nöth in the current volume.
For instance, V. Colapietro (1993: 160) has defined it namely like this, very 
briefly: phytosemiotics is ‘the semiotics o f  plants’.
überschneidet sich mit der Kultursemiotik, der Biosemiotik einschli­
esslich der Phytosemiotik und der bisher nur ansatzweise existieren­
den Physikosemiotik’ (Nöth 2000: 250). In another work, Nöth (1994: 
51-52) writes about ‘spatial opposition in phytosemiosis’.
Since plants and animals do not cover all the non-human living 
world, it has naturally been asked whether we need additional terms 
for fungi, protists, and bacteria. ‘If the phytosemiotic sluice was 
opened, the argument ran, there would be no end to new semiotics —  
e.g., mycosemiotics, cytosemiotics, and so on’ (Krampen 1992: 213). 
Indeed, T. A. Sebeok (1997) has argued for using the corresponding 
terms for each o f the five kingdoms of life. Accordingly, reviews now 
exist about semiosis in unicellular organisms (Yates 1997) and fungi 
(Kraepelin 1997), in addition to the ones about animal semiosis.
Beside the problem o f semiotic threshold (i.e., the question, on 
which side o f the boundary plants belong), we, therefore, face, here, 
the next problem. This is the question, whether there may be anything 
special in plant semiosis in order to justify its distinction from the 
other fields o f biosemiotics (i.e., the problem o f distinction between 
semiotics o f different kingdoms).
It may be necessary to stress that under phytosemiotics we do not 
mean the semiotics o f botanical research, neither the existence of 
plants as signs in human communicative systems (the latter would still 
be a part o f ecosemiotics, cf. Kull 1998, Nöth 1998; see also Krampen 
1989)5, neither we will argue for any psychic phenomena in plants (cf. 
Nagel 1997). Our subject is confined to the question o f the existence 
o f (primitive) sign processes in plants. Phytosemiotics is the study o f 
semiosis in the realm o f plants. Also, we would like to exclude, here, 
the mechanisms which are general to almost all cells, and would like 
to focus on the semiotic phenomena which are specific to plants.
We use, here, the contemporary division o f plants, according to 
which the kingdom Plantae includes only multicellular organisms 
with cellulose cell walls (i.e., all bryophytes and vascular plants). 
Most algae belong to the kingdom Protista (except the blue-green 
ones, which belong to Bacteria).
Thus, we ask in this paper, whether the formulation o f phytosemi­
otics is justified, whether the inclusion o f botany into semiotics is well 
grounded. In order to do so, first, we will give a review o f the existing
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literature about phytosemiotics, and second, we will try to sketch 
some o f the characteristics o f its principal theoretical framework.
Twenty years of the term:
Martin Krampen’s phytosemiotic work
In 1981, the paper ‘Phytosemiotics’ by Martin Krampen, which 
coined the term phytosemiotics and argued for its rights to exist, was 
published in Semiotica (Krampen 1981). This paper has been reprinted 
(with few changes, Krampen 1986a) and very often referred to. Later, 
Krampen has published several new versions o f this paper (Krampen 
1986b, 1997a) and a few analyses o f some particular aspects o f his 
approach (Krampen 1992, 2001), in addition to his writings on various 
ecosemiotic aspects o f plants (Krampen 1994) and the usage o f plants 
in architecture (Schempp et al. 1997).
Krampen has described the appearance o f his view on the semiot­
ics of plants as follows:
The establishment of phytosemiotics as a specific field of inquiry grew 
out of my in-depth study of Jakob von UexkiiH’s ‘Theory of Meaning’7, 
which asserts that living beings down to the cell are ‘autonomous’ in their 
acceptance or refusal of signs from outside them, that there is a semiotic 
correspondence between the living organism and its specific surrounds 
(Umwelt), and that there is such a correspondence between the specific 
surrounds of different living beings according to a ‘plan of nature’. 
(Krampen 1992: 213)
In his 1981 paper Krampen gives a brief review of Uexküll’s biosemi­
otics and an analysis o f Uexküll’s view on the distinctive features of 
plants. He agrees with most o f Uexküll’s statements (e.g., the absence 
of effectors and receptors in plants, absence o f a functional cycle, 
casing instead of Umwelt, meaning factors instead o f meaning carri­
ers). Krampen refers to the recent work on plant receptors and plant 
hormones, but tends to conclude that ‘I would [...] like to maintain 
Jakob von Uexkiill’s conception denying plants the capacity o f spe­
cialized receptor organs, and rather apply to what are called receptors 
in the [...] literature the term ‘sensors’, according to the parlance o f 
cybernetics with respect to feedback cycles’ (Krampen 1981: 194).
I want to thank Dagmar Schmauks and Winfried Nöth for drawing my attention to 
few interesting papers.
7 Uexkiill 1940.
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Krampen also describes a few examples o f animal-plant relation­
ships, including the plant defence mechanisms against herbivores 
(Krampen 1981: 203-204).
The other topics in Krampen’s paper mainly concern human rela­
tionships to plants —  an area which does not say much about semiosis 
in plants themselves and would, thus, belong to ecosemiotics. He also 
provides quantitative data on the influence o f plant gas exchange on 
the dynamics o f oxygen concentration in a greenhouse, interpreting 
this in the context o f plants’ meaning for humans.
An interesting additional point made by Krampen states that 
plants’ signs are indexes, animal ones icons, and human ones symbols: 
‘in plants, indexicality certainly predominates over iconicity. [...] In- 
dexicality, on the vegetative level, corresponds to the sensing and 
regulating, in a feedback cycle, o f meaningful stimulation directly 
contiguous to the form o f the plant’ (Krampen 1981: 195-196).
In the later versions o f this paper, Krampen has added a few exam­
ples, e.g. on mimicry in plants (Krampen 1997a: 518), an apparently 
active defence by plants by sending chemical messages (Krampen 
1997a: 517), on plant semiochemicals which attract the parasite hosts 
o f the attacking caterpillars (Krampen 1992: 215), etc. The ecosemi- 
otic part, i.e. the analysis o f human-plant relationships, has also been 
developed. In a recent paper (Krampen 2001) the relationship between 
autotrophs and heterotrophs via oxygen and carbon dioxide has been 
given a semiotic interpretation.
The main point o f Krampen’s approach is formulated in his ‘phy- 
tosemiotic hypothesis’: ‘while plants are autonomous living be­
ings [...], their semiosis is different from that o f human and animal 
subjects in such a way that it merits its own semiotic analysis’ 
(Krampen 1981: 191-192). He also admits that ‘the difficulty o f this 
enterprise is to avoid anthropomorphizing the behavior o f plants and 
to adopt, as an observer, the correct "phytocentric" perspective’ 
(Krampen 1986b: 729).
Jakob von Uexkiill’s statements about plants
Jakob von Uexktill has written quite little about plants. In his Theore­
tische Biologie (Uexktill 1928) plants are almost not mentioned. How­
ever, in his late work (Uexkiill 1940) he attempts to include plants in 
his consideration, in order to reach his fundamental conclusion: ‘The
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question o f meaning is, therefore, the crucial one to all living beings’ 
(Uexküll 1982: 37). Below are a few statements about plants from this 
study.
Both animals and plants build living houses for themselves, i.e. their 
bodies, with whose help they lead their existence. [...] The plant has no 
nervous system, receptors, or effectors; therefore, no meaning-carriers, 
functional circle, perceptual, or effector cues exist for the plant. [...] The 
houses of plants lack mobility. Because they possess neither receptor nor 
effector organs, plants are not able to construct and be in command of an 
Umwelt.
The plant possesses no special Umwelt organs, but is immersed di­
rectly in its habitat. The relationships of the plant with its habitat are alto­
gether different from those of the animals with their Umwelten. The 
building-plans of animals and plants are the same in only one respect. 
Both select precisely from among the stimuli that impinge upon them 
from the environment. (Uexküll 1982: 33)
Although plants may not have Umwelt, their relationship to the habitat 
is nevertheless different from the one o f  non-living things —  it uses 
meaning. Thus, in the place o f Umwelt, Uexküll uses the word 
Wohnhiille for plants.
Essential [lebenswichtige] stimuli also exist for plants; they emerge as 
meaning-factors out of all of those that impinge upon them from all sides. 
The plant encounters these stimuli, not with the help of receptor or effec­
tor organs, but because it has a living cell-layer that enables it to make its 
choice of stimuli from the dwelling-integument [Wohnhülle].8 (Uexküll 
1982: 34)
According to Uexküll, plants can utilise meaning via their form.
In the case of a plant, one cannot speak of functional circles. However, the 
meaning of the plant’s organs (which also consist of living cells) lies in 
the utilization of the meaning-factors of its dwelling-integument 
[Wohnhülle]. It masters this task due to its shape, built according to a 
plan, and the exquisite organization of its components. (Uexküll 1982: 36)
He also gives few examples.
[...] the shapes of the plants and trees are adapted to the meaning-factor, 
wind, which they use in various ways to disperse their seed. [...] The rain 
is caught in the gutters of the tree-leaves, and is guided to the delicate 
root-ends under the earth. The sunlight is caught by the chlorophyll-
K The translation o f  the last sentence, here, is slightly different from the one o f  1982; 
cf. Uexküll 1940: 10.
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containing cells of the plant and is used for carrying out an intricate 
chemical process. The chlorophyll is not synthesized by the sun, nor is the 
gutter the product of the rain. (Uexküll 1982: 37)
The example o f the form o f tree foliage which directs rainfall towards 
the root tips is the one that Uexküll uses also in several other instances 
(Uexküll 1982:49-51 ,53).
Plants in other biosemiotic studies
As an important part o f biology, botany should also have been in­
cluded as subject matter in other works in the field o f biosemiotics. 
However, plants, despite being most remarkable and common biotic 
components, have appeared very seldom as examples on the pages of 
these treatises.
John Deely, who has commented Krampen’s paper in several of 
his writings (Deely 1986, 1990), has coined the term physiosemiosis to 
denote the role o f semiosis in evolution in general, including the non­
living world, ‘whereby the physical interaction o f existing things is 
channelled toward a future different from what obtains at the time of 
the affected interaction’ (Deely 1990: 30). When speaking about 
plants, he emphasises an old tradition o f thought according to which 
‘the life o f plant exists within the animal itself precisely as base and 
part o f its proper life’ (Deely 1990: 97). Still, he hesitates to assign 
plants an ability o f actual semiosis.
Rich as are the results of this method in Krampen’s hands, I am not con­
vinced that they succeed in establishing phytosemiotics on an equal foot­
ing. Or, to put it another way, I am not convinced that the communication 
among plants and between plants and the physical environment and the 
communication between plants and animals is, on the side of the plants 
themselves, fully an actual process of semiosis, such as it certainly is on 
the side of the animals. (Deely 1990: 98-99)
Deely also says that ‘from Krampen’s work I am convinced o f phyto­
semiotics, but not o f phytosemiosis’ (Deely 1986: 103). This view is 
connected to ‘a distinction between communication, which is virtually 
semiotic, and actual signification proper’ (Deely 1990: 99). According 
to Deely (1990: 99), virtual semiosic phenomena involve thirdness 
latently, and he includes, here, endosemiotic, physiological and tropic 
phenomena, calling them all vegetative.
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Few interesting points are added by Thure von Uexkiill (1986: 
211), who says about vegetative signs that ‘they are not signs for oc­
currences outside the plants, as there is no "outside" for vegetative 
systems.’ He also writes:
Plants are solipsistic systems. Since they do not know about objects there 
is no point of describing them as subjects. They are only able to distin­
guish ‘se lf  and ‘nonself. The signs which enable them to do this are 
iconic signs, i.e. perceptual signs for a decrease, operational signs for an 
increase of the similarity to ‘se lf . [...]
These facts also apply to the systems within our body. Cells are solip­
sistic systems as well, and endosemiotic signs are iconic signs of such 
systems. (T. v. Uexkiill 1986: 211)
Jesper Hoffmeyer, in all his biosemiotic writings, has said remarkably 
little about plants (except for a few comments on Wohnhülle on the 
basis o f Uexkiill 1940, and references to some o f Krampen’s exam­
ples). However, he has argued for the existence o f semiosis in cells, 
and, using the writing o f A. Rayner (1997), has attempted to prove 
that fungi have semiosis (Hoffmeyer 2000).
I want to emphasise, here, a surprising controversy. Namely, when 
most authors, including Uexkiill himself, state that plants have no 
Umwelt, they, at the same time, can attribute an Umwelt to some uni­
cellular organisms. For instance, Uexkiill describes the Umwelt o f 
Paramecium, (Uexkiill 1992: 342), and the Umwelt and Umwelttunnel 
of a parasitic microbe Plasmodium vivax (Uexkiill 1922), unicellular 
organisms which both belong to the kingdom Protista.
The basic reason why it seems easy to speak about the Umwelt o f 
unicellulars is evidently the distinguishability o f their receptors and 
effectors. They have membrane receptors, and a flagella or cilia for 
moving their body. And even in the case when a cell cannot actively 
move, it has several other means to operate, for instance a mechanism 
for excretion. But the latter may also exist in plant cells. If  so, then we 
can conclude that at least plant cells may have Umwelt. And if their 
cells have it, why not the organism as a whole?
Accordingly, we are reaching a hypothesis that the reason why 
plant Umwelt has usually been denied is because these authors have 
not studied plants in all the necessary detail.9 It may, thus, still be that 
plants possess an Umwelt, although a different kind.
Indeed, the authors cited (J. v. Uexkiill, M. Krampen, J. Hoffmeyer) are not bota­
nists.
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The problem is difficult not only for semiotics but also for biology. 
Ethology, the study o f organisms’ behaviour, only quite seldom de­
votes a chapter to the behaviour o f plants. Neither has cognitive ecol­
ogy (Real 1993) spoken about plants.
Vegetative sign systems:
Semiotic phenomena in the botanical field
Krampen (1997a: 511) writes: ‘What plants do have in any event are 
feedback cycles connecting sensors and regulators’. And he adds: 
‘Whether these processes satisfy Tembrock’s (1975) strict definition, 
requiring a function cycle and signalling systems, is still too early to 
say. Phytosemiotics should one day be able to answer this question’ 
(Krampen 1997a: 517). Thus, the question seems to converge very 
much in the precise definition o f functional cycle. Still, most biosemi- 
oticians agree that Uexküll’s (1992: 320-321) famous example about 
the behaviour o f a tick represents a functional cycle. If this very sim­
ple reaction chain o f a tick can be considered to be semiosic, then a 
plant ecophysiologist may evidently propose many examples o f com­
parable compexity from his field. Below, we list a few common phe­
nomena in plants that may be interpreted as functional cycles or their 
necessary components.
Plant movements
The statement that animals move and plants do not is scientifically in­
correct. It is well-known that many plants can move their flowers or 
leaves towards a source o f light, they can open and close their flowers, 
they move tendrils, the shoot and root apexes can turn if the gravita­
tional field changes direction, etc. However, there is also an important 
difference between the movement o f plants and animals, and, thus, a 
more correct statement says: most animals possess organs which can 
move the whole body, whereas plants cannot actively move the whole 
organism (except through growth) and may move actively only some of 
their parts. Thus, what is lacking in plants is not an active movement, 
but an active locomotion over distances (cf. Krampen 1997a: 511).
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Darwin has written a large work about plant movements (Darwin 
1865). He has also picked up some profound similarities between 
animal and plant movements:
When the nerves and muscles of an animal are excited by galvanism or by 
the absorption of strychnine, the consequent movements may be called an 
incidental result, for the nerves and muscles have not been rendered spe­
cially sensitive to these stimuli. So with plants it appears that, from having 
the power of movement in obedience to certain stimuli, they are excited in 
an incidental manner by a touch, or by being shaken. Hence there is no 
great difficulty in admitting that in the case of leaf-climbers and tendril- 
bearers, it is this tendency which has been taken advantage of and in­
creased through natural selection. (Darwin 1872: 178)
However, Darwin’s main interest concerned the explanation of the 
evolutionary origin of these phenomena, and not the dissection of their 
proper mechanism.
Plant and animal movements differ remarkably in time scale. 
Plants are usually very slow in their reactions. This may be a reason 
why the behaviour of plant organisms cannot usually be recognised as 
meaningful per se. Thus, in order to make the plants’ reactions recog­
nisable to the human eye, one has to use speed photography, for ex­
ample (cf. the emphasis made by Uexküll (1928) on the importance of 
cinematography for behavioural research).
According to the relationships to the source of excitation, the organ 
movements have been classified as tropic, nastic, and autonomic 
movements. In the case of tropisms, the movement depends on the 
direction of the signal, whereas the nastic movements are independent 
of the direction of the excitant. Autonomic movements do not require 
any external signal.10
An encyclopedic work by Haupt and Feinleib (1979) provides 
many examples of plant movement, also demonstrating, for example, 
the data which shows the availability of actomyosin in plant cells and 
the mechanism of contractile motor cells in Mimosa.
Thus, many cases are known where plant organs present an active 
movement which is coordinated with the whole life process of the in­
dividual. And ‘a careful reconsideration of plant mobility might lead
10 The terminology o f tropisms was developed particularly by Jacques Loeb, who 
distinguished between chemo-, helio-, geo-, etc. tropisms. Uexküll (1936) strongly 
criticized Loeb’s approach, because the latter seemed to claim that the factors o f  
movement are situated in the environment and not in the organism itself.
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to the hypothesis that there could be more to information seeking in 
plants than hitherto believed’ (Krampen 1997a: 508).
P lan t recep to rs and effectors: R ecogn ition  in p lan ts
There exist many examples o f mechanisms in plants where certain 
external signals are recognised by specialised cells or other plant 
structures, followed by a reaction chain that leads to an adaptive re­
sponse in the same, or sometimes in another, organ o f the plant. Here 
belongs, for instance, graviperception, which regulates the direction of 
growth in shoot and root tips (Volkmann, Sievers 1979). Another ex­
ample can be the adaptive formation o f reaction-wood as a result of 
changes in mechanical tension in root or shoot tissues (Wilson, Archer 
1977). The third example may be the release o f abscisic acid in roots in 
drying soil, which leads to stomatal closure and thus saves the plant from 
desiccation (Davies, Zhang 1991). There also exist photoreceptors, 
which are different from chlorophyll, reacting to certain light parameters 
and regulating plant differentiation.
Let us consider the following experiment with a seedling growing 
in complete darkness (on the resources either taken from the seed or 
mycotrophically from fungi). Due to gravitropism its shoot grows 
vertically. Let the pot with the seedling be covered by a cap which has 
two holes in it, both at some angle from the shoot. From one o f these 
holes, we will give a low intensity radiation o f a frequency that cannot 
be used for photosynthesis. The result may be that the shoot turns and 
grows through the irradiated hole. This experiment can be interpreted 
as demonstrating the adaptive response o f a plant, where the plant uses 
the radiation o f one kind as a sign for a possible light source suitable 
for photosynthesis. It demonstrates that the seedling is able to choose 
the direction o f growth.
Thus, plants have selectively reacting structures that forward the 
signal to target mechanisms for a co-ordinated response.
Intercellular communication: 
cellular recognition and functional differentiation
In bacteria and protists, it is a common phenomenon that in natural 
conditions a new organism can develop in full from a single cell that
is totally separated from any other cell o f that kind o f organism. In 
fungi, this also occurs, e.g. via conidia —  the unicellular forms of 
vegetative reproduction. From conidia new mycelium can develop, 
which will form its own conidia, and so ad infinitum. In animals, this 
is not possible in natural conditions —  in order to develop into a mul- 
ticellular organism, a cell must have some communication with some 
other cells o f its kind. In laboratory conditions the development o f an 
organism from a single separated cell can be achieved, but this means 
that the natural communicative signals required for this in natural 
conditions will be replaced by artificial ones specially created in the 
growth media by the researcher. All vascular plants are, in this re­
spect, similar to animals. However, in bryophytes it is possible that a 
new plant develops from a separated single-cell spore. This new plant 
can then reproduce vegetatively, via multicellular means, but it cannot 
produce new spores, and thus the full life cycle cannot occur. Thus, in 
all plants (as well as in all animals), the permanence o f the intercel­
lular communication system is an obligatory requirement for the life 
cycle to run. In most other large taxa this is not the case, since there 
exist many examples from the kingdoms of bacteria, protists, and 
fungi, where the intercellular communication system can be recreated 
anew, in natural conditions, from a single separate cell.
The role o f intercellular communication concerns very much the 
overall regulation o f growth and reproduction in most organisms. For 
instance, in the apical meristems o f plants, the intercellular connec­
tions are considerably reduced in comparison to most differentiated 
tissues. Similarly, unlimited or malignant growth in animal tissues 
often occurs when the intercellular contacts (e.g., the cell-to-cell rec­
ognition mechanisms) are not working. Thus, decontextualisation is 
often related to the loss o f growth control (Kull 1998: 353).
Differentiation, the formation o f different types o f cells in a tissue or 
a cell population, as a rule, is a result o f certain communication mecha­
nisms. If these do not work, the differentiation cannot take place.
Inter-organismal communicative structures: 
sexual recognition and symbiosis
Plants do have sex and sexual organs. This means that male and fe­
male gametes have to find and specifically recognise each other. If the 
gametes belong to different individuals —  which is frequent in
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plants —  the result will be biparental reproduction, and, consequently, 
the individuals categorise themselves into biological species. It has 
been demonstrated earlier that categorisation on the basis o f selective 
recognition can be interpreted as a general phenomenon in semiotic 
systems (Kull 1992, 1993). Communication is responsible for the 
emergence o f certain spatial or temporal structures —  communicative 
structures —  among which the biological species is one example.
It can be seen, particularly among plants, that there may also exist 
such taxa (i.e., o f the above-species rank, usually o f the level ‘subgen­
era’) that do not include any biological species. These are the cases 
where biparental reproduction has been lost (e.g., in Hieracium). 
Among animals, no good examples o f this kind are known.
Among the communicative relationships between the specimens of 
different species, the most well-known examples belong to symbiotic 
or parasitic relationships. These exist between different plant species 
(e.g., between Cuscuta and Urtica), but even more widespread are 
those between plants and fungi (e.g., mycorrhiza) or plants and bacte­
ria (e.g., Trifolium and Rhizobium). The statement that every symbio­
sis represents a semiosis has been repeatedly expressed in biosemiotic 
literature (see for instance Anderson et al. 1984, Kull 1999b).
Plant-animal relationships have seemingly been the area most often 
used for finding examples o f communication-like phenomena in plants. 
This especially concerns plant pollination mechanisms, which show a 
great variety o f fascinating forms. Darwin has studied several examples 
o f plant-animal relationships, particularly those related to pollination by 
insects and the behaviour o f insectivorous plants (Darwin 1875, 1984). 
He has pointed out the richness in plant forms, which is comparable to 
that o f animals, e.g., in his book about orchids (Darwin 1984: 1): ‘The 
object o f the following work is to show that the contrivances by which 
Orchids are fertilised, are as varied and almost as perfect as any o f the 
most beautiful adaptations in the animal kingdom.’
Mimicry in plants
Mimicry is one o f those rare phenomena which have been counted as 
semiotic even by those researchers who generally do not accept that 
biosphere may be included into the semiotic sphere (cf. Maran 1999). 
The reason for this comes from the apparent and evident deception 
process that is the core o f mimicry. However, most o f the impressive
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examples o f mimicry come from the animal kingdom. If a plant is in­
volved in a mimicry situation, then it may not be clear whether the 
whole adaptive evolution could not be attributed only to the animal 
partner. Still, there are several examples, described, which are hard to 
interpret without an active adaptation from the side o f the plant (for a 
review, see Wickler 1968, Wiens 1978, Komärek 1998: 279-283).
‘The meaning-utilisation by form’ reconsidered
One of the interpretations o f Uexkiill’s example o f the oak-tree and 
rain is as follows:
To put it in the common semiotic terminology: the leaf’s [actually, the 
crown’s —  K. K.] form is the interpretant and the physical behavior of the 
raindrop [or rain] is the signifier. The code coupling leaf and raindrop [or, 
tree crown and rainfall] is the oak tree’s need of liquid for transporting 
nourishing salts into its cells. (Krampen 1997a: 512)
If this situation is viewed in detail, one may notice that the growth of 
roots depends on the distribution o f water in the soil. If the moisture 
conditions are more suitable in the region o f the crown’s edge projec­
tion on the ground, then this will also be the region o f maximum den­
sity of fine roots, due to the sensitivity o f roots to moisture. Therefore, 
what we have here is an example o f a functional cycle, where the 
shortage o f water leads to root elongation, until the roots reach the site 
with sufficient moisture. Further on, the same roots supply the leaves 
with water, and the crown can grow in diameter only if the roots have 
reached the suitable spatial distribution. Thus, indeed, the correspon­
dence between the spatial placement o f leaves and roots will be 
achieved due to a functional relationship that has originated from a 
specific biological need.
Biological needs, vegetative needs, and semiosis
A basic problem that still remains is: what makes the phenomena, de­
scribed above, different from usual physical feedback mechanisms. 
Why it is not sufficient to apply a (bio)physical description to them, 
why do we in addition need a semiotic one?
Limiting myself to referring to the studies which argue for the ho­
listic features o f living processes (Elsasser 1998, Rosen 1991) or de-
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scribe in detail the characteristics o f biological semiosis (Emmeche 
1998, Hoffmeyer 2000, Sharov 1999), I will further analyse here the 
notion o f biological need.
Life starts with needs. An existence o f needs can be taken as a dis­
tinctive characteristic o f living systems. If  all the needs o f an organism 
or its cells are removed, it will become a dead body.
Despite o f its wide usage in biological literature, biologists lack a 
scientific definition o f biological need. In order to go on in the discus­
sion, I define this notion, here, using semi-cybernetic terminology: a 
need is an expected input which regulates the output until the input 
reaches what it has expected. Thus, need is a situation when lack o f 
something regulates operation for its sake.
This corresponds nicely to the explanation o f the word need given, 
e.g., in the W ebster’s Dictionary. Need is defined simultaneously as 
(1) something necessary, useful, or desirable, and as (2) a lack of 
something necessary, useful, or desirable.
A stone does not have needs. When we say that a car needs petrol in 
order to move, then this is not the car itself which needs petrol, but the 
petrol is needed due to a human who wants to drive. However, plants 
themselves need light in order to assimilate carbon dioxide and grow.
Need is not just a feedback, in the same way that functional cycle is 
not just a feedback. In the case o f functional cycle, the output is not 
deterministically caused by input; the input is related to that particular 
output due to the ‘input expected’. The lack of expected input is related 
to certain output because it stands for the expected input.11 Thus the 
functional cycle is rather feed-forward, in the sense o f Robert Rosen.
What distinguishes an action o f physical cause from an action of 
sign, is that in the latter the effect that follows is not due to this cause, 
but is only explainable through something it stands for. In this way we 
can see the similarity between semiosis and the process o f need.
11 One may ask whether there exist any 'unexpected inputs’ for an organism? The 
answer is, certainly —  yes. All those factors, for which an organism has no system of  
recognition or perception, i.e. which cannot be recognised by the organism, are in this 
sense ’unexpected’. This may be a sound for a deaf, or X-rays for an animal. The 
boundary between the ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ in this sense coincides with the 
boundary o f  Umwelt and non-Umwelt in the sense o f  Uexküll. On the other hand, the 
’unexpected’ input also can change the organism’s behaviour, like in the case o f dam­
age caused by X-rays. Therefore, for an observer, a resulting change in behaviour can­
not be a sufficient criterion for the distinction between the ‘expected’ and ’unexpected 
inputs. Cf. also Barham 2000: 16.
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Still, a few other conditions need to be fulfilled in order to consti­
tute a sign relation, or a need. First, one and the same factor has to be 
able to cause several different effects in the same system. Otherwise it 
is simply a physical factor, and cannot be a sign vehicle. And second, 
several different factors have to be able to lead to one and the same 
effect in the system. Otherwise one o f the factors cannot stand for 
something else. Thus, the relation, or mapping, between the factor and 
effect has to be both one-to-many and many-to-one, in order to make a 
sign relation possible.12
And yet this is not enough. There should also be a memory. Mem­
ory means a capacity to store and to forget. That is, it should be possi­
ble that a current effect has an influence on an effect which will take 
place later, as a result o f the same factors. If so, then we have the nec­
essary conditions for a learning event to take place. It is a secondary 
problem, here, whether the memory is realised as a genetic, or epige­
netic, or a neural one.
If life is just the operation o f needs, then it might be possible to 
view biology as an analysis o f needs.
A feedback in a mechanistic homeostat is a deterministic cycle. 
When a need appears, it will be indeterminate (cf. the discussion about 
the indeterminacy in Hoffmeyer 2000). During the formation o f a 
sign, or a need, the connection between the input and output becomes 
canalized. But despite canalization, the potential multitude remains, 
and this enables the search to occur. A potential to make a search, or 
to seek, is evidently a general feature o f functional cycles.
Thus, the organic forces are needs. And certain basic needs are 
those that descend. Biological evolution (as well as development), 
consequently, can be viewed as the differentiation o f needs.
Need is also a holistic feature, being something emergent. The ho­
listic behaviour o f need follows also from its mapping relation, as de­
scribed above. Differentiation o f needs, therefore, is like differentia­
tion of a whole into parts. Needs are characterised, usually, as biologi­
cal functions.13 Thus, when a function is differentiating, then the 
functional connection does not disappear. And if  this is true, then the 
functional connection can be kept even, for instance, in the differen-
1 One can notice that these conditions are fulfilled for enzyme systems, as well as 
for neural nets.
1 1 his corresponds well to the functional explanation o f  biological traits via viability 
explanation. ‘Viability explanations relate traits o f  organisms and their environments 
in terms o f what an individual needs’ (Wouters 1995: 435).
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tiation o f organisms into autotrophs and heterotrophs. This is 
Krampen’s last example about the connectedness between plants and 
animals via mutual supply.
From the identification between needs and signs, or the need proc­
ess and semiosis, as we have argued above, we now receive a fasci­
nating statement: sign is always a part — a meron.
If so, then we can draw a line from a biological need to all possible 
types o f  signs, and also say that biological purpose originates from 
vegetative needs.14
When Deely (1990) finds that the most general phenomenon re­
lated to semiosis o f any kind is evolution, I would argue that evolu­
tion, as a temporal change, may also occur without the involvement of 
any semiosis, as it appears in the evolution o f stars or many other non­
living dynamic systems, or in certain cases probably also in the evolu­
tionary changes o f living systems. A more appropriate candidate for a 
generally semiotic process may be a need, as it occurs in all organ­
isms, beginning from cells.
Following the definition o f need, above, one can hypothesise that 
the principal difference between plants and animals, in the functional 
aspect, has something to do with the form o f expected input. In case of 
animals, these are usually much more complex, due to the integrating 
power o f nervous system. For instance, it is probably unthinkable that 
the expected input may be temporally structured in the case o f plants, 
whereas it often is so for animal perceptual signs.
Meronomy of signs and needs
Classification can be carried out in two ways. If we classify independ­
ent objects, we carry out taxonomy, and get taxa. But if we classify 
parts o f a whole, this is meronomy, where we make a distinction be­
tween merons. Thus, in the case o f the classification o f sign vehicles, 
we have taxonomy, whereas when classifying signs as components of
14 One can see here certain similarity to some statements o f  the botanist and geneti­
cist E. Sinnott (1950), who has argued that there seems to be in every living organism a 
sense o f  its inner subjective relation to its bodily organization that guides and controls 
vital activities towards specific ends. In other words, "the pattern or tension set up in 
protoplasm, which so sensitively regulates its growth and behaviour, can also be expe­
rienced, and this is the genesis o f  desire, purpose, and all other mental activities" (Sin­
nott 1950: 48).
An introduction to phytosemiotics 343
a sign system, we have to carry out meronomy (Meyen 1977, 1990, 
Schreider 1983).
Taxonomic classifications are based on various similarity relations. 
Context may have only secondary importance in taxonomy. Mero- 
nomic classification describes the functional differentiation o f a sys­
tem. Context cannot be broken in merons, because, through this, the 
relationship with the whole is kept.
‘A difference that makes a difference’ is a well-known definition 
of information by Gregory Bateson, but this is also the basis o f any 
functional classification. Meaningful information is always ‘a part o f .  
This is exactly the difference between structural and meaningful in­
formation. If there is no part-whole relation, there is no meaning. Still, 
without any ontological part-whole relationship, the measurement o f 
structural information is applicable.
Meaning is made by part-whole relations, and, therefore, semiotics 
is meronomy. There is no signification without functional differentia­
tion.
What is said here about sign, also belongs to the concept o f need.
Typology of sign systems: Vegetative sign systems
A problem that semiotic biology faces from the very beginning is ter­
minological. Starting, e.g., with the process-structure dichotomy, the 
biology of the last half century is not well fitted to the holistic under­
standing of its objects.
Until the beginning o f the 20th century, the distinction between 
vegetative, animal, and intellectual phenomena was well accepted in 
biology. The analysis o f instinct, as different from both vegetative and 
intellectual aspects o f life, constituted a developed part o f scientific 
discourse and o f the professional biological intuition. However, since 
this distinction has not been supported by corresponding principal 
classes o f biological mechanisms, it disappeared, step by step, from 
the textbooks and biological theory. Another reason for this change is 
seemingly connected to the fall o f the teleological view that has 
largely served as a basis for that approach.
There has been a well-known debate about the concepts o f primary 
and secondary modelling systems. According to the initial formulation 
by Lotman, language is the primary modelling system, whereas cul­
ture comprises the secondary one. Later, Sebeok has argued that there
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exists a zoosemiotic system which has to be called the primary one, 
leaving the secondary status to language, and the tertiary one to cul­
ture (e.g., Sebeok 1994). Sebeok’s view has been supported by many 
later authors (cf. Moriarty 1994).
Now, speaking about the sign systems in plants, we are facing the 
problem of the inappropriancy o f this classification again, due to the 
great differences between animal and vegetative signs.
It is seemingly appropriate to distinguish between sign systems and 
modelling systems. The modelling relation assumes an ability to imi­
tate. Plants cannot imitate. But what plants have is a readiness toward 
certain events in their surroundings. Considering, as stated above, that 
plants do use signs, we are reaching a new classification, which is dif­
ferent for sign systems and modelling systems.
Thus, we can distinguish between five levels o f sign systems.
1) Cellular sign systems. This is the sign system o f any bacterial cell. 
Its characteristic processes are enzymatic recognition and membrane 
reactions. Its inheritance system combines the epigenetic and genetic. 
Described, e.g., by T. v. Uexküll (1985: 104-106); cell has no Um­
welt, but dwelling integument ( Wohnhülle). It is characterised by mi- 
crosemiosis. According to Yates (1997: 458), microsemiosis ‘does not 
address communication between cells or among cell complexes’.
2) Vegetative sign systems. This includes the communication between 
the tissues in multicellular organism. It is the system that is responsi­
ble for the genesis o f multicellular biological form, the whole mor­
phology o f the body. The basic inheritance system here is epigenetic. 
Morphogenesis and cell differentiation are its typical representatives. 
In this sense, vegetative sign systems are not confined to plants — 
they may occur in all multicellular organisms.
3) Animal sign systems. This is the senso-neuro-muscular system, the 
one that is responsible for the behaviour o f a motile animal organism. 
The basic inheritance system, here, is neuro-humoral (or behavioural, 
according to Jablonka et al. 1998). Its characteristic feature is the ex­
istence o f complex Umwelt.
4) Linguistic sign systems. This corresponds to the primary modelling 
system (natural language), according to Lotman (or secondary model­
ling systems, by Sebeok 1994). Differently to the animal sign system, 
it has syntactic signs (Bickerton 1990), and is principally symbolic 
(Deacon 1997). Its characteristic feature is the existence o f symbolic 
language.
5) Cultural sign systems. This corresponds to the secondary modelling 
systems, according to Lotman (or tertiary modelling systems, accord­
ing to Sebeok 1994). Their characteristic features include the exis­
tence o f artistic, ideological, ethical, etc. structures.
This, or similar, type o f hierarchy has, o f course, been proposed ear­
lier, many times. Here, the distinctive aspect and emphasis is placed 
on the basic differences in semiotic features and characteristics of 
these levels.
A history o f this typology goes back, for instance, to the classical 
distinction between anima vegetativa, anima sensitiva, and anima ra­
tionale. Already the doctrine o f Thomas Aquinas included a view that 
in the first stage of embryonic development, the vital principle has 
merely vegetative powers; then a sensitive soul comes into being, 
educed from the evolving potencies o f the organism —  later yet, this 
is replaced by the perfect rational soul, which is essentially immaterial 
and so postulates a special creative act (cf. Ingensiep 1999). Thus, this 
whole story about the semiotic phenomena o f plants is very much 
reminiscent of an old discussion, where the schoolmen assign some 
sort of soul, an anima vegetativa, to plants, whereas others have 
thought that soul goes no further than consciousness.
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Conclusion
Certainly, there are many other phenomena, in plants, which can be 
treated as the semiotic ones. The aim o f this work was to describe few 
better-known examples, in order to demonstrate the existence o f 
semiosis in plants, and accordingly, to argue for botany as a semiotic 
discipline. The living process, which is interconnected via needs, so 
much as it requires wholeness, has to be treated holistically. However, 
this is only one side o f the coin. The extension o f the concept o f 
semiosis over biology requires, simultaneously, a clear understanding 
of differences between the types o f semiosis.15 Only then, theoretical 
botany cannot be developed for long without taking into account the 
fundamental semioticity o f its major subject. And this may lead to a 
better understanding o f what is sign.
h In this, the arguments for vegetative semiosis differ from the statements, for in­
stance, about the ‘Intelligenz der Blumen’ (Maeterlinck 1907), or the equality o f  life 
and cognition (Heschl 1990).
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Введение в фитосемиотику: 
семиотическая ботаника и 
вегетативные знаковые системы
В статье исследуется вопрос о наличии у растений семиозиса. Статья 
дает обзор имеющихся работ по фитосемиотике, связывая ее с бота­
нической традицией, рассматривающей растения как немеханиче­
ские системы. Такой подход позволяет использовать понятие биоло­
гической потребности как первичного холистического процесса в 
живых системах. Демонстрируя сходство потребности и семиозиса, 
автор приходит к заключению, что знак —  это мерономическая 
единица. Выделяются пять уровней знаковых систем: клеточная, 
вегетативная, анимальная, лингвистическая и культурная. Вегетатив­
ные знаковые системы участвуют в морфогенезе и дифференциации 
организма и встречаются во всех многоклеточных организмах.
Sissejuhatus fütosemiootikasse: 
semiootiline botaanika ja vegetatiivsed märgisüsteemid
Artiklis uuritakse küsimust, kas taimedel esineb sem ioosis. Antakse üle­
vaate senistest fütosem iootika käsitlustest, seostades seda traditsiooniga 
botaanikas, mis vaatleb taimi kui mittemehhaanilisi süsteeme. See lähene­
mine lubab kasutada bioloogilise vajaduse mõistet, nähes selles esmast 
holistlikku protsessi elussüsteemides. Näidates vajaduse ja semioosise 
sarnasust, järeldatakse ühtlasi, et märk on meronoomiline üksus. Erista­
takse viit märgisüsteemide tasandit: raku, vegetatiivne, animaalne, ling­
vistiline ja kultuuriline. Vegetatiivsed märgisüsteemid on need, mis osa­
levad organismi m orfogeneesis ja diferentseerumises, esinedes seega 
kõigil hulkraksetel organismidel.
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Abstract. Prodi’s semiotics theory comes into being to answer a radical 
question: if a sign is a cross-reference, what guarantees the relation be­
tween the sign and the object to which it is referring? Prodi rebukes all 
traditional solutions: a subject’s voluntary intention, a convention, the 
iconic relation between sign and object. He refutes the first answer be­
cause the notion of intention, upon which it is based, is, indeed, a fully 
mysterious entity. The conventionalist answer is just as unsatisfactory for 
it does nothing but extends to a whole group that which cannot be ex­
plained for a single component; the iconic one, finally, is rejected too 
since in this case the notion of “likeliness”, as the basis of the concept of 
“iconicity”, is not explained. Prodi’s answer is to locate the model of se­
miotic relations in the figure of the circle. The circle is life, which is 
nothing else but an infinite chain of translation and recognition relations 
amidst ever more complex systems. The circle has neither a beginning nor 
an end. It has no foundation, no established rule. It holds no cause that 
cannot become, in turn, effect. Semiosis, then, is based upon life for life, 
itself, is intrinsically semiotic. We can put the world in signs, that is we 
can come to know it, because we, ourselves, are a part of that very world 
that through us is made known. Finally, what this implies is that being in­
side the circle of semiosis-life, an issue arises what is beyond that circle: 
that is both an aesthetic and a religious problem.
Introduction
Giorgio Prodi (1928—1987)1 was, first of all, a scientist, an oncologist. 
It was as a scientist that he started questioning himself on the purpose
Biographical note. Giorgio Prodi was bom in Scandiano (Reggio Emilia), in 1928 
and died in 1987. In 1952 he graduated in Medicine, and later on in Chemistry as well, 
at the University o f Bologna. From 1958 he taught in the same city general pathology
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of his own activities. The things he would do when planning an ex­
periment, how he went about doing those things, what his findings 
were —  when the experiment was successful, that is to say, what was 
the nature of the object around which the experiment centered, and, 
mostly, on why knowledge was possible.
Traditionally, the issue of knowledge is presented, when reduced 
to its most elementary terms, as justifying the relationship between the 
one who knows —  the subject —  and what that knowledge is about, 
the object. How can the subject, which is free, meaning moved by rea­
son, conscious, and active, know about the object, that, on the con­
trary, is moved by causes, thus falling under determinism, and is brute 
and passive matter? The problem of consciousness would be on how 
to reconciliate these two opposite poles, separated by a fundamental 
dualism. Posed in such terms there is no answer to this question, for 
however many attempts are being made, the object shall always be too 
far from the subject: if the subject is separated from the object, due to 
the fact it is made of matter different from the one of the object (as 
according to the current Cartesian vulgata, that would be the res 
cogitans in respect to the res extensa) or because it responds to differ­
ent principles (the former acts when reasons move it, the latter follows 
causes), being it operates according to different modes than the ones 
on which the object functions (the former is active, the latter is pas­
sive), etc. Well, in all of these cases there is no sound justification to 
be had for the fact, as far-fetched as it may be, that knowledge is pos­
sible, and that the subject is seemingly able to interact efficiently with 
the world (McDowell 1994).
It is to this question, instead, that Prodi gave an apparently simple, 
and for this very reason, radical answer. His answer, instead of pre­
suming dualism and discontinuity, rather takes into account the as­
sumption of biological unity and continuity: “knowledge has 
‘stemmed’ from things, and it can come to know about these as in so 
much as it is measured on them due to its own same origin” (Prodi 
1974: 134).2
We are not the ones, as presumptuous subjects, to know the object, 
rather things alone let themselves be known by us. We are nothing but
and then experimental oncology. From 1973 he directed the Institute o f  Cancerology of 
his university. In addition to a vast experimental scientific bibliography (more than 300 
publications), he has published novels and poetry works.
“La conoscenza e 'venuta ftiori’ dalle cose, e le puõ conoscere in quanto ё dimen- 
sionata su di esse a causa della sua stessa origine”.
the ultimate transformation of other things, linked, in turn, to many 
others, and so on, all the way up to those very things we are presently 
knowing. The world does not account for an a priori distinction be­
tween subjects and objects which are separated and differ from each 
other, but only on more or less complex systems, all tied to an articu­
lated web of relations that coincides with life (and semiosis and, 
hence, with knowledge, as we will see). If dualism is based upon a 
pattern entailing two separate poles that counter each other, Prodi’s 
model is a biological one, concerning the evolution of living forms. In 
this model there are no halts but only ongoing transformations, living 
forms turning yet into other more or less complex forms of life. Sub­
ject and object cannot constitute the starting point of knowledge’s de­
veloping process. Still they represent the final point, though never 
wholly attainable, for if such a full separation would ever occur, the 
biological continuity that links them, would break down. That would 
mean to say not the end of semiosis or knowledge, but of life itself.3
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The line and the circle
To explain something means looking for a simpler fact or principle 
than the fact that one must explain, that is a fact or principle upon 
which the phenomenon which needs explaining must base itself. A 
thorough explanation should have an essential characteristic: if the 
phenomenon which needs explaining is found, say, at level L, its ex­
planation S must then be at least at level L - 1. That is to say, the ex­
planation will have to make a more proper use of terms than the ones 
it needs to explain. Nevertheless, when this kind of explanatory logic 
is applied to mental and, in particular, semiotic phenomena, it is 
spontaneous to come and believe that it does not function properly. An 
intentional explication seems to better respond to these types of phe­
nomena, meaning that a fact can be explained by presuming it stems 
from an explicit intention for that very fact to take place. For instance, 
we may ask ourselves why a baby cries; according to the intentional 
explication the baby cries because in its mind lies the intention to at­
tract the parents’ attention. The mental phenomena, and among these 
particularly the semiotic ones, would be defined, and therefore ex­
ln the text which follows I will go through some o f  the principal ideas o f  Prodi’s 
vast work on semiosis. An ampler study o f  it can be found in Cimatti (2000b).
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plained only through the intentions of those who partake in them 
(Buyssens 1943).
Such a conviction is strengthened by the idea that the use of signs 
rests upon an explicit convention (at least by and large), that is to say 
voluntarily. That the horse is named “horse”, as this explication wants 
it, does not depend on how the horse is made but rather by the fact that 
is the way it has been decided, properly speaking due to a voluntary 
choice in this respect. Yet, then, all of the semiotic phenomena may be 
explained only through intentional notions, such as, for example, the 
voluntary one. An explanatory strategy of this type has a fundamental 
defect: it does not respect the rule illustrated here above, for it is more 
complex than what it would like to explain; if fact F  is found at level 
L, S this time is placed at level L+1. Why? That is because we do not 
have access to what happens within people’s mind, for we know 
nothing about intentions, we do not even know if intentions are real 
things as are bottle openers and philosophers. In this fashion the expli­
cation becomes more complex than what it would want to explain. 
Therefore, one cannot speak, in proper terms, of an explanation. More 
often than not, semiosis has tried to explain its facts through inten­
tional explanations, that is by placing at the origin of semiosis a sub­
ject which voluntarily chooses to use a certain material object, the 
sign, in order to define something else, its meaning. As said before, 
this is no explanation in that it relies on a notion, as intention for in­
stance, which cannot be summed up in something plainer. As Prodi 
himself observes (1982: 108): “The conscious is a fact to be explained 
through unconscious facts, even though usually there is a tendency to 
invert the points of the issue”4. One of the scopes of Giorgio Prodi’s 
theoretical work, instead, is to try and explain semiosis by means of 
unintentional phenomena, thus truly respecting the norm that wants 
the explanation to be simpler than what it is explaining. W hile the in­
tentional explanation can be illustrated by an arrow that descends from 
a higher to a lower level, with a criterion ranging from hard to easy, 
the unintentional one may be symbolized by an arrow heading the op­
posite way, as it goes from simple to complex levels.
‘La coscienza ё fatto da spiegare attraverso fatti non coscienti, anche se di solito si 
preferisce invertire i termini del problema”.
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COMPLEX
Intentional explanation 
(TOP-DOWN)
Unintentional explanation 
(BOTTOM-UP)
SIMPLE
Figure 1. Non-biological explanation patterns.5
Still, if the strategy of the intentional explication seems hopeless, is its 
alternative, from lower to upper level, more efficient? Semiosis is a 
discipline that deals, primarily if not exclusively, with institutionalized 
current sign systems. Thus leaving the fundamental problem unsolved: 
if a sign is essentially a cross-reference, what guarantees the relation­
ship between the sign and the object/thought to which it refers? Is it 
enough to appeal to social convention to establish such a relationship? 
Then, what does social convention, in turn, feed upon? Prodi’s answer 
to this problem is to seek the origins of semiosis not in culture but, 
rather, in biology, or even better, in a biological method that closely 
considers culture in the relationships that are already established in 
different cellular entities.
Yet to consider biology altogether falling under the category of 
mediation, practically accounts for recognizing it as a single and infi­
nitely complex web and interpretations of signs, likewise (Emmeche 
1991). In this respect, however, one is quick to realize that Prodi’s 
explanatory strategy is not even an unintentional reductionist one, that 
is to say one which attempts to undo, or properly reduce, complex 
phenomena in their simpler components. It is not so, according to 
Prodi, because the foundation of semiosis and language is, of course, 
in our world, but only given that the world is intrinsically already a 
language, meaning that it can be considered as an infinite chain of 
complex systems giving way to a continuous chain of other more 
complex combinations. Prodi’s explanatory strategy then, cannot be 
represented by an arrow, regardless if it is directed from simple to 
complex or vice versa, but can be best illustrated with a circle (Lo 
Piparo 1992), that is a figure in which the end meets with the begin­
ning. The subject is nothing but the last, and momentary, transforma­
tion of the object:
This diagram, as the following ones, is not Prodi’s.
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There must be a factual frame in which knowledge is a part of it, for with­
out this frame knowledge itself could neither function, nor could it repro­
duce itself [...]• If we can know things (and in nature there may have been 
objects formed, able to know things) it is because a) there is an entire set 
of relations; b) this entity is “viable” with operations; c) it has produced 
systems that are, too, the “frame”, that means they are included in the 
whole of the links, and employ actual present conditions, being that they 
are manifestations of it (Prodi 1982: 8)6.
The world is a “frame of facts”, that is a whole of relations, not of 
separate and isolated things; this whole of relations, which is the 
world, defines the space of the “material logic found in the facts, in 
the relation of the elements on the horizon” (Prodi 1977: 43)7. This 
means, precisely, that the very world is intrinsically logical:
we are used to link logic uniquely with the functioning of the ability of 
thinking: yet if these are present in nature, their root is common to the one 
of material exchanges, in turn differentiated through more complex func­
tions [...]• In this sense, logic, in its deeper step, is a material tautology. It 
is logic that which is (Ibid.f.
The world, furthermore, coincides with life, for the vital phenomena 
are the phenomena where relations and mediations prevail (Caims- 
Smith 1999: 72). In the world of life, in fact, every entity operates in 
accordance to a prime elementary form of “categorial logic” as Prodi 
calls it. A logic based upon selection, upon the discrimination of any­
thing one may come in touch with and from which such a relation is 
not possible. A logic which produces the first implicit categories. 
Presently this “categorial logic [...] identifies itself with the general
6 “Deve esistere un telaio di fatti di cui la conoscenza fa parte, senza il quale ne essa 
potrebbe operare, ne potrebbe essersi prodotta [ ...] . Se noi possiamo conoscere le cose 
(e si possono essere formati in natura oggetti capaci di conoscere le cose) ё perche a) 
esiste un insieme dato di rapporti; b) esso ё “percorribile” con operazioni; c) ha pro- 
dotto sistemi ehe, essi pure, sono “telaio”, сюё sono inclusi nell’insieme dei rapporti, e 
utilizzano condizioni di fatto presenti, essendone manifestazioni”.
"Logica materiale [che] ё nei fatti, nelle relazioni tra gli elementi dell’orizzonte”.
"Noi siamo abituati a collegare la logica unicamente al funzionamento della ca- 
pacitä di pensiero: ma se queste sono presenti in natura, ё perche si sono differenziate 
in natura, e dal momento che agiscono sulla natura, la loro radice ё comune a quella 
degli scambi materiali che esse possono interpretare, essendo basate su una logica di 
scambi materiali, differenziati attraverso funzioni via via piii complesse [...] . In questo 
senso la logica, nel suo gradino piii profondo, ё una tautologia materiale. Ё logico ciõ 
che ё”.
biological organization” (Prodi 1977: 83)9, that is, precisely, with life. 
At the same time, the world-life is also logic, a natural logic, a “web 
of facts, a material web” (Prodi 1982: 9)1 , or, even more explicitly, 
“the initial operation is, then, a preliminary identification of logic with 
onto-logic” (Prodi 1982: 16)11. This web, this “network”, is viable, it 
can be known because it is the very world-life model that produces 
“systems” that can get to know it. These systems are, in fact, nothing 
else but “manifestations” of that original network. The result is that -  
having an outcome all but paradoxical for every model obtusely mate­
rialistic -  the complex world-life-natural logic gets to know itself 
through its own sub-systems and manifestations: “from the very be­
ginning, what is meant is the radical interpretation of how gnoseology 
functions internally to ontology” (Prodi 1982: 9)’2. Knowledge be­
comes a function of being, a partial manifestation of being:
a frame of existing facts is the territory upon which one moves and in 
which, contemporarily, one searches for the explanation of moving. If 
there is an existing network of facts, and if we are part of it, our nature 
(structure, functions) stems from it, and as a specification of this, it can be 
neither contradictory nor external. We need not raise the issue of justify­
ing the network, but rather being justified by it [...]. Such a network is 
then a continuity along our very selves: yet it is not to be estranged by us, 
as if we were globally external and opposed observers. We hold it within 
us, for our cognitive modes are simply one of its particular organizational 
methods. Through the network facts that are our make-up and the facts 
that connect us with the outer existence, we are submerged without any 
possible interruption in the most general web of facts (Prodi 1982: 15)13.
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9 “Logica categoriale [ehe ...] si identifica con l’organizzazione biologica in gener­
ale”.
111 “Trama di fatti, una trama materiale”.
11 “L’operazione iniziale e, dunque, una identificazione preliminare di logica con
onto-logica”.
12 “Fin da principio, s ’intende quindi radicalmente interpretare la gnoseologia come 
funzione interna all’ontologia”.
13 “Un telaio di fatti esistenti e il terreno su cui ci si muove e in cui, contemporanea- 
mente, si cerca la spiegazione del muoversi. Se esiste un reticolo di fatti, e se noi ne 
siamo parte, la nostra natura (struttura, funzioni) deriva da esso, ne e una sua specifi- 
cazione, non puõ essere ne contraddittoria ne estema. Non si pone per noi il problema 
di giustificare il reticolo, ma di esseme giustificati [...1. Tale reticolo e dunque in con­
tinuity con noi: ma non e qualcosa di estraneo, ehe possiamo vedere come osservatori 
globalmcnte esterni e contrapposti. Lo conteniamo alPintemo, perche le nostre mo- 
dalitä conoscitive sono semplicemente un suo particolare modo organizzativo. Attra- 
verso i fatti reticolari ehe ci compongono e i fatti ehe ci connettono a quanto e fuori, 
noi siamo immersi senza soluzione di continuitä nella trama piu generale dei fatti”.
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It is not, then, the hierarchical and foundation model (illustrated with 
the line and the arrow) to be the guiding image of Prodi’s thought, 
rather it is the image of the circle; along a circle there is no single 
point that can be considered as the foundation of all others. The circle, 
on the contrary, represents the model of a world considered as an infi­
nite series of complex entities’ transformations yet into other, more 
complex ones, and so on. A transformation chain that never shrinks 
from the deep web that unites every living form to other forms of life. 
Let us go over this sequence of evolutive identities, in order to show 
the paradoxical outcome to which it leads: the first one is the web- 
world of relations that is equivalent to the material logic. The latter, in 
turn, can even be understood as life; but life, as it has already been 
pointed out, is coextensive with semiosis, and therefore with lan­
guage:
it is clear that material logic and material semiosis coincide. If one mate­
rial presence selectively interacts with another one [as it is specifically for 
categorial logic], becoming a reference-sign and startling it in an opera­
tional mode, such is a logical condition which is related with the imper­
sonal assertion “each time that...”, and it expresses the non-elasticity of 
the structure within which everything is imbibed, thus going beyond any 
reflection and incorporating any consideration (Prodi 1977: 44)14.
Therefore, life equals semiosis, that is, language: “biology is a natural 
kind of semiosis” (Prodi 1987b: 147)15. Still, for what concerns the 
transitivity of this identity chain, one reaches the identity resting be­
tween language and world (in so much as that the world is coextensive 
to life), from which one moves into tautology that is simultaneously 
beginning and end —  in the circle figure every beginning is also an 
end, and vice versa —  of the language corresponding to the same lan­
guage. Tautology, in genetic terms, means that language is at the ori­
gin of language (Prodi 1987b: 93). In figure 2, we shall try and sum­
marize this chain of identities (the targeted vectors represent the path 
of the process, to be considered as a contemporaneous evolutionary 
and foundational model) (Figure 2).
“Ё chiaro che logica materiale e semiotica materiale coincidono. Se una presenza 
materiale interagisce selettivamente con un’altra [questa e specificamente la logica 
categoriale], scoprendola come referente-segno e come innesco operativo, questa e una 
condizione logica, ehe e connessa con l ’impersonale asserzione “tutte le volte ehe . . .”, 
ed esprime la non elasticitä del tessuto in cui tutto ё immerso, e ehe va al di la di ogni 
riflessione e ehe ingloba ogni riflessione”.
“La biologia e una semiotica naturale”.
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Life = categorial logic 
(every system selectively ‘interprets’ its own environment)
world = material logic (frame of facts) -  world = language
Figure 2. The circle as a founding pattern for semiosis.
The (apparent) final (world) language tautology = (human) language, 
in reality, is not properly so, for it gives an evolutive relation to time, 
from the world of language, as well as a foundational relation. Lan­
guage is made possible, because it is nothing else but the last trans­
formation of the very world, that in this respect can be described as its 
own product: “man —  as Prodi affirms, and not by chance, with an 
Hegelian touch — [...] is a thought-up nature, [it is] inner nature” 
(Prodi 1987b: 93)16. Yet, already in this statement there is an implicit 
allusion to the dynamics internal to the circle, which, in reality, is not 
closed at all on itself (for if it really were it would render void lan­
guage itself, to the extent there could not be any need whatsoever to 
express something already known), since the self-consciousness of 
nature is truly in continuous expansion. This means that the unknown 
regions, accessed through this former circular motion that developed 
into a spiral one, will be always more ample.
Language, according to Prodi, and semiosis generally, is not 
something of a distinctive nature from the world of life (Prodi 1988a). 
Language, and even its transformations, just as for society, culture, 
and history, do not counter nature, biology, and matter (Prodi 1988b). 
It is not, then, an attempt to simplify what is complex, as much as to 
show that what we believed being easy has, in reality, always been 
complex.
16 “L’uomo [ ...]  ё natura che si pensa, [ё] l’interiorita della natura”.
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This also means, ultimately, getting rid of the distinction between 
simple and complex, as well as the disparity between arbitrary and 
iconic which represents its translation in the classical terminology of 
semiosis. For if language has always been a manifestation of the world 
of life, it also stands to say that it will never be able to pose itself the 
question of its major or minor “iconicity” in regards to that very 
world. Language is defined as a natural manifestation, and therefore it 
will never be separated from the world of life. Anyhow, the distinction 
between iconic and arbitrary supposes such a separation. In the end 
“iconicity” is a false consciousness of arbitrariness, that is the attempt 
to knit somehow together the relations between language and world 
after they have been severed through the notion of arbitrariness, whose 
function is to drastically separate language from the world. Yet, if this 
assumption is abandoned, the idea that language, as a full-way mani­
festation of culture, is different from the natural world, there no longer 
is any need to soften its excesses with iconic drugs. Once the dualistic 
model has been forsaken, why bother asking oneself if language is 
more or less closer and/or similar to the world? Furthermore, to sus­
tain that (nature’s) language creates (human) language, does not mean 
falling back into idealism, no more than affirming that nature gives 
way to culture means falling into materialism. The same is true of re­
nouncing the notion of intention which is not the equivalent of reduc­
ing semiotic and mental phenomena to sheer causal concatenations. If 
life is semiosis this means that, ultimately, it makes no sense to ask 
oneself where to trace the boundary line between culture and nature, if 
ever one should try to understand how nature becomes culture:
Duality is not overcome by synthesis, rather by the ascertainment that at 
the very base of it all there is no duality. Thrusting forward the natural- 
biological study of nature, on the one hand, we can see that in its most so­
phisticated and recent regions it becomes moral[.„], on the other hand, 
returning to its origins, we can notice that every form of knowledge is in­
nate in things. It is participation. It is likewise with man. The state of re­
alities to be had is quite different from the one which we are accustomed 
to: things are speechless, yet they can answer when they are adequately 
questioned. By questioning them, one highlights one of their fundamental 
implications with the instruments that interrogate them, that is us. Our 
knowledge comes from far more ancient forms, all the way up to the roots 
of what is biological, that appears to be an “elementary knowledge” fro 
the very initial steps of its organization (Prodi 1987b: 119)17.
17 4iLa dualitä non ё superata dalla sintesi, ma dal constatare ehe, alla radicc. non 
esiste dualitä alcuna. Spingendo a fondo lo studio naturale-biologico della natura, da
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From biological complementarity 
to the semiotic triangle
According to a classical diagram, the fundamental semiotic relation 
can be represented, approximately at first, with a triangle, in which a 
sign is related to a certain object, the sign referent, through the media­
tion of a meaning (Eco 1973: 25). This diagram, in the framework of 
Prodi’s project for a biological foundation of semiosis, raises a radical 
issue: which principle guarantees the relationship between the sign 
and that which it is referring to? The most obvious solutions are those 
that seek the answer in the question itself or in the intentions of the 
subject, or in an agreement among subjects. An agreement which can 
be translated into a code, which should establish a list of correspon­
dences between signs (meanings) and the corresponding objects, or in 
the fact that somehow the sign should be similar to the object (sign 
“iconicity”). W e have begun to demonstrate tracing Prodi’s steps, that 
the first idea is not an answer since it is based upon a principle, the 
intention or the consciousness of the subject, which is completely 
mysterious, whereas a good explanation should always rely upon facts 
simpler than those that need explaining. Even the code solution is 
truly unsatisfactory, for it does nothing but extending the first 
(pseudo) answer to the entire society that uses that given code: if there 
is no real justification for the fact that for the single subject the sign S 
is in relation with the object O, why should we feel better if we take 
into account all of the subjects that use that same code? If the relation 
is unjustified for the one, it will be even more so by multiplying that 
one for all of those that make use of it. According to the iconic solu­
tion, finally, the sign would be in relation with what it is referring to 
because it would somehow look like it. Truthfully, not even this solu­
tion appears to be viable since the relation of likeliness does not seem 
to be a natural one, but rather, itself, be unconsciously based upon an
una parte vediamo ehe nelle sue piii sofisticate e recenti regioni essa diviene morale 
[...], dall’altra, risalendo indietro verso l ’origine, vediamo ehe ogni forma di 
conoscenza e connaturazione con le cose, e partecipazione. Cosi anche per l’uomo. II 
quadro della realtä da conoscere e ben diverso da quello ehe ci si prospetta abitual- 
mente: le cose sono mute, ma possono rispondere quando sono adeguatamente interro­
gate. Interrogandole, si evidenzia una loro fondamentale compromissione con gli stru- 
menti ehe le interrogano, cioe con noi. La nostra conoscenza deriva da forme piu an- 
tiche, via via fino alla radice di ciõ che ё biologico, che ci appare in se come 
“conoscenza elementare”, fin dai priini passi della sua organizzazione”.
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estimated choice operation. For instance, whatever object Q is similar 
to whatever other thing Q l, not because it is naturally so, but because 
someone sees in Q l a likeliness with Q. Therefore there is always 
someone finding a similarity, which is not something of a given in 
nature, but appears to be always in the eyes of the subject . If this is 
so, “iconicity” rests upon a few instituted rules (and a rule said to be 
‘unaware’ is by all means still a rule), hence it would be a somewhat 
arbitrary relation, and finally it could never constitute the undisputed 
foundation of the relation between the sign and what it refers to. If 
“iconicity” is understood as something that has to do with resem­
blance it cannot represent the solution for the problem of the founda­
tion of semiotic relation. In the semiotic model, that we can define as 
Cartesian, the sign is inscribed to hold, as in the case of the subject in 
regard to the semiotic instrument it uses, no link with what it is indi­
cating. Such an original separation makes it difficult for any attempt to 
bring back together these two wholes, the subject and the object.
To answer the question we asked ourselves earlier, that is what 
does the semiotic relation rely upon -  it is necessary to take into con­
sideration not the semiotic triangle under way, but rather ask oneself 
how are the first proto-semiotic interactions in nature, and thus within 
the phenomena of life, bom. Prodi’s starting point is the concept of 
natural significance:
the most general condition for a language situation (that is retrieval and 
transmission of sense) is significance, the condition for which a natural 
presence is correlated to another natural presence through a relation of 
selectivity. This condition is at the origin not only of language as it is 
normally intended, but of the entire biological organization: which is, ac­
cording to this point of view, intrinsically linguistic (Prodi 1983b: 186)19.
Let us take into consideration an absolutely elementary situation, il­
lustrated in figure 3: an organism Л that explores its environment. In­
side this environment, to make it easier, there are only four objects B,
18 We are before the classical critique o f  Eco (1975) on the notion o f  “iconicity”. Yet, 
while for Eco this critique had the function to defend a completely arbitrary position, in 
our case it helps to make way for a biological model o f  semiosis, which is neither arbi­
tral*)' nor iconic.
19 “La condizione piii generale per una situazione di linguaggio (ehe e reperimento e 
trasmissione di senso) e il significato, cioe la condizione per cui una presenza naturale 
e correlata ad un’altra presenza naturale attraverso una relazione di selettivitä. Questa 
condizione e alia base non solo del linguaggio come normalmente inteso, ma di tutta 
Torganizzazione biologica: la quale e, sotto tale punto di vista, intrinsecamente lin- 
guistica”.
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C, A  and E. A has a certain make-up, for instance, if A is a protein, 
the atoms that form it will give it a particular spatial configuration, 
that is a particular ability to come in touch with certain object forms 
excluding all other forms. In the A environment the only other object 
it is possible to come in relation with is B, meaning that A and В have 
a specific complementarity. Using a metaphor that Prodi often em­
ploys, between A and В there is an analogous relation to the one that a 
door lock and the only (at least in theory) key to open it share. В , in 
respect to A, represents the only meaningful portion of its environment
(or, to use another terminology "pertinent"): “significance is a catego- 
• • ^  20 nzation: a sign, that is interactive selection” (Prodi 1982: 169)" . В ,
for A, is a sign that ‘means’ the relation it can, in fact, have with A. 
However, at this all but primitive semiotic level, В is a sign that is 
identical to its referent, that is, В does not refer to else but itself: in В 
the sign and the referent coincide. Properly said, the semiotic triangle 
is in turn a point to reach, for the “boundaries of the semiologic rela­
tionship are initially only two [...] mediation (the autonomy of the 
sign) is subsequent” (Prodi 1977: 158)21. В for A ‘m eans’ an object 
with which it is possible to come in touch, and with which it can form 
a more complex system, an agglomerate [ab]:
Figure 3. The origins of semiosis as a natural significance.
At the beginning neither is A a subject nor is В an object, since the 
subject is such only in respect to something which counters it (an ob­
ject), just as an object needs, from a biological point of view, in so 
much as that all of Prodi’s model is not but a reconstruction of semio-
2Ü "II significato nasce come categorizzazione: e segno, cioe interazione seletliva”.
2'"I termini del rapporto semiologico sono inizialmente due [ .. .]  la mediazione 
(l’autonomia del segno) ё posteriore”.
D
A
364 Felice Cimatti
sis in biological terms, a subject in order to define itself as such. At 
the same time B, as previously noted, is a sign for A, in the sense that 
it is intrinsically endowed, in ^ ’s respect, with a certain significance 
for it is important coming from its point of view. В is not only an ob­
ject. It is an object that means something for yet another object (that 
special object which Prodi refers to as a “reader”): “the sign is not the 
thing, but the thing in relation to a reader: the sign is the existence of a 
deciphering, or relationship, or reaction specificity process” (Prodi 
1982: 169)22. In this respect the foundation problem on how to justify 
the union of a sign with what it indicates is overcome since В is, at the 
same time, sign and referent. The sign, in biological terms, comes into 
being as a union, as a continuity:
our problem is: how is this significance situation, for which a thing is a 
sign for an interpreter possessing its code, bom in nature [...]. In this case, 
the sign does not have two sides, there is no semainon nor semainomenon. 
The sign is a thing. A thing becomes a sign when a reader that can inter­
pret it appears and “picks it up” selectively. The selection, that is the spe­
cific relation conducted by a sign interpreter: such is the origin of semiot­
ics (Prodi 1987b: 146)23.
The basic situation represented in figure 3 can now be sketched in 
figure 4. The classical semiotic triangle flattens in the complementary 
bijective relation between the reader A and the object В (the 
sign/referent), a relation from which stems the formation of the com­
plex object [AB\.
reading
A reader <4............ В sign/referent ...............► [AB]
Figure 4. Non-triangular pattern of the sign.
Extended chains of natural significance form on the basis of proto- 
semiotic complexes (as in the case of [AB] in figure 4), that is, living
22 “II segno non e la cosa, ma la cosa in rapporto a un lettore: il segno e esistenza di 
un processo di decifrazione, о rapporto, о reazione di specificitä”.
23 “II nostro problema e: come nasce in natura questa situazione di significato, per cui 
una cosa ё segno per un interprete ehe possegga il codice [...] . In questo caso il segno 
non ha due facce, non e ’e semainon e semainomenon. II segno e una cosa. Una cosa 
diventa segno nel momento in cui compare un lettore ehe la puö leggere, ehe la 
“prende su” selettivamente. La selezione, сюё la relazione specifica condotta da un 
interprete del segno: questo ё l ’inizio della semiotica”.
The circular semiosis o f  Giorgio Prodi 365
organisms which are “complex federations of significance interpreta­
tion, coherent and capable of expressing their own sought-out reading 
advantage on the surroundings. In this respect one can speak of the 
intrinsically “linguistic” character of biological objects” (Prodi 1983b: 
189)24. From such an indication one may also infer an idea about how, 
according to Prodi, the mind my function: “a network (united in its de­
centered entirety) more than [...] a hierarchical type of unit, that can be 
represented as a system of vertically-placed filters” (Prodi 1983b: 
176)25. The hierarchical system is completely compatible with the 
classical Cartesian model, the one that sees consciousness at the zenith 
as an uncaused cause in that it is formed by a substance which is alto­
gether different from the one found in the rest of the brain (Eccles 
1996). A concept of this kind is incompatible with Prodi’s naturalistic 
model, for it places at the top of the whole system a mysterious res 
cogitans, by definition irreducible to a simpler form: “we do not have 
the pretence of explaining the language with an extra-natural inter­
vention of an “intentional” kind” (Prodi 1983b: 314)26. The mind, in­
stead, according to Prodi, is, in fact, a network, a complex federation 
of significance interpretation chains, a material network, notwith­
standing how astronomically complex, of situations like the one repre­
sented in figure 4 (Cimatti 2000a).
In Prodi’s model, then, the separation between sign and referent as 
seen in the classical semiotic triangle will never occur. It can be ob­
served only to the extent that we have lost all recollection of their 
original spatial contiguity when the translating chains that link the first 
to the second are extremely prolonged. Thus, their separation is, as 
said before, only apparent: the sign is always contiguous to its object, 
what varies, instead, is the extension of the translating chains. Though 
if continuity is the major characteristic of semiosis, once again re­
turning to the model of the circle, there will never be a radical separa­
tion between sign and referent. That leads, in turn, to flattening the 
semiotic triangle in a continuous transformation line of entities in 
other more complex ones:
24 “Federazioni complesse di letture del significato, coerenti e capaci di esprimere 
suil’intomo il proprio raggiunto vantaggio di lettura. In ciõ risiede il carattere intrinse- 
camente “linguistico” degli oggetti biologici”.
“Piii un reticolo (unitario nella sua globalitä decentrata) ehe [ ...]  una unitä di tipo 
|erarchieo, rappresentabile come un sistema di filtri disposti verticalmente”.
“Noi non pensiamo di spiegare il linguaggio umano con un intervento extra- 
naturale di tipo ‘intenzionale’“.
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the two faces of the sign occur from the moment when there appears a 
sufficiently complex code in nature; yet, if we were able to undo a sign in 
its various steps, we would discover [...] that every step is formed by a 
reader-thing that interprets another thing which, in turn, is seen as a sign, 
that is, subsequently read by yet another thing. All the molecular proc­
esses that we are beginning to be aware of rather well, in the present-day, 
(from the proteinic synthesis to the employment of energy, from the du­
plication of the DNA to the transmission of nervous drives) belong to this 
typology. Man’s cerebral functioning is surely terribly complicated [...] 
but it is hard to believe that it may operate differently from a continuous 
molecular recognition of significance (Prodi 1987b: 147)27.
On the borders of the circle: 
the aesthetic experience and the religious problem
Prodi affirms that our knowledge of the world cannot avoid passing 
through the filter of a theory, that is a network of hypotheses. In this 
respect, the knowledge of the world is nothing but another manifesta­
tion of language. In this very categorization it is clear that there will 
always be something that will pass through the nets of such a frame­
work given that 1) a network is made in a way to relinquish something 
from its meshes; a network is made-up of knots and each knot is tied 
to another, and no matter how closely-knit this web can be there will 
always be empty spaces between knots. A network is selective, that is, 
every network will let something go by, hence any hope of having 
absolute knowledge of reality is nothing but an illusion. An illusion 
because it is logically impossible (and therefore, according to Prodi, 
ontologically and semiotically, too) to strive for an ultimate under­
standing of the world; 2) every network, no matter how extended, is 
nevertheless limited. A bigger network would be useless as it could 
hardly function. Yet, if every network must be (more or less) small it 
means that the attempt to use it in exploring the total surface of the sea
"La doppia faccia del segno si ha dal momento in eui si pone in natura un codice 
sufficientemente complesso; ma se riuscissimo a smontare un segno nelle sue varie 
tappe, scopriremmo [...]  che ogni tappa e formata da un lettore-cosa che legge un’altra 
cosa ehe diventa segno per lui, e questo a sua volta ё letto da un’altra cosa. Tutti i 
processi molecolari ehe oggi cominciamo a conoscere abbastanza bene (dalla sintesi 
proteica all’utilizzazione dell’energia, dalla duplicazione del DNA alia trasmissione 
degli impulsi nervosi) sono di questo tipo. La funzione cerebrale dell’uomo ё certo di 
una complicazione terribile [ ...]  ma ё difficile pensare che essa funzioni in modo di- 
verso da un continuo riconoscimento molecolare di significativitä”.
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is by definition unattainable. Knowledge might even single out very 
large portions in that infinite sea of the knowable yet they remain lim­
ited. Once again, it is the figure of circle that explains this situation. 
The logic of language as a generative whole defines a space indefi­
nitely extended, for there is no superior limit, at least in principle, in 
regard to the admissible sentence combinations in our language. Any­
way, such a whole, regardless of its great size, will be a mere fraction 
of the entire infinite within which the rules of our language are (still) 
not valid. The inherent logic of language defines two complementary 
spaces: the one in which its rules are valid, and that coincides with the 
world, our world (for we hold no other access to the world than the 
one mediated by knowledge = language), and the other one, contain­
ing the former and being infinitely more extended than that one, in 
which such rules are not valid, as we will attempt to show in figure 5:
infinite space of the aesthetic and religious experience
logical space 
of language 
the world
borders determined 
by.the rules of language
Figure 5. The biological origin of the aesthetic-religious issue.
Thus, we have reached the problem of borders, that is the aesthetical 
question together with the theological one. For Prodi, they are both 
determined by logic even prior to the feeling of beauty or fear of the 
unknown: “sacredness is, then, from such perspective, a precise drive 
that embodies logic” (Prodi 1987b: 119)28. Language, understood as a 
circle, defines two concentric spaces: we are inside the space of lan­
guage, and by definition we cannot go beyond the limits imposed by
"II sacro ё dunque, da tale prospettiva, una pulsione precisa ehe fa corpo con la
logica”.
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its inherent logic, for we cannot think outside the language. Every sin­
gle conceivable access to the world must pass through language. 
Every thought is determined by language, and therefore that which is 
not governed by the rules of our language is unthinkable. Since our 
language determines a space, and we are within that given area, it 
brings about the logical need, that however cannot be further defined, 
of all that which is external to our very language field. Logically we 
can recognize that there is no space outside the logic, that is, our logic, 
yet this space, just as logically, is unattainable, unknowable, unthink­
able. Here, then, there is more space for the possibility, that is histori­
cal and evolutive logic, of those experiences that are found at the very 
borders of language, both aesthetic and religious:
[human reality] is not only composed of objects А, В, C, and so on, in­
cluding those hidden objects that are highlighted and seized by language, 
but also (and ever more) by those objects that are not there. Knowledge is, 
in fact, from its very start, firmly tied to the unknown. If an animal reacts 
towards his significative terms, they alone exist. The animal does not pose 
itself the question of whether things exist or do not exist at the borders of 
its own categories. When knowledge becomes propositional and reflexive, 
there is a contextual incertitude that arises in so much as it is not charac­
terized by the speech thus settles in the problem of the borders beyond 
which there is a reality which cannot be attained (Prodi 1987b: 118)29.
The undeterminable space that extends beyond the limits of the lan- 
guage-world, now becomes the only scope of experience which we 
can aspire to. For everything that precedes it, which we can learn 
through language, we shall know sooner or later (such is the scope of 
science) as it has always been determined this way, just as for Prodi it 
is because semiotics and ontology coincide.
Within the circle, instead, we are attracted by what is outside it. 
That is, what is defined as that which we cannot know, because the 
logic of our life and of our language prevents it: “hence, the funda­
mental issue is borders: what we are unable to understand, what lies 
beyond the boundaries, and for which we have no categories” (Prodi
:ч "[La realtä umana] non e solo composta dagli oggetti а  в с  e via via dagli oggetti 
nascosti ehe vengono evidenziati e eatturati dal linguaggio, ma anehe (e sempre piii) 
dagli oggetti ehe non ci sono. La conoscenza ё infatti, fin da principio, solidalmente 
legata alia non-conoscenza. Se un animale reagisce verso i suoi termini signifieativi, 
solo essi esistono, non si pone per lui il problema di ciö ehe forse с ’ё e forse non с ’ё al 
di la dei limiti delle sue categorie. Nel momento in cui la conoscenza diventa riflessa e 
proposizionale, si pone contestualmente l ’incertezza per quanto non ё caratterizzato dal 
discorso: sorge il problema dei confini oltre i quali с ’ё una realtä impredicabile”.
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1987b: 212)30. This indefinite and extra-logical space, in particular, 
can be known only from within: “no reader can exit reality and con­
template it from outside. One may read only from ‘within’, that is in­
side a complex of interactions” (Prodi 1983a: 17)31. This area beyond 
language may be reached through two distinct yet linked ways. Firstly, 
through a hypothetical process of the extension of language itself, in a 
way making an attempt to redirect the unknown to the known. Sec­
ondly, entirely admitting the logically inescapable fact of the limit of 
the space determined by the language-world circle. The first possibil­
ity is aesthetical, and in particular poetic, while the second one is re­
ligious.
Let us return to the language-world circle of figure 5. The human 
animal coincides, for what it holds of specifically human, with its lan­
guage. Language defines the borders of the human world due to its 
biological complementarity between the reader and the organism read 
(v. supra, figure 2): “an organism knows-interprets (has a specific re­
lation with) the reality on which it has formed itself. It interprets the 
world together with its categories, even though it is such a world that 
has built those very categories” (Prodi 1987b: 143-144)’2. Given that 
the whole of what is known is coextensive with the whole of the lan­
guage, the boundaries of the world coincide with the borders of what 
the (innate) rules of language allow us to think-say. The point is that, 
as previously said, our human experience is completely within that 
circle, yet this does not prevent us from understanding that beyond it, 
where our categories are useless, there is an outside that although un­
known, nonetheless attracts us, and regardless of the fear we feel we 
have an urge to explore and get to know it. This feeling occurs, once 
again, inside the circle. We are aware of the fact that our knowledge, 
that is the whole of operations with which we recognize as significa­
tive certain portions of reality (as this is the true point, only some por­
tions, not the entire reality, by definition unreachable by beings en­
dowed with only a particular point of view), is meaningful only in 
relation to an infinitely more vast region of the unknown, “[which] 
is [...] a fundamental constituent of the speech, and brings into speech
"Dunque, il problema fondamentale e quello dei bordi: ciõ che non riusciamo a 
capire, ciõ che sta oltre i confini, per cui non abbiamo categorie”.
"Nessun lettore puõ uscire dalla realtä e contemplarla da fuori. Si puõ leggere solo 
dentro”, cioe dall intemo di un complesso di interazioni”.
"Un organismo conosce-interpreta (ha relazione specifica con) la realtä su cui si t  
costruito. Interpreta il mondo con le sue categorie, ma queste categorie quel mondo 
stesso le ha costruite”.
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the burden of all the existing things of which, though, we have no 
documentation. Therefore, the word implies a non-word, not through 
games of dialectics but rather thanks to the mechanics of speech gene­
sis” (Prodi 1983a: 40)33. Knowledge, as we said, is the natural opera­
tion through which one asserts that something, in respect to a myriad 
of other possible and alternative ‘somethings’, is significative. What is 
not significative, on the contrary, remains in the background, just as 
any word that defines itself in relation to an ampler space of speech­
lessness, and is thus destined to remain unknown as well as unthought 
of. Yet, this implies that the unknown (the region without boundaries 
that extends to the exterior of the area of the circle in figure 5) is al­
ways present, in the form of background or as an indefinite horizon of 
(possible) knowledge. “If what is called “rationality” is the whole of 
modes in which man has learnt to humanly manage a certain area of 
reality (that has become a little more its own), the rational is, then, a 
small space cut out in the irrational, always placed within it. The ra­
tional is a tiny “organized irrational” ” (Prodi 1983a: 41 )34.
The aesthetic experience, that for Prodi is all but restricted to that 
of beauty or art, is the one felt in the proximity of that boundary. The 
aesthetic experience is akin to the cognitive one. It represents the ini­
tial, hypothetical, explorative moment because a strong “cognitive 
drive” is at the base of it. Aesthetics is present wherever, coming from 
the experience of a precise cognitive placement, within the language- 
knowledge circle, one attempts to thrust himself beyond it, towards 
the exterior. As Prodi himself says, the unknown, or towards the 
“dark” (being, as we shall see further on, another way to characterize 
that which for the religious experience is god, unknowable and always 
exceeding our limited tools to circumscribe it):
The main nucleus of aesthetic quality deals with our own undecided 
placement, meaning our own being, entirely, the very object of that wa­
vering that characterizes the borders (and further): our own selves being 
most likely beyond those borders, unknown to us in a radical fashion, un­
able to act with decisive introspection, with direct shortcuts, even when
j3 “[II quale] e [ ...]  un costituente fondamentale del discorso, e porta nel discorso 
tutto il peso delle cose ehe esistono, ma di cui non abbiamo documenti. Quindi la pa- 
rola implica la non-parola, non attraverso giochi dialettici ma attraverso la meccanica 
della genesi del discorso”.
34 “Se chiamiamo “razionalitä” I’insieme dei modi in cui l ’uomo ha imparato a ma- 
neggiare umanamente una certa area di realtä (ehe ё diventata un po’ piii sua), il razi- 
onale ё allora un piccolo spazio ritagliato nell’irrazionale, sempre depositato nel suo 
intemo. II razionale ё un minuscolo “irrazionale organizzato””.
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really close to ourselves, almost as if coinciding with our own center, if 
ever there is one (Prodi 1987b: 216)35.
Having linked anxiety with the experience of the limit, the human 
animal has its own way to respond to uncertainty. It does so with an 
hypothesis, with an attempt to extend to the unknown and to the future 
what is worthwhile for the known and the present-day (and thus the 
past):
hypothesis and doubt are two aspects of the same mechanism [...]. It is 
hypothesis [...] that transforms the knowable world. Doubt itself refers to 
areas of reality which are larger than those that we have experienced: it is 
relative to the area of “non-significative” things which can become sig­
nificative; it is the possible area. It is not a sheer psychological state. It is 
res extensa adequate enough to be considered linguistic organization” 
(Prodi 1983a: 38)36.
The hypothesis is not (yet, and might never be) justified, in so much 
as it is a hypothesis, that is, an attempt at extending the boundaries of 
the known at the expense of the unknown. The hypothesis is actually 
such for it is not justified, because if it had been justified, it would 
have ceased to be, appropriately, a hypothesis, and thus the clause 
would return amidst proven facts, scientifically described, that is, facts 
internal to the language-world circle.
The role of language is central in the construction of hypothesis: 
that we may bring forward having the avail of language’s combinato­
rial resources, which allow us to internally generate those clauses 
(still) unrestricted by the exterior world’s characteristics. In fact, hy­
pothesis is (relatively) free given that language as a combinatorial ma­
chine allows to produce an indefinite number of terms, each of which 
may represent a possible explorative path. A way to grasp, in the 
space external to the language-world, contents that were just waiting
35 “11 nucleo duro dell’esteticita ё una certa nostra collocazione indecidibile, сюё 
l’essere noi, integralmente, proprio l’oggetto di quella indecidibilitä ehe caratterizza i 
bordi (e oltre): l ’essere noi presumibilmente giä oltre i bordi, сюё oscuri a noi stessi in 
modo radicale, impossibilitati ad una introspezione decisiva, a scorciatoie dirette, an- 
corche vicinissimi a noi stessi, quasi coincidenti col nostro centro, ammesso ehe ci 
sia”.
36 ‘‘Ipotesi e dubbio sono due aspetti dello stesso meccanismo [...] . Ё l ’ipotesi [ ...]  
che trasforma il mondo conoscibile. II dubbio si riferisce a zone del reale piii larghe di 
quelle di cui abbiamo esperienza: ё relativo alia zona di cose “non significative” ehe 
possono diventare significative; ё l’area possibile. Non ё un semplice stato psicologico. 
E res extensa passibile di organizzazione linguistica”.
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to become, using Prodi’s terminology, significative, to select a reading 
machine that may interpret them:
[the hypothesis is] a fantastically processed original nucleus [...]. Hy­
pothesis is a fantasy situation, meaning a cerebral de-facto state charac­
terized by the subject’s ability to autonomously have its own linguistic 
materials, without any environmental-external dependence on selections 
or restrictions or censorship, from feedback unto reality. It is considered a 
structure’s material state. The inner space extends to the outer space, that 
is the pole of knowledge: though it is temporarily isolated from it during 
the operativeness of the hypothesis (Prodi 1983a: 209)37.
The hypothesis is intrinsically cognitive, but even inherently aesthetic, 
that is to say poetic, for it rightly is an internal experimentation. A 
word game that seems to act according to a purely combinatorial 
logic, though, also in this case, it produces what we may refer to as 
“cognitive tentacles” with which to tear shreds of “darkness” from the 
unknown in order to make them knowable and expressible. Through 
the auxiliary of hypothesis a kind of surrealist bridge, resting on a sin­
gle bank that is internal to the language-world, is built, while on the 
other bank, initially, it is suspended. It rests supported only by its own 
weight, and however paradoxical it might sound, it is not considered 
so, which, in turn, is the true paradox inherent in the hypothesis. Such 
a paradoxical condition comes from the logical impossibility of 
speaking about what is beyond the borders of the language-world. By 
definition, for anything which is found beyond the borders of the ex- 
pressible-knowable nothing can be said that would make any sense. 
That is because none of our clauses can be accepted or denied in re­
gard to the pro or con proofs relative to it.
Let us return, once more, to figure 5. The aesthetic dimension of 
language, places us, as it has been said earlier, on the outskirts of the 
world. On the outskirts, or right over the boundary line where, logi­
cally, we could not stand even though we try and stay there, anyway, 
by using the instruments of analogy, that is a particular linguistic pro­
cedure in which the old projects himself into the unknown in order to
'7 “[L’ipotesi ё] un nucleo originale di elaborazione fantastica [...] . L’ipotesi e una 
situazione di fantasia, intendendo con ciõ uno stato di fatto cerebrale caratterizzato 
dalla capacitä del soggetto di disporre autonomamente i propri materiali linguistici, 
senza alcuna dipendenza da selezioni о restrizioni о censure esteme-ambientali, da 
feed-back sul reale. Essa ё uno stato materiale della struttura. Lo spazio intemo si con- 
tinua con lo spazio estemo, ehe ё il polo della conoscenza: ma ne ё isolato tempora- 
neamente durante la operativitä dell’ipotesi'.
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see if it works there too. Even that portion of “darkness” covered by 
our hypothesis is governed by the same laws of the known, the already 
known. The hypothesis, then, is based on the analogy:
the analogy functions aesthetically in the direction of darkness, as an at­
tempt to translate/enlarge our area towards it, in terms of verbal meanings. 
They are unverifiable. They do not make any sense in their providing with 
objective references. At the base of this is a radical analogous mecha­
nism [...]: to yield our point of view in the dark, to be watched by eyes 
that we cannot see. To be watched by things rather than looking at them: 
even from their hidden sides (Prodi 1983a: 207-208)38.
This means that, thanks to the aesthetic use of language, the bounda­
ries of the language-world extend. At first, they extend only hypo­
thetically, but then, if the analogy holds firm, even cognitively, as we 
try to point out in the diagram below, where the hypothesis-analogies 
stretch out those “tentacles”, which we talked about earlier, in the un­
known, in the “darkness” :
analogic-aesthetic extension 
of language's boundaries
Figure 6. The hypothesis of poetry that extends knowledge into the “dark­
ness”.
“L'analogia funziona esteticamente nella direzione del buio, come tentativo di 
traduzione-allargamento dell’area nostra verso di lui, in termini di costrutti verbali. 
I.ssi sono inverificabili, non hanno senso nella loro referenzialitä oggettiva. Alla loro 
base vi e un meccanismo analogico radicale [...]: cedere il nostro punto di vista al 
buio. essere guardati da occhi ehe non vediamo. Essere guardati dalle cose, anziche 
guardarle: anche dal loro lato nascosto”.
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If the aesthetic is akin to science, all along, given that in both cases it 
has “to digest the unknown with the digesting system of a language 
that works” (Prodi 1983a: 208-209)39, nevertheless, it still accounts 
for the logical, yet entirely insurmountable fact that neither of the two 
experiences can help us relax our minds before the undetermined fall 
of darkness. In addition, knowledge, regardless if scientific or aes­
thetic, stems from the attempt to practically overcome that anxiety, yet 
at the same time, due to its partial and almost compensating nature by 
definition, does nothing but reassert our unsatisfaction, our feeling of 
narrowness and finitude. Before our logical eyesight there always lies 
the boundless vastness of the unknown, “of that full length [...] pre­
vailing outside us [...] the region of what is inexpressible” (Prodi 
1983a: 195)40, that is referred to by many, in ordinary vocabulary 
filled with an anthropomorphism which is unfamiliar to Prodi, as God. 
Herein, seen neither as someone nor as something, but if anything, as 
the matrix of every determined something, and in particular this region 
represents the speechless and dark horizon of our unsatisfaction as 
linguistic animals, that can produce hypothesis because, through lan­
guage, we reach the awareness of living in a closed world, even 
though deep inside it is indefinitely extended.
The religious problem stems from what we may call a logical sen­
sation that cannot be done away with, if we may use an oxymoron, 
being that we are within the language-world circle, and it is not possi­
ble to observe the circle from the exterior, it would mean relinquishing 
our logic and our language in order to adopt yet another one. Though 
this is naturally (logically) impossible. We are children of that lan­
guage and cannot renounce it at our liking. This is to say that we are 
finite, logically finite, and we are such in respect to an infinite that 
exceeds, towers, and oppresses us. Thus, the religious problem is more 
similar to logic than to feelings, for it is through logic that we become 
practically and essentially aware of our limits: “sacredness then, in 
such a perspective, is a precise drive that embodies logic” (Prodi 
1987a: 119) 1. In this sense the religious problem, and so much for all 
the materialistic utopias of a world without God, is inscribed in our 
own being.
39 i-Digerire il non conosciuto col sistema digerente di un linguaggio ehe funziona”.
40 [Quel’f'esteso e [ ...]  prevalente fuori di noi, [ ...]  la regione dell'indicibile”.
41 "II sacro ё dunque, in tale prospettiva, una pulsione precisa ehe fa corpo con la 
logica”.
The circular semiosis o f  Giorgio Prodi 375
The materialistic and functionalistic explanations of religion try to 
explain its origin by linking it to the feeling of panic, fear of the un­
known, thus connecting it to the most obscure and blindfolded drives 
of our mind. By so doing they create a sentiment that, at least in the­
ory, might be overcome one day thanks to an adequate education, 
sufficiently developed scientific knowledge. In Prodi’s approach, on 
the contrary, the religious problem is intrinsically inscribed in our 
minds. This does not mean to say, according to the trivial belief that 
the idea of God is innate (although this does seem as a captious and 
circular justification of religion), as much as it signifies that our deep- 
rooted linguistic make-up naturally brings us, through the aesthetic 
experience of hypothesis, to question ourselves on the limit, and to 
wonder, what could or could not be beyond that point. In this sense 
the religious experience is akin to an instinct, a very particular logical 
instinct, yet another oxymoron, that is totally a whole with our being 
intrinsically and radically linguistic animals:
In the complex, the hypothesis suggested is opposed to the anthropological 
and ethnographical theories based on the absolute irrational originality and 
primitivity of sacredness, pertaining to a rudimental phase of civilization. 
They invariably take into consideration an already genetically constituted 
man. Whereas what is being affirmed, instead, is the that the origin of sa­
credness must be anticipated to the phase of man’s rational formation, oth­
erwise said of its specific differentiated traits. For it is contextual to logic 
and morality. Sacredness characterizes the passage from non-man to man, 
and collaborates to building its specificity (Prodi 1987a: 118)42.
Conclusions
The circle is a figure without a beginning or an end, it does not have 
an absolute before and an absolute after, and it lacks a foundation and 
an established rule. The circle, as we have tried to explain, constitutes 
Prodi’s model of semiotics. Semiotics that, in reality, aspires at doing
42 “Nel complesso, l’ipotesi ehe si propone e in contrasto con le teorie antropologiche 
ed etno^rafiche basate sulla assoluta originalitä e primitivitä irrazionale del sacro, 
proprie di una fase rudimentale della civiltä. Esse prendono invariabilmente in consid- 
erazione un uomo e ia geneticamente istituito. Qui si vuole affermare invece ehe 
l’origii.. 4  sacro va anticipata alia fase della formazione razionale dell’uomo, cioe 
propriamente dei suoi caratteri differenziali specifici. Esso ё contestuale alia logica e 
alia morale. II sacro caratterizza il nassaggio dal non-uomo all’uomo, e collabora a 
costruime la specificitä”.
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much more than just defining and determining the field of intentional 
and conscious signs use of, let alone human signs. Prodi uses the cir­
cle to show how, at the moment, human semiotics is the last phase of 
an evolution that with a total continuity, which however does not 
eliminate altogether the possibility of radical new experiences, refers 
back to natural semiotics, to those natural exchanges, that is material 
logic, which entail, and whose full meaning is, life. Life, in this re­
spect, is intrinsically semiosis. Thus life, semiosis and material logic 
are biologically coextensive terms. Still, since human language, 
through the mediation of categorial logic, is the direct prosecution of 
worldly life, of natural semiosis, the very language is, through an 
evolutive identity, life. Hence, the circle comes a full way round and 
starts closing in for the possibility of language, which Prodi tell us is 
also knowledge, to say that the world derives from the fact that, in the 
end, language and the world share the same make-up. They are the 
same thing under different combinations43.
The circle, however, becomes a spiral. An open spiral for if lan­
guage is knowledge it is even capable, thanks to its aesthetic customs 
and therefore through hypothesis, to extend the world’s boundaries 
since, as in so much as initial identity, language and world are coex­
tensive. The evolution of the human world is, then, indefinitely open. 
As we have seen, this opening, this inherent possibility of extending 
the world’s boundaries implies, straight away, and implies logically at 
that, the existence of an infinite spatial region beyond those borders, 
which Prodi calls “darkness”. That is the unknown and unknowable 
region within which our language is not valid. A region, nonetheless, 
of which our world is not but a restricted portion that rests upon and 
originates from this very region. This region is what we could call 
God, even though it would refer to a strange type of God since it 
would be no person, it would concern neither an order nor a presence 
but if anything at all, instead, a kind of absence. It would be more of 
an emptiness that attracts us and makes us worry, while thrusting us to 
explore it and inquire about it. A God, granting that Prodi would have 
allowed such an improper use of this term in his semiotic reconstruc­
tion, in this respect, that would have given (paradoxically speaking, 
for we have excluded that it may be someone or something) us an as­
signment. A paradoxical assignment, actually, because it would deal 
with a duty that no one explicitly assigned. A task, indeed, that would
43 As Lo Piparo (1999: 200) states “a theory on the world is a part o f  the world that 
observes the world”.
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grow spontaneously within the human animal and not from some ex­
ternal authority. Still a duty that arises from the evolutive depths of 
man, for his linguistic ability, as it has been already pointed out, is 
nothing but complicated and innovative development yet free of any 
elementary stalemates of semiosis and, hence, of life, itself, which, for 
Prodi, is essentially semiosis.
The task of knowing and thus naming things, then, would be an 
assignment that comes, precisely, not from the outside, that is, a world 
superior to our own. On the contrary, it is an issue that stems from us 
as in so much as we are animals, because we are radically linguistic 
animals. We are at the heart of the circle, and this is another paradox. 
Around the perimeter of the circle there is no center, no heart to be 
had: the duty that makes things want to know about other things, and 
therefore know themselves, is given to us by our very nature, and thus, 
by our own selves. Still, it seems as if the order came from somewhere 
else from here, that is elsewhere but at the same time coinciding with 
us. In the circle, tautologies seem to proliferate. Yet, there is no other 
possibility. If ontology is circular, then the question that seems to 
come from God, and asking for a response directed towards God, is 
bom in the very circle, and comes from nature. In fact, and here is 
where tautology sums itself up to the point of disappearing, the human 
animal “is nature that thinks of itself, [it is] nature’s inner life” (Prodi 
1987: 93)44.
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Циркулярный семиозис Джорджио Проди
Семиотическая теория Проди возникает в ответ на радикальный 
вопрос: если знак —  это кросс-референция, то чем гарантируется 
связь знака с объектом, к которому он отсылает? Проди отбрасывает 
все традиционные решения: осознанная интенция субъекта, конвен­
ция, иконическая связь знака и объекта. Проди опровергает первый 
ответ, поскольку он опирается на совершенно таинственное понятие 
интенции. Конвенционалистский ответ также неудовлетворителен, 
так как распространяет на всю группу критерий, который не может 
быть объяснен и в случае единичного компонента. Наконец отвер­
гается и иконический ответ, так как не объясняется понятие 
“сходства”, лежащее в основе концепта “иконичности”. Ответ Проди 
локализует модель семиотических отношений в фигуре круга. 
К р уг—  это жизнь, ничто иное как бесконечная цепь отношений 
перевода и узнавания во все более сложных системах. В круге нет ни 
начала, ни конца. У него нет ни основания, ни установленного 
закона. Он не содержит причины, которая может стать, в свою
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очередь, следствием. Семиозис, таким образом, опирается на 
понятие жизни, ибо жизнь сама внутренне семиотична. Мы можем 
поместить мир в знаки, то есть познать его, так как сами являемся 
частью этого мира, который через нас познается. Наконец, как 
следствие нахождения внутри круга жизни-семиозиса, встает вопрос 
о том, что за пределами этого круга, — проблема и эстетическая, и 
религиозная.
Giorgio Prodi tsirkulaarne semioosis
Prodi semiootiline teooria tekib vastusena radikaalsele küsimusele: kui 
märk on rist-viitav, siis millega garanteeritakse märgi seos objektiga, 
millele ta viitab. Prodi heidab kõrvale kõik traditsioonilised lahendused: 
subjekti teadlik intentsioon, konventsioon, märgi ja  objekti vaheline 
ikooniline seos. Prodi loobub esimesest, kuna see toetub üpris ebaselgele 
intentsiooni mõistele. Konventsionalistlik vastus on samuti ebarahuldav, 
kuna kriteeriumi, mida ei ole võimalik seletada üksikkomponendi puhul, 
laiendadakse tervele grupile. Lõpuks heidetakse kõrvale ka ikooniline 
variant, kuna “sarnasuse” mõiste, mis on “ikoonilisuse” aluseks, on lahti 
seletamata. Prodi vastus lokaliseerib semiootiliste suhete mudeli ringi 
kujul. Ring — see on elu, ei midagi muud kui tõlkimise ja äratundmise 
suhete lõputu ahel üha keerulisemates süsteemides. Ringil ei ole ei algust 
ega lõppu. Tal ei ole alust ega kindlaksmääratud seaduspärasust. Ta ei 
sisalda ühtegi põhjust, mis ei või omakorda muutuda tagajärjeks. 
Semioosis tugineb seega elu mõistele, kuna elu ise on oma olemuselt 
semiootiline. Me võime asetada maailma märkidesse, st tunnetada teda, 
kuna me ise oleme selle maailma osad, mida läbi enda tunnetame. Lõpuks 
kerkib selle elu-semioosise ringi sees olles küsimus: mis asub sellest 
ringist väljaspool? See on nii esteetiline kui ka religioosne probleem.
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The semiotics of animal freedom: 
A zoologist’s attempt to perceive 
the semiotic aim of H. Hediger
Aleksei Turov ski
Estonian Marine Institute and Tallinn Zoo,
Paldiski mnt. 145, 13522 Tallinn, Estonia 
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Abstract. The works, views and ideas o f Heini Hediger (1908-1992), one 
o f the most distinguished and influential zoologist o f the 20th century, had 
and still have an enormous impact on contemporary understanding of ani­
mal behaviour. His views on territorial, social, etc. aspects o f animal be­
haviour are based on semiotic concepts derived from Umwelt-theory 
(J. v. Uexküll) and combined with ideas from modem ethology. Hediger’s 
special attention was devoted to the area o f animal-man communications; he 
treated these problematic phenomena as a system o f semiosis-processes, in a 
mainly holistic way. Hediger’s approach inspires the author to propose a 
notion ‘4he need for impression” to be used in zoosemiotic analyses.
My childhood dream, my lifelong wish, would have 
been fid fd led  if  it had really been possible to con­
verse with animals.
H. Hediger (1985: 177)
There ’s a disadvantage in a stick pointing straight 
(because) the other end o f  the stick always points 
the opposite way. It depends whether you get hold 
o f  the stick by the right end.
G. K. Chesterton (1984: 221)
There have never been any difficulties in pointing out the signs of 
captivity: the bars and gratings, the fetters and shackles, the nets and 
traps: signs o f obstacles, hindrance and limitations o f any kind will
The semiotics o f animal freedom  381
certainly do. But it is not at all easy to find a universally acceptable 
and generally comprehensible symbol even o f human freedom, so 
what could serve us as a sign o f animal freedom? The image o f an 
animal moving freely is a sign o f escape rather than that o f a free life 
par excellence. The general notion o f a free animal has always been 
something o f vague perception o f a completely undetained creature, 
imperceptible though certainly dwelling somewhere in the wild.
It is hard to believe in our time, but it seems that Heini Hediger 
(1908-1992) really was the first zoologist who realized that there is no 
such thing as an animal that is free in anthropomorphic sense: “the 
free animal does not live in freedom: neither in space nor as regards its 
behaviour towards other animals (Hediger 1964). Animals in the wild 
are “bound by space and time, by sex and social status” (Hediger 
1985: 158). If we consider now that Hediger also elaborated on the 
distinction between nest and home, the former being a repository for 
eggs and raising the young” ... and the latter “a place o f refuge, which 
is the function o f the home” (Hediger 1985: 178), it becomes quite 
clear, for a zoologist at least, how Hediger approached the phenomena 
of animal life. He did it from within, treating the living world as the 
Umwelt in Jakob von Uexktill’s sense.
To Uexküll Hediger dedicated his study on tameness (Hediger 
1935). He was a friend and admirer o f Jakob von Uexküll and Thomas 
A. Sebeok, but was he a semiotician? As far as I know, he was a zoo- 
biologist and field zoologist in the first place, deeply involved in 
zoopsychological and behavioural studies, friend and adherent o f 
K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen, though not an ethologist proper (Hediger 
1985: 178-179). Having enormous experience in ecology o f animal 
behaviour both in the field and in captivity, Hediger doubted the 
somewhat rigid interpretations o f the instinct, the ritualistic behaviour 
in the first place, adopted by ethology as a science o f species-specific 
behaviour of animals. Indeed, the vast diversity o f deviations from the 
main schemes of instincts within one and the same species, the flexi­
bility and continuity o f the adaptive behaviour o f animals give us rea­
son to belive, that the individual organism itself is the most active in­
terpreter of the innate mechanisms o f behaviour and that the main 
matrix on which these interpretations evolve during the ontogenesis is 
the semiosphere. Hediger distrusted “the accepted evolution theory” 
not accepting the claim that the “two major constructors o f speciation 
are mutation and selection” (Hediger 1985: 179). And Hediger cer­
tainly was not a behaviourist in classical sense. It is my conviction
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that, in all his studies, especially “The Clever Hans phenomenon from 
an animal psychologist’s point o f view” (Hediger 1981), Hediger op­
erated with conceptual notion-instruments ‘signum-structure' in the 
cases where the behaviourism would apply the famous ‘stimulus-re- 
action’ scheme instead. In all his studies and encounters with animals 
in the field and in the zoo Hediger’s attention was driven to the bio­
logical meaning o f the signal —  an impulse o f information passing 
between animal and other components o f the Umwelt, including all 
human factors as well. This reminds me of what my father Markus 
Turovski, a philosopher, once said to me about his attitude to living 
things: “If I were told that an octopus can talk in, say, English or Rus­
sian, I would consider it simply as a fact o f its personal biography. 
What it is talking about is the only thing that matters to me”.
Thomas A. Sebeok describes Hediger as a “visionary innovator 
who reached from the inside outwards entirely comfortable within 
Jakob’s [von Uexkiill —  A. Т.] Umwelt paradigm, but implicitly with 
(zoo) semiotics too, which he came increasingly and quite explicitly to 
embrace” (Sebeok 2001). Sebeok highly values Hediger’s works on 
territorial and social behaviour, especially his concepts o f ‘individual 
distance’ and ‘home range’ together with distinguishable ‘territorial 
idiolects and dialects’ as characteristics for the communicative pat­
terns o f the species sharing a home range, and also Hedigers views on 
hierarchy and dominance in animal social status, on parental care and 
other forms o f communicative stimulation/inhibition activities. In 
these concepts as well as in all his logically extremely coherent works, 
Hediger is estimated by Sebeok as a true zoosemiotician whose works 
offer materials and ideas o f great importance for semiotics of all sci­
entific trends, —  anthropological, perhaps, in the first place (Sebeok 
1972: 172-173; 1989: 5, 55; 1990: 107, 124).
Hediger, though he perhaps probably did not call himself a semi- 
otician, obviously worked like one. And following the aim of his 
works, we could describe the free animal as a representative of a par­
ticular species, active in its specific semiosphere as part o f the Um­
welt. The contacts (and conflicts) between an animal and human cul­
ture, and furthermore between its species and civilization could be 
then understood as interactions between animal and human semio- 
spheres, so the main aspect o f these interactivities is the dynamics of 
attention on both sides.
In “Communication between man and animal” (Hediger 1974), 
“Man as a social partner o f animals and vice-versa” (Hediger 1965),
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“Wil vnimals in Captivity” and many other studies Hediger empha­
sizes the absolute necessity o f understanding the actual animal-man 
encounter situations by their signs as examined from animals’ point o f 
view in the first place, in order to find optimal means o f control. 
“People never answer what you say. ... They answer what they think 
you mean” (Chesterton 1984: 76). Actually animals act in the same 
way and it is, essentially, up to the inquisitive interrogator —  the man, 
to arrange “the questionaire” by meanings, that is, to formulate it 
semiotically in elaborated sets o f signs, fitted in to the space-time 
structure of the semiosphere o f particular animal species. In the course 
of a life time, that is in embryonic, postnatal, juvenile, subadult, 
adult/imagial-sexually mature and postmature periods an animal 
passes through a succession o f very different behavioural stages o f 
orientation to other animals (and man) as objects o f its attention. One 
of the important attitudes in this process besides the motivational atti­
tudes to resources, foes, sexual partners, social ranks, broods etc., is 
the fulfilment of the need to be impressed by changing signals —  im­
pulses of information from the environment, otherwise indifferent in 
the aspects of major biological needs/functions. The matrix structure 
of the semiosphere o f the animal obviously transforms these signals 
into signs in accordance with the prevailing motivations; so the forms 
of the Umwelt become semiotically involved in unique personal expe­
rience of the animal in dependence on its ontogenetic age-period. Such 
a ‘need for impression’ is presumably coupled with the need to im­
press and thus to provoke feedback signals which also contribute to 
the process of semiosis. Man has been making use o f the need for im­
pression, calling it “natural curiosity” o f animal, in taming and do­
mestication.
Apparently there is no such thing as a “free population”, to say 
nothing of “a free species”. But a free animal could, perhaps, be use­
fully imagined as a healthy member o f a healthy population o f a cer­
tain species dwelling in such part o f the land- or seascape which is 
safe from foes but promising in resources as far as this animal can 
recognize by its semiotic means within the range and limitations o f its 
sensorics. Or, to make long story short, free is an animal for which the 
fulfilment o f the need for impression is granted by the functional 
structure of the semiosphere.
For a free animal, the best way to avoid encounters with all and 
any possible enemies is assumably to make itself imperceptible, to 
dissolve semiotically into its habitation, become undetectable. But this
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can be effective no longer than the event o f disclosure happens. From 
this moment on the next necessary and diligent course o f action is ei­
ther to flee or, if the escape is impossible or o f dubious effect — , to 
kill or scare the enemy off, or to gain time by stunning it, making it to 
hesitate even for a moment.
Presumably, the best way to do this is to produce such a complete 
set o f the signs o f danger, as to force every particular enemy to choose 
by itself the most horrifying pattern in accordance with its specific 
properties and personal experience. That can be done to any animal 
species because all forms o f animal life are united semiotically by the 
need for impression. Quite convincing evidence o f the importance of 
this need in case o f humans could be easily found by approximate es­
timation o f the numbers o f horror films addicts. In the well known 
scheme of the mimicry the most active, essential role belongs to the 
“dupe”. The “dupe” is the actual decider on the course o f events and 
final results in all situations where camouflage, mimicry and other 
suchlike phenomena are involved. So, it is the “dupe” to whom the set 
o f repelling patterns o f form and behaviour is offered to make its own 
choice what particular sign to be scared of. And it is ecologically es­
sential that the life o f the dupe must be preserved (e.g., Martens mim­
icry clearly shows in case o f deadly coral snakes that they are mimics, 
but not models), for a dead dupe can neither learn, nor pass the knowl­
edge. Semiotically man holds the unique position in the Umwelt, 
viewed in the aspect o f mimicry in “hide, seek, scare and catch” 
games, because man could rationally take on any or all o f these roles 
at the same time, avoiding being duped. That gives humans the most 
advantageous position as hunters, tamers, domesticators, and a most 
perilous exterminators as well. Unless I am very much mistaken, such 
was the main concern o f Heini Hediger as a zoologist, zoo director 
and a man to whom the communications with animals and zoological 
studies were at least equally important. This dualistic attitude could 
probably be marked as romantic, but it certainly is semiotic.
If I may be allowed a lyrical reminiscence, Hediger’s inclination to 
approach life problematics “from within” reminds me of Geheimer 
Archivarius Lindhorst, actually a Salamander (Fiery Spirit of Nature), 
the most powerful character in Hoffm ann’s “Der goldne T opf’ (Hoff­
mann 1814), whose principle was to act always “from within out” in 
order to restore the harmony between man and Nature.
All my personal experience obtained in 28 years with animals in 
Tallinn Zoo indicates clearly that the main and very first concern of an
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animal that founds itself outside its enclosure is to ensure the safest and 
straightest way back home. This home as it is pointed out above is in 
Hediger’s sense a place for refuge. But to recognize the home from 
outside could be extremely difficult for an animal (and also for human 
as it happens in various situations), accustomed to experience the world 
strictly from within. So the animal is always most grateful (or at least 
we can say: relieved) for any assistance from the part o f humans (or 
other animals, e.g. dogs), which are considered by the animal as its con- 
specifics, if the animal is tamed or properly acquainted with man. Gen­
erally speaking, humans could find themselves in very similar but re­
versed situation in the nearest future. Until recent years the concept of 
civilization for the majority of at least Western Europeans has obviously 
been based on the conviction that the landscape is something extremely 
stable and unchanging “by itself’. Now, with the global warming and 
other suchlike troubles it seems to be possible that people would find 
themselves on the “outside” from their home and with anxious expecta­
tions that just animals will “show the way back inside”. I think that such 
would have been H. Hediger’s feelings nowadays.
As for Hediger’s doubts about the synthetic theory o f evolution, 
those I think were based mainly on such observable events as the pref­
erence given by females to childlike or otherwise deviated males in­
stead of some very masculine ones, the general infantilization and 
sexual acceleration in zoo animals (but not only them), on striking 
importance of imprinting combined with games and teaching in rais­
ing the young in predatory mammals and birds (but also some fish and 
even insects, e.g, Passilidae, Coleoptera), and on the vast variability 
in communication patterns in animal behaviour. But, as all the scien­
tific legacy of Hediger, this topic needs further studies. Reproductive 
isolation may occur within a population due to behavioural particu­
larities of single organisms. It is well known that in some cases fe­
males prefer the males clearly deviated from the median pattern o f 
behaviour, e.g. wasps Mormoniella vitripennis (White, Grant 1977), 
Drosophila sp. sp. in the phenomenon o f asymmetric evolution on 
Hawaii islands (Lambert 1984), though, as a rule, female mate choice 
favours symmetrical males in such different species as barn swallows 
(Hirundo rustica), earwings (Forficula auricularia), humans (Homo 
sapiens) and many other (Polack 1997). From my part, the study o f 
the possibilities to apply the Baldwin principle in the analyses o f 
zoosemiotic views of Hediger seems to be very promising. In this field 
especially interesting would be to try the application o f K. Kull’s ideas
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on Osbom-Baldwin effect (Kull 2000). According to his interpretation 
of this effect, “the activity of an organism as a subject may play a role 
as an evolutionary factor” (Kull 2000: 53).
One must not expect to have a powerful and beautiful waterfa}! 
without the river. Such expectations can never arise where the Umwelt 
theory is semiotically correctly applied as it was always done by 
Dr. Heini Hediger in all his studies.
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Семиотика животной свободы: попытка зоолога понять 
семиотическую цель X. Хедигера
Работы, взгляды и идеи Хейни Хедигера (1908-1992), одного из 
наиболее известных и влиятельных зоологов 20 в., имели и до сих 
пор имеют огромное значение для современного понимания пове­
дения животных. Его взгляды на территориальные, социальные и 
другие аспекты поведения животных основаны на семиотических 
концептах, заимствованных из Umwelt-теории (Я. Юкскюлль) и 
соединенных с идеями современной этологии. Особое внимание 
Хедигер уделял коммуникации животного и человека: он рас­
сматривал это проблематичное явление прежде всего холистически 
как систему процессов семиозиса. Хедигеровский подход побудил 
автора исследования предложить для использования в зоосемио- 
тических исследованиях понятие “потребность впечатления”.
Loomse vabaduse semiootika: zooloogi katse mõista 
H. Hedigeri semiootilist eesmärki
Heini Hedigeri (1908-1992), ühe 20. sajandi tuntuima ja  mõjukama zoo­
loogi tööd, vaated ja ideed omasid ja omavad siiamaani suurt tähtsust 
loomade käitumise mõistmisel. Tema vaated loomade käitumise terri­
toriaalsetele, sotsiaalsetele ja muudele aspektidele toetuvad semiooti- 
listele kontseptidele, mis on tuletatud Jakob von Uexkülli omailma 
teooriast ning on täiendatud kaasaegse etoloogia ideedega. Erilist tähele­
panu pööras Hediger inimese ja looma vahelisele kommunikatsioonile, 
vaadeldes seda probleemset nähtust eelkõige holistlikust vaatepunktist kui 
semioosise protsesside süsteemi. Hedigeri lähenemine inspireeris käes­
oleva uurimuse autorit pakkuma välja zoosemiootiliste analüüside tarbeks 
mõiste “muljete tarve”.
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Abstract. One of the seminal constructs in 20th-century biosemiotics is 
G. Evelyn Hutchinson’s ‘niche’. This notion opened up and unpacked car­
tesian space and time to recognize self-organizing roles in open, dynami­
cal systems — in n-dimensional hyperspace. Perhaps equally valuable to 
biosemiotics is Hutchinson’s inclusive approach to inquiry and his will­
ingness to venture into abductive territory, which have reaped rewards for 
a range of disciplines beyond biology, from art to anthropology. 
Hutchinson assumed the fertility of inquiry flowing from open, far-from- 
equilibrium systems to be characterized by ‘fabricational noise’, follow­
ing Seilacher, or ‘order out of chaos’, following Prigogine. Serendipitous 
‘noise’ can self-organize into information at other levels, as does the 
‘noise’ of Hutchinson’s contributions themselves.
An ecology of, by, and for, an ecologist
Spectacular, seminal, searching minds —  as that gracing George 
Evelyn Hutchinson (1903-1991) —  do not emerge in every field, in 
every generation, in every culture, with any regularity, and when they 
do they defy every orderly principle. O f logic. O f comprehensibility. 
O f coherence. Such minds, and their works, emerge more willy-nilly, 
evoking evolutionary surprise in their observers and for their authors 
as well, rendering their occasional more linear, predictable, develop­
mental contributions equally surprising, rather than suspenseful, as 
would otherwise be the case.
The majority o f researchers in any field are naturally apt to work in 
that appropriately-labelled discipline, and to communicate within its 
circumscribed discourse. Such usual, developmental discourse builds 
incrementally, linearly, and, at least in hindsight, predictably —  corre­
sponding to so-called gradual evolution, where difference is quantitative 
or one of degree. In contrast, the Hutchinsons in any discipline dart and 
wander around and beyond its boundaries. Intellectual peregrinations 
sometimes destabilize the received wisdom of an otherwise comfort­
able, orderly field. Periodically, though, collective understanding reor­
ganizes with a surprising leap, in substance or direction —  the analogue 
of punctuated evolution, a qualitative difference in kind. These meta­
phors of evolution and development in semiotic systems are drawn from 
Stanley Salthe (Salthe 1993, Salthe and Anderson 1989). I fancy 
Hutchinson would resonate with these metaphors as well.
The playful properties o f Hutchinson license me, perhaps, to deal 
with him as subject and object in a strolling, trolling, manner. Or per­
haps the situation is not one o f license but rather an imperative. Either 
way, I take liberties. I take liberties with the slices o f Hutchinson 
making up this salmagundi, and I take liberties with the strictures and 
structures of English style. To some extent, I address this document to 
Hutchinson as well. Like many o f his essays, this one is in cant: 
oblique, lilting, intimate, inviting complementation and contest. Semi- 
otician that he was, Hutchinson will find the beat and follow the inter­
secting spirals I trace in his oevre. In another life, I can make amends, 
and emendations.
Ushering out, ushering in
I was an usher, that’s all. An usher at Hutchinson’s memorial service. 
An ethnographer, too, you might say. That was at Y ale’s Battell 
Chapel, 19 October 1991, following Hutchinson’s death in England on 
17 May 1991. One hundred twenty days earlier, in early January 1991,
I had watched sadly as Hutchinson left New Haven to visit, if  not to 
remain in, his native England (Anderson 1998). Five years before his 
departure and death, he received the second Kyoto Prize in basic sci­
ences. Eight years earlier, there had been a grand celebration o f 
Hutchinson’s 80th birthday at Yale’s Peabody Museum. Twelve years 
earlier, on 24 October 1979, Hutchinson received the Franklin Medal 
of the Franklin Institute in Philadephia for Development o f the Scien­
tific Basis of Ecology.
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Closing his address to the Franklin Institute on the above occasion, 
he wrote:
Finally, since it has been said that nothing I say is wholly serious, I would 
like in this vein to express a hope that the honor you have done me is a 
tribute not only to partly forgotten and largely collaborative researches but 
also, in a minor way, to one or two more playful and ornamental exercises 
which I think may have given occasional pleasure to some o f you. 
(Hutchinson 1979b: 4)
Eighty-eight years before his death, Hutchinson was born, 30 January 
1903, in Cambridge, England. Hutchinson proceeded to study and be 
studied in Cambridge, Naples, Johannesburg, Tibet, numerous frothy 
ponds and illuminated manuscript archives, and Yale.
Contemplating Hutchinson today benefits from his, and our, will­
ingness to wander, to trace the macrame of his mentation. Read aloud 
any o f his work, and you will hear Hutchinson’s voice. His experience 
and experiences imbue all of his writing with his personal touch and 
breath, and this is emphatically so with respect to his autobiographies: 
The Ecological Theater and the Evolutionary Play (1965) and The 
Kindly Fruits of the Earth: Recollections of an Embryo Ecologist 
(1979a).
Strolling and trolling with and 
without G. Evelyn Hutchinson
Like so many others o f his generation, Hutchinson was precocious in 
early publication and prolific thereafter, and more and more eclectic 
with time. His bibliography published in Limnology and Oceanogra­
phy 16(2) (March 1971) and 36(3) (May 1991) records Hutchinson’s 
very first article, in 1918, titled ‘A swimming grasshopper’. 
Hutchinson shared his research —  on particular aquatic creatures 
(1968), populations and communities (1978a), species relationships 
(1954), bodies o f water (1957), and chemical cycles (1948a) —  with 
limnologists; but he also reported on science itself (1983), on biology 
generally (1948b), on taxonomy (1966), on larger ecological dynamics 
(1948c), on human evolution (1959a), on human culture (1955), on 
gender (1973a, 1973b), on art (1963, 1978b), on ethics (1948c), and 
on issues concerning global survival (1948c). By 1943, when his 
‘Marginalia’ contributions were regularly featured in American Scien­
tist, Hutchinson’s wide-angled vision enlightened many across the
broadest range o f academic disciplines. He was generous in his critical 
reviews o f cutting-edge books, and in his obituary essays commemo­
rating departed colleagues. At the same time, Hutchinson shared his 
surviving circle o f intellectual friends with others, making it possible 
for his students to read a variety o f manuscripts in process and even to 
engage eminent scholar-scientists in correspondence. Hutchinson as­
sumed that real scientists were scholars and vice-versa. Just as he was 
fascinated by phenomena at every scale and o f every description, his 
collegial generosity knew no bounds.
What rendered Hutchinson’s scholarly-scientific contributions 
particularly semiotic was his insatiable curiosity leading him to disre­
gard or dispute traditional boundaries o f research or o f discourse, even 
in his own formulations. In the winter o f his life, just before the spring 
of his death in 1991, he was asked about what singular problem we 
inherit at the end of the twentieth century; he instantly replied, ‘insides 
and outsides’ (Anderson 1998: 235). Among other things, this had 
relevance for the spatial and energetic parameters once pertaining to 
niche, even when referenced to n-dimensional hyperspace. Thereby, 
niche could connote a sophisticated space bounded by edges, beyond 
which there was no ‘outside’, enclosing an ‘inside’ distilled down to 
n-dimensional components. The elucidation o f the concept o f  niche 
moved, in Hutchinson’s mind, from analytic to synthetic, from extrin- 
sically closed and concrete to intrinsically open and relational, from 
physical to semiotic, or, to borrow from Rosen (1991), from syntactic 
to semantic. The relational entails roles, in biology as well as in soci­
ety, and roles construct emergent meanings rather than being the pre­
cipitates of extrinsic measurables.
While strolling and trolling himself, Hutchinson routinely turned 
every incident and observation along his path into meaningful rela­
tions with other phenomena. This he acknowledged in his lecture oc­
casioned by the Kyoto Prize in 1986, which essay he titled ‘Keep 
Walking’ (Hutchinson 1986), quoting and crediting the advice he re­
ceived from an indulgent editor. The gist o f this essay was that ordi­
nary evolutionary wandering folds into developmental trajectories, 
surprise fertilizes suspense, means can become ends, medium may be 
message, and chaos can sort itself into provisional order... and vice 
versa, Möbius-fashion. All o f this Hutchinson subsumed as ‘fabrica­
tional noise’, a phrase he adopted from a narrower usage by Seilacher 
(1974). Fabricational noise also describes the self-organizational be­
havior in far-from-equilibrium systems (Prigogine and Stengers
Sharing G. Evelyn Hutchinson’s fabricational noise 391
1979/1984), whether developmental or evolutionary, and is consonant 
with his student Slobodkin’s characerization o f evolution as ‘existen­
tial poker’ (Slobodkin 1968).
Hutchinson’s adopted philosophy o f ‘keep walking’, o f strolling 
and trolling, recalls the equally magnificent metaphor deployed by 
Jakob von Uexküll in his, ‘A stroll through the world o f animals and 
men; a picture book o f invisible worlds’ (Uexküll 1957). Great minds, 
no doubt, stumble onto great metaphors as they stride.
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Relationships, perspectives, and invariance
Hutchinson’s approach to biosemiotics emphasized relationships 
(e.g., the roles eventually constituting ‘niche’) and holism (e.g., his 
compulsive inclusive integration o f context with content). These incli­
nations cross-fertilized. Consequently, neither figure nor ground were 
fixed. About niche, Hutchinson ventured that critics may conclude it is 
‘compounded o f equal parts o f the obvious and the obscure’ (1957: 
416). And no interrogation o f biological process could exclude the 
human interrogator together with his/her culture, language, and per­
sonality. Although bringing in gender in the marked hybrid possessive 
pronoun ‘his/her’ sounds inelegant, and consequently un- 
Hutchinsonian, he was truly fascinated by gender and how it played 
itself out in both society and science —  witness his generous reviews 
o f the works o f his friend, Rebecca West (e.g., 1987), whose four- 
footed cane he inherited and relied on for his strolling and trolling 
during the final five years o f his life.
While known as an ecologist, in Hutchinson’s practice o f ecology 
there was no exclusion o f ethology (1957, 1969). If we assume ecology 
to focus on the largely extrinsic material/energetic grounds relating 
some units o f analysis, and ethology to consist in the overlapping and 
complementary behavioral roles, largely informatic, of and between 
some units o f analysis (Anderson et al. 1984) —  then it’s clear that 
ecology and ethology are more than sibling disciplines; they are more 
like Siamese twins, but not just connected to each other, either. Semiot­
ics entirely problematizes the traditional crutch of units o f analysis.
Hutchinson’s ecology, moreover, approached its subject matter 
from both the micro-experimental, descriptive level and the macro- 
statistical level seeking general laws, such as that obtaining between 
population density and body size. His strolls took him into realms of­
ten considered incommensurable: the micro, the meta, the macro; the 
chemical, the biological, the cultural; the inductive, the deductive, the 
abductive; scale, rhythm, symmetry (1957).
Invariant among and between all o f Hutchinson’s contributions is 
the foregrounding of the provisionality o f any and all units o f analysis. 
Any units (molecule, gene, cell, organism, population, species, ecosys- 
tem-not to mention niche) are necessarily tentative or elusive, even as 
they are constituted vis-ä-vis other formal units and within overarching 
temporal situations and spatial contexts. More persuasive units will not 
be spatial or energetic entities, but processual integrations also relating 
informatics and time, and/or any other dynamics which help consolidate 
our always interim understanding. While the significance o f any de­
scription, analysis, or synthesis is at best provisional, given the infinite 
deferral inherrent in meaning-making, Hutchinson insisted that it was 
nonetheless imperative to be bold in the exercise o f semiotic inquiry. 
Humans can and must build on and simultaneously challenge if not de­
construct accumulations of received wisdom packaged as knowledge.
In pursuit of competition, cooperation, and creativity
Biologists working with conventional models have taken process to be 
increasingly knowable, predictable, mappable. For example, com­
plexity lends itself to be tamed by assumptions o f closed-system com­
petition through natural (or even artificial) selection. Hutchinson was 
among the earliest to find as suspect the overdetermined natural selec­
tion narratives of competition (1948b). He preferred to take into ac­
count obvious conditions of cooperation and allow for the opacity and 
transparency of both chance and necessity —  and o f ignorance.
One can speculate that Hutchinson’s own personal habits o f coop­
eration leaked into his analysis o f various outcomes o f biological pro­
cess. Projection, after all, may be rampant in human cognition, and as 
such is certainly natural. In considering cooperation, leading to co­
evolution, biological process becomes more complex and nuanced-and 
more realistic and interesting.
Hutchinson could productively ratchet between the most improb­
able of sources and resources. Theorizing for him was an autotelic 
activity, resembling perhaps the self-rewarding compulsions o f allo- 
primates afforded paints and canvas or musical instruments, who ef­
fortlessly go on to create designs in space and sound appealing to our 
sensibilities (1963: 107).
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For all his penchant for creativity, Hutchinson allowed some role 
for selection. Consider this: ‘It is not necessary in any empirical sci­
ence to keep an elaborate logicomathematical system always apparent, 
any more than it is necessary to keep a vacuum cleaner conspicuously 
in the middle o f a room at all times. When a lot o f irrelevant litter has 
accumulated the machine must be brought out, used, and then put 
away’ (Hutchinson 1957: 416). This observation predates Kuhn 
(1962), and is much more graphic and satisfying!
As can be appreciated, Hutchinson was simultaneously humble and 
bold. Sometimes a well-meant scholar or student would venture to 
utter that Hutchinson was the ‘father o f ecology’, whence 
Hutchinson —  reflecting on his own fabricational noise —  would 
usher out the admirer, and mutter, ‘No, that would be Darwin’.
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Разделяя “фабрикационный шум” 
Г. Ивлина Хатчинсона
Один из продуктивных конструктов биосемиотики 20 в. — “ниша” Г. 
Ивлина Хатчинсона. Это понятие раскрыло картезианское пространст­
во и время, что повлекло за собой признание самоорганизации в 
открытых динамических системах, в n-мерном гиперпространстве. 
Возможно, не менее ценен для биосемиотики инклюзивный подход 
Хатчинсона к исследованию и его готовность покорять новые тер­
ритории, что вознаграждается во многих дисциплинах за пределами 
биологии, от искусствоведения до антропологии. Хатчинсон пред­
полагал, что плодотворность исследования проистекает из открытых, 
неравновесных систем, характеризующихся “фабрикационным шу­
мом” по Зейлахеру, или “порядком из хаоса”, по Пригожину. Откры- 
вательский “шум” может самоорганизовываться в информацию на 
других уровнях, так же как “шум” открытий самого Хатчинсона.
Osasaamine G. Evelyn Hutchinson’i 
“valmistusmürast”
Üks 20. sajandi biosemiootika produktiivsetest konstruktsioonidest on
G. Evelyn Hutchinson’i “nišš”. See mõiste avas kartesiaanliku ruumi ja 
aja, mis tõi endaga kaasa enesereguleerimismehhanismi tunnistamise 
avatud dünaamilistes süsteemides, n-m õõtm elises hüperruumis. Võimalik, 
et mitte vähem tähtis biosemiootika jaoks on Hutchinsoni inklusiivne 
lähenemine uurimistööle ja tema valmidus hõivata uusi territooriume, mis 
on andnud tänuväärseid võrseid paljudel bioloogiast väljapoole jäävatel 
aladel kunstiteadusest antropoloogiani. Hutchinson arvas, et uurimuse 
tulemuslikkus tuleneb avatud, tasakaalustamata süsteemidest, mida ise­
loomustab “valmistusmüra” (Seilacheri termin) või “kord kaosest” (Prigo- 
gine). Avastuslik “müra” võib iseorganiseeruda informatsiooniks teistel 
tasanditel, samuti nagu Hutchinsoni enese avastuste “müra”.
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Abstract. The essay informs on Gregory Bateson’s holistic approach to­
wards an epistemic view o f nature. The ecology o f mind relies upon a 
biological holism serving as a methodic tool to explain living “phenom­
ena”, like, e.g., communication, learning, and cognition. Starting from the 
idea, the smallest unit o f information, Bateson developed a type hierarchy 
of learning that is based on a cybernetic view o f  mind. The communica­
tion model focuses on paradoxa caused by false signification. It leads to a 
pathogenesis o f sckizophrenia that is subsumed under the conception o f  
double binds. This ecosystemic perspective o f living processes represents 
a truly (w)holistic theory o f nature.
In spring, when woods are getting green,
I ’ll try and tell you what I mean. [...]
In autumn, when the leaves are brown, 
take pen and ink, and write it down. 
Humpty-Dumpty’s song (Carroll 1899: 129)
Some preliminary remarks on holism
It was in spring 1998 when I gave a series of lectures on holism in the 
sciences covering physics, mathematics and biology at the Institute of 
Semiotics in Tartu.1 It culminated in a discussion of Gregory
My thanks belong to Peeter Torop and Kalevi Kull who invited me to this adven­
turous task. Without the patience and tolerance o f the audience, the students o f  semi­
otics. 1 could not have fulfilled it. Their awareness was more than encouraging.
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Bateson’s cybernetic approach towards a holistic epistemology that 
focuses on us humans, and how we cope with our environment, or 
know about it. Since then time has past, and I am still thinking about 
holism and its impact on the natural sciences, particularly on the bio­
logical sciences. Now it is autumn 2000, and I will discuss this crucial 
issue again, but this time with pen and paper instead of chalk and 
blackboard.2
The objective of my lectures series was to show the virtue of 
shifting from ontology to epistemology and backwards by the means 
of a concept named holism. For historians and philosopher of science 
there does not exist any doubt, that this concept was and, maybe still 
is, at the centre of fundamental changes in various areas of philosophy 
and the sciences in the 20th century. Some versions of holism that 
deal with intentional phenomena are widespread among analytic phi­
losophers subsequent to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Quine’s 
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. For the sciences holism is considered 
as an option as, for example, the Copenhagen interpretation of quan­
tum mechanics, Gestalt theory of psychology or the organismic view 
of biology have shown. The biological holism that is particular of in­
terest for my own research on theoretical biology, intended to refute 
or, at least, to correct the strong version of genetic determinism which 
became a paradigm for biological sciences. Opting for holism in any 
of these areas has far-reaching consequences for our view on nature 
and ourselves as well. In general, the point of my inquiry into the dif­
ferent forms of holism is to assess their impact on the development of 
the natural sciences.
The biological holism of the 20th century continued a controversy 
that started in the 19th century. The point of departure was the crucial 
issue, whether organisms are (physical) machines, or whether they 
exhibit properties that cannot be described by physico-chemical meth­
ods and principles. This question was initiated by the Cartesian state­
ment that the laws of nature are identical with the ones of classical 
mechanics. A fundamental feature of the mechanistic way of thinking 
is a reductionism filtering out complex events of nature to singular 
states or processes to investigate them with the techniques of physics 
and mathematical methods.
As this is mere an essay, I consciously avoid to bother the reader with the exten­
sive German style o f  quotations. However, i f  the reader is interested, he and she might 
find the bibliography useful.
Steps towards an ecology o f  cognition 399
As opposed to mechanism, neovitalism stated that all living phe­
nomena as embryogenesis, the development and growth of organs can 
be deduced from a trans-biological principle, namely the entelechy, 
whereas the mechanistic counterpart argumented by the machine 
metaphor. To overcome this time-wasting discussion, holistic ap­
proaches claimed that organisms are functioning like systems struc­
tured by their own inherent lawfulness. By it these living entities are 
connected with their internal subsystems and, at the same time, with 
their external environment. The trick here was that holism was con­
verted from an ontic entity to a methodic tool which could be accepted 
by scientists working in laboratories.
As a purely metaphysical concept holism is as old as philosophy 
itself; you can think of Plato, Pascal, Leibniz, Goethe, Hegel, W hite­
head among many others as thinkers who proposed holistic ap­
proaches to explain the world. Partly it is analogous to the idea or 
Weltanschauung that ancient Greek philosophy subsumed under the 
concept of ap |io v £ ia  that synthesizes complex components to a 
whole entity. For example, Plato wrote in the Sophistes “to develop is 
always towards a whole” —  this is an ontic approach. Opposed to 
him, Aristotle mentioned in the Metaphysika that the whole is a sys­
tem of parts structured in a mutual arrangement that come into being 
by a holistic and indivisible principle; this is a methodological ap­
proach. Kant investigated in the Kritik der Urteilskraft the epistemic 
version stating that the cause of the mode of existence for every part 
of a living body is included in the whole. Furthermore, he defined a 
functioning organism as a living being that is demarcated due to its 
own properties against its physico-chemical surroundings. But, si­
multaneously the organism constructs its own specific environment. 
For Kant the whole-part relationship represents a bivalent relation the 
members of which belong to the same level. This statement differs 
significantly from holistic approaches of theoretical biology that de­
manded for a hierarchic organization of the system involved. The de­
cisive point of the Kantian view was that the whole emerges as the 
result of its elements, and a part, on the other hand, is determined by 
the not-yet developed whole. Kant called this a paradox (antinomy) 
that still holds as you will see when discussing Bateson’s epistemic 
ecology.
The shortest interpretation of holism is the whole is mc"n than the 
sum of its parts; hence, you have to add the references between the 
parts to constitute a whole, as Nagel has added. Obviously, it seems to
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be trivial that the part is not the whole, it already follows from the 
definition of part and whole as Leibniz has done it: If the whole is A, 
the part is В, I assume, that A is bigger than В, because a part of A, 
namely B, is equivalent to В in its whole totality —  qoud erat demon­
strandum.
The main characteristics of whole systems are that they exhibit 
emergent macro-properties that cannot be predicted before they have 
occurred. Not all their properties can be reduced from the properties of 
the subsystems, and there exists a holistic feedback, or macro­
determ ination/ Particularly the latter implication has caused fired dis­
cussion for it seemed to be absurd stating that one component which 
interacts with many, sometimes even with all other components, inter­
acts with the system as a whole simultaneously. For critics it means 
that the logical principle of tertium non datur is faulted. However, 
holism claimed that real systems are interacting with each other, and 
no system can be isolated from another under absolute conditions. No 
doubt, objects are approximately separated — the physicist calls this 
feature quasiseparable — , since otherwise it would be not possible to 
gain knowledge about them. In addition, holistic systems exhibit a 
referential deduction top-down, i.e. the network concept. Finally, there 
exists the postulate of moral value, or the ecological approach. It 
means that we should comprehend nature and every living being as 
the indivisible part of a holistic system which should be protected. 
This hypothesis has its roots in an ecological definition of organisms 
as subjects actively being related to their environment as Uexkiill has 
argued.
My series of lectures concluded with the paradigm of Gregory 
Bateson, a well-known son of a famous father, the British geneticist 
William Bateson. As the development of modem holism started in 
psychology, the social sciences and linguistic semantics, it makes 
sense to concentrate in this holistic essay again on Gregory Bateson. 
The main question addressed in the following will be how Bateson’s 
cognitive ecology fits these holistic principles. Thus, with pen and ink, 
I now write down my ideas about the anthropologist, philosopher, poet 
and naturalist, film director, photographer, and profound holistic 
thinker Gregory Bateson (1904-1980).4
The philosopher Donald Campbell has defined it as downward causation.
Here biographical dates will be neglected; for the interested reader I would like to 
refer to Lipset (1980) and Harries-Jones (1995).
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Gregory Bateson’s ecological epistemology
It is said by some evolutionary theoreticians that the impact of 
Bateson on cybernetic epistemology is comparable to the one of Dar­
win on evolution. As far as I can judge it, this is a true overestimation. 
Nevertheless, he has compared data, principles, and experiences of 
anthropology, sociology, linguistics, history, psychology, cybernetics 
and art, and analyzed their structures and developmental processes as 
maybe nobody else has done in this way. In the broadest sense of the 
word, he was an anthropologist studying mankind in all its aspects. 
That was the reason why Bateson’s theory fascinated me, and why it 
was, on the other side, so difficult to grasp its messages. His strong 
commitment to an elliptic rhetoric has caused more than once confu­
sion and headaches in my brain. As difficult as the terrain may be that 
we will enter now, I nonetheless hope the reader will enjoy this holis­
tic approach towards a holistic ecology. Bateson wrote on epistemol­
ogy, and we will investigate his epistemic ecology from an ontic point 
of view without bothering on the specialty of psychology, anthropol­
ogy, or evolution.5 To anticipate his systemic approach on epistemol­
ogy Mind here constitutes a component of reality and it is, therefore, 
encompassed inside nature.
My short treatise aims at clarifying some basic notions like idea, 
difference, pattern, context, and double-bind. Furthermore, it will dis­
cuss the interplay of learning, information and communication. The 
main objectives are to elaborate Bateson’s concept of mind as a feed­
back system, his learning theory, his communication model that fi­
nally resulted in an ecology of mind. Besides the discussion of his 
holistic epistemology the essay will play with some traits of logical 
reasoning which have fascinated serious thinkers and clowns as Lewis 
Carroll and Ludwig Wittgenstein.6 My paper relies upon on two 
books, namely, the Steps toward an Ecology o f Mind and Mind and 
Nature. The collection of articles tried to formulate an ecology of 
ideas relating questions like, what for an interaction exists between 
ideas, which economy restricts the manifoldness of ideas inside a spe­
cific area of the brain, what are the necessary conditions for the stabil-
Bateson described epistemology as follows: “It is the name o f  a species o f  scien­
tific study and talk. We set out to study the nature o f  study itself, the process o f  acqui­
sition o f information and its storage” (Bateson 1979: 6).
Bateson can be called a distant cousin o f these two logicians.
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ity or survival of such a system and/or subsystem. The second book 
calls for the platonic thesis that epistemology is a nondivisible inte­
grated metascience enclosing evolution, thinking, adaptation, embry­
ology and genetics —  a science of mind in the broadest sense of the 
word.
In 1951 he and his Swiss colleague Jürgen Ruesch published their 
book on Communication (Ruesch, Bateson 1951). At that time he also 
taught physicians and beatniks at the Californian School of Fine Arts 
in San Francisco —  probably a good source for his double-bind, when 
you will heave read the anecdote confirming that double binds really 
exist:
It happened during the first meeting of the class, and I had talked about 
the cultural differences between England and the States —  an issue, that 
always should related to when an Englishman is teaching Americans on 
cultural anthropology. At the end of the meeting one of the participants 
came to me. He had a look behind his shoulder to be sure that all the oth­
ers were gone and said very slowly: <1 would like to ask one questions 
<Sure, do it.>
<Do you want that we learn what you are telling us?>
I hesitated one moment with my answer, and he quickly continued: 
<Or is this all a sort of example, an illustration of something?>
<Yes, that’s it!>
<But an example for what?>
And nearly one year later I heard some rumour, a sort of complaint. It 
was said <Bateson knows something which he does not tell us> or b e ­
hind the sentences o f Bateson, there is something behind all of this, but he 
never reveals it>. O f course, I did not answer the question <an example 
for what?>.7
The Batesonian concepts
In his cognitive theory idea represents the smallest unit of a mental 
process, comparable to the bit of our information age. It denotes a dif­
ference that distinguishes itself and is situated on the lowest level of 
perception, and produces patterns. In his later years Bateson referred 
to Gustav Theodor Fechner who investigated the “just noticeable dif­
ference” meaning that perception depends on difference, contrast and
This happens when taking Bateson seriously and literally —  never forget that 
Gregory is looking from behind the glasses.
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ratio, but not on a specific state of matter-mind.8 The logician will be 
probably remineded of Spinoza’s dictum definitio est negatio. That 
means, when you define something, you implicitly negate its contra­
position. What we call in ordinary language idea resembles more a 
complex aggregate of the units in question. However, even in ordinary 
language we hesitate to name, for example, the bilateral symmetry of a 
frog or the message of a single neural impulse as idea as Bateson has 
done it.
To clarify this concept of difference that Bateson preferred to our 
common word facts, Kant’s transcendental idealism might help, as so 
often when the issue converts to a philosophical sophistication. 
A Kantian difference represents an object or phenomenon that consists 
of a million of potential facts of which just a few will be realized. The 
realization depends on the observer and his choice. Due to an idea, the 
observer and the natural phenomenon are interwoven after the ob­
server had sorted out all the other possibilities that the phenomenon 
offered to him. You could also call it a recursive operation, it is the 
logical term Bateson might have preferred.
Closely related to difference, not to say, mere another word is the 
pattern classifying a collection of events or objects that enables us to 
formulate conjectures. Patterns —  a kind of Kantian schemata —  refer 
to the relations between phenomena, things, or events occurring in our 
environment, and their ability to change the environmental outlook. 
They are non-material entities that do not emerge as given substances. 
They are, however, the necessary outward and visible sign of the sys­
tems being organized, as Bateson darkly stated. Bateson further ex­
plained that the behaviour of animals arises from patterns and forms 
that are shaped by relations between the animals. The psychologist 
May described them as the metaphors by which individuals are per­
ceived, and recognized (May 1977: 85f). In an example of frog and fly 
and how their behavioural pattern are connected, May illustrated the 
problem of the difference or idea in a very convincing way. A hungry 
frog sees a fly moving around its head. With the first fly movements 
the frog takes aim, and the second time when the fly moves the frog 
gulps it up. Thus, the frog could perceive the fly because the flying 
animal differed from the frog’s environment.
For a further elaboration o f Fechner, Fechner’s law on the efferent side o f  the cen­
tral nervous system, and for the philosophy o f anomal monism, cf. Heidelberger (1993) 
and Davidson (1980).
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The patterns, or Kantian schemata based on our imagination, per­
ception and thinking, are swirling around us and inside us, intertwin­
ing the phenomena of the environment with our mental states and 
building up a referential network that we call “our universe”.9 For 
Bateson as for Kant and, in his succession, for Uexküll10 we humans 
create our world by applying our schemata, and categorize the world 
in that way as we see it behind our eyes. Schemata are fixed as in­
variants, or primary categorization for they do not depend on culture 
or language, education or upbringing, we are bom with them. For 
Bateson they are floating images along interfaces whereby the redun­
dancy of all the possibilities that nature offers us, is limited. Interfaces 
are stretched out between the nervous system transferring the message 
of a difference, and the environment. They refer to systems’ bounda­
ries defined by an information exchange and by changes in coding, 
rather than to enclosures like our skin.11
You can compare the Batesonian patterns to Cassirer’s thought and 
perception schemes that fix our floating Anschauung (Cassirer 1929: 
471). In the third volume of the “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms” Cas­
sirer defined perception as an objectivation that constructs invariants. 
Hence, the process of cognition, or knowledge fix the permanent flux 
of the continuum that surrounds us by placing invariants.12 With those 
invariants we perceive heterogeneous gestalten. If we have designated 
these gestalten and have conceptualized them to ideas, we have built 
up a reference cluster. Premise is, however, that the heterogeneous 
forms can be transformed into each other; shortly, they are congruent
9 In my lectures series I tried to compare Cassirer’s cultural anthropology that relies 
upon a Sprachwelt with Bateson’s ecology. For lack o f space, I here just quote Cas­
sirer: “All theoretical cognition takes its departure from a world already preformed by 
language; the scientist, the historian, even the philosopher, lives with his objects only 
as language presents them to him” (Cassirer 1925: 28).
10 “In der Gegenwelt sind die Gegenstände der Umwelt durch Schemata vertreten, 
die je nach dem Organisationsplan des Tieres sehr allgemein gehalten sind und sehr 
viele Gegenstands arten zusammenfassen können. ... Die Schemata sind kein Produkt 
der Umwelt, sondern einzelne, durch den Organisationsplan gegebene Werkzeuge des 
Gehirnes, die immer bereitliegen, um auf passende Reize der Aussenwelt in Tätigkeit 
zu treten. ... Die Schemata wechseln mit den Bauplänen der Tiere” (Uexküll 1921: 
168-169).
11 “It seems that the interface between nerve and environment is characterized by a 
deep difference in kind, i.e. in logical typing, between what is on one side o f the inter­
face and what is on the other” (Bateson, Bateson 1987: 123).
"Invariants are never any objects, but just specific basic relations and functional 
interdepencies that we humans fix by the symbolic language o f  mathematics and 
physics in equations” (Cassirer 1921: 42; 1929: 471).
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to each other. In other words, we humans are capable to convert 
groups or gestalten because we map perception groups into cluster 
terms whereby we observe structures. That means, we are anchoring 
the transient Anschauung with a grid that we envelope upon our intui­
tive categories. At that very moment the floating is come to an end, 
and the real world is trapped into a system of differentiating symbols.
As soon as we have defined an object or event that we are per­
ceiving, we have cut out of nature’s collection a phenomenal entity. 
Due to the cut, or as philosophy says, due to the ontic separation, we 
can observe what happens on our side of the cut, and we might guess 
what happens on the other side of the cut —  so far Bateson’s hope. 
Premise is that something that is on the other side, has meaning that 
will diminish the probability of wrong guessing. Crucial is, however, 
how to position the information per se inside the huge lake of redun­
dant messages or differences whilst it does not matter to which side 
we are referring. Bateson who purposed to eliminate this confusion, 
identified redundancy and meaning as if both belong to one and the 
same discoursive world. Inside our small universe, being full of 
meaningful messages, redundancy is part of a meaningful world which 
encloses the intercourse and the extensional connections as well. But, 
how should we think of the purpose and/or function of the communi­
cative cognition representing our consciousness?
For Bateson cognition couples ourselves as residents of the envi­
ronment definitely to the ecosystem at large. Thus, it corresponds to 
the interrelationship of object to system, or to the whole of nature as 
Uexküll has pointed out in more poetic words in his Umweltlehre. 
Uexküll’s model shows that human monads13 whirl around between a 
specific Merknetz and Wirknetz, and act in their own closed shells 
called environment. This environment that is based on the Kantian 
category of space, is a construct of every living organism configuring 
their own inner world.14
The allusion to Leibniz is conscious. A monad reflects the whole contents o f  the 
world because it is a self-identical entity. Therefore, it does not divide itself to a sub- 
ject-object relation. For a critique o f the monadic perspective, cf. Willard van Orman 
Quine, the mathematical holist.
For a further analysis o f Uexküll’s notion o f  environment and how it depends on 
our tactile and visual perception, cf. Brauckmann (2001) and Kull (1998).
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Mind and its learning levels
Based on his experimental data on the communication of dolphins and 
the learning process of computers, rats, and humans in exact this se­
quence, Bateson developed a type hierarchy of learning. To anticipate 
one of Bateson’s statements on learning, it reveals a kind of qualita­
tive progression, or, to use his terminology, it is a change of ideas. It 
is closely modelled to Russell’s type hierarchy and Goethe’s ideal 
morphology. The name of the latter might be too eccentric to be men­
tioned in this context. However, Goethe also formulated a typological 
classification when describing the Urpflanze that makes a difference: 
A stem is what has leaves, a leaf is what has buds, a bud is what has a 
pistil, a pistil is what has carpels, and a carpel is what has an ovary, 
style and stigma and so on until you finally imagine the idea repre­
senting the Urpflanze.
We will start our discussion on Batesonian learning with a few 
sentences on mind and its meaning when explained from a typological 
perspective. Without mind, you cannot learn as you have been taught. 
It is for sure that Bateson would doubt the statement. As the reader 
might already expect, the mind is somehow inspired by the concept of 
differences embodying our categorical patterns. Hence, our mind op­
erates like an assembly of mental processes that are caused by differ­
ences which conversely are correlated to the transient alterations of 
negentropy and entropy.15 This concretely means that mental proc­
esses demand for circular, or even more complex chain causation de­
termining the divergent states of our mind. By doing so, they create 
effective differences that correspond to meaningful information, and 
code versions of the preceding operations that are already stored in our 
memory a long time ago. Then the primary differences are converted 
to transmutations the operation rules of which are relatively constant.
The description and classification of such processes corroborate a 
hierarchy of logical types being immanent of the phenomena and our 
mind as well. Unfortunately, Bateson apparently did not consider the 
difference between ontology and epistemology —  or has he seen be­
yond it? In his ecology, cognitive notions and ontic phenomena that 
we call thinking, evolution, ecology, life, or learning, are only occur­
ring in systems satisfying those criteria. As our mind is a classificator
13 To avoid misunderstandings, Bateson here points implicitly to probability and
statistics, and not to the thermodynamics o f  irreversible processes.
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of logical types, learning will codify differences to patterns since oth­
erwise it would violate the rationality of the Batesonian theory.
First, Bateson distinguished four different levels of learning that 
starts on the level zero. Zero-learning can be carried out even by sim­
ple mechanical devices as a thermostat. When an individuum receives 
a signal, for example, a sensory input that is repeated over a certain 
time, the individuum will show a minimal change in his or her reac­
tions. The zero-level is not stochastic, or to say it from the other side, 
this learning cannot correct itself by trial and error. After Bateson had 
worked with dolphins for some years, he extended the concept of 
zero-leaming slightly. Now the relationship between two or more or­
ganisms represents the sequence of a stimulus-response series which 
forces zero-leaming to evolve to Learning I. On this learning level we 
acquire further skills by actively changing a received signal; this is 
called Learning I, induced, for example, by punishment and reward, or 
by Pavlovian conditions. It still resembles a kind of mechanical 
learning that even organisms without a nervous system can carry out. 
However, even at this primitive state of learning, a frame of reference 
or context is implicated. Furthermore, it is assumed that a context 
which can be repeated, symbolizes a pattem-like something informing 
the organism what for a set of alternatives, whether there are right or 
wrong, it might opt for. As it might easily been seen, Learning I cor­
rects the results obtained on the zero-position.
When an organism is qualified to modify the knowledge that was 
acquired on the level of zero-leaming and was trained by Learning I, it 
has arrived at Learning II, or deutero-leaming. Then the context as it 
was perceived will have been changed. In Bateson’s cybernetic model, 
Learning II generates the linear learning of the preceding stages to 
information sets that enable us to order patterns and to reflect our 
knowledge. Again, after Bateson had gained more experimental data 
on the behaviour and learning of dolphins, he revised it. Now deutero- 
leaming prepares us humans to achieve knowledge about the patterns 
that structure context contingencies which have occurred at Learning
I. The revision was necessary for realizing the analogy between a 
computer as thinking machine and the human brain as operator of dif­
ferences. Consequently, he insisted that any receipt of information is, 
in a broad sense, learning. It may sound as if Bateson mapped the cal­
culating machine to imaginative brains, but please beware of it —  it is 
just an analogy, and not an existential proposition as Artificial Intelli­
gence Research has stated it.
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This third step of learning will modify the character of the indivi- 
duum because it creates a pattern belonging to one person in that two- 
person system which constitutes a context of learning. Bateson ex­
trapolated his model further arguing that living organisms are con­
strained to accumulate deutero-leaming and, therefore, to create hier­
archies of knowledge. By it, we are mapping the pattern contexts of 
the earlier steps of learning processes to our knowledge and try to ra­
tionalize the antinomies resulting from the process of deutero- 
leaming. This leads finally to Learning III, the realm of cognition.
The central point of his epistemic anthropology is the concept of 
deutero-leaming that refers to a knowledge “every schoolboy knows”, 
namely, you learn for gaining knowledge and habits that distinguish 
yourself from any other person. As it exists and functions, at least 
sometimes, mental states as the free will and operational thinking, 
exist, too. It corresponds to the assumption that there is a set of cogni­
tive habits based on awareness to which mental states will relate with­
out converting themselves at each time to memory. To fully compre­
hend this statement, one has to recall that for Bateson memory evi­
dences a stream of events, floating around without fixed boundaries 
such that it is reshuffled again and again, always adjusted to the here 
and now. To say it in other words, you can identify deutero-leaming 
as the mental state before the knowing of patterns and after trivial 
learning presupposing a kind of proto-leaming. The proto-learning is 
characterized as the quantitative increase of a simple learning curve 
which alterates to deutero-leaming by a slow progression. The pro­
gression starts from a Pavlovian framework and improves by trial- 
and-error mechanisms to that stage on which the contexts we have 
learned, help us to avoid wrong decisions, or to gain wrong informa­
tion. To be honest, there are some minor problems to believe in it. The 
most important one is that we humans do not like always to behave 
like rational animals.
One by-effect of his type hierarchy of learning is that the genetic 
determinism is pushed aside because we can achieve levels of knowl­
edge that free us from the micro-deterministic constraints imposed 
upon us by our genetic constitution. The result of a permanent learn­
ing process is a kind of evolution. Bateson himself stated that if there 
exists a fixed scheme of how we think, the evolutionary system will 
be able to select positive decisions. Such a scheme is either located
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inside genes or between them.16 Bateson’s sentences indicate that not 
all possible choices are placed on the same level; quite the opposite, 
you will find them distributed on a hierarchy of different stages. That 
is the main reason why redundancy is emerging, or to say it in Bateso- 
nian terms, the predictability of particular events inside a complex 
system will increase.
Analogous to the levels of learning Bateson deduced three cogni­
tive types that are congruent to specific neurophysiological structures. 
They are based on the mental curves that classify the learning hierar­
chies and map the neuronal synapses to the contexts of our mental 
actions. In other words, in our brain contingent permutations directing 
and controlling the nervous system are emerging. By a selective proc­
ess of energetic amplification and elimination, our mental states adjust 
the constraints of the environment in such a way that they are finally 
feasible to our logical categories. Conversely, the patterns are regu­
lated by the physical outerworld that surrounds us and every living 
organisms, animals and plants as well, and that is independent from 
our interventions or our perceptions.17 Bizarre as it might sound, for 
Bateson we humans or animals or plants consist of simple energy 
transferring system belonging to an integrated eco-cybemetics called 
Nature.
In his theory the progress of science corresponds to the trails of 
fuzzy thinking structuring itself slowly upon a more or less un­
grounded base. Such a base is, part by part, underpinned by rational 
operations that set interfaces and correct the shadowy fundament. The 
structure of science that Bateson described as £i5o<  ^ is more likely the 
same in all different disciplines. This assumption is mainly based on 
the General System Theory as developed by Bertalanffy stating that 
we can transfer scientific results from one discipline to another be­
cause we are dealing with analogies.18 For Bateson the analogies, pri­
mary relations and secondary relations as well, are produced by in­
formation processes of the type hierarchy of learning.
Maybe, you can locate it inside the immune system as Niels Jeme has proposed in 
comparing his network theory o f the immune system to the generative grammar o f  
С homsky, cf. Brauckmann (1999) for a short discussion how Jeme’s network theory o f  
immunology relates to biosemiotics.
I he difference between environment and surroundings marks the cornerstone o f  
I Texküll’s Uimveltlehre, cf. Kull (1998).
С assirer characterized this transfer as the fruitful result o f  categorical faults.
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Bateson’s simplification of Russell’s formal type hierarchy is based 
on his hypothesis that there exist a difference between the context it­
self and the operation which demarcates the context in question from 
other patterns. As an example for the relationship of context and mes­
sage the elephant may serve: Let us imagine the trunk of an elephant. 
For the elephant it is its nose. The trunk is a nose because of a com­
munication process for its context identifies it as a something that is 
placed right in the middle of two eyes and a mouth. And such a thing, 
we call a nose. In other words, the context determines how an infor­
mation is coded. In fact, we are talking of a metacommunication in the 
sense of Whorf. The metacommunication serves to classify messages 
which are embodied in the context. Furthermore, it constitutes and 
explains the linguistic standards to which message and context refer. 
And therefore, beware of the message, it is not what it causes. If you 
do not consider this warning, you might be caught in the trap of dou­
ble-binds that simulate from a psychiatric perspective the troubles 
Russell and Whitehead encountered when cleaning up the antinomies 
of traditional logics. As it is well known, they tried to purify logics 
from all the disturbances caused because we humans liked to confus­
ing logical types, not to say, we all, sometimes more, sometimes less, 
celebrate the homo ludens in ourselves. It pleases us to categorize ob­
jects, phenomena, or events falsely, particularly when doing it on a 
very high level of abstraction. However, logics was finally [?] thought 
to be saved for all these paradoxa enjoying philosophical clowns.
Communication, as Bateson understood it, is furnished by some 
premises that will be shortly described now. The first one is the Freu­
dian postulate that only limited aspects of a part of what happens in 
human communication are accessible to the consciousness of the par­
ticipants. Bateson used the image of Rilke’s unicorn to sketch the 
phenomenon of the unspeakable context.19 When discussing the 
enigma of communication at the Advanced Institute of Behavioral
Communication
14 ‘‘Rilke's Unicom is present in every conversation between persons and this ficti­
tious beast evolves and changes, dissolves and is recrystalized in new shapes with 
every move and message. Denial o f the Unicom will not prevent its existence —  but 
only cause it to become monstrous” (Bateson 1971: 20). Although Bateson quotes 
Rilke s Sonette an Orpheus, Teil 2, Sonett 4, he hides the other Unicom that was of 
utmost importance for his theory, namely Carroll’s Unicorn appearing behind the 
looking-glass.
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Sciences of Stanford in the 1950s, he referred explicitly to Sapir’s 
definition of the unconsciousness as a necessity of the economics of 
hierarchic organization —  a concept which was at the bottom of his 
own theory of communication.20 The difference to the Freudian ap­
proach rest upon the emphasis upon communication and perception. 
However, Bateson agreed to Freud that all messages —  whether ver­
bal or non-verbal — are mediated in their creation by a primary proc­
ess, i.e., they contain multiple references characterizing our commit­
ment to dream and fantasies.
Another premise was the discontinuity of our experience, a basic 
statement of Gestalt psychology. It emphasizes the hierarchy of subdi­
visions typical of the perception process that results in multiple cod­
ing. The mentioned multiplicity can effect a code distortion when the 
persons involved differ in their explicit and implicit rules of coding 
the phenomena or entities they perceive. Bateson concluded therefore 
that the rules of self-perception controlling the formation of our self- 
image, are very often modified by the way in which others apprehend 
our messages — double-binds are lurking behind the mirror. If other 
persons cannot transform our messages into information that makes a 
difference, the communication has failed. When such a failure will be 
repeated again and again, it will at least affect our behaviour, then our 
habits and our individual constitution, maybe even until we become 
cases for pathogenetic investigations.
An important notion of his communication model is the type —  it 
might not surprise anymore. How did Bateson now define types? 
Types are communication levels that are enmeshed into each other, 
and at the same time they are used to be built upon hierarchies struc­
turing the communication. As can be easily seen, this double structure 
and twofold function will cause some additional troubles. Hence, we 
all know because we were trained to know, there exists a difference 
between nomina and the referential process, the system and the gene­
sis, the analogous and the digital. To solve it, Bateson tried to knot the 
digital procedures —  that is the traditional denomination —  to the 
analogous procedures. His point of departure was the logical principle 
that the process of denomination itself can be nominated; to say it 
simpler, Bateson replaced the ladder of logical types that resulted from
"It was Sapir’s genius to recognize that culture, language, and personality form an 
interacting system and that this system in turn interacts with the biological givens o f  
perception to generate cognition'’ (Rieber 1989: 19). Whether it is a sign o f  geniality to 
stating the obvious, I really doubt.
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the Principia, by attributing an inherent evolution to the context.21 
However, you cannot say that the epistemic ecology became simpler 
when adding the time dimension; quite the opposite, it all became 
more complicated.
According to Bateson communication systems are hierarchically 
structured, and the verbal description of such an organization rests in 
most cases upon visual perception converted into linguistic patterns. 
What did he want to confirm with such a strange statement? His main 
objective was to refute the reductionistic hypothesis, non-verbal (vis­
ual) communication that is based on mythical or religious thinking, 
would be an evolutionary residuum without any meaning for us, mod­
em and civilized as we ourselves claim to be. Bateson’s problem was 
that he rationalized all what in effect cannot be rationalized, and ap­
plied mythical thinking to all what is rational, or to all that appears to 
be rational. Thus, he really talked myth. The crucial problem con­
cerning a philosopical theory of myth in general, is that myths operate 
by actions. They very often cannot be abstracted to conceptual images 
which we try to communicate by ordinary language. You inwardly 
experience and feel a myth, and if you try to put it in proper words, it 
becomes mere a not yet fully rationalized fiction which is categorized 
by the belief that its designated sign exists really as an object. Mythi­
cal narrative requires a specific way of perceiving, that does not com­
prehend nature as an objective existence located a world apart. For 
Bateson, the myth performs a scheme to orient life in general, it in­
terprets our world based on feelings and sensation. Thus, it represents 
the mother soil for symbolic forms on which, if language and technics 
are added, science and art can emerge.
In his ecological model, this specific modus of communication 
fulfils purposes quite different from the verbal language. And it does 
so since the world of communication contains messages, and it does 
not consist of well-defined objects which belong to the kingdom of 
pure mathematics. Concerning the issue, to which scientific discipline 
Bateson’s ecology of communication, or message and difference be­
long, he himself set it apart of the canon of science and construed it 
with referring to the anthropological concepts of context and meaning. 
Therefore, Bateson’s ecological epistemology has some similarities to 
Berkeley’s universe of phenomena although even Berkeley himself 
has underestimated the point, as Bateson conceeded. Maybe, a better
Bateson stated for his own development that he was deeply influenced by his fa­
ther who did not appreciated Darwinian evolution.
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idea would have been “in this context” if Bateson had connected his 
approach to Uexküll’s ethological aesthetics serving as the visual cue 
that plays definitely a great part in our understanding of the environ­
ment.
Double-bind
A decisive step to his double-bind theory was done when Bateson dis­
covered the conception of the “map-territory” that Alfred Korzybski 
formulated in a monograph of nearly thousand pages. According to 
Korzybski reasoning, perception and the communication on percep­
tion transform and code the ideas, the perceived objects and phenomal 
signs, whereby the report maps the objects in question. By doing so, 
all methods of coding are subsumed under the iconic pars pro toto 
relationship that couples concepts, objects, and phenomena to each 
other on quite different ways. As a consequence, the operation to clas­
sify all of the communicative material has to be controlled at each 
state of communication whether it is the map or the territory. Thus, it 
is evident, or it should be obvious at least, that message and context 
implicitly refer to the same level constituting and explaining both of 
them. Should we call this level the difference? In one talk on game 
theory Bateson asked the audience when a sign will be recognized as a 
signal, and answered it that it will be known because the sign-objects 
are communicated on a metalevel —  and again, we are sitting in tau­
tology’s trap.
If the specific communication levels that are codified as logical 
units and typify a message, are disturbed by misunderstandings or, 
even worse, by contractions between speech and action, an additional 
context will appear that ascribes the typifier in a wrong way to the 
concerned message. And if further this confusion will become a per­
manent habit of our person since message and context are falsely re­
lated to each other again and again, strong psychoses can infect you 
and maybe change your individuality. In 1961 Bateson edited and in­
troduced the notebook of a schizophrenic, Perceval ’s Narrative which 
shows how the world of a schizophren is structured completely by 
double-binds. In the schizophrenic’s world the apparent coherence of 
logics that our mind can process, is broken up. To explain this sharp
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argument, you have to think about Bateson’s attitude towards the 
syntactical first person, the Ich n
Like Schopenhauer, Bateson denied an objective existence of the 
Ich since it is present in the world of communication alone. By it, he 
avoided the solipsism of philosophical phenomenology as formulated 
by Husserl.2'1 For Bateson’s ecological approach the Ich is an essential 
member of the syntax that covers its own experience and the life of its 
fellow Ichs on which its well-being depends. To put it into other 
words, between context —  whether it is a speech or an action —  and 
messages, or between meta-message and message there exists the 
same gap that you can discover between an object and the word as­
signed to it. That means simply you need a bridge to cross the river of 
difference that floats between both. And even worse, per definitionem 
both belong to different hierarchical levels. Thus, you are forced to 
climb, too. Seriously, as we all live our lives as a zoon politikon, we 
desperately need conceptual and commonly accepted notions to de­
scribe the perception states of other persons if we want to experience 
these states with our own body.24
Due to his double-bind concept Bateson focused even more than he 
had done before on the human observer whom he set right into the 
centre of the observation process. Such a focus presupposes that the 
entity to be investigated represents an infinite regress of references 
that will never transform to the object itself —  a statement corre­
sponding to his attitude towards the Ich.25 The nucleus of the double­
bind theory stated that beyond every single message is hidden a con­
text which conditions the message and effects our actions. The dou- 
ble-binds that support trans-contextual syndroms, function like the 
bridge offering us a pathway over the tissue, woven of contexts and
22 Here the German idiom Ich for the English I is consciously chosen because the 
plural o f  the English I reminds o f  German eggs —  no doubts, they are objects, but not 
the subject addressed here.
23 For the scientific attitude cf. Schrödinger’s attitude: “Pour etre bref, je designerai 
l ’hypothese qui s ’oppose au solipsisme par lettre P (personality des creatures qui 
m’entourent)” (Schrödinger 1935: 186).
24 “Eine recht radikale Folgerung daraus ist, dass das Innere (Psychische, Mentale), 
also das eigentlich privat, intern Zugängliche nur mittels der äusseren Sprache und 
ihrer sozial bestimmten Bedeutungszuordnungen dargestellt (repräsentiert), differen­
ziert, gemeint und begriffen werden kann. Das klingt geradezu paradox” (Lenk 1994:
38).
23 “In communication exchange, there could be no quantities or substances, however, 
only transformations o f  patterns. [...] I acquire in my mind no double bind but only a 
percept or transform o f a double bind” (Bateson 1972: 272).
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messages. Obviously, his double-bind theory is based on the model of 
deutero-leaming emerging from the crucial problem of Verdingli­
chung [objectivation].
Ecology of mind
Now context and message are even more interwoven than ever before. 
As already said, the mind consists of transformations, phenomena, 
events and the rules which transform the former. To recapitulate 
shortly, Bateson defined the mind from a systemic standpoint and, at 
the same time, from a genetic perspective. According to evolutionary 
theory, all biological systems are capable of an adaptive modification 
initiated by a feedback that results from the transient operations of 
trial and error. To say it in more biological terms, they obey the Ti- 
betian pray mill murmuring selection-adaptation-mutation. Those ac­
tions, conversely, create a superimposition that connect the numerous 
feedback loops mutually. Thereby mental habits are shaped which 
qualify us to problem solving. And here we are — standing again on 
the level of deutero-leaming.
Ecology here — it seems to be meaningless to say anymore in this 
con tex t— is characterized as a classification modus, i.e., an operation 
that is executed by the whole system consisting of an individual, a 
computer and the environment. And exactly this encompasses ecology 
o f  mind. For example, a specific information set is transferred by the 
mind, this is what Bateson called the screening of the consciousness to 
curves of mental moments. One idea after the other is systematically 
selected by an unconscious process of perception that is performed by 
our mind. A formal feature of this mental operating is the aiming to­
wards a steady state that couples body, mind and ecosystem in har­
mony. During this process the system is learning. That means, in mu­
tually crossed loops phase alterations are effected by the environment 
and then distributed very slowly through the whole ecosystem. 
Bateson has described it as the behaviour of vicious systems escalat­
ing over their circuits; maybe an overshot will be the best image to 
describing it. To sum up shortly, the minimal demands for an ecologi­
cal system of mind that should be fulfilled are the following condi­
tions:
1 ■ 1 he system consisting of our mental states and the external envi­
ronment works on the basis of differences;
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2. the system consists of closed, but dynamic networks resulting from 
differences and transformations of differences;
3. many events inside the system are fed more likely by a reacting 
component than by the influence of the triggering component with 
energy;
4. there exists self-regulation, or self-correctiveness, as Bateson em­
phasized, towards homeostasis.
Conclusion
Bateson’s wanted to discover the patterns that connect the physical 
world of pleroma26, and of creatura. In the universe of the former, the 
forces and effects explain sufficiently events, but inside the creative 
universe you cannot apprehend without considering the semantic dif­
ferences imposed upon us by the environment. To transfer these dif­
ferent worlds to Bateson’s ecological theory, he talked in the terms of 
pleroma in addressing mythical creatura. Unfortunately, he was too 
occupied with the formal origins of order which he understood as a 
problem of recursive-like operations. The ecology of mind represents 
an epistemology based on anthropological and ethological field stud­
ies and, at the same time, on cybernetic research. His contextual epis­
temology symbolizes an eco-systemic perspective of living processes 
that envelopes the individual mind, the pathways and messages out­
side the body, the interconnected environment and the planetary sys­
tem. He held an epistemological holism that is exaggerated by a cy­
bernetic terminology —  and that is the elegance of his theory as its 
pitfalls, too.
Therefore, I should confess that I am more than dubious about im­
posing a formal logical style hierarchy of logical types on the human 
style of thinking. For me, we are not nearly as rational as Bateson 
suggests. His epistemic ecology is, however, sympathetic for me, be­
cause he burnt his fingers by putting them to many rusty conceptual 
approaches, mental habits, ways of perceiving and relational patterns. 
In the gestalt of a leaf, in the body of a cancer, in the grammar of our 
language he discovered comparable messages that patterns our world. 
If you translate Bateson’s pattern into existential terms, then you will 
see the myth as the structure that patterns human events. A few centu-
Pleroma openly refers to Jung’s ideas, but Bateson understood this mystical notion 
in a pre-Jungian sense.
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ries ago it would have been called pantheism. No doubt, helpful here 
was his immense scientific imagination and his maxim of reasoning to 
think strictly and loosely simultaneously.
How does it all fit together? To answer with Batesonian words, it 
is the idea that the contrast between part and whole as soon as such a 
contrast appears in communication is just one of the logical types, but 
never one of reality. The whole is always related to its parts on a 
metalevel — my addendum here is, on the metalevel of a communica­
tion model of cognition. Are there any questions left? I really hope so, 
except the initial question asked at the beginning, namely, how 
Bateson’s cognitive ecology fits the holistic principles of emergent 
macro-properties, the holistic feedback, an approximate separation, 
the non-predictiveness, and the moral value. This question was im­
plicitly answered again and again on the preceding pages.
References
Bateson, Gregory 1936. N avert: A Survey o f  the Problems Suggested by a 
Composite Picture o f the Culture o f a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from  
Three Points o f View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— 1961. Perceval’s Narrative: A Patient's Account o f  his Psychosis, 1830- 
1832. Reprint edited and introduced by G. Bateson. Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press.
— 1971. Communication. In: McQuown, Norman A. (ed.). The Natural 
History o f an Interview. Chicago: University o f Chicago Library Micro­
film Collection o f Manuscripts on Cultural Anthropology [no. 95, se­
ries IV], 1-40.
— 1972/2000. Steps to an Ecology o f  Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropol­
ogy, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. San Francisco: Chandler 
Publishing Company.
— 1979a. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York: Dutton.
— 1979b. The Science of Knowing. Esalen Catalog 17(2): 6-7.
Bateson, Gregory and Bateson, Mary Catherine 1987. Angels Fear: Towards 
an Epistemology o f the Sacred. New York: Macmillan.
Bateson, Gregory and Mead, Margaret 1942. Balinese Character: A Photo­
graphic Analysis. (Special publication o f the New York Academy o f Sci­
ence, vol. 2.) New York: New York Academy o f Sciences.
Brauckmann, Sabine 1999. On genes, cells and memory. Semiotica 127(1/4): 
151-167.
2001. From the haptic-optic space to our environment: Jakob von Uexkiill 
and Richard Woltereck. Semiotica (Special issue: Jakob von Uexkiill: A 
Paradigm for Biology and Semiotics, in print).
418 Sabine Brauckmann
Cassirer, Ernst 1921/1994. Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie. In: Cassirer, 
Ernst. Zur modernen Physik. 7. unveränd. Auflage. Darmstadt: Wissen­
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 3-124.
—  1929/1996. The Philosophy o f  Symbolic Forms. Vol. 3: The Phenomenol­
ogy o f  Knowledge. (Translated by Ralph Manheim, pref. and introd. by 
Charles W. Hendel.) New Haven: Yale University Press.
—  1925/1953. Language and Myth. (Translated by Suzanne K. Langer.) New 
York: Dover.
—  1979. Symbol Myth and Culture: Essays and Lectures o f Ernst Cassirer, 
1935-1945. Verene, Donald Phillip (ed.). New Haven: Yale University 
Press.
Carroll, Lewis 1899. Through the Looking-Glass and what Alice Found 
There. London: MacMillan.
Davidson, Donald 1980. Mental events. In: Davidson, Donald. Essays on 
Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 207-222.
Fechner, Gustav Theodor 1873. Einige Ideen zur Schöpfungs- und Entwick­
lungsgeschichte der Organismen. Leipzig: Breitkopf u. Härtel.
Frede, Dorothea and Schumacher, Reinhold (eds.) 1997. Ernst Cassirers 
Werk und Wirkung. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Harries-Jones, Peter 1995. A Recursive Vision: Ecological Understanding and 
Gregory Bateson. Toronto: University o f Toronto.
Heidelberger, Michael 1993. Die innere Seite der Natur. Gustav Theodor 
Fechners wissenschaftlich-philosophische Weltauffassung. Frankfurt: 
Klostermann.
Jerne, Niels 1985. The generative grammar o f the immune system, Bioscience 
Reports 5: 439-451.
Kant, Immanuel 1790/1975. Kritik der Urteilskraft. In: Kant, Immanuel. 
Werke, vol. 5. Weischedel, W. (ed.). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch- 
gesellschaft, 237-620.
Korzybsky, Tadeusz 1941. Science and Sanity. New York: Science Press.
Krois, John M. 1981. Peirce and Cassirer: the philosophical importance of a 
theory o f  signs. In: Ketner, Kenneth L.; Ransdell, Joseph M.; Eisele, 
Carolyn; Fisch, Max H. and Hardwick, Charles S. (eds.), Proceedings of 
the Charles S. Peirce Bicentennial International Congress. Lubbock: 
Tech University Press, 99-104.
Kull, Kalevi 1998. On semiosis, Umwelt, and semiosphere. Semiotica 
120(3/4): 299-310.
Lenk, Hans 1994. Von Deutungen zu Wertungen: Eine Einführung in ak­
tuelles Philosophieren. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Lipset, David 1980. Gregory Bateson: The Legacy o f  a Scientist. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
May, Rollo 1977. Gregory Bateson and humanistic psychology. In: Brock­
man, John (ed.), About Bateson. (Essays on Gregory Bateson by Mary C. 
Bateson, Ray Birdwhistell, John Brockman, David Lipset, Rollo May,
Steps towards an ecology o f  cognition 419
Margaret Mead, Edwin Schlossberg, with an afterword by Gregory 
Bateson.) New York: Dutton Paperback, 75-99.
Quine, Willard van Orman 1987. Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical 
Dictionary. London: Penguin.
Rieber, Robert W. 1989. The Individual, Communication, and Society: Essays 
in Memory o f Gregory Bateson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ruesch, Jürgen and Bateson, Gregory 1951. Communication: The Social Ma­
trix o f Psychiatry. New York: W. W. Norton.
Sapir, Edward 1927/1949. Selected Writings o f Edward Sapir. Mandelbaum, 
D. G. (ed.). Berkeley: University o f California Press.
Schrödinger, Erwin 1935. Quelques remarques au sujet des bases de la con- 
naissance scientifique. Scientia, 57: 181-191.
Uexküll, Jakob von 1921. Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. 2. Auflage. Ber­
lin: Springer.
— 1940. Bedeutungslehre (BIOS. Abhandlungen zur theoretischen Biologie 
und ihrer Geschichte, sowie zur Philosophie der organischen Naturwis­
senschaften, Bd. 10.) Leipzig: J. A. Barth.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee 1952. Collected Papers on Metalinguistics. Washing­
ton: Foreign Service Institute.
Шаги к экологии познания: 
холистическое эссе
Эссе информирует о холистическом подходе Грегори Бейтсона к 
эпистемическому рассмотрению природы. Экология разума опи­
рается на биологический холизм, служащий методическим средст­
вом объяснения “феноменов” жизни, таких как, например, комму­
никация, обучение, познание. Начав с идеи, мельчайшей единицы  
информации, Бейтсон разработал классификацию обучения, осно­
ванную на кибернетическом подходе к разуму. Коммуникационная 
модель сосредоточена на парадоксах, обусловленных ложной сиг- 
нификацией. Она ведет к патогенезу шизофрении, определяемой в 
рамках концепции двойных посланий. Эта экосистемная перспектива 
по отношению к живым процессам представляет истинно холисти­
ческую теорию природы.
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Teadvustuse ökoloogia poole: 
holistlik essee
Essee annab ülevaate Gregory Bateson’i holistlikust lähenemisest epis- 
teemilisele loodusvaatele. Mõistuse ökoloogia tugineb bioloogilisele 
holismile, mis on elu “fenomenide”, — nagu näiteks kommunikatsioon, 
õppimine, tunnetus, —  seletamise metoodiliseks vahendiks. Alustades 
ideest, vähimast informatsiooniühikust, töötas Bateson välja teadvusele 
küberneetilisel lähenemisel põhineva õppimise klassifikatsiooni. Kommu- 
nikatsioonimudel keskendub väära tähistamise poolt põhjustatud para­
doksidele. See viib skisofreenia patogeneesini, mida määratletakse 
topeltseoste kontseptsiooni raames. Taoline ökosüsteemne elusprotsesside 
käsitlus esindab tõeliselt holistlikku(terviklikku) loodusteooriat.
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Discovering ecosemiotics
Winfried Nöth, Kalevi Kull1
Ecosemiotics (or ecological semiotics) is the study of sign processes in the 
interaction of humans with their natural environment. This semiotic field at 
the crossroads of nature and culture is closely related to its neighbouring 
fields of biosemiotics and semiotics of culture, but semiosis in the relation 
between humans and nature is also of concern to aesthetics, the visual arts, 
literature, hermeneutics, and theology. Aspects related to ecosemiotics have 
also been studied in human ecology, cultural geography, ecopsychology, and 
ecolinguistics.
There are two different conceptions of the ecological aspects of semiotics:
(1) Ecological refers to all environmental information except for the one 
communicated by humans or in the case of other organisms by conspecifics. 
In this sense, there is ecological semiosis in all organisms, and ecosemiotics 
comprises a large part of biosemiotics.
(2) In a narrower sense ecological refers to the environment of humans only. 
Accordingly, human environmental problems, when treated semiotically, 
belong to the field of ecosemiotics. In this sense, ecosemiotics is a part of 
anthroposemiotics, and more strictly, of the semiotics of culture. Four major 
models of the relationship between humans and their environment can be 
discerned in the history of culture: the pansemiotic, the magical, the mytho­
logical, and the one of the natural sciences (see also Nöth 1998; 2000: 251- 
252).
Due to these two different meanings of ‘ecological’, there have been dif­
ferent definitions of ‘ecosemiotics’. For instance, Tembrock (1997) follows 
the first, whereas Kull (1998) follows the second definition.
First outlines of ecosemiotics and semiotic ecology can be found in the 
special issue of Zeitschrift für Semiotik 18(1) entitled ‘Natur, Umwelt, 
Zeichen’ (1996) or in the papers by Nöth and Kull in Sign Systems Studies 26
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(1998). Other special issues o f journals dedicated to the topic are American 
Journal o f  Semiotics 11(1/2), entitled ‘Refiguring Debris’ (1994), Zeitschrift 
fü r Semiotik 19(1/2), entitled ‘Zur kultursemiotisehen Funktion von Gärten 
und Parks’ (1997), and Sign Systems Studies 28 (2000), with two articles on 
the topic. As a university course, ecosemiotics has been included into the 
curriculum of Tartu University (since 1998) and o f the Estonian Agricultural 
University (since 1999). As an applied field, ecosemiotics may have a grow­
ing importance for landscape planning and for environmental studies in gen­
eral (see, e.g., Böhme 1997, Cantrill and Oravec 1996, Larsen and Grgas 
1994, Posner 1990, Schempp et al. 1997, Simmons 1993, Wrede and Adams 
1994).
A workshop on Ecosemiotics: Studies in Environmental Semiosis has 
been held in the framework o f the Nordic-Baltic Summer Institute for Semi­
otic and Structural Studies at Imatra, Finland, on June 16-17, 2000. Consid­
ering the potential importance o f this new field o f semiotics and its potential 
for bridging the cultural and scientific aspects o f ecology, it seems worth­
while to point out few details o f this event as one o f the first meetings in the 
field.
The contributions.to the workshop were subdivided in three parts: 
Theoretical Foundations:
Winfried Nöth (Germany) —  Introduction to ecosemiotics: studies in envi­
ronmental semiosis;
Kalevi Kull (Estonia) —  Inter-species relations in change: an ecosemiotic 
analysis;
Soren Brier (Denmark) —  Cybersemiotics, biosemiotics and ecosemiotics; 
Solomon Marcus (Romania) —  The semiotics o f ecology in a mathematical 
perspective;
Andreas Weber (Germany) —  Turning the inside out: natural forms as ex­
pression o f intentionality.
Cultural Ecosemiotics:
Osmo Kuusi (Finland) —  Ecosemiotics o f materials;
Christina Ljungberg (Switzerland) —  (Mis)reading the signs: problems of 
interaction in contemporary Canadian fiction;
Hannele Kerosuo (Finland) —  Border zones as places o f change;
Peter Schulz (Switzerland) —  Subjectivity in an semiotic perspective; 
Alexander E. Sedov (Russia) —  New Russian myths concerning genetic re­
search in the mass-media and in the common mind;
Dario Martinelli (Italy) —  To beast or not to beast? That is the question; 
Tuomo Jämsä (Finland) —  Ecology o f  the human nature.
Verbal and Nonverbal Ecosemiotics:
Zdzislaw W^sik and Elžbieta W^sik (Poland) —  On the ecological properties 
of languages: searching for a descriptive model in the domain o f external 
linguistics (on the basis o f Aroumunian and Frisian);
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Isabelle Guai'tella (France) —  Role du geste et de la voix pour l’expression 
des attitudes dans Г interaction;
Serge Santi (France) —  Fondations sensori-motrices des relations voix/gestes 
dans la communication;
Albert Di Cristo (France) —  Une grammaire ecologique comme cadre inter- 
pretatif de la prosodie de la parole;
Riste Keskpaik (Estonia) —  Semiotics o f garbage in Estonian press;
Magnus S. Magnusson (Iceland) —  Genes and the music o f human interac­
tions.
The abstracts o f the papers were published as a booklet {Abstracts — Nordic- 
Baltic Summer Institute fo r  Semiotic and Structural Studies. Imatra, 2000) for 
the participants. The session included a general discussion about the relation­
ships between ecosemiotics, biosemiotics, and semiotics o f culture. Despite 
some overlap between these fields, there remains much to be explored.
An important challenge for ecosemiotics will be a systematic analysis o f  
models o f semiotic relationships between humans and their environment, both 
in historical and in contemporary cultures (cf. Böhme 1996, Bouissac 1989, 
Hornborg 1996, Krampen 1989, Nöth 1998, Oelschlaeger 1991, Rapp 1981, 
Warnke 1998). This work has only begun.
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Finno-Ugric semiotics: 
Cultures and metacultures
Anti Randviir, Eero Tarasti, Vilmos Voigt1
In the framework o f the Finno-Ugric Congress held in Tartu in 2000 there 
took place, under the Hungarian initiative, also foundation o f the Finno-Ugric 
Semiotic Association to unite different Finno-Ugric peoples and cultures, 
from the semiotic viewpoint, in at least two major aspects. The first aspect is 
concerned with unified semiotic analysis o f these cultures, whereas the sec­
ond one should be concerned with organizational matters in terms o f forming 
stabile network between the Finno-Ugric semioticians and the relevant na­
tional institutions. Since this type o f organization (cf. organizations founded 
on the basis o f so-to-speak universal objects, e.g. visual semiotics, spatial 
semiotics, etc.) is not common yet in the international structure o f semiotics 
(probably with some exceptions like the Balkan region), it is probably worth 
introducing both from the formal viewpoint and with respect to a closer look 
at the semiotic activity in the three Finno-Ugric cultures having the state 
structure to support it (Estonia, Finland and Hungary). Within the domain of 
Finno-Ugric studies, semiotics appeared only during the last decades as a 
special field of research. Important works were published in linguistics, liter­
ary studies, musicology, art history, cultural analysis, psychology, folklore 
and sociology etc. from semiotic points o f view. Detection o f signs in differ­
ent Finno-Ugric cultures became a fashionable topic. International acceptance 
of Finnish, Hungarian and Estonian semiotics has been overwhelming. Still, 
we know relatively little about semiotics among other Finno-Ugric peoples. 
Historic surveys are relatively frequent, but until recently there was no at­
tempt to summarize the scope and prospects o f ‘Finno-Ugric semiotics’. 
About thirty years ago Thomas A. Sebeok, in a lecture for the audience o f the
Authors’ addresses: A. Randviir —  Dept, o f  Semiotics, University o f  Tartu, Tiigi 
St. 78, 50410 Tartu, Estonia; e-mail: randviir@ut.ee; E. Tarasti —  Dept, o f  
Musicology, University o f  Helsinki, Vironkatu 1, 00014 Helsinki, Finland; e-mail: 
tarasti@helsinki.fi; V. Voigt —  Dept, o f  Folklore, Eötvös Loränd University, Piarista 
köz 1, 1052 Budapest V, Hungary; e-mail: voigt@ludens.elte.hu.
Helsinki University, spoke about the necessity o f  collecting data o f non­
verbal behavior among the Finno-Ugric peoples, including their sign systems. 
However, this lecture remained unpublished and thus without direct results. 
Thus, in accord with the trivial dynamism between the development of sci­
ence and its formal structures (university departments, associations, etc.), 
foundation o f Finno-Ugric Semiotics Association presents a good ground to 
ask the question why there would be any need for Fenno-Ugric semiotic 
studies at all.
It is a well-known fact that semiotics is as old a discipline as having its roots 
in Ancient Hellas, having been belonging, as a (sub)doctrine o f diagnostics, to 
the scientific field of medicine. It is also a widespread triviality that the word 
‘semiotics’, as having its roots in ancient terminology, in fact did survive much 
thanks to this quite specific area o f usage. Yet again, from the contemporary 
semiotic viewpoint it is not customary to acknowledge survey o f semiotics as 
such a dependent field. Instead it is more usual to rather divide the history of 
semiotics into roughly two periods, one o f which helps semioticians to refer 
their history back until Antiquity, and the other one considering the end of the 
19th century' as the ‘true semiotics in the meaning understood in contemporary 
context’. This understanding, as we know, has also dissimilar points of depar­
ture: some claim contemporary semiotics to have begun with the works of F. de 
Saussure, others associate it with creation by C. S. Peirce. A silent background 
knowledge o f both trends, however, acknowledges the fact that neither of the 
individuals can be associated with conscious positive propaganda for the birth 
of contemporary semiotics, for one of them was articulated practically only via 
his students, and the other one, in connection with quite specific biographical- 
historical circumstances, could not express his views unless pleasing the goal 
keepers o f the time.
Thus at the first glance we could differentiate between two births of semi­
otics: one at its historical literary beginning in ancient Hellas, and the other 
one as having taken place in the end o f the 19th or in the beginning of the 20lh 
century. Hereby it is maybe even not that relevant what was the respective 
argument for the grounds o f such a discipline —  whether the similarity of 
different sign systems (Saussure) or the overall logic o f human behavior 
(Peirce). Hurrying on ahead —  the general development, or more correctly 
introduction o f  the conceptions, o f ‘semiotics proper’ has comparative aspects 
for semiotic discourse in the Finno-Ugric cultures, and on the other hand it is 
possible to outline connections o f the Finno-Ugric people(s) with the devel­
opment o f semiotics as a discipline (e.g. merits o f the Hungarian T.A. Sebeok 
and others for the expansion o f Peircian semiotics, and cultural semiotics as a 
branch o f Saussure’s semiology). However, if  we want to give a short sketch 
on Finno-Ugric semiotics, the topics should include at least the following: 
Finno-Ugric background o f native semiotic terms; semantic development and 
recent status o f terms denoting the ‘scientific study o f signs’ in the Finno- 
Ugric perspective; native-cultural semiotic discourse; recent ‘schools’,
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‘trends’ and ‘circles’ in Finno-Ugric semiotics and their research history; and 
finally o f course also future tasks and perspectives.
If we leave for a moment the metalevel o f description, we immediately 
recognize that at the same time the above mentioned two major contemporary 
semiotic theories were molded, there were shaped also those semiotic con­
cepts that were quite directly connected with the general movement o f forma­
tion o f nation states in Europe; and the latter were most definitely semiotic. It 
does not even seem important whether the national movements leading finally 
to contemporary order o f Europe (and that much o f the world in general) were 
national in the today’s recognized meaning, but they definitely took many 
semiotic structures as those through which to differentiate between dissimilar 
cultures. Suchlike semiotic structures often included language, way o f life, 
behavioral patterns, image-schemas, and the similar —  and it is noteworthy 
that this has been alike also on the metalevel (e.g. C. Kluckhohn’s outstand­
ing treatment [that was actually roughly simultaneous with trials o f defining 
culture by O. Loorits, an Estonian cultural philosopher, to be taken up be­
low]). During the radical development o f the foundations o f contemporary 
semiotics as a discipline, the general cultural development o f several nations 
was essentially reflective and semiotic as well.
Traces of the semiotic vocabulary and 
the Hungarian as the oldest
Let us first consider the Finno-Ugric background o f the respective native se­
miotic terms. Hungarian jel/jegy, the basic term in semiotics, occurs in his­
torical manuscripts from 1416/1224 on. Its meaning is ‘sign’, and medieval 
sources contain verbs or derivatives from it (together with scholarly refer­
ences). In a Dominican codex, Sermones Dominicales (1456-1470), a Latin 
glossa explicitly says: “Et hoc vobis i.e. signatum vel pro signo Jel signum”, 
where the correct and erudite Latin terms deserve the most attention. It is well 
known a fact that in Magyar Encyclopaedia... by Jänos Apäczai Csere (1653) 
we could trace a highly developed classification and terminology o f signs in 
Hungarian. The most striking feature is that the words used in Hungarian for 
semiosis are not from the common European (Graeco-Latin) vocabulary, but 
refer to an older strata in the language. Hungarian (TESZ II: 270) and Finno-Ugric 
etymological dictionaries (UEW I: 2, 91) agree that the Hungarian je l/jegy  can be 
derived from the Finno-Ugric jälke  (footprint), belonging thus to the vocabu­
lary of the ancient culture o f hunters (see Voigt 1990).
In the major Finno-Ugric languages we do not find such old words, used 
today as semiotic terms: the Finnish merkki or the Estonian märk (and mär­
gisüsteem further on) are recently coined forms with non-Finno-Ugric back­
ground. In other Finno-Ugric languages the similar terms are quite new too. A 
similar situation can be observed also at the semantic development and recent 
status of terms denoting the ‘scientific study o f signs’ in the Finno-Ugric per-
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spective. Following the development and terminology o f international semi­
otics, the Estonian semiootika has been invented recently, as a term from the 
1960s, originated from the Russian terminology o f the same time. Somewhat 
later the Finnish semiotiikka appeared, following the main international semi­
otic trends and terms. This term is from the Anglo-German-Russian tradition 
(not from the French one), and, despite the very close contacts o f Finnish 
semioticians with the French schools, does not represent (with some excep­
tions) semiologie. Slightly earlier the Hungarian szemiotika was used as a 
scholarly term. It came directly from Russian (better to say from the early 
works o f the Moscow-Tartu School), but within an international frame of 
reference, and with some regard to older usage. The Hungarian equivalent 
(jeltudomany) is understandable, but it does not exist in everyday use. The 
Hungarian term finally belongs to the American (Peircian) tradition, but with 
Russian intermediary reasoning.
In other Finno-Ugric languages we could not find such a special term for 
semiotics or for the study o f signs in general usage that would not be a direct 
translation from Russian.
One could repeat the fact that in the Finno-Ugric languages thus terms to 
designate ‘the science o f signs’ are related to semiotic(s), rather than semiolo­
gie (which is o f course curious, if taking into account the specific scientific 
developments both on the paradigmatic scale and the connections on personal 
level between the scholars). It is an important task to describe the semantic 
development o f the terms for ‘semiotics’ in all Finno-Ugric languages with a 
special emphasis on their origin and differences. Unfortunately, there have 
not been such summarizing attempts; so this is definitely an important task for 
the future.
As for contemporary humanitarian studies, then in Hungary only some 
years later than the Tartu-Moscow School was established in Estonia, by 
about 1968, structural studies in linguistics and literature, search for models 
in folklore, mass communication or cultural phenomena were grouped to­
gether into a special circle which was then marked by terminology o f semiot­
ics. Informal (but not persecuted) groups, projects, conferences and publica­
tions grouped on similarly. Since then semiotics in Hungary has been alive, 
and has gained a positive international response (see Voigt 1977). On the 
other hand there is no ‘Hungarian School’ o f semiotics; however there have 
been established stabile connections with Hungarian semioticians who have 
been working in Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, United States, 
France, Italy, etc.
While the present article can treat the development o f semiotics in Esto­
nia, Finland and Hungary, it can not be as successful when trying to describe 
other Finno-Ugric cultures in which we do not know of any particular semi­
otic school or trend —  at least by now and according to our information. 
However, in Debrecen (1 9 9 0 ) and Jyväskylä (1 9 9 5 ) international Finno-Ugric 
congresses Komi ethnographers and mythologists declined to semiotics. As 
N . Konakov has written at the 1992 Imatra International Summer Institute
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meeting, Komi (Zyrian) semiotics considers the works by A. Sidorov (from 
1924 on), L. Gribova (from 1968 on), V. Semenov, N. Chesnokova and D. 
Nesanelis as its predecessors. In September 1991, the third all-republican 
meeting (“Death as a Phenomenon of Culture —  Komi Seminar o f  Culture”) 
was held in Syktyvkar. At the 11th Annual Meeting o f the Semiotic Society o f  
Finland (Imatra, July 13-19, 1992) a session “Semiotics o f Nature and Cul­
ture of the Komi (Zyrians)” was organized by J. Seppänen and N. Konakov. 
In the frame o f that event Konakov declared their connection with the Tartu 
School. However, in the papers presented, the terminology o f  semiotics oc­
curs very rarely, not giving thus the possibility for the reviewers to make the 
relevant Finno-Ugric comments (among the few articles by the Finno-Ugric 
authors representing semiotic viewpoint and simultaneously nations incorpo­
rated to the Russian, formerly the Soviet, cultural space, see Konakov 1993; 
Limerov 1993; Uljashov 1993; Shaparov 1993).
At least today it remains a secret, whether in the lost manuscript by G. 
Kuzebaj (1898-1937) from 1922-1925 on the Udmurt ornaments we could 
have found another (Udmurt) forerunner o f Finno-Ugric ethnosemiotics.
Finno-Ugric semiotics and 
its influence on the semiotic paradigm
What about the Finno-Ugrians as a group o f little nations to have their influ­
ence on the development o f global semiotics? A simple and common sense 
answer would be: peripheral. However, this is also the key to analyzing any 
development of scientific paradigms in Kuhn’s sense. In the development o f  
semiotics, several Finno-Ugrians (as we first are to talk restrictedly about 
individuals in the philosophical terms o f  scholarly development) have been in 
the role of influencing the alternation o f the paradigm as defined by the es­
sence of the nucleus of the paradigm. The Hungarian T. A. Sebeok has un­
doubtedly served semiotics in its expansion to the object areas considered as 
nonexistent or peripheral in the mainstream o f semiotics (see Sebeok’s output 
1942-1995; Deely 1995). The open contemporary (having o f  course the fun­
damental works by J. v. Uexkiill from the beg. o f  the turn o f the century in 
mind) inclusion of biological (and, in fact, biospheric in Vemadski’s sense) 
phenomena into the scope o f semiotics has demanded also review o f  the gen­
eral metalanguage and terminological foundations o f the nuclear elements of 
the paradigm as a whole. This development seems to be a classic example o f  
the evolution of a scholarly discipline.
In connection with the biological aspects to be dealt by semiotics, but 
besides such an overall influential cooperation to semiotics, there can be 
brought forward also other kinds o f examples concerning the dynamism be­
tween the center and the periphery o f objects in a scientific paradigm. For 
example, it is a general truth that several peripheral phenomena including the 
savage from the cultural point o f view (e.g. madmen, heathens) were not
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switched into scientific analysis o f human culture (see e.g. C. Kluckhohn’s 
view on ‘culture as a theory’; Kluckhohn 1961: 25). So, while it is true that 
the development o f psychology and psychiatry in a way helped also to widen 
the perspective o f other disciplines studying man and his environment, there 
can probably be observed an even more coherent progress allied with the field 
of psychosemiotics. In this area it is expedient to mention Estonian scholars J. 
Valsiner and J. Allik whose well-known contribution is situated at the foun­
dation stones o f the field, especially when laying stress on the semiotic ingre­
dient o f it (Valsiner and Allik 1982). There are certainly other areas that do 
not belong directly to the mainstream o f the semiotic discussion, but probably 
the Finno-Ugric presence can be noticed in several areas due to the specific 
contemporary history o f these peoples. O f course, when talking about the 
general development o f semiotics in terms o f  speaking o f a discipline’s de­
velopment as an interaction between the central and peripheral elements, one 
can not escape both earlier contributions o f the Finn E. Tarasti to musical 
semiotics from the 1970s onwards (in English see e.g. Tarasti 1979 and 1994) 
and his initiative excursions into philosophical, i.e. ‘existential’ semiotics 
(Tarasti, forthcoming).
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Semiotics and a Finno-Ugric culture: Finland
Contemporary Finnish semiotics was in its nation-wide scale apparently born 
through the foundation o f the Finnish Semiotic Society (1979). The first 
group o f Finnish semioticians came from late French structuralism, but it was 
also in contact with the Tartu school. Its membership and the scope of inter­
ests grew fast, and by now Finnish semiotics is probably the best-organized 
nation-wide trend in Europe. The unusually dynamic growth o f semiotics 
during recent twenty years in Finland (that can be followed through the jour­
nal of the Finnish Semiotic Society, Synteesi, from 1982 on) lead to the foun­
dation o f the International Semiotics Institute at Imatra, Eastern Finland, in 
1988 —  now one o f the world's leading center in the field. During the recent 
years ISI has organized international summer schools o f semiotics, and its 
contacts with Estonian, Hungarian Soviet/Russian, Nordic, American, French 
and other schools and individual semioticians are extensive. Semiotics in 
Finland is many faceted: semiotics o f  music, literature and theatre, film and 
art, semiotics o f culture and personality. Symposia very often deal with the 
characteristics o f Finnish people and culture. It is interesting to observe that, 
although they follow very contemporary themes and models (marketing, in­
formation theory, politics, gastronomy), for some traditional domains (as 
e.g. linguistics), there is a gap between them: traditional scholars in Finland 
do not use the vocabulary and ideas o f semiotics (see also Voigt 1995).
1 he quick evolution o f semiotics in Finland can be explained only on the 
basis o f its Finno-Ugric roots —  the semiotic approach in general has its firm 
basis in the Finno-Ugric mentality, first revealed by the fact that the main
hero of Kalevala, Väinämöinen, was a sorcerer who by his wisdom and 
magic, and not by force, ruled over the world. The Finns have an inclination 
towards meditation and philosophical questioning (not to mention such later 
caricaturesque figures in the Finnish literature like Veikko Huovinen's “Ha- 
vukka-ahon ajattelija”; see Huovinen 1952). On the other hand, semiotics in 
Finland was launched by the brothers Kaarle and Julius Krohn in the late 
nineteenth century, and completed in musical research by Ilmari Krohn, first 
professor of musicology at the Helsinki University. Their ideas for classifying 
the folklore, folktales, folk tunes were later adopted by the Russian formalists 
like V. Propp, and in music by B. Bartok and Z. Kodaly. When Propp was 
found among the French and American structuralists in the 1960s, the new 
discipline within semiotics, narratology, began. So there is a direct line lead­
ing from the Krohns to the entire rich area o f narrative studies at the moment.
Moreover, the ties with Baltic semiotic traditions were important in the 
history of Finnish semiotics. If the first ‘semiotician’ in Finland was Henry 
Parland (1908-1929), a Finnish-Swedish poet, who wrote cultural essays as a 
kind of ‘Barthes before Barthes’, then his uncle Wilhelm Seseman (1884— 
1963), who was a half-Finn, has been considered the greatest philosopher in 
Lithuania whom even A. J. Greimas knew before his emigration.
These traditions were found when the Finnish semiotics, during its rapid 
rise in the 1980s, searched for a 'noble origin' and history o f its own. But still 
a great part o f semiotic research in Finland focuses on the Finnish or ‘Finno- 
Ugric’ specificity albeit most semiotics exercised by the Finns attempts to be 
as universal as the science always should be.
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Semiotics and a Finno-Ugric culture: Estonia
While it is clear that the role o f the Hungarian and Finnish semioticians in 
determining the development o f contemporary semiotics is hardly question­
able, this can not be said of Estonian scholars. Beginning from J. von Uexküll 
up to the influential figures o f cultural semiotics until very recently, one can 
only admit the role o f Estonian cultural space as having favored the develop­
ment of semiotic argumentation. O f course there can be listed several names 
whose output can be regarded as semiotic, but at a closer look we find their 
terminology loose and, probably in connection with the influence o f German 
philosophical influence, ignorant o f their contemporary semiotic treatments 
characterizable as already semiotics proper. A vague borderline between the 
use of culturological and culturo-philosophical general bias o f expressing 
views on cultural developments, and modern attitude marked by more coher­
ent and already at least presemiotic argumentation style can be associated 
with the (largely unknown both for Estonian and international audience) 
works of Uku Masing (1909-1985) that are extensively being printed only 
nowadays (e.g. Masing 1993, 1995). Thus it seems that, when trying to out­
line the merits o f Estonia in the new complex o f studies in Finno-Ugric semi­
otics and if wanting to delineate the semiotic features, structures and devel­
opments o f this particular cultural area, there are exactly the wider linguistic, 
cultural and national aspects to be analyzed.
When speaking o f the field o f Finno-Ugric semiotics, it seems necessary 
to differentiate between two paradigmatic aspects: on the one hand we can 
speak o f the metalevel and ‘semiotics proper’ in the disciplinary sense of the 
expression. On the other hand we should probably consider also semiotic 
development and the development o f semiotic conceptions and viewpoint at 
the sociocultural scale o f Finno-Ugrians in the sense semiotic interpretations 
are used in everyday cultural discourse. Such cultural discourse includes dif­
ferent topics beginning from issues pertaining to cultural and national identity 
to e.g. public criticism o f cultural life (discussions on exhibitions, presenta­
tion o f a given culture and socium internationally, etc.). It has often been ar­
gued that such topics belonging to the core o f cultural identity are not dis­
cussed among the relevant society and that the cultural practices in which 
these core items manifest themselves, are largely automatic. However, it 
would probably be useful to differentiate between dissimilar techniques of 
building and using the so-to-speak habitual doxic universe (see Bourdieu’s 
treatment o f the theme; Bourdieu 1992), and also between different items 
belonging to it. In more isolated and in the so-called primitive cultures the 
non-questioned status o f the cultural nucleus concerns both the cultural units 
it comprises, and also norms regulating the usage o f these units. In other cul­
tures that are subjected to more intense international and intercultural com­
munication, it seems to be inevitable that the communicative habits and cul­
tural life style is systematically brought to conscious reflective practice in 
order to maintain a stable position in intercultural interaction. Therefore it 
seems that a considerable amount o f cultural units belonging to the nuclear 
elements o f the sociocultural reality are to be switched into active semiotic 
use to keep the national and cultural identity discourse integral.
Due to the specific geopolitical location o f Estonia there has always been 
a strong need for the above described intracultural dialogue to facilitate pres­
ervation o f cultural self-awareness. Estonian military and political history 
have urged cultural self-determination as related to the others also in terms of 
what has been considered as forming the core o f cultural identity. Therefore 
there have been brought to discussion the elements and semiotic systems re­
garded as culturally the basic ones on the one hand, and semiotic techniques 
applied to the usage o f  them on the other hand. The overall Estonian public 
semiotic activity reached its first contemporary peak in the middle of the 19lh 
century during the first period called National Awakening. Probably greatly 
due to the suppression o f the Estonian language by different foreign powers 
that had been ruling the Estonian area, a major attention has been paid to lan­
guage from that stage o f cultural identity discourse onward. The role of lan­
guage as a means o f mediating this discourse and further publication of the 
latter was recognized immediately, and so the status o f  language and written 
documents started to gain special attention and authority. It was Carl Robert
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Jakobson (1841-1882), one o f the few decisive figures in the process of 
forming the shared consciousness o f individuals living in the territory o f the 
present Estonia, who articulated the central position taken by language in the 
national and cultural identity. In his Three Speeches on/for Fatherland (1868- 
1870) Jakobson expressed quite a characteristic view on language as “the 
foremost thing, however, from which a nation’s degree o f mental education 
can be recognized” (Jakobson 1991: 21). Thus language is attributed a kind of 
metacultural role —  “Language is the vehicle o f a nation’s education, and 
thus it is what gives birth to its [the nation’s] fine order and freedom, it is the 
most precious heritage o f a nation” (ibid.). In a way then we can see that lan­
guage and a culture, and a culture as semiotically definable as a signifying 
order (the term used by M. Danesi and P. Perron; Danesi 1998, Danesi and 
Perron 1999) are indeed related to the study o f  cultural spaces as related to the 
original concept o f culture area as developed by P. Vidal de La Blache and
H. Mackinder (see e.g. Vidal de La Blache 1926). Cultural traits by which 
cultural areas can be determined anthropologically are a type o f manifestation 
of the signifying order, which is largely configured by natural language (fol­
lowing this logic, see Randviir, forthcoming). Thus one could see evidence o f  
organizing semiotics on the metalevel also as a study o f different signifying 
orders that can be classified on the basis o f language groups, and it will 
probably imply more coherent studies than those arranged according to the 
specific individual categories o f objects o f research.
Having mentioned Jakobson as one o f the most important public figures 
for the formation o f the Estonian nation, we simultaneously witness the be­
ginning o f a tendency to determine the essence o f the Estonian as distinguish­
able from the others through opposition. There have been diverse bases for 
building the relevant system of opposition(s), e.g. according to the national 
principle (the Estonian vs. the Russian or the German), religious aspects (Es­
tonians as religious people vs. Estonians a pragmatic profane people; Estoni­
ans as having their own pagan belief vs. Estonians as Christians, etc.). It is 
perhaps typical that national and cultural self-definition as based on opposi­
tional character gains actuality during such decisive periods or in such cul­
tural situations that involve more factors directly influencing cultural behav­
ior. Stagnation in cultural identity discourse can be noticed during especially 
calm political environment, be such tranquility due to independent well being 
of a nation (in case o f Estonia during the approximate period between 1920s- 
1930s), or due to forced political situations (e.g. the Soviet period o f Estonia). 
Similarly it seems to be characteristic that reflections on cultural identity have 
been active in the Diaspora o f Estonian culture. Hereby it is convenient to 
refer to Oskar Loorits, a cultural philosopher in matters pertaining to outlining 
what constitutes the Estonian culturally and psychologically. He is a suitable 
representative o f the Diaspora in Sweden where there actualized several cul­
tural oppositions needed to be solved (Estonia vs. Estonian SSR, Estonia vs. 
USSR, Estonia vs. Russia, Estonia vs. Sweden, etc.). It seems quite charac­
teristic that due such oppositional plentitude that lead to a demagogical
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deadlock, Loorits finally reduced the binaries to the contrast between the 
great nations and the small ones, comparing the history o f the former to a 
“motion picture with exciting scenes, shocking conflicts and surprising trick- 
solutions” (Loorits 1951: 14). Estonian history, on the other hand, is “a 
monumental mosaic picture compiled o f bits and pieces collectively by all 
generations that is enlivened and spiritualized by the harmonious synthesis o f  
man and nature up to cognition o f the divine not only in oneself, but every­
where” (ibid.). Loorits thus makes a distinction between the great and the 
smaller nations on the basis o f different degrees o f cultural reflective (rather 
than actual) activity, stating that peoples small in number are to stabilize their 
culturo-historical development by continuous conceptual return to the past, 
because the “essence o f a nation lies in its past” (Loorits 1951: 10). Such re­
flective practice helps to minimize and soothe potential oppositional situa­
tions inside the given culture; homogenization o f history through its transfer 
into a coherent cultural tradition involves swap o f stress from individuals and 
their merits to the nation as an integral agent in the historical process. A 
similar look has been taken by U. Masing who, discussing about the mentality 
o f the Estonians, conjoins the linguistic and grammatical (e.g. absence o f the 
future tense and gender), geographical (as concerning the landscape) and gen­
eral spiritual features o f Estonians under a vague common denominator of the 
“unicellular amoeba” that is growing in all directions in its integral develop­
ment (from the article On Estonian Spirit included in Masing 1993: 163).
While distinctive oppositions have been characteristically set on the basis 
o f ‘big vs. small’, there have also been made trials to switch the Estonian 
culture into a wider multicultural oicoumene, probably in order to inscribe a 
more confident position o f the nation in intercultural communication. These 
attempts have usually been made on either linguistic or geographical basis, 
connecting the latter with the cultural dimension. Attempts to define cultures 
in spatial, linguistic and other terms have been made in both intracultural 
dialogue on identity, and also on the metalevel. It is possible to differentiate 
between two major trends in suchlike association o f the Estonian cultural 
space with a wider context: on the one hand there is the linguistic approach, 
and on the other hand we can find the geographic one. Needless to repeat that 
neither o f them appeals to linguistic or geographic features only, but rather 
treat the subject in the terms o f cultural areas. The linguistic division has the 
expression ‘Finno-Ugric’ as the common denominator, while the geographic 
bias has used the term ‘Balto-Skandia’. The Finno-Ugric trend can well be 
illustrated by the works o f the already mentioned cultural philosopher O. 
Loorits who’s approach can, in turn, be viewed as following the ideas o f clas­
sical cultural anthropology in its manner o f  explaining the substantial nature 
of cultures and cultural individuality (see e.g. C. Kluckhohn’s classical treat­
ment; Kluckhohn 1961: 20-40). Loorits describes the common past o f the 
Finno-Ugric peoples as having its origins in the ‘Uralian culturehood’ that, as 
an integral whole o f life-style and behavioral patterns, together with environ­
mental features, was imprinted into the collective mind o f all the Finno-Ugric
peoples. The gradually more and more local settlement induced the kinship 
consciousness that was essentially molded by natural conditions dominated 
by the forest (Loorits 1951: 35). Such mentality shaped by the woodland 
seems to be another macrosignified manifesting itself in other Finno-Ugric 
cultures as well (see e.g. Tarasti 1999). Hereby we will not go into deeper 
analysis o f the semiotic features based on the Uralian common cultures that, 
according to Loorits, must be considered as essential also nowadays during 
the process o f both primary and secondary socialization (see Loorits 1953); 
this is —  as at leat a reflective task —  for the future.
The other general view on the relationships between the Finno-Ugric cul­
tures and their kinship with other Scandinavian and Baltic cultures is perhaps 
best represented by the works o f the Estonian geographer E. Kant. His views 
on the Finno-Ugric unity (from the Estonian viewpoint) represent schemes o f  
geographic proximity between (only few) Finno-Ugric peoples. In Kant’s 
view Estonia belongs environmentally and thus also culturally to the geo­
graphic and cultural area of Balto-Skandia (cf. W. Ramsay’s Fenno-Skandia). 
It is in a way interesting that Kant’s understanding o f territorial structures was 
functional (which, in fact, was common to his era) —  one o f the main factors 
in the case o f his description o f the unity o f the Balto-Skandic space being 
religious homogeneity in the face o f Christianity (cf. Loorits and many other 
thinkers who have religiously conjoined the Finno-Ugric peoples with having 
their own unique religion connected with their specific life-style). Since the 
anthropo-ecological view on such territorial and cultural unified semiotic 
space like Balto-Skandia, as widely treated by E. Kant (see e.g. Kant 1934, 
1935), has recently been given a historical and theoretical overview (Buttimer 
1994), the matter needs no further discussion in detail in the current context.
Whereas the above hopefully endorsed o f contributions o f certain Finno- 
Ugrians to the general advance o f semiotics, this is obviously just a minor 
aspect the Finno-Ugrian semiotics should concentrate on. Especially the posi­
tion of Estonian cultural space seems to point at that it is not only the indi­
viduals are to be included into suchlike semiotic research, but rather the re­
spective culturo-national factors favoring (or not) semiotic development.
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Filling up Finno-Ugric semiotic studies in the future
International cooperation among Finno-Ugric semioticians is not a new phe­
nomenon. They have known of each other, and since very many years Finnish 
and Hungarian semioticians, Finnish and Estonian semioticians regularly 
meet by combining these meetings. In May 1997 there was the 19th Finnish- 
Hungarian semiotic symposium in Budapest, and between November 26-28  
in 1998 the 20lh symposium in Berlin. There exist a few reports also about the 
previous meetings (see Broms 1995, 1997). Following this line in a more 
extensive scale, a primary task for the Finno-Ugric Semiotics Association is 
first of all facilitation of information exchange that perhaps can be coordi-
nated by the ISI, together with the new association, in Imatra. Through sym­
posia and publications the Finno-Ugric semiotics is to reach to a “handbook” 
o f itself (whether in a concrete written form or not) in order to bring the 
theme clearly also to wider international semiotic dialogue, since general 
international semiotics has been relatively unaware o f it. Until now Finnish, 
Hungarian and Estonian (the latter as having been included to ‘semiotics in 
the USSR’) semiotics have been represented in one o f the best handbooks o f  
the recent history o f semiotics (Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1986), but as 
these chapters were written more than a decade ago, a new (or at least up­
dated) version, with regards to as many Finno-Ugric peoples as possible, 
should be composed.
From the 1960s to the 1990s there was the “new golden age” o f semiotics 
in Europe, America and elsewhere. Today semiotic institutions have gained 
certain stability, even though most o f  the pioneer semioticians have passed 
away. Now we witness the “silver age” o f international semiotics, as new 
centers or schools appear (other ones, e.g. from France, disappeared). The 
Tartu-Moscow school in its original form does not exist any more. Hungarian 
semiotics remained as loose a formation as it was ever. Finnish semiotics has 
become one o f the leading groups in the whole world. The growing trend of 
the Finnish tradition (it is hereby noteworthy that the rapid evolution o f it 
came along with the formation o f an institutional structure, as mentioned 
above), and also the re-organized practice in Estonia, point, in fact, at another 
possible development. While the mentioned “golden age o f semiotics” was, 
all in all, still determined by individual works and scholars, the contemporary 
stage o f semiotic studies clearly has integration as a common denominator. 
This integration concerns several semiotic (sub)paradigms, viewpoints, ob­
jects o f study, scientific communities and individuals. Cooperative projects 
(e.g. those initiated in Finland) imply studying native or local cultural objects 
and themes internationally, just as well as inspection o f cultural phenomena 
involves application o f diverse semiotic tool-kits that were not considered as 
unitable even recently. Therefore, hoping that Finno-Ugric semiotics will add 
qualitatively new perspectives to the study o f national cultures in their inter­
twined nature, one could also look forward to its contribution to bringing 
clarity to the overall integrated net o f semiotic objects and metalanguages in 
general.
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